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Part A 
Macroeconomic developments 
and outlook 

A.1. Economic situation and prospects for Europe in 1987 
Economic recovery in the Community is continuing. This is due in large part to the transfer 
of income follmring the considerable fall in import prices. The decline in price increases and 
interest rates are imprm•ing medium-term groll'th prospects. First successes have also been 
achieved in reducing the high level of 1111employme11t i11 the Community, but these fall 
considerably short of what can and must be achieved. The attainment of the employment 
target i11 the Commission's 'Cooperative groll'th strategy for more employment' ll'ill therefore 
require further efforts. 
A.1.1. The 1986 adjustment to fundamental 
changes in the economic environment 
Since the middle of last year the Community's economic 
environment has changed considerably: 
(i) The price of crude oil has fallen even more sharply than 
had been assumed in almost all forecasts at the end of 
last year and at the beginning of 1986. The extent and 
speed of the fall can be seen in the price on the Rotter-
dam spot market: from November 1985 to the end of 
June it fell from USD 29, I per barrel to USD 12 per 
barrel, and in July crude oil was even quoted below the 
ten-dollar mark. Short term shifts in supply and demand 
have particularly noticeable effects on the spot market. 
But the average import price of oil is the important 
variable for the economic situation in the Community. 
The present forecasts of Commission departments as-
sume that in 1986 imported oil will average USD 16 
per barrel compared with USD 27,5 per barrel in 1985. 
For 1987, when the decline will probably have fully 
passed into long-term supply contracts, an import price 
of USD 15 per barrel is assumed. Because of the simul-
taneous appreciation of the ECU against the dollar, the 
average import price of crude oil in ECUs should fall 
by 53 % between 1985 and 1986, equivalent in real 
terms to a I O % decline compared with 1978, i.e. before 
the second oil shock. This would directly cut the 
Community's oil import bill by some 40 OOO million 
ECC - 1,5 % of Community GDP. Added to this 
there are further savings from the parallel decline in the 
costs of natural gas imports. Since far less has to be 
exported for every import unit, the result is a one-off 
transfer of income back to the Community. The use 
of this additional income will fundamentally influence 
economic developments both this year and next. Be-
cause the oil bill has been almost halved, supply-side 
effects will also extend beyond 1986 and 1987, since 
favourable production and employment prospects have 
improved in the medium-term. The lower oil price is 
making it profitable to bring older. obsolete plant back 
into service; this increases the economy's effective pro-
ductive potential. There is a resultant increase in the 
rate of return on plant in operation and due to cost 
reductions also on expected rates of planned investment 
projects. Consequently the preconditions for closing the 
investment gap in Europe in the next few years have 
improved. 
(ii) Between May 1985 and May 1986 the ECU appreci-
ated by around 30 % against the dollar and lost some 
5 % against the Japanese yen. In this Review it is 
assumed that the dollar's average exchange rate will 
remain at around its present level until the end of 1987. 
In 1986 the Community's weighted average exchange 
rate vis-a-vis its major trading partners appreciated by 
9 % over the previous year. 
The change in the exchange rate and falling oil prices 
are on the whole having adverse effects on Community's 
exports : the lower oil price severely restricts the scope 
for imports of the Community's traditionally important 
customers (the OPEC countries, Comecon). Because of 
keener price competition and the regional structure 
of the Community's export markets, the Commission 
expects the Community's 1986 merchandise exports to 
grow by only 2,9 % in real terms, which is roughly half 
the 1985 figure (5. 7 % ). Even though real exports are 
growing more slowly, the Community's current account 
will go on improving in 1986; measured as a percentage 
of gross domestic product, the Community's nominal 
balance on current account will climb from 0.4 % in 
1985 to a probable I, I % in 1986 and will start declining 
(to 0,9 % ) only in 1987. In 1986 the Community is 
enjoying a marked improvement in the terms of trade. 
In real terms, however. the foreigntrade surplus will 
decline considerably (by almost I % of GNP). As a 
result, the Community will make a significant contri-
bution to the process of adjustment of world payments 
balances; the Community is using much of the oil-
induced transfer of income to import more and is thus 
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helping to eliminate the external payments imbalances 
of the United States, the OPEC countries and the devel-
oping countries in the medium term. 
(iii) The inf1ationary expectations of both companies and 
consumers have fallen markedly (see Graph A. I. I). 
Because of its unexpected speed and intensity, this 
favourable development in itself has given rise to fears 
in some quarters that it might end in def1ation. It is 
argued that because prices are expected to fall further, 
both companies and consumers are already displaying 
caution with regard to purchases, and this attitude 
could become self-reinforcing. But such fears seem to 
be unfounded. In fact, unlike a typical def1ationary 
situation, prices are not falling on a broad front in 
the Community: the falls are essentially confined to 
imported raw materials and primary materials , es-
pecially oil and gas. The price trend of the gross dom-
estic product is still pointing upwards throughout the 
Community, even in member countries such as the 
Federal Republic of Germany, where there has been an 
absolute fall in the consumer price index in the las t few 
months. Since part of the terms of trade gain remains 
with enterprises, their profit situation will also tend to 
go on improving in the next few months , and this would 
also be quite untypical of a period of def1ation. If - as 
the Commission forecasts assume - the price of oil 
and the value of the dollar do not fall further in the 
forecasting period, the additional price-curbing effect 
of these external factors will soon di sa ppear. 
Because of the unexpectedly sharp fall in the dollar and 
the price of oil, inf1ationary ex pectations ha ve come 
down far more quickly than had originally been con-
sidered realistic. Inf1ation expectations must now be 
stabilized at their present low level, if not reduced even 
further - as is necessary in quite a few countries. The 
more quickly financial investors are convinced that the 
fall in inf1ation rates is not temporary, but lasting. the 
sooner real interest rates on the capital markets will 
fall. 
(iv) In the United States. economic policy has changed 
course. Public expenditure has been ti ghtened . while 
monetary policy has been relaxed. The change of course 
towards a ti ghter budgetary policy is documented in the 
passing of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. which 
envisages the complete disappearance of the United 
States Federal deficit by 1991. Even if thi s Act has been 
found in part unconstitutional by the Supreme Co urt. 
the mere fact that Congress and the President ha ve 
thrown their weight behind it emphasizes the fundamen-
tal change in attitudes to the budget problem in the 
United States. However necessary. the planned re-
duction of the Uni ted States budget deficit will un-
doubtedly ha ve the effect of putting a brake on econ-
14 
GRAPH A . I. I : Price expectations of consumers and indus-
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Source : Eurostat, Community business and consumer scrvcys. 
omic ac ti vity bo th in the United Sta tes and the rest o f 
the world . For this reaso n it is necessa ry tha t th is 
interna l imbalance in the United Sta tes is to be elimin-
a ted in stages over a fa irly lo ng period , thus dimini shing 
the da nger of a severe recession in the United Sta tes, 
with co rresponding adverse effects on wo rld economic 
act ivity. 
A.1.2. A pause in output growth at the beginning 
of 1986 
The net effect of the last 12 months' changes in the economic 
environment will in the end be favo urable fo r the Com-
munity, even tho ugh the effects on economic developments 
in the member countries were adve rse a t the beginning o f 
the adjustment process . In the first qua rter o f 1986. the 
evolution of gross domes tic product. employment and indus-
tri a l producti on was di sappointing in some member 
countries. But this is deemed to be only tempo rary a nd -
apart fro m the exceptio na ll y bad wea ther. which mainly hit 
the build ing industry - was ca used by the fo llowing fac to rs: 
(i) T he strikingly la rge build-up of stocks in the las t qua rter 
of 1985 o bviously ca used dema nd to fa ll in the first 
quarter of l 986. 
(i i) The partly unexpected increase in rea l di sposable in -
come was a t first used mainly to build up priva te sa -
vings. 
(iii ) Expo rt customers a ffected by the loss o f o il revenues 
cut down o n their orders and purchases more quickl y 
tha n expected. 
Despite the slow growth in the first few months o f the yea r, 
the Commission fo recas ts fo r l 986 will probably not have 
to be adjusted significantly downwa rds : thi s seems justifi ed 
among other fac ts by the evalua ti o n o f the consumer clima te 
indica tors, which the Commission reco rds in regular surveys 
in nine member countries . They indica te a clear improve-
ment; intenti ons of purchasing consumer durables are today 
on a fa r more definite upwa rd trend th a n a yea r ago . The 
Commission's composite leading indica to r, which includes, 
in addi tion to measures o f the consumer climate, an assess-
ment of the situa tion in industry, the building trade a nd 
fin a ncia l markets, improved againrecentl y. The o utloo k for 
a strengthening in the upturn bolste red ma inly by priva te 
consumption a nd - to a lesser ex tent - by investment 
demand , is therefore still pla usible. By promptl y implement-
ing their investment pla ns, compa nies can help to conve rt 
their income gains rapidl y into demand and into additi ona l 
jobs. As the results of the April l 986 investment survey show, 
industria l companies in nea rly a ll the member co untri es 
have adjusted their investment plans fo r l 986 upwa rds as 
Economic situa ti on a nd perspecti ves for Europe 
compared wit h the a utumn 1985 survey. The switch fro m 
a n economic cycle which has hithert o been heavil y reli a nt 
on exports to predomina ntly domes tic demand growth th ere-
fo re seems to be succeedi ng in the Community, even th o ugh 
the pace of growth still leaves a lo t to be desired . 
A.1.3. Forecasts for 1986 and 1987 
On the who le. therefore, the pictu re presented by the Com-
muni ty economy is a n encouraging one. a ltho ugh it is se ri -
ously clouded by the centra l pro blem o f continuing hi gh 
unemployment. According to the Commissio n's la test fo re-
casts fo r 1986 a nd l 987 (see Table A. I. I): 
(i) The growth p rocess in the Communit y will continue: 
the increase in rea l Community G DP, which was 2,3 % 
in 1985. sho ul d reach aro und 2 3/4 % in bo th 1986 a nd 
1987. In 1987. the upturn in the Community will thus 
be entering its fi fth yea r. but its growth pa th is still too 
Oa t to bring a bo ut a significant a nd las ting reducti o n 
in unemployment between now a nd the end o f the 
decade. T he last Annua l Economic Report considered 
GDP growth rates of between 3 % a nd 3,5 % as necess-
ary in order to achieve thi s. Graph A. 1.2 shows the 
GRAPH A.1.2 : A comparison of cyclical upswings - The 
first 48 months of the cyclical upswing from 
end 197S to end 1979 and in the present 
upswing which set in at the beginning of 1983 
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lack of vigour so far in the present upswing in the 
Community : at the end of 1986, i.e. after the fourth 
year of upswing.gross domestic product will be around 
9 % above the cyclical trough, compared with 15 % at 
the same point in the last upswing (end-1975 to end-
1979). 
Table A.1.1 
Main indicators of the economic situation in the Community (EUR 12) 
Average 
1961-73 
(ii) Domestic demand will this year and next make the most 
important contribution to the growth of GDP; in real 
terms it is likely to grow by 3,6 % in 1986 and 3,3 % 
in 1987. It is thus expanding more rapidly than GDP. 
Domestic demand is therefore replacing export demand 
as the main driving force behind economic activity. 
Average 1982 1983 1984 19851 1986' 19871 
1974-81 
(a) Macroeconomic performance 
GDP at constant prices (annual percentage growth) 4,8 1,9 0,5 1.2 2,0 2,3 2,7 2,8 
Unemployment rate 2,42 5,J2 9,32 11,0 11,7 12.0 11,9 11,6 
Rate of inflation (price deflator for private consumption, 
% p.a.) 4,6 12,1 10,4 8,4 7,0 5.8 3,5 3,1 
Current account balance(% of GDP) 0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0,1 0,1 0,5 1,1 0,9 
(b) Indicators of demand 
(percentage change on previous year) 
Domestic demand at constant prices 
Community performance 5,0 1,6 0,8 0,7 1,6 2,1 3,6 3,3 
Deviation from other OECD Member States -0,5 -0,6 1.1 -1,9 -4,2 - I.I 0,5 0.1 
Private consumption 5,0 3,0 0,6 1,0 0,9 2,1 3,5 3.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 5,6 0,0 -1,5 -0,3 1,3 2.3 4,9 4,9 
Exports of goods and services 9,2 4,6 1,5 3,2 7,6 5,7 2,9 4,2 
(c) Indicators of supply conditions 
Employment (percentage change per year) 0,3 -0,1 -0,9 -0,8 0,1 0.4 0,8 0,8 
Productivity (percentage change on previous year) 4,5 2,1 1,5 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,0 
Real unit labour costs (Index 1973 = I 00) 98.8 103.0 102.3 101,3 100,2 99,2 97,8 97,3 
Profitability3 (Index 1973 = I 00) 109.0 74.1 67.4 65,2 70,5 74,6 84,9 89.4 
Investment in equipment (percentage change per year, EUR 
10) 0.2 0,3 3.4 7,4 6,7 6,6 
Cost competitiveness4 (Index 1973 = I 00) 101,9 110.3 100.6 94,7 88,2 87,1 95,0 96,0 
(d) Economic policy indicators 
Compensation per employee 
- nominal 10,1 14,7 11,1 9,8 7,5 6,9 6,1 4,8 
- real (deflated by the price deflator for private consump-
tion) 5,2 2.3 0,6 1.3 0,5 1,0 2,6 1,6 
Monetary expansion (annual average) 11.42 13,7 11.3 11,2 9.5 10,2 8,7 7,1 
General government borrowing(% of GDP) -4,J2 - 5.42 -5,42 - 5.4 -5,2 -4,6 -4,4 
Gross debt of general government(% of GDP) 40,35 44,96 49,8 53.4 56,0 58.9 60.4 62,2 
I Estimates and Economic Forecasts of Commission services (May 1986). 
J 
EUR 9 (without Greece. Spain and Portugal). 
Estimate for EUR 10. 
Real cfTcctive exchange rates on the basis of unit labour costs: total economy. 
' 
1973 (without Greece. Spain and Portugal). 
1981. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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(iii) In 1987. both private consumption and investment a re 
likely to remain buoyant. even if it is assumed tha t there 
will be no further improvement in the terms of trade. 
Consumpti on and investment will be stronger because 
of the secondary effects of the 1986 fa ll in the price of 
oil. Export growth could well accelerate somewhat in 
1987. since the nega ti ve impact of the do llar's de-
preciation sho uld grad ua lly diminish a nd wo rld t rade 
is expected to expand a li tt le more q uickly. 
(iv) Although employment is once again increasing (by 
around 0,8 % a year in 1986 a nd 1987) , unemployment 
remai ns unacceptably high. On average. 16,3 millio n 
gainfully employable persons were without wo rk in 
1985 in the 12 Mem ber States of the enlarged Com-
munity, ha lf a million mo re tha n the previous year, 
bringi ng the Commun ity unemployment rate to 12 % 
of the labo ur force. 
If the high level of unemployment is to be brought down 
perma nently, it will not be sufficie nt sim ply to util ize spa re 
capacity full y. There is a shortage o f jo bs in the Communit y, 
which can be made up o nly through new inves tment. Invest-
ment must therefore increase a t a n especially fast ra te fo r a 
lengthy period and must be made mo re employment-crea ting 
in order to close the gap which has opened a nd to bri ng the 
unemployed back into work. 
The volume of gross fixed investment in the Community has 
recovered only slowly from the cont rac ti on it suffered in 
198 1 and 1982. Only in 1986 and 1987 will investment, 
increasing by 5 %, agai n grow more quickly tha n G DP. 
This will be the highest growth ra te since 1970. T he improve-
ment in macroeconomic profi ta bility since 1983 has, in pa r-
ticular, contributed , with some delay, to the recove ry in 
investment in equipment, the growth ra te of which is now 
close to 7 % (see Table A . I. I). Much o f the decline in 
profita bility a fter 1973 thus seems to have been reversed . 
The improved level of capacity utiliza ti on, modera te rea l 
wage increases and , most recently, the fa ll in raw ma teri al 
prices have all contributed to thi s. Fo r expecta tio ns of profi-
tability in the medium-term, which is decisive for inves tment, 
steady growth of dema nd and modera te rea l wage increases 
remain essenti a l. As a n example, G raph A. 1.3 shows the 
close connection between profits, capi ta l-widening invest-
ment and employment in G erma n industry : if the rate of 
return on physical capital increases , thi s genera lly leads, two 
yea rs la ter, to a n increase in capital-widening investment 
and in the number of persons in employment. 
It sho uld be emphasized , however, that the p rospects o ut-
lined here depend on a number of critica l ass umptions. 
Should there be a furth er ma rked wea kening o f the doll a r, 
which cannot be completely ruled o ut in view o f the ex isting 
Economic situa tio n and perspec ti ves fo r Europe 
imbalances a nd . sho uld the deve lopment o f the oil price 
di ffe r nota bly fro m the one assumed, the continua tio n o f 
the curren t modera te ra te o f growth wo uld be jeopa rdized . 
In add ition. the assumpti ons fo r world trade depend to a 
considerable ex tent on a n o rderly so lution o f the indebted-
ness problems of developing countries. This, too, is a n as-
sumption which contai ns elements of uncerta inty. 
GRAPH A.1.3: Profits, capital widening investment and em-
ployment in the Federal Republic of Germany 
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Change in the number of persons employed2 
(industry) 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 
Estimate or the Gennan Bundcsbank . 
1986 figure estimated Commission's services. 
Source : Deutsche Bundesbank. IFQ.Jnstitut, Statisti schcs Bundcsamt. 
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A.1.4. The present upswing in its cyclical context 
In 1987. the upturn in the Community will be entering its 
fifth year. According to the normal cyclical pattern of earlier 
upturns, this would mark the late phase in the recovery 
process, and the upper cyclical turning point will not be far 
off (see Graph A.1.4). But in the current situation, this 
conclusion seems unfounded, since the cyclical upswing this 
time differs markedly from its predecessors. Firstly the pre-
sent cyclical upswing has been much more moderate (see 
Graph A.1.2). Secondly, unlike 1972/73 and 1979/80 rising 
capacity utilization has so far not been associated with 
upward pressure· on prices, but on the contrary with clearly 
declining inflation rates and selling-price expectations (see 
Graph A.1.5). Thirdly, for 1987 there is no sign so far 
of the risk of overheating which would necessitate tighter 
monetary policy measures. On average for all the member 
countries in 1987, the Commission actually forecasts a 
further slowdown in the upward movement of prices (3, I % 
compared with 3,5 % in 1986; consumer prices), mainly 
because of progress in fighting inflation in the member 
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countries which have so far still had high rates of price 
increase (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy). In the other 
member countries, the inflation rate is probably stabilizing 
at the relatively low 1986 level or is increasing only slightly. 
Fourthly, unit labour costs have not yet started to rise 
rapidly, as they have usually done in other late phases of an 
upturn. One of the factors behind the lack of buoyancy in 
unit labour costs is undoubtedly the continuing high level 
of unemployment. 
There is a possible danger of the upswing coming to an end 
in the second half of 1987 or the beginning of 1988 because 
the internal driving force behind economic activity in Europe 
will not have developed enough momentum of its own to be 
able to manage without additional stimuli - such as the 
increase in exports to the United States in 1983/85 and the 
fall in the oil price in 1986/87. While at the moment there is 
no evidence of an imminent end to the upturn, the evolution 
of the economy in the next few months must be kept under 
careful review, so that prompt action can be taken to ward 
off any unfavourable developments. 
Economic situa ti on and perspecti ves fo r Euro pe 
GRAPH A.1.4: Growth-cycles in the European Community - Deviations of real GDP from long-term trend (in %)1 
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I The quancrly data of real GDP (seasonally adjusted) have been interpolated on a monthly basis before the long-term trend (moving 99 months average) has been calculated. The 
estimates for 1986/87 are based on the Commission·s forecast (May 1986). 
!>aura: Eurostat. calculations and estimates of Commission servioes. 
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GRAPH A.LS: Capacity utilization and selling price expectations in industry 
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A.2. Developments in the world economy 
The \\'orld economy has entered a period offar-reaclzing adjustment o(accumulated distortions 
arising.fi·om the oil shocks o(the 1970s. the USfiscal deficit ll'ith its associated appreciation 
o( the dollar. and the excessive external borrmring o( certain de!'eloping countries. This 
process is being stimulated by the ll'eakening of the dollar. the fall in illlerest rates. the sharp 
decline in oil prices and the e.f.(orts being made to reduce US.federal goremment expenditure. 
The renell'ed spirit of international cooperation 011 economic policy that emerged .fiwn the 
Tokyo Summit has increased the probability that the adjustment ll'ill be smoother than 
prel'iously expected. Holl'el'er. 11'.lzilst this correction of unsustainable disequilibria ll'il! he 
beneficial in the medium-term. the adjustment process ll'ill not he costless and transmission 
lags could ll'ell delay the stimulus to 1rorld trade ji-om the el'entual expansion 11( economic 
activity. As may be seen in Table A . .:.l. the rate <!/' grmrth o( ll'orld trade is, therefore. 
expected to strengthen only slight(\' in 1986 to 3,8 % h111 to accelerate to just under 5 % in 
1987. Not all countries ll'ill share in this improred outlook and, despite the Baker Plan. the 
risk o( default has i11creasedfi1r those higlzly-indehted de1·elopi11g countries dependent 011 oil 
exports. 
A.2.1. The international environment 
Major changes have taken place in the international environ-
ment over the last 18 months : 
(i) The depreciation of the US dollar against the ECU and 
the yen. from its peak in the first quarter of 1985, which 
was reinforced by the Group of 5 Agreement of 22 
September 1985; 
(ii) the change in the policy of Saudi Arabia from attempt-
ing to maintain the price of OPEC oil by limiting 
its own production, towards an objective of regaining 
market share through lower prices: as a consequence, 
the price of oil has fallen rapidly, and its future path is 
uncertain; 
(iii) the introduction of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 
which instituted a procedure for reducing the US federal 
budget deficit to zero by fiscal year 1991. The Act has 
been judged to be, in part, unconstitutional, but the 
alacrity with which the measure was adopted bespeaks 
a genuine desire by both Congress and the President to 
overcome the budget deficit problem; 
(iv) the fall in interest rates which was stimulated initially 
by an easier stance of US monetary policy. 
The devaluation of the dollar against the yen and against 
European currencies began in March 1985 but the decisive 
change was brought about by cooperative central bank 
intervention after the September G-5 meeting. Although the 
change in policy by the United States' authorities, who had 
previously argued strongly against interference with the free 
working of foreign exchange markets. was initially motivated 
by a desire to reduce the protectionist pressures which were 
building up in Congress. it is now recognized as an important 
element in the limitation. and eventual reduction of the 
United States· external deficit. Its effect on the growth of 
world trade is expected initially to be small but negative. 
but it is an adjustment which is necessary to achieve a more 
realistic set of exchange rates and thus make it less likely 
that the world will need to suffer a recession in order to 
correct the external imbalances of the major trading 
countries. 
The current consensus view is that oil prices have stabilized 
at about USO 15 per barrel and will stay at this level over 
the next year or two. The initial impact of the price fall will 
be to cut the earnings of oil exporting countries by some 
USO 90 billion a year, with a corresponding gain by oil 
importers. Oil consumers in the OECO will be the major 
beneficiaries. The beneficial effects will, however, only ap-
pear with a lag as the reduction in imports by oil exporters 
consequent upon the fall in their export revenue will tend 
to occur more rapidly than the increase in imports of oil 
importing countries. 
Thus, a temporary deceleration in activity may be expected 
before the more positive consequences of the oil price fall 
are felt. These derive essentially in the short-term from an 
unanticipated fall in prices which will make monetary growth 
easier to contain within existing target ranges and thus 
reduce interest rates. Profitability will rise and therefore. in 
the longer term, investment projects should become more 
attractive, leading to a supply-side boost to potential output. 
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A.2.2. The outlook for the Community's major 
trading partners 
The outlook for the United States federal budget deficit 
has improved greatly with the discipline imposed by the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act even though the Act has been declared, in part, unconsti-
tutional. The expectation of a continuing decline in the 
Federal Government's demand for loanable funds over the 
next few years, together with the disinflationary effect of the 
oil price fall, has contributed to the substantial reduction in 
nominal interest rates which has taken place in the past year. 
As a consequence of smaller budget deficits, fiscal policy 
will be contractionary for several years. 
Although the devaluation of the dollar has inflationary 
implications for the US economy, the fall in oil prices itself is 
counter-inflationary and should permit the Federal Reserve 
Board to continue its relatively accommodating monetary 
stance. The recent dramatic fall in interest rates to about 
6 % at the short end and to below 7,5 % for longer-term 
bonds will thus be sustained until the end of the year, and 
will be an important factor contributing to economic growth 
in the forecast period. 
The prospect for 1987 is less encouraging. Next year the 
effects of the fall in the dollar on the inflation rate will be 
at their strongest, while the effects of the oil price fall 
are wearing off. In these circumstances, some tightening of 
monetary policy might be considered appropriate by the 
Federal Reserve, and the consequent constraining ofmone-
tary growth at a time when fiscal policy is already contrac-
tionary would lead to a marked deceleration of growth. 
Consumers' expenditure in the United States will grow more 
slowly than in recent years, despite lower interest rates, as 
wage increases remain moderate and consumers seek to 
increase their savings ratio from its current low level. Invest-
ment in housing is strong in response to the prospect of 
lower mortgage repayments but non-residential investment 
will drop sharply at first because of the rapid fall in oilfield 
production and exploration expenditures. The proposed tax 
reform legislation will further discourage investment by in-
creasing the tax payments of the business sector but should 
boost consumption via income tax reductions. Lower inter-
est rates and slightly improved growth prospects will lead to 
a small positive contribution to growth from stockbuilding. 
Government consumption will be very weak as the increase 
in state and local expenditures will at most only just compen-
sate for the economies induced at the federal level by the 
Gramm-Rudman Act. 
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Although export and import growth rates arc expected to 
be roughly similar ( on a year-on-year basis and on the 
assumption of no further significant fall in the dollar), since 
imports in the base year arc so much greater than exports 
there will be a continuing negative contribution to growth 
from net exports. 
The outlook for Japan has been improved by the fall in oil 
prices, which may compensate to some extent for the effects 
of the rapid strengthening of the yen. The real income gains 
resulting from the massive improvement of the Japanese 
terms of trade are likely to improve the prospects for invest-
ment and, if they are passed on to the consumer. could boost 
private consumption in real terms. At the same time, the fall 
in import prices and the ability of exporters to absorb a 
large part of the potential price-risk implied by the yen 
revaluation may prevent a sharp deterioration of the compe-
titiveness of Japanese exports. 
The budgetary stance remains constrained by the commit-
ment of the Government to reduce the central government 
deficit and to restrain the increase of the public debt; never-
theless the provision for capital expenditure has been in-
creased by recourse to non-budgetary investment and loan 
finance. On 8 April, the Government adopted a programme 
aimed at sustaining domestic demand which includes an 
acceleration of public works. housing loans facilities and 
measures which should help the small and medium size 
enterprises hit by the appreciation of the yen. Furthermore 
the Government has taken measures to ensure that the fall 
in import prices is passed on to retail prices. The discount 
rate of the Bank of Japan has been lowered twice in January 
and March to the level of 4 %; monetary policy is likely to 
remain flexible while a further decrease in interest rates is 
expected. 
The current account surplus is likely to exceed USD 80 
billion in both 1986 and 1987. The growth of exports is 
stagnant at the moment and will not recover before the 
second half of this year. In spite of a rapid rise in imports 
in real terms in the second half of 1986 and in 1987, the 
improvement of the terms of trade will sharply increase the 
nominal trade surplus in both years. 
Canada exceeded expectations in the matter of growth in 
1985. having lagged behind the United States in 1984 in 
both investment and employment. Although the growth of 
import demand by the United States and hence the Canadian 
export market is now diminishing, a continuation of the 
recent upsurge in internal demand is expected to run on into 
1986 and 1987. 
In EFTA countries, GNP growth is likely to weaken gradu-
ally over the next two years. In Austria and Switzerland 
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Table A.2.1 
World economy: Key indicators 
i9StH4 1985 19861 19871 
AH:rag1.· 
GDP/GNP(% change) 
EUR 1,0 2,3 2,7 2,8 
USA 1,8 2,2 2,5 2,7 
Canada 1,6 4,5 3,8 2,8 
Japan 3,9 4,6 3,2 3,2 
OtherOECO 2,2 3,1 3,0 2,9 
OECO-Total 1,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 
Import volume(% change) 
EUR 2,1 5,5 6,2 6,2 
USA 4,9 4,1 5,9 6,0 
Canada 2,1 7,5 6,0 4,5 
Japan 0,1 -2,1 4,4 10,6 
Other OECO 3,8 6,4 5,1 4,0 
OECO-Total 2,7 4,7 5,8 6,2 
OPEC 3,7 - l l,3 -16,5 -10,0· 
Other developing countries 1,0 3,0 3,5 4,5 
World 2,4 3,3 3,8 4,8 
Balance on current account ( USD billion) 
EUR 13,6 45,0 39,0 
USA -117,7 -108,8 -113,7 
Canada -2,0 -4,0 -2,1 
Japan 49,3 81.9 78,8 
OtherOECO -5,2 -2,9 -3,7 
OECO-Total -62,2 11,2 - l.8 
OPEC -3,6 -32,3 -20,5 
Other developing countries -25,6 -19,2 -19,7 
Commodity prices ( dollar-based) 
Oil: average EC import price (USO p.b.) 31,53 27,49 16,00 15,00 
All commodities excluding fuels(% change) -10,2 7,6 2,4 
Exchange rares 
OM per USO 2,381 2,942 2,311 2,265 
ECU per USO 1,006 1,321 1,072 1,060 
Yen per USO 234,278 238,383 182,959 172.510 
Interest rates ( yearly arerage in % ) 
US 3-month Treasury Bill 10,9 7,5 6,5 6,0 
US JO-year Government Bond 12,4 10,8 8,1 7,2 
I Forecasts. 
n.a. = not applicable. 
23 
Macroeconomic developments and outlook 
where the expansion was led mainly by exports, future 
growth will depend to a greater extent on stronger domestic 
demand. In Sweden and Finland on the other hand, budget-
ary consolidation policies will have the effect of slowing 
internal growth. Norway has recently devalued its currency 
and introduced a restrictive supplementary budget which 
should cut internal demand in the next 18 months, but will 
have great difficulty in replacing the loss of export revenue 
caused by the oil price fall. 
The slowdown in world trade in 1985 seriously reduced the 
growth of the newly industrialized Pacific countries, whose 
export growth fell from 18, 7 % in 1984 to - 0,8 % in 1985. 
Prospects for 1986 and 1987 are a little brighter, following 
the fall in the price of oil, but the relatively slow growth of 
world trade remains a handicap for their export-led econ-
omies. 
Many of the OPEC countries, who were already facing 
current account problems before the latest oil price fall, will 
be obliged to reduce imports substantially. The richer OPEC 
countries with substantial foreign investments will be in a 
position to choose between cutting imports and running 
down assets. For OPEC as a whole a sharp fall in imports 
is expected in both 1986 and 1987. 
Prospects for the oil-producing debtors, notably Mexico, 
Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia, are very black and only 
substantial cuts in internal demand and additional financial 
help will extricate them from their difficulties. However, the 
oil price fall, which is so damaging to them, favours other 
indebted developing countries, which are likely to receive 
additional help from the fall in interest rates. Moreover, 
the counter-inflationary plans introduced by Argentina and 
Brazil have so far met with considerable success and are 
likely to be imitated by certain other indebted countries. 
However, producers of primary commodities are unlikely to 
experience any marked improvement in their situation : even 
if activity progressively picked up in line with the oil price 
drop, growth of world economic activity would remain con-
fined to relatively modest rates, and supplies are generally 
abundant. 
A.2.3. Primary commodities and world trade 
In conjunction with the secular downward trend in demand 
due to reduced material use. substitution and technical pro-
gress, a situation of over-supply of many primary commodi-
ties has tended to depress prices which - in spite of the 
dollar depreciation - fell in dollar terms in the second half 
year of 1985. The decline in ECU terms was even more 
substantial. 
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At the turn of the year, there was an increase in the dollar 
price of some commodities; this was the case for some 
agricultural products but particularly for coffee, due to a 
drought in Brazil, and among metals, for aluminium, as cuts 
by producers began to work through. But prices of other 
metals e.g. tin, and of oil and fats dropped further. The 
forecast of a price rise in dollar terms for the average of the 
year 1986 is based on the hypothesis that a dollar de-
preciation results eventually in a progressive upward effect 
on dollar prices. Moreover a similar influence would be 
conveyed by the positive reactions of the \\orld economy tu 
the oil price fall. In 1987, the disappearance of the ·coffee 
effect' and the lack of any prospects for a faster rate of 
growth in industrial countries could tend to keep price rises 
to a modest rate. 
Although data are far from complete, the latest available 
indicators suggest that the growth of world imports in 1985 
was significantly weaker than expected at the time the Au-
tumn forecast was prepared. World imports, last year, are 
currently estimated to have grown by only 3.3 % as com-
pared with 4,8 % forecast last Autumn. A large part of this 
downward revision has become necessary following changes 
to the national accounts of the United States and Japan 
and, indeed, has served to correct somewhat the previous 
large inconsistency at world level. Nevertheless. it does seem 
that it was trade outside the Community which was weaker 
than expected, as there has been a slight increase in the 
estimated rate of growth of Community (EUR JO) imports 
compared to the previous forecast. 
Prospects for world trade in 1986 have been altered funda-
mentally as a result of the changes in exchange rates and oil 
prices. On balance. the lower oil price and interest rates are 
expected to provide a significant stimulus to world economic 
activity in industrial countries later in the year with a conse-
quential increase in the rate of growth of their imports. 
However, the effect at the world level is already being offset 
by a further sharp contraction of imports by oil-exporting 
countries as a result of their reduced dollar export earnings, 
aggravated by the faster than expected depreciation of the 
dollar. The overall result of these factors is that world 
imports, including the Community, are currently forecast to 
expand by 3.8 % in 1986. I % lower than was forecast last 
Autumn. However. there will be some change in the sources 
of supply of these imports consequent upon the movements 
in relative prices and in exchange rates. At present. OPEC 
is expected to increase the volume of its exports as higher 
rates of economic growth and lower prices stimulate demand 
for oil; on the other hand, the Community will tend to lose 
market share following the faster than expected exchange 
rate appreciation. 
The present outlook suggests that the favourable effects of 
the lower oil price and interest rates are likely to produce a 
further acceleration in the rate of growth of economic ac-
tivity and trade in 1987. Whilst the growth of aggregate 
output in the OECD area is expected to remain stable 
at 2.8 %. a stronger acceleration is expected in non-oil 
developing countries. The expansion of world imports is 
forecast to increase significantly to 4,8 % as the effect of the 
exchange-rate changes matures and the stimulus to domestic 
demand from lower oil prices continues to strengthen. 
A.2.4. Risks and uncertainties 
Developments during early summer provided a sharp re-
minder that the situation of the world oil market is far from 
stable and is a major source of uncertaintly concerning both 
the short and medium-term outlook for the world economy. 
This uncertainty affects prospects for world economic ac-
tivity and trade in two ways. Firstly, there is the question 
of the extent and timing of the beneficial impact of the 
reduction in oil prices that has already occured over the last 
twelve months. It is becoming increasingly evident that many 
forecasting institutions have seriously under-estimated both 
the deflationary effects of weaker oil prices on oil-exporting 
countries· demand and on oil sector investment. and the 
time-lag between the fall in oil prices and the subsequent re-
allocation of real expenditure. It is thus possible that the 
acceleration in economic activity currently foreseen for the 
second half of this year has similarly been over-estimated 
and that the time needed for the transmission of the full 
effects of lower oil prices is longer than originally expected. 
Such a development could arise if the principal beneficiaries 
in oil-importing countries. consumers and business man-
agers, viewed the present weakness of oil prices as only a 
temporary phenomenon and used the resulting gains to 
restructure their balance sheets (i.e. to reduce their indebted-
ness) rather than to increase their real expenditure. 
A second uncertainty arising from the oil market concerns 
the future price of oil. The most recent short-term forecasts 
by the Services of the Commission were based on an assumed 
average price of USO 15 per barrel until the end of I 987, 
but recent price fluctuations underline the fragility of such 
an assumption. Although the possibility of an agreement to 
restrict supply cannot be entirely ruled out, the conflicting 
needs and interests of producer countries make it very un-
likely that an average price much in excess of the assumed 
USO 15 per barrel could be sustained during the next I 8 
months. However, there is a distinct possibility that the 
combination of increased output by Saudi Arabia, the re-
liance on netback pricing and weaker than expected econ-
omic activity will result in a lower average price of oil than 
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assumed in the forecast. In any case. prices will be subject 
to greater fluctuations than was the case in recent years. 
The fall in oil prices has also served to exacerbate the 
difficulties confronting a few highly-indebted developing 
countries, in particular Mexico and Nigeria. which depend 
to a large extent on exports of oil. Although the debt service 
burden of these, and of other developing, countries has been 
reduced by lower interest rates. the reduction in export 
earnings from oil has overwhelmed this benefit. The risk 
of some form of radical unilateral action has. therefore. 
increased although the damage, to the US banking system 
in particular and to the international financial system in 
general, likely to result from such action has been lessened 
by the improvement in the reserve position of banks over 
the last few years. 
The second major source of uncertainty surrounding the 
prospects for the world economy arises from the need to 
correct the disequilibria associated with the United States· 
twin deficits - on the Federal budget and on the current 
account of the balance of payments. Although the de-
preciation of the dollar and the passing of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act were both encouraging steps in the 
right direction, they are not sufficient to guarantee that the 
necessary adjustment will be achieved. In particular. three 
areas of risk remain. Firstly. there is the possibility that the 
balanced budget legislation will not be fully applied once 
its provisions start to bite deeply into politically-sensitive 
expenditure programs. However, such developments would 
be unlikely to reverse the movement towards deficit re-
duction although progress could well be slower than cur-
rently expected. Secondly, the forecast for the US economy 
is also threatened by the possibility of a greater than expected 
increase in inflationary pressure over the outlook period. 
which could arise from the effects of a further sharp fall in 
the dollar leading to higher prices both of imports and 
of domestically-produced goods as import competition is 
reduced. Given the easy availability of credit and the fore-
seen improvement in corporate profitability, a price-wage 
spiral could well begin with sufficient strength to induce a 
significant tightening of monetary policy. Such a move. 
taken together with the deflationary effect of a tight fiscal 
policy, would lead to much slower growth than at present 
foreseen. Finally, it is possible that a combination of weaker 
growth of the US economy. the effects on agriculture and 
the oil industry of continued low prices, and electoral con-
siderations will lead to a build-up of protectionist pressure 
that will prove to be too strong to resist. Such a scenario 
would not only have a general deflationary impact on the 
world economy but would also be likely to lead to the 
Community being confronted by increased diversion of Ja-
panese exports. 
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A.3. The labour market 
Unemployment in the Community has passed its peak in 1985. It ll'ill, for the first time since 
1973, fall on an annual basis in 1986 as well as in 1987. There ll'ill. howel'er, still be about 
16 million registered unemployed in 1987. Long-term as ll'ell as female unemployment remain 
the dominant structural problems of the Community labour market while the share if yo1111g 
unemployed in total unemployment is falling. The 01•erall imprm•ement is facilitated by a 
gradual reduction in demographic pressure: in spite of increasing participation rates. the 
labour supply ll'ill groll' less rapidly than in the past. Employment growth 11·ill accelerate and 
exceed the increase in the labour supply. It does. however.fall short of the expansion desired 
in the Cooperative Groll'th Strategy for More Employment. It is the acceleration of real 
output groll'th ll'hich fi1els the growth of employment. Output growth is jill"thermore more 
employment-creating than in the past. The share of non-labour income ll'ill, due to moderate 
ll'age increases, continue to groll' in most member countries: the terms o.f trade gain alloll'ing 
at the same time the first imprm•ement in employees' purchasing power since 1980. Member 
States are focusing their policies on the economic .fi"amell'ork f<1r .fiirther output and employ-
ment groll'th. These general policies are supplemented by labour market policies .1peci/frally 
designed to improve adaptability. extend training andfacilitate the creation of nell' enterprises. 
A.3.1. Unemployment trends and outlook 
In the Community of Twelve, the rate of unemployment 
reached 11, 7 % 1 in 1984, 12,0 % in 1985 and is now expected 
to decline somewhat to 11,9 % in 1986 and further to 11,6 % 
in 19872 (see Table A.2.1 ). This corresponds to 15,8 million 
registered unemployed in 1984, 16,3 million in 1985, 16, I 
million in 1986 and 15,9 million in 1987. 
Thus, unemployment in the Community - measured in 
annual average terms - reached an historical peak in 1985. 
The expected decline for 1986 will be the first annual decline 
since 1973. The improvement is, however, rather small: 
in 1986 and 1987, two years of faster economic recovery, 
unemployment will only decrease by a total of 0,4 million. 
The extent of the deterioration in the labour market is 
underlined by a comparison with the period before 1973. In 
this earlier period. unemployment was of the order of 2,0 to 
2,5 %3 with relatively minor nuctuations. 
1 All Community figures are EUR 12 unless otherwise stated Data for 
1985 to 1987 arc based on the estimates and forecasts of the Commission 
Services· economic forecasts 1986-87 (May 1986). 
2 The interpretation of some national unemployment data and of the 
aggregates has to take into account several changes in national statistical 
procedures, which all tended and tend to reduce the number of registered 
unemployed. Such changes were recently introduced on I Jar:uary 1984 
in the Netherlands. I April 1985 in Belgium. I January 1986 in Germany 
and I February 198(, in the United Kingdom. 
' EUR 9. 
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Medium-term projections (see Chapter A.8), which take 
most recent developments into account. show that. if pre-
sent-day policies and behaviour patterns are maintained 
(base scenario), there will be no great improvement in the 
labour market situation in the medium term. Accordingly, 
the Community of Twelve would in 1990 still have I 0,4 % 
of the labour force unemployed. which is equivalent to a fall 
in the unemployment rate or only 1,6 percentage points for 
the five years 1986 to 1990. 
The overall unemployment problem in the Community has 
become even more acute with the accession of Spain and 
Portugal. According to Commission estimates, which are 
based on national quarterly surveys, 2,94 million were out 
of work in Spain in 1985, a number which is forecast to 
grow to 2.96 million in 1986 and further to 2,97 million in 
1987. For Portugal the respective numbers are 0,47 million 
( 1985 and 1986) and 0,46 million (1987). For comparison 
with previous publications the unemployment rates or the 
former Community of Ten are supplied in Table A.3.1. 
Experience across the Community is varied with most Mem-
ber States sharing in the general pattern of moderate re-
ductions in rates of unemployment in !986 and 1987. 
Stronger than average reductions. however, are expected 
in Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, 
whereas Ireland, in 1986, and Greece. even into 1987, are 
likely to experience rising rates of unemployment. 
Certain segments of the labour force still pose particular 
problems. The unemployment rate for women for example 
exceeded the rate for men by more than one percentage 
The labour market 
Table A.3.1 
Unemployment rates in the Community~ 
\41) lll~U 1484 Jl):S)I ]4:Sb 1 l<l87 1 
B (2,8) 14,3 14,4 13,7' 13,2 13,1 
DK (0,8) 10,2 9,8 9,0 7.7 7.3 
D 1,0 8,4 8,4 8.4 7.7' 7.3 
GR 7,9 8,1 8,5 9.4 9.9 
E 17,9 20,7 22,1 22.1 21,9 
F 1,8 8,8 9,9 10,3 10.6 10,5 
IRL 5,6 14,9 16,5 17.1 17,2 16,8 
I 4,9 10,9 11,9 13,0 12.9 12.5 
L 0,0 1,6 1,7 1.6 1.4 1.2 
NL 2,9 14,3 14,5 13.1 3 12.0 I I.I 
p 10,2 10,5 10.4 10.3 10.1 
UK (2,2) 11,6 11,8 11.8 11.83 11.5 
EUR 12 (2.4)4 (\ \.O) (11,7) (12.0) I I. 9 11.6 
EUR 105 10.3 10.8 11.0 (10.8) ( 10.5) 
I Estimates anC forecasts of Commission services (May 1986). 
Unemployed population as 01(, of civilian labour force: Eurostat definition (for Greece, Spain and Portugal estimates of Commission Services based on national definitions). 
3 Owing to changes in the definition of registered unemployed, figures before and after arc not fully comparable. 
EUR 9 (without Greece, Spain and Portugal). 
Without Spai:1 and Portugal. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
point in 1985 and there is no sign of a narrowing of this gap 
in 1986. Youth unemployment, which made up nearly 40 % 
of total Community unemployment in 1980, has grown less 
than total unemployment. In 1985 its share was 37 % and 
it is expected to fall below 36 % in 1986. This reflects in part 
the reduction in demographic pressure with the youth labour 
force ( 15 - 25 years) now being relative!)( static in the Com-
munity. Another significant contribution stems from special 
efforts of Member States to extend basic training and edu-
cation as well as to facilitate the transition of school leavers 
into employment. Youth unemployment remains a particu-
lar problem in Spain, where it exceeded 45 % of total unem-
ployment in 1985. Of significance is the continuing rise in the 
share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment in 
the Community. 
A.3.2. Labour supply 
The total labour force is still growing in the Community but 
at a rate which is below the average of the last decade (see 
Table A.3.2). There is therefore still a need to accommodate 
a growing number of those seeking employment. This is the 
result of two opposing developments: a reduction in the 
demographic pressure, which is in part offset by a recovery 
of the participation rate. The rate of growth of the popu-
lation of working age (15 - 64), which as a result of the 
'baby boom' had reached 1,6 % in 1982. has now fallen to 
0,5 % in 1985 and will continue to fall through 1987 and 
after. Whilst remaining significantly positive in only a few 
member countries (Spain. Greece and the Netherlands), it 
is already negative for Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg. 
The participation rate on the other hand, which had declined 
in 1981 is slowly increasing. This in part reflects reactions 
to improving labour market conditions, which are familiar 
from previous recoveries. 
Other factors contributing to the reduced growth of the 
labour force are the extension of early retirement schemes 
as well as the growing extent of training and vocational 
programmes. Although they vary considerably between 
countries, these programmes (including early retirement) 
have now reached a point where the number of participants 
equals 10 % to 50 % of total registered unemployment in 
the Member States. 
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Table A.3.2 
Labour force and population of working age 
1984 76 
(average) 
B 0,6 
DK 1,2 
D 0,4 
GR 1,7 
E 0,3 
F 0,7 
IRL 1,5 
I 1,02 
L 0,2 
NL 1,8 
p 1,2 
UK 0,4 
EUR 12 0.7 
1 Estimates and forecasts of Commission services (May 1986). 
2 Civilian Jabour force. 
Tola! \Jbour force 
)985 1 19861 
-0,73 - 0,33 
1,1 0,3 
0,8 0,6 
0,8 0,7 
OJ 0,6 
0,0 0,4 
1,0 0,8 
0,82 0,82 
0,4 0,4 
-0,43 
-OJ 
-0,5 0,4 
1.5 LO 
0.6 0.6 
r :4nnual pt'TCt'nltJKt! grmnh J 
Population of working age: 
( 15-b-l years) 
1987' )984 76 )985 1 )986 1 )987' 
(average) 
0,0 0,6 -0,1 -0.2 -0.2 
0,3 0.5 0,5 0.3 0.1 
0,5 0.9 0,4 -0.1 -0,2 
0,6 1.3 LO 0.5 0,5 
0,8 1.2 1,2 1.2 I.I 
0,5 LO 0,4 0,5 0,3 
0.8 1.5 
0,82 0,9 0,8 0,6 0,4 
0.5 0,2 0,0 0.0 -0.1 
-0,1 1.3 I.I 0,9 0,8 
0.3 0,9 LO LO 0.9 
0.5 0,7 0,0 0,1 0.1 
0.6 0.9 0,5 0.4 0.3 
3 Owing to changes in the ddinition of registered unemployment these rates of change in the la hour force arc not comparable. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
A.3.3. Employment performance 
Employment growth in the Community is accelerating to an 
annual rate of 0,8 % in both 1986 and 1987 as against 0.4 % 
in 1985 (see Table A.3.3). The duration of the process of 
improving employment and the speed eventually achieved 
in 1986 and 1987 are significant. if measured against the 
very poor average job creation record in the Community 
over the last 20 years (see Graph A.3.1 ). It is. however. only 
in the course of 1986 that employment surpasses its level in 
1970. In . the meantime the Community labour force has 
grown by more than ten percent. Furthermore. the expected 
growth in employment falls short of the 1.1 % average 
annual rate of growth required in the Cooperative Growth 
Strategy over the five years from 1986 to 1990. if the target 
rate of 7 % unemployment in 19904 is to be met. 
• In the Annual Economic Report 1985-86. it was illustrated in a simulation 
for the Community of Ten that a 7 % unemployment rate could be 
achieved by 1990. The starting point was the Community's average 
unemployment rate of I I.I % in 1985. When account is tJken of Spain 
and Portugal. the initial situation changes. however: the Member States 
of the present Community of Twelve had an average uncmplovment rate 
of 12,0 % in 1985. · 
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Clearly the continuing growth of real output has had ben-
eficial effects on employment creation as one might expect 
(see Graph A.3.1 ).Indeed it was when real output-growth 
became more favourable during 1981 /82 that the employ-
ment losses first began to diminish.Having turned positive 
after 1983, the rate of employment growth accelerated along 
with output growth. 
In addition. however, the relationship between employment 
and output growth has shifted further in favour of employ-
ment: in the 1960s. average GDP growth of just under 
5 % a year was accompanied by an annual increase in 
employment of only 0,2 %; at the end of the 1970s (1978/ 
79) with growth at 3,2 %, the annual increase in employment 
was already 0.5 %; in order to achieve a 0.8 % increase in 
employment, in 1985/86 an annual growth rate of 2, 75 seems 
to be sufficient. This would suggest that the character of 
economic growth in the Community is indeed becoming of 
a more employment intensive nature. 
At the same time and of equal significance, growth of ob-
served labour productivity has remained stable. The ex-
pected rate for 1987 (2,0 % ) is equal to the average rate of 
GRAPH A.3.1: GDP and employment growth in the Com-
munity (EUR 12) (annual percentage growth 
rate) 
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Source : Eurostat ( 1985-87): estimates and forecasts of Commission ser-
vices, May 1986). 
producti vity growth prevailing between the first a nd the 
second oil price shocks (see Ta ble A .3.4). Sta ble growth 
of productivity per employee a long with the expansion in 
employment seems to indica te that the pressure on firms in 
the Community to reduce rea l unit labour costs, by obta ining 
productivity gains via the reducti o n of their work fo rce, has 
eased significa ntl y. At the same time more activities with 
low producti vity gains have retained economic viabil ity. 
A major co ntribution to the improved employment outlook 
from the supply side is the di stinct moderation o f rea l wage 
growth. Compensatio n of employees per head , defl a ted by 
the GDP-def1ator , has aga in in 1985 grown less tha n labour 
productivity (0,8 % as compa red to 1,9 %, see Table A .3.4). 
This trend is ex pected to continue through 1986 a nd 1987, 
allowing for a further improvement in the sha re of non-
labour income. 
The la bour ma rk et 
Las t yea r·s Annua l Eco nomic Re po rt 5 proposed a Coopera t-
ive Growth St ra tegy. one component o f whi ch was the 
perceived need fo r a modera tio n in the grow th o f rea l la bo ur 
costs. It was th ought th a t if these costs evo lved a t a ra te of 
one percentage point below the rate o f growth of pro-
ductivity fo r the necessa ry lengt h o f time. em ployment cre-
a tio n wo uld be suffic ient fo r a significant a nd substanti a l 
red ucti on in the ra te of unemployment. In fac t. thi s proposed 
requirement is exceeded in 1986. T hi s does, however. ta ke 
the fo rm o f a tempora ry gain in the terms o f trade and as 
thi s ga in begins to disappear through 1987. wage modera ti o n 
might fa ll behind the desired adjustment pa th . Furtherm ore 
it has to be noted tha t thi s genera l trend of improving sha res 
of non-labour income does not o bta in in the Ne therl ands 
and the United Kingd om. two coun t ri es. whose income a nd 
growth perfo rma nce suffer fro m the reversa l of oi l a nd gas 
pnces. 
In both cases wages have no t yet adjusted to thi s and the 
profit situa tio n is deteri ora ting. In the United Kingd om, the 
problem of adjustment is even grea te r. since the modera ti on 
of rea l wage increases has no t made much headway in recent 
yea rs. 
Due to the anti-infl a ti o na ry policies in the past a nd the 
combined effects of the oil-price fa ll and the US do lla r 
deva lua tio n. infla ti onary pressure (measured by the deflat or 
of priva te consumptio n) in the Communit y continues to fa ll. 
In 1985 the purchasing power o f em ployees expanded by 
1.0 %. In 1986 (+2,6%) a nd 1987 (+ 1.6%) stronger im-
provements a re expected . 
With rega rd to indirec t la bour cos ts there a ppea rs to be a 
common consent in the Member Sta tes in the pas t th a t 
these have risen excessively a nd have bo th reinfo rced the 
di scrimina tio n agai nst la bo ur as a fac tor of prod ucti o n a nd 
reduced interna ti ona l competiti veness (for a n ana lysis of 
ex tent a nd effects of the ·tax wedge· in the Communit y, see 
Chapter 8.4. 3 o f thi s review). In response to thi s, some 
governments have reduced socia l securit y contributio ns in 
general (Portuga l) o r employers' contributi ons onl y (Den-
mark , Spa in a nd the United Kingd om). Due to the still 
seve re budget constra ints a nd the heavy burden o f unem-
ployment on the socia l security systems, the ex tent o f the 
reductions however tended to be rela tively small. Mo re 
subs tantia l reductions in . o r exemptio ns from , socia l securit y 
contributions a re used as a n incenti ve fo r the hiring of 
ta rgetted groups fro m the poo l o f unemployed . Exa mples 
' Sec E11ropea 11 Ecmw111_1 ·. No 26. November 1985. 
6 See £ 11ropca11 Eco110111r. No 27. Ma rch 1986. 
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Table A.3.3 
Employment in the Community 
Tot::.! employment Annual percentage grnwth 
1973,60 1983 73 1984 19851 19861 1987' 
(annual averages) 
B 0,6 -0,4 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,1 
DK 1,1 0,2 2,2 3,1 1,6 0,8 
D 0,1 -0,6 0,1 0,7 1,3 0,9 
GR -0,5 0,3 -0,2 0,4 -0,3 0,0 
E 0,8 -1,7 -3,9 -1,4 0,6 1,0 
F 0,7 0,1 -1,0 -0,4 0,1 0,5 
IRL 0,0 0,6 -1,3 -0,3 0,6 1,3 
I -0,4 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,7 1,3 
L 1,1 0,4 0,0 0,4 0,7 0,6 
NL 0,9 -0,4 -0,5 0,9 1,0 0,9 
p 0,1 2,0 1,1 -0,5 0,5 0,6 
UK 0,3 -0,6 1,6 1.3 1.0 0,7 
EUR 12 0,3 -0,2 0,1 0,4 0,8 0,8 
I Estimates and forecasts by Commission services (May 1986). 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
Table A.3.4. 
Growth, wage costs, productivity and employment performance2 
( Armua/ pt·n<·ntt1Kt' wowtli J 
1983 1973 1985 1 19861 1987 1 
{annual averages) 
G w p E G w p E G w p E G w p E 
B 1.7 2.9 2,1 -0,4 1.3 0.3 1.0 OJ 2,0 - 1,0 1,7 0.3 2,1 0,9 2.0 0,1 
DK 1,5 0.9 1.3 0,2 3,8 - LI 0.7 3,1 2,5 - 1.5 0,9 1,6 2,2 0,2 1.4 0,8 
D 1,6 1,9 2.2 -0.6 2.5 0,8 1.8 0,7 3,5 1.3 2,2 1,3 3,0 1,9 2,1 0,9 
GR 2,4 3.6 2,0 0.3 2.1 4.2 1.7 0.4 -0.4 -5,5 -0,1 -0,3 -0,2 -1.0 -0,2 0,0 
E 2,0 3,3 3.8 - 1.7 2,1 0.2 3.5 -1.4 2.7 -2.2 2,1 0,6 2,7 0,5 1.7 1.0 
F 2,3 2.9 2.1 0.1 1.3 I. I 1,7 -0.4 2.3 -0.I 2,2 0,1 2,9 0,4 2,4 0,5 
IRL 3,6 3. I 2.9 0.6 2,1 0,5 2.4 -0.3 3,2 0.5 2,6 0,6 3,7 2,5 2,4 1.3 
I 1.9 1.9 1.2 0.6 2.3 I. I 1.8 0,5 2,7 -1.4 2,0 0,7 3,8 1,4 2.5 1,3 
L 1.3 2.7 0.8 0,4 2.1 -0.9 1.7 0.4 2.2 -1,8 1.5 0,7 2,5 2,7 1,9 0,6 
NL 1.6 1.5 1.9 -0.4 2.3 -0.8 1.4 0.9 1.7 2.2 0,7 1,0 1,8 2,3 0,9 0,9 
p 2.7 2.8 0.7 2.0 3.7 -0.1 4.2 -0.5 3,9 -0,7 3.4 0.5 3,6 1,0 3,0 0,6 
UK 1.0 1.2 1.6 -0.6 3.3 1.3 2.0 1.3 2.6 3.5 1.6 1.0 2.4 2.4 1.7 0,7 
EUR 12 1.7 2.1 2.0 -0.2 2.3 0.8 1.9 0.4 2,7 0.6 1.9 0,8 2,8 1.4 2.0 0,8 
I Estimates and forecasts of Commission Scrvi,:c<; ( Ma) 1986). 
Key: G ~ real GDP 
w~ real compcnsation of cmplo)ccs per head (dcfla1or: GLJP-pno:s) 
p ~ lahour productivity (GDP at constant market prices by total cmpbymcnt) 
E ~ total cmp\o~mcnt 
Sourn·· Eurostat and Commission :-.crvicc:-.. 
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are the young unemployed in Portugal. the long-term unem-
ployed in Ireland. first-time employees in Belgium and sup-
port for training programmes for employees in Spain. 
A.3.4. Labour market adjustment 
Apart from the fostering of overall output growth and the 
readjustment of relative factor prices to expand the scope 
of sustainable employment, a large variety of specific labour 
market policies are used in the member countries. Most 
newly adopted measures are designed to improve the process 
of positive adjustment. All Member States, for example. are 
expanding the scope of their training programmes for 
school-leavers. the unemployed and those who indicate will-
ingness to improve their career prospects. New financing 
facilities for the foundation of businesses or becoming self-
employed have been introduced in Belgium and Ireland. 
Legal regulations seen as impeding the flexible access of 
unemployed to new employment continue to be reduced. 
With regard to working hours. data from several member 
countries indicate that the number of hours worked per 
employee has fallen more strongly in 1985 than in previous 
years. Looked at in the context of the Cooperative Growth 
Strategy, the reduction of working hours provides one way 
of reconciling efforts to improve labour productivity growth 
per hour with the desire for more employment creation in 
terms of employees along a path of accelerating output 
growth. In order to be compatible with the intention of 
The labour market 
restoring profitability. the reduction of working hours per 
employee should be cost neutral for firms. In a growing 
number of cases, this is therefore combined with a reorgan-
ization of working time to improve the utilization of pro-
duction facilities and facilitate adjustment to demand fluctu-
ations. As indicated by the Community industrial survey 
1985/867 about one half of firms in Community industry 
intend to organize working hours more flexibly over the 
next 1-2 years. This meets with a widespread preference of 
employees for more flexibly distributed monthly or annual 
working time, if total working time continues to be reduced. 
Some governments provide additional support for reorgan-
ization schemes (Belgium. Netherlands) and/or offer new 
subsidies for additional hiring as a consequence of working 
time reduction (Belgium). 
In Spain government efforts to provide more stable, growth-
oriented monetary and fiscal policies as well as new measures 
for training and restructuring have been tied in with commit-
ments from the social partners to moderate wage increases 
into a cooperative 'Economic and Social Agreement (AES)' 
for 1985 and 1986. First assessments indicate overall success. 
especially with regard to the wage guidelines. providing 
Spain with a particularly marked improvement in the real 
unit labour costs (see Table A.3.4). The cooperative ap-
proach chosen has facilitated the reduction of legal restric-
tions concerning temporary employment: the legal frame-
work for part-time employment and early retirement has 
been improved. 
' Sec European Eco110111r. No 26, November 1985. 
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A.4. Income, consumption and savings 
As a result o( the pronounced slmrdoll'n in inflation and the upsll'ing in activity, real gross 
disposable income o( households in the Community 11·ill expand strongly in 1986 and 1987. 
Non-ll'age earners ll'ill benefit most from this increase in purchasing power. Pril'ate earnings 
ll'il! rise faster than gross disposable income but this does not result, as o(ten in the past. 
fi"om further increases in fiscal pressure. Private consumption ll'il! mm•e hroadly in line ll'ith 
households' income. Its buoyancy is unprecedented in the 1980s and prm•ides the mqjor 
impetus to the present acceleration of domestic demand groll'th. The doll'mrard trend in the 
savings ratio ohserved since the mid-1970s is likely to be interrupted temporarily in 1986, as 
adjustment and real interest rate factors outll'eigh ll'ealth e.f(ects. The lagged pattern <>( 
private consumption ll'hich results, ll'i!l lead to a continuing stimulus to economic activity in 
1987. In adclit ion. the increase in households· saving in 1986. together 1rith the ongoing 
adjustment in public finance, ll'ill contribute to easing real interest rates. By supporting 
demand and improving conditions on financial markets, the expected trends in income, 
consumption and savings make an important contribution to the cooperati1•e groll'th strategy 
for more employment. 
A.4.1. Developments in households' real dispos-
able income 
After being more or less na t between 1980 and 1983, real 
disposable income of households in the Community picked 
up in 1984 (0,9%) and 1985 (1.6%). Real disposable in-
comes are expected to be boosted further in 1986, to a 
growth rate of as much as 3,8 %. This acceleration stems 
principally from the impact of important unanticipated fac-
tors, notably, the improvement in the Community's terms 
of trade triggered by the depreciation of the dollar l'is-a-l'is 
European currencies and the sharp fall in prices of energy 
raw materials, in particular oil, on domestic prices. For the 
Community as a whole, import prices in 1986 will account 
for as much as 2,3 percentage points of the deceleration in 
the total final expenditure deOator. Only in Greece will 
import prices exert a positive effect on the overall level of 
inOation in 1986, elsewhere their dampening effect will range 
from 0,8 to 4, 7 percentage points (see Table A.4.1 ). 
The growth in real disposable incomes is forecast to continue 
in 1987, albeit at a slightly slower pace of 3 %, despite the 
fact that the restraining effect of import prices on inOation 
is projected to taper off. Thus, in 1987 for the Community 
as a whole, import prices are expected to boost prices by 0,4 
percentage points, with contributions varying from zero in 
Germany and the Netherlands to 1, 7 and 2, 7 percentage 
points respectively in Greece and Portugal. 
The continued strength in real disposable incomes is due to 
the tendency of nominal increases in incomes to adjust only 
slowly to unanticipated decelerations in consumer prices. 
Accordingly much of the terms of trade-induced real income 
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gain will accrue to the household sector in the form of more 
rapid increases in real wages, transfers and income from 
wealth than would have otherwise been the case. The lagged 
adjustment of consumption to income growth changes will 
serve to maintain the momentum of domestic demand which, 
together with the renewed upswing of EC export growth, 
will enable Community GDP to expand by 2,8 % in 1987. 
The most rapid increases in the components of nominal 
income in 1986 and 1987 will be in the category 'other 
factor incomes' (see Table A.4.2). This category includes the 
income of the self-employed and property and entrepreneur-
ial income (interest, income from land. dividends, etc.), and 
its growth reOects the participation of equity-holders in 
the steady recovery in profitability noted elsewhere in this 
Review and the more dynamic performance of unincorpor-
ated business. Over the period 1975-85 'other factor incomes' 
have on average grown somewhat faster than wages and 
salaries. although to a less significant degree than in the 
forecast period. This has been reOected in a steady fall, 
except in 1980-81 as a result of the second oil shock, in 
the labour share, adjusted for independents, of Community 
GDP at factor cost, from a peak of 78,5 % in 1975, to a 
forecast level of 73,5 % in 1987. This projected level is below 
the average level recorded in the 1960s (74,8 % ). 
Real household income before taxes and transfers is expected 
to grow faster in 1986 (4,5 %) than real disposable income 
(3,8 % ). A similar pattern is forecast for 1987 (3,3 % as 
against 3, I % ). Thus, the overall impact of taxes and trans-
fers in real terms can be seen to have a dampening effect on 
the strong growth in household income. Current transfers 
received by households are the least buoyant elements of 
Table A.4.1. 
Contribution of import prices to the rise in the total final expenditure deflator 
B DK D GR 
1960-73 TFE 3,6 6,2 3,9 4,l 
M 0,8 0.8 0.2 0,5 
1973-80 TFE 8,l 10,6 5,2 16,5 
M 3.4 3,1 l.3 4.0 
1980 TFE 7,5 11,5 6,3 21.0 
M 5,2 5.3 2.4 6,9 
1981 TFE 8.4 12,0 5,6 19.0 
M 5.4 4,5 2.4 3.2 
1982 TFE 9,5 10.5 4,0 25,0 
M 5.4 2,7 0,6 5.4 
1983 TFE 6.7 7.3 2,7 20.4 
M 3,0 l.3 O,l 4,8 
1984 TFE 6,3 6.4 2,5 20.7 
M 3,l 2.2 l.0 5.3 
1985 TFE 4,0 4,8 2,2 17,2 
M l.0 0.8 0,5 3.9 
1986 TFE - l,5 0.6 -0.4 19,7 
M -3,8 -2.7 -2.4 3.l 
1987 TFE l.5 2,0 l,2 11.2 
M 0.5 0.0 0,0 l.9 
Key: TFE = ~'o change in the Tola! Final Expenditure Dcflator. 
M = contribution of the import price deflater to change in TFE dcflator in 0,'o points. 
Source: Eurostat a:,d Commission services. Sec also EuropetJn Economy No 26. Technical Annex. 
Table A.4.2 
Income and expenditure of households and private non-profit institutions 
Compensation of employees 
Other factor income 
Current transfers received 
Current transfers paid 
Direct taxes 
Disposable income 
Real disposable income4 
Gross saving in % of disposable income 
Wages and salary earners 
Employment 
I Absolute values in thousand million PPS or thousand persons. 
2 Forecasts. 
l 6 - I + 2 + 3 - 4 - 5. 
EUR 10 
1980 75 
(I) 12,6 
(2) 13,1 
(3) 14,3 
(4) 14.1 
(5) 14.4 
(6)3 12,7 
2,8 
17,3 
0,7 
0,4 
4 Real disposable income equals nominal disposable income dcOatcd by the consumer price index. 
Sourn·: Eurostat and Commission services. 
E F 
6,8 4,6 
0.4 0.3 
17,8 11,0 
2,7 2,l 
16,8 13,0 
4,7 3,0 
15,6 12.7 
4,l 3,l 
13,6 12,0 
2,1 l.9 
13.3 8,9 
3,5 l.3 
l l,3 7,7 
l.8 l.8 
8,2 4.6 
0,6 O.l 
6,6 l,I 
-2,6 -2.4 
5,3 2,0 
0,5 0,2 
1984180 
7,6 
8,3 
ll,l 
10,0 
10.3 
8,2 
0.4 
15,6 
-0.9 
-0.7 
Income, consumption and savings 
IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 
6,1 5,1 3,6 4,7 3,7 5,0 4,7 
1,2 0,5 l,I 0,5 0,8 0,8 0.5 
16,0 18,1 7,3 7,9 21.4 16.4 12.4 
6,8 4,0 3,7 3,2 6,6 3,5 2,9 
16,0 20.9 7,8 8,6 22,2 17,6 13.8 
7,2 4,6 3,9 4,8 7.0 2,1 3,7 
18.4 20.3 8,6 8,5 19,l l l,I 12,2 
7,2 6,0 4,3 5,0 7.4 l,7 3,7 
12,8 16.4 l l.8 4.4 20,3 7,3 10,l 
2,9 2,5 6,5 0,5 5,5 1,3 l.9 
8.4 12.9 7,8 l.3 25.4 5,6 7.9 
l.9 I. I 3.4 0.2 9,0 l.5 l.5 
7.4 10,6 6,8 3,7 27.4 5.3 7,l 
3.4 2.2 3.2 l.9 9,7 l.8 2,0 
4.8 8.3 3.6 l.9 18,l 5.6 5.4 
l.0 l.5 0,8 0,5 3,5 0,8 0,8 
l.2 3,6 -0,3 -4,7 l l,7 l.9 l,9 
-2,6 -3,2 -3.4 -4,7 -0,8 -0,9 -2,3 
l.5 3,9 l.9 -0,l 10,9 3,7 2,9 
0,2 0,5 0,3 O.l 2,7 0.4 0.4 
Average °-o 
EUR 12 
1985 1986 1.' 1986' 19871 
7,3 2 223.l 7.0 5,6 
8,7 l 040.7 9,9 7,8 
7,8 876,0 6.2 5,3 
8,2 752.7 7.6 5,7 
8,8 406.6 8.2 5,6 
7,5 2 980.6 7.4 6.3 
l,6 3.8 3,l 
15,2 15.4 15,3 
0,4 100 010,6 0,8 0,8 
0.4 123 450.9 0,8 0.8 
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household income as expenditure is contained in certain 
countries with high budget deficits, the growth in numbers 
receiving transfers flattens out. and the slowdown in in-
flation is integrated more rapidly into the adjustment of 
social transfers. (For a more detailed treatment of longer-
term developments in social transfers see Chapter 8.4). Di-
rect taxes, on the other hand. will. after having a broadly 
neutral impact on wage and other incomes in 1986. boost 
disposable income in 1987 as discretionary policies come 
into effect and fiscal drag declines. In total, the sum of 
direct taxes and employees' and employers' social security 
contributions relative to the sum of gross wages and salaries 
and non-labour income is expected to equal 59, I % in 1986 
and 58,8 % in 1987 compared to 59.4 in 1985. The speeding 
up of economic growth (from 2.3 % in 1985 to close to 3 % 
in 1987), in conjunction with the cut in the unemployment 
rate (from 11, I % in 1985 to I 0,5 % in 1987) are the main 
factors that enable the European Community during the 
current and following year to reconcile a continued re-
duction of the public sector's net borrowing requirement in 
terms of GDP with no increases in the fiscal pressure on 
private earnings. I This is in contrast with earlier experience 
when since 1982 for example, the gradual narrowing of the 
budget deficit was invariably accompanied by an increase in 
fiscal pressure. 
1 II should be noied that the combined reduction of the budget ddicit as 
a percentage of GDP and of direct fiscal pressure is not achieved by 
cutting real transfers to the average household. Real transfers arc antici-
pated to grow this year and next by 2.7 % and 2,2 % respecti,·ely. whereas 
total population will expand by only 0.2 °1., each year. 
Table A.4.3 
Real growth of disposable income and compensation of employees 
The general trend noted above conceals considerable differ-
ences between Member States. This is illustrated in Table 
A.4.3. which presents for 1985 to 1987 the actual and fore-
cast growth disposable income and compensation of em-
ployees by country. Germany is expected ro lead with a real 
disposable income increase of 5,7 %. The nominal increase 
in German disposable income in 1986, amounting to some 
30,6 billion ECU results primarily from a rise in compen-
sation of employees (25 billion ECU). a half of which is 
offset by an increase in social security contributions. Other 
factor incomes rise by 14,2 billion ECU. Other countries 
expecting to experience a particularly buoyant increase in 
real disposable income in 1986 are Italy ( 5.6 % ) and Portugal 
(5,3 %), two countries which stand to gain relatively most 
from the decline in energy prices. In these countries the role 
of other factor incomes in the increase is much more marked 
with other factor incomes making up 48 and 51 % respect-
ively of the rise in all flows which affect gross disposable 
income positively,2 compared to 31 % in Germany. Greece 
remains the only economy which is likely to face a cut in 
real household income. 
A.4.2. Trends and outlook for consumption and 
savings 
The sharply increased pace of growth of real gross disposable 
income in 1986 provides the margin for private consumption 
' Compensation of employees. non-labour income .,nd transfer receipts. 
1 /lcr( t'ntagl' ( lwng,·1 1 
\9X6 1 1987 1 
Di..;posahlc 
IIKlHllC 
c·ompcnsat1on D1:,.po:,.ahk ('ltrllpcmatuin 1)1:,.po:-.ahll' ('ompcnsation 
B 1,2 
DK2 1,3 
D 1,7 
GR 3,3 
E 1,2 
F 0,9 
IRL 2,0 
I 1,6 
L 1.6 
NL 2,0 
p 2,3 
UK 2.1 
EUR 12 1.6 
1 Forcc;.1st. 
1 The Danish d1-;pnsi1hk llll'l'nll' ligun .. ", m.:ludL' h,,th the lwu:,.l'twld ;ind cntc·prisc "cctnr-, 
Sount'. Commission :-.en 1~r.:,. 
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1,1 
3,0 
1,8 
4,6 
0,6 
0,1 
0,8 
1.4 
1,3 
0,1 
2,0 
3,0 
1.5 
lni.:llnlC ln(Ollll' 
3.4 2.1 1.4 1.0 
0.6 2.8 1.8 2.1 
5.7 5,5 3.4 3.3 
- 5.5 -7.5 -0.8 - 1.8 
2.9 2.1 2.7 2.6 
3.3 2.0 3.0 1.2 
3.7 4.4 4.5 4.6 
4.3 2.9 3,9 2.7 
3.8 4.2 4.0 4.8 
2.7 3.4 1,6 2.8 
6.3 5.8 4,3 4.1 
3.9 4.4 3.2 3.1 
3.8 3.5 3.1 2.7 
to expand by 2, I % in 1985 a nd by 3.4 % in bo th 1986 a nd 
1987 compared to 2.1 % in 1985. Such buoyancy has no t 
been observed si nce the cyclica l upturn of 1978 and 1979. 
Together with the recovery in construction investment. it 
is private consumpt ion which will serve to underpi n the 
accelera tion of domestic demand expansion from 2. 1 % to 
3,6 %. Both growth in real activ ity and employment will of 
course benefit from this. 
The terms of trade gain a nd the consequent increase in rea l 
disposable household income and priva te consumption thus 
contri b ute sign ifica nt ly to providing the aggregate dema nd 
support called for in the cooperative strategy to ensure a 
fas ter expansion of output, investment a nd em ployment. 
The vigoro us growth of domes tic demand makes it possi ble 
to continue efforts in certa in coun tries to trim publ ic sec to r 
deficits witho ut hampering the ach ievement of the strategy 's 
objectives. 
T he growth rate in the volume of private consump ti on wi ll 
accelerate in 1986 in a ll Member States. except Denma rk, 
where it will continue to grow at above 2 % as in 1984 
and 1985. and Greece, where ba la nce of payments a uste rit y 
measures wi ll result in fa lls of 1,3 % in 1986 a nd 0.9 % in 
1987. Not surprisingly, Germany, It a ly a nd Portuga l are 
expected to expand private consum pti on fastest. The United 
Ki ngdom also is forecas t to exceed the Europea n average 
rate. 
A genera lized reductio n in savings ra ti os has occurred since 
they reached their peak level of 18 % fo r the Communi ty as 
a whole in 1975. T his was substantia lly higher th a n the 
average level registered in the 1960s a nd has been va ri ously 
ascribed to facto rs such as the maintenance of the rea l va lue 
of assets in the face o f inOa ti on, preca ut io na ry savings in 
the contex t of uncerta in ties o n the employment market etc. 
Si nce 1975 the aggregate Community savings rat io has fa llen 
to reach 15.2 % last year (see Graph A.4 .1 ). A lthough sa -
vings rat ios a re q uite vo la til e. due to the fact that they a re 
generally trea ted as a residua l in the estima ti on of the na-
tio nal accoun ts, some possible reasons behind the short term 
va ria ti ons shown in Table A.4.5 fo r a num ber of Member 
States, can be suggested . a nd the o utlook for the fo recast 
period assessed. 
A widely accepted view is tha t the propensity to save o ut of 
current income is determined essentia lly by the perceived 
level of so-ca lled 'perma nent income·, the rea l leve l o f wea lth 
a nd the course of ex pected rea l in te res t ra tes . It is help ful , 
therefore. to consider the curren t a nd expec ted evo lutio n of 
these factors and how they might affect sav ings behavio ur . 
Beca use people tend on average to adjust th eir consum pti o n 
behavio ur to their medium-te rm consum pti o n o ppo rtun ities 
rather th an to the current level of di sposa ble income, th e 
propensity to consume say, this yea r's rea l income increment 
Income. consum ptio n a nd savings 
GRAPH A.4.1 : Savings' ratio, consumer price inflation and 
real gross disposable income of households 
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Source : Eurostat and Commission services. 
will be re la ted to whether the increase is judged to be las ting 
o r not. A substa ntia l amo unt of the present increase in 
disposable income res ul ts from the fa ll of the do lla r aga inst 
the ECU a nd the decline in the o il p ri ce. T he future of bo th 
o f these elements is hard to fo resee. Any rise in the savi ngs 
ra ti o will tend to be modera ted . the mo re thi s yea r·s additi on 
to rea l disposab le income is th o ught to be pe rma nent .3 
On the o ther ha nd , a n inc rease in the vo lume o f ho useho ld 
wea lth will tend to d ri ve down th e savings ra ti o as people 
a tt em pt to spread consum pti on mo re evenly ove r time. 4 
3 A perm a11e111 income gai n is in terp reted he re as res ulti ng fr o m a p urel y 
temporary terms of t rade improwmen t. The p ri ces 01· expo rt s O\'er im-
po rt s move up in o ne period to fa ll back promptly to thei r o r igi na l level 
thereafte r. The savin gs ra ti o may even d imin is h when eco nomic agent s 
a rc o f the o pinion tha t t he rea l dep recia ti o n or the do lla r a nd th e 
cheapeni ng of energy wi ll not be rewrsed in t he years a head since th is 
wo uld mean th a t the im p li ci t in te rn a tio na l p urc hasin g powe r ll ow in 
fa vo ur of the Com mu ni ty wo uld be pe rpetuated beyo nd the p resent. /\ 
mi rror view of thi s argu ment p rovides an exp la na ti on for the 198 1 
increase in the sav in gs rat io a lt ho ugh gross d isposable income wa s being 
cut in the d irect afte rmath o r the second o il p rice shoc k . 
• Sec for insta nce the li fe-c ycle hypot hesis adva nced by A. A nd o a nd F . 
Modigliani. ·The li fe cyc le hypo thesis or sav ing: aggregate im p li cat io ns 
and tests'. American ccunomic reric1r. March 1963. 
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Table A.4.4 
Percentage changes of private consumption at constant prices 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR JO EUR I~ 
1961-70 3,7 4,3 5,2 6,7 7,2 5.4 3,7 6.4 4.2 6.2 5,6 2,3 4.7 4,9 
1971-80 3,8 1,6 3,5 4.4 4,0 4,3 3,8 3.0 4,1 3.4 4,3 2,1 3,3 3.4 
1979 4.4 1.4 3,1 2,7 1.2 3,5 4.9 4,9 3,6 3,0 0,9 4.5 3,9 3,6 
1980 2,3 -3,7 1,7 -0,2 1,3 1.5 4.8 4,8 3.2 0.0 3,2 -0.4 1.5 1.5 
1981 -1,2 -2,3 -0,2 1,0 -0,9 2,1 2.1 0,8 1.7 -2.5 2,3 0.0 0.4 0,3 
1982 0,7 1,5 -1.4 2,1 0,7 3,2 -4,9 0.2 -1,7 -1.2 2.0 1,0 0.5 0.6 
1983 -0,9 1,7 1,1 0,6 0.7 0,7 -3.5 -0,6 - 1,2 0.4 -1,0 4.2 I. I I. I 
1984 0,5 2,8 0,6 2,1 - 1.0 0,7 -0.5 1.8 -1.2 -0.6 -3.0 1.7 I.I 0.9 
1985 0,7 4,3 1.7 3,2 1,3 2.4 1.5 1.9 1,7 2,0 0.7 2.8 2,2 2,1 
1986 2,8 2,6 4,9 -1,3 2,8 2,9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 4.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 
1987 1,9 2.4 4,0 -0.9 2,8 3.3 4,3 4.2 3.7 2.0 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.4 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
Table A.4.5 
The savings ratio, the growth of disposable income and the consumer price inflation rate 1 
B I) F NL UK 
1971 19,8 4,6 5,3 12,9 5.5 5,9 16.8 7,0 5,5 24.4 5,1 5.5 16,6 4.4 8.3 7.7 1,3 8,6 
1972 20.4 7,0 5.4 12,5 6,3 5,6 16,8 7,8 5,8 25.6 4,8 6.4 17,0 3,8 8,8 9.9 9,0 6,6 
1973 19.4 6,9 6.1 12,0 2,5 7.1 17,3 6,8 6,8 25,3 7,1 12,5 18,3 5.6 9,3 I I. I 6.4 8,3 
1974 20,2 4,3 12,7 12,3 1,9 7.6 17.4 3.4 13,5 24,7 1.4 20,9 18,3 2.8 10,1 11.2 -1,7 17,1 
1975 20.1 0,5 12,3 14,0 4,8 6,0 18,6 5.4 11.3 27.3 1.7 17.7 16,3 0,9 10,7 12,7 0,0 23,7 
1976 21.7 7.1 12.3 2,1 4,2 16.4 3,1 9,8 26,9 3,5 18,1 16,3 6,6 8,8 12.0 -1,0 15,7 
1977 19.7 -0.2 7.1 11.3 2.4 3,7 16.6 3,7 9,0 26,5 2,8 18.2 13,5 9,5 6.0 11.3 -1.3 14,9 
1978 19,8 2.7 4.1 11.2 3,6 2.9 17.5 5,8 8.7 27,7 5,1 12.9 13,5 4,7 4.5 13.1 8,2 9,0 
1979 18,3 2,6 4,0 11,8 3.3 4.2 16.2 2,1 10.4 26,9 4,2 15.1 12,8 2,6 4,3 13,9 6,4 13,6 
1980 18,3 2,5 6.6 11.9 1,0 5,5 14,9 0,0 13,2 25,0 2,6 20,2 12,1 -0,7 6,9 15,1 1.6 16.4 
1981 19.0 -0.4 8.5 12.5 -3.0 6.0 15.8 3,6 12.8 25.1 1,6 19.2 13,5 -0.4 6.3 13.4 - 1,5 11.2 
1982 17.4 -1.5 7.5 11,9 - 1.8 4,8 15,7 3,5 11,2 24,8 0.0 17.0 15,7 2,2 5.3 12.8 0,9 8,3 
1983 15.8 0,3 7.0 10.2 -0,7 2.9 14.5 2.0 9.4 24.0 -2.1 14,9 14,1 2,8 10,7 10,7 2,3 5, I 
1984 15.0 0,9 6.2 11.6 1,0 2.5 13.5 -0,5 7.3 25,5 2.0 11,1 14,0 0,0 2.6 12,1 2.3 5, I 
1985 15.4 1.2 4.9 11.6 I. 7 2.0 12.3 0,9 5,5 25.1 1,6 9.4 14,0 2,0 2,2 11,5 2,1 5.4 
1986 15.9 3.4 1.2 12.3 5.7 0.0 12.6 3.3 2.4 25.8 4.3 5.6 13,6 2,7 0,0 11,7 3,9 3,9 
1987 15.4 1.4 1.7 11,8 3.4 I. I 12.5 3.0 2,2 25.9 3,9 4.8 13.3 1,6 0.2 11.4 3,2 4,0 
= Gross savings as a percentage or gross households' disposahk income. 
-
Percentage growth of real gross disposable income. 
-
Consumer price inflation rate. 
I Given the mst1tu1ional di!Tcrcncc:. he1wccn indi\idual i.:ountriL·s ,rnd the heterogeneous lklimtions of the household sector. the ligurcs for one country cannot serve in principle as a yardstick for 
judging the saving~ behaviour of another countr}. However. they permit a comparison of the \artous Member States· savings pattern through time. 
Sourn•: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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Since inflation erodes the real value of wealth. such as 
monetary assets. cash and fixed interest rate bonds. it will 
result in the need for higher savings ratios to compensate 
for this erosion and to maintain the level of household wealth 
intact. The fall in the savings ratio observed throughout the 
Community in the l 980's reflects the declining importance 
of this factor as inflation rates were increasingly brought 
under control. 5 
In addition. the recent. largely unanticipated. deceleration 
in inflation also raises the real yield on existing interest-
bearing assets held by households 0 permitting them to spend 
more and save less. Besides the favourable effect from lower 
inflation. net household wealth has benefitted equally from 
rising equity prices. Numerous European stock exchanges 
have seen their indices register very substantial increases. 
Hence the increase in wealth which households are enjoying 
currently, stimulates consumption and thus tends to depress 
the savings ratio. 
The savings ratio is also influenced by the distribution of 
income between non-labour income, wages and salaries and 
transfer payments. In general, consumption out of non-
labour income will tend to be lower than from wages and 
salaries, which in turn will be lower than from transfers. 
Given expected developments in income growth in 1986 and 
1987, i.e. non-labour income growing faster than compen-
sation of employees, and this in turn growing more rapidly 
than transfers, the distributional effect is likely to be in the 
' This decline is much less pronounced when the savings ratio is adjusted 
for the inflation-induced depreciation of net monetary assets. See A. 
Cukierman and J. Mortensen. 'Monetary assets and inOation-induced 
distortions of the national accounts - conceptual issues and correction 
of sectoral income Oows in five EEC countries·. S111clies in ha11ki11g a11cl 
finance. North-Holland. 1985. for a discussion of. and figures for, the 
adjusted savings ratio for a number of countries over the period I 960-
81. 
6 For a discussion of anticipated and unanticipated gains/losses on monet-
ary assets of the various sectors in the economy due to inOation. see A. 
Cukierman. K. Lennan and F. Papadia. 'InOation-induced redistri-
butions via monetary assets in five European countries: 1974-82". Econ-
omic papers, No 41, Brussels 1985. 
Income. consumption and savings 
opposite direction to the other factors mentioned above, 
tending to boost savings. 
Finally, the savings ratio is influenced by high real interest 
rates. The decline in rates of inflation has been faster than 
the fall in nominal interest rates with the result that in April 
1986, the real interest rate for the Community as a whole 
was substantially above the levels recorded in the recent 
past. 7 It should, however. be noted that the measurement 
of real interest rates is subject to substantial methodological 
and conceptual difficulties, particularly in periods of strong 
external price shocks (see Chapter A.6). Accordingly. expec-
tations of future real rates may not be as buoyant as the 
current levels would suggest. 
The balance of the above effects is expected to result in a 
slight increase in the savings ratio in 1986. from 15,2 to 
15,4 % as gains in real incomes are not fully reflected in a 
rise in the volume of consumption. In 1987, on the other 
hand, the savings ratio is forecast to ease again to 15.3 as 
adjustment to higher real income levels gradually takes place. 
The resulting pattern of household consumption behaviour 
will, therefore, carry some of the beneficial effect of falling 
oil prices into 1987, boosting activity in that year and thereby 
smoothing out the pattern of GDP growth. 
In addition. the predicted rise of household saving in the 
Community, rising from 340 to 365 billion ECU. together 
with the reduction of 8 billion ECU in public sector deficits. 
will have a favourable influence on financial markets and 
tends to exert downward pressure on interest rates. This will 
in turn boost consumption and, more importantly, in the 
framework of the cooperative growth strategy for more 
employment, pave the way for a more rapid increase in 
investment. 
7 The real interest rate is defined here as the difference between the nominal 
interest rate on long-term government bonds and the consumer price 
inOation rate. In April 1986 the real interest rate for EUR 12 was 5,75 %. 
Measures using the GDP price deOator or unit labour costs result in 
substantially lower estimates. 
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A.5. Investment and productive capacity 
Gross fixed capital .fcmnation in the Community gre\\' hy 2,3 % in /985, in ll'hat \\'as the 
second _rear of' recover_r afier declines in inl'estment during 1981-83. The pa Item o( recover_r 
has heen quite variahle hetween countries and sectors. Indeed the construction component o( 
capita/formation declined hy 2,4 % in /985 compared to an increase of 7,5 % .fc>r equipment 
investment. The growth of GDP, ll'hich increased by 2,3 % in the Community in /985 and 
which is expected to rise hy 2.7 % in /986, has laid the foundations .fc1r increased capital 
.fcmnation, but has until 110\\' led essentially to increases in capacity utili:ation. Profitahility 
and investment shares have increased since /982-83 hut are still significantly below the levels 
experienced in the 1960s and early 1970s. Lower oil prices are expected to give an added 
boost to output and im•estnu'nt and forecasts have heen re1•ised upwards hut the expected 
levels o( output growth and capital .fcmnation are still helo\\' those ll'hich arc likely to he 
required to .fi1(/if the output and employment targets <!/' the cooperative growth strategy. 
A.5.1. Introduction 
This assessment of investment performance in the Com-
munity deals essentially with three topics. The first is the 
nature and extent of investment activity during the present 
recovery (e.g. the breakdown of capital formation between 
industry and services, equipment and construction, public 
and private). The second is the longer term performance of 
investment and, in particular, the evolution of certain key 
aggregate variables such as output, the capital stock and 
employment, including the link between gross fixed capital 
formation and the capital stock. In this context it is useful 
to review the major elements of the cooperative growth 
strategy; namely 3,5 % output growth and I - 1,5 % annual 
employment growth over the period to 1990 with the unem-
ployment rate for the Community falling to 7 %. The third 
topic concerns those factors which might innuence capital 
formation. namely expected output. profitability, the cost 
of capital and factor prices more generally, technological 
innovation and in particular the implications for short-term 
investment expectations, bearing in mind also the additional 
recent factor of the oil price reduction. 
A.5.2. The investment recovery 
In general for the Community. output has recovered from 
late 1982 onwards. with the increase in capital formation not 
occurring until 1984. This recovery in investment followed a 
period from 1980 to 1983 when gross fixed capital formation 
(GFKF) in the Community declined by 1.1 % annually (sec 
Table I). Furthermore. the performance of GFKF in the 
Community during the 1970s was relatively poor: 1.3 °1., 
average annual increase during the 1971-78 period compared 
to rates of about 4 % for the USA and Japan. The real 
annual increase in gross lixed capital formation for the 
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whole economy was 1.3 % for the Community in 1984 and 
2.3 % in 1985. This contrasts with the USA where the 
recovery began a year earlier and has been much more rapid 
(7.9 %, 17,6 % and 7.5 % increases in GFKF for 1983. 1984 
and 1985 respectively) and with Japan which in any case 
experienced a less severe recession and where gross fixed 
capital formation rose by 4.6 % and 5,6 % respectively in 
1984 and 1985. 
Clearly such aggregate figures (for the whole economy and 
the total Community) conceal a considerable variation in 
performance between countries and sectors. Table A.5.1 
shows that the largest increases in total gross fixed capital 
formation in 1984 occurred in Denmark. Italy, the Nether-
lands and the UK and in Denmark, Spain and Italy in 1985. 
Reference to Table A.5.2 shows the extent to which the 
recovery has been based on equipment investment. In 1985, 
gross fixed capital formation in equipment rose by 7,5 % 
for the Community with significant increases in all countries 
except for Portugal. Construction investment on the other 
hand declined by 2,4 'Yo and only in Denmark. Greece. 
Belgium and Spain did this component of capital formation 
rise noticeably. It is not possible to give a breakdown be-
tween residential construction and structures but it is likely 
that high interest rates have played a major role in holding 
down housing investment. 
Tables A.5.3 and A.5.4 provide further insight into the 
nature of the investment recovery. Table A.5.3 provides 
rates of growth of gross fixed capital formation from the 
Community sectoral database for industry and market ser-
vices. while Table A.5.4 gives information on manufacturing 
investment from the EC business surveys. Gross fixed capital 
formation for the market services sector is not available for 
1984- 85 but with the exception of Belgium. investment 
in services seems to have declined by less than that in 
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Table A.5.1 
Investment trends by country 1 
1978 71 198.1 80 1984;8.1 1985/84 1986 85' 1987 86' 
B 2,5 -5,1 1,0 3.3 5,3 4.1 
DK 0,8 -6,4 12,8 14,6 10,8 1.2 
D 0,5 -0,7 0,8 -0.3 5.8 5.7 
GR 3,2 -4,3 -4,7 3.4 -2.5 -0.3 
E 2,9 -0,9 -3J! 5.4 6,6 6.3 
F 2,8 -0.1 -2,2 3,0 3,9 4.4 
IRL 6,3 -3,5 -1,8 1.6 2.5 5,0 
I -0,4 -0,3 4,1 4,1 5,9 7,5 
L 1,6 -4,0 -1,4 1.7 2.7 2,0 
NL 0,5 -3,8 4,3 2.4 3,7 3,2 
p 8,0 2,5 -18,0 - 1.8 8,6 8,5 
UK 0,8 -0.9 8.2 1.0 3.6 2.6 
EUR 123 1,3 - I. I 1,3 2,3 4.9 4,9 
USA 4,4 - 1,1 17,6 7.5 2.6 5.7 
Japan 3.7 1.7 4,6 5,6 6,7 5,3 
I Total economy annualized real rate of change of gross fixed capital formation, 1980 prices. 
2 Forecasts. 
J EUR IOfor 1978/71.1983/80. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table A.5.2 
Gross fixed capital formation by main component (average annual growth rates) 
1978/71 1985,i\.l 1986,85 1 1987 s1, 1 
E C E C E C E C 
B 0,7 2.1 5.4 1,9 9.2 2.6 8,1 I. I 
DK 4,0 -0,6 16.5 13,1 13.7 8,2 -0,7 2.9 
D 2,8 0,2 9.3 -6,2 10,2 2,7 8,9 3.2 
GR 3,6 3,0 4.4 2,6 -4.1 - 1,1 0 -0,5 
E 12.0 1,5 8,5 5,3 8,0 5.1 
F 4,6 1,2 4.5 0,1 5,0 1.7 5,5 2,0 
IRL 9,4 4,2 8,0 -5,5 5,2 -0,8 6,5 2,9 
I 1,5 -1,6 9,9 -1.7 9,0 2.6 11,2 3,3 
L 1,5 1.5 4,0 0.7 5.0 1.7 4,0 1.0 
NL 2,0 0 10,7 -3.2 6.3 1,8 6,5 0.6 
p 1.0 -4.0 9.6 7.7 8,6 8,5 
UK 2,3 -0,6 6.1 -3.1 3.1 4.0 2.7 2.5 
EUR 12 7.5 -2.4 6,8 3, I 6.9 2.9 
E = equipment, C = construction. 
I Forecast. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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manufacturing between 1980 and 1983. Both Tables A.5.3 
and A.5.4 show the large increases in industry investment 
which took place in 1984 and particularly in 1985. Compared 
to the increase of 7,5 % in 1985 for equipment investment 
in the Community mentioned above, industrial investment 
rose by about 10 % (EUR 10). In Denmark ilnd the Nether-
lands there were much higher increases of 33 % and 21 % 
respectively. Only Ireland appears to have experienced a 
decline (- 11 %) in industri a l investment in 1985. 
According to the business surveys the marked increase in 
manufacturing investment which has taken place in Den-
mark and the Netherlands is expected to moderate substan-
tially in 1986, but all countries foresee volume improvements 
in 1986 and expectations appear to be most buoya nt in 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, although for 
Ireland and Greece there are specific sectoral reasons for 
this (see footnotes 4 and 5 to Table A.5.4). 
A.5.3. Productive capacity and output 
Despite the fairly optimistic outlook for investment in 1986 
and 1987 (Table A.5.1 gives the forecasts for total gross 
fixed capital formation and Table A.5.2 a breakdown for 
construction and equipment investment) the question still 
remains as to whether it will be enough to satisfy the require-
ments of the cooperative growth strategy. Although GDP 
grew by 2.3 % in 1985, manufacturing employment in the 
Community declined by about 0,5 % and total employment 
only increased by about 0.4 %. With GDP growth forecast 
a t 2,7 % in 1986 total employment is expected to increase 
by about 0 ,8 % and the forecast for 1987 is broadly the 
same. The a nalysis that follows shows that output growth 
must further increase to sat isfy the employment targets of 
the cooperative strategy and that this implies both increases 
in capacity utilization and significant increases in capacity. 
EC business surveys suggest tha t capacity utili za tion in 
manufacturing industry at the beginning of 1986 was ap-
proaching the level of the last cyclical peak (capacity utili za-
tion had risen above 85 % in Germany, Luxembourg and 
the UK. see Table A.5.5). It is instructive, therefore . to try 
to cast some light on productive capaci ty and he links 
between capital formation. the capital stock . output a nd 
employment. 
Concern was expressed in the las t Annual Review 1 about 
the long-term decline in the in vestme nt ratio (investment as 
a percentage of value added) for both industry and the whole 
1 See European Eco110111\' No 26. November 1985. Annual Econom ic Re-
port and Review 1985~86. 
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economy in the Community. The extent of this decline is 
illustrated in Graph A.5.1 which shows that the downward 
trend in the investment ratio for industry (from about 16 % 
in 1970 to about 11 % in 1982) has only been arrested in 
the last two to three years. The present situation is that 
when averaged across the Community. the investment ratio 
for the whole economy is now in the region of 19 % as 
compared with about 23 % in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
For industry the ratio has dropped from about 16 % to 
12%. 
One of the consequences of this decline in the investment 
ratio is that the capital stock has become more outdated . 
Some evidence for this development is provided in Table 
A.5.6 which shows the ratio of the net capital stock to the 
gross capital stock for manufacturing. This ratio 2 is an 
approximate indicator of the age of capital assets and can 
GRAPH A.5.1 : Gross fixed investment in Industry! 
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Table A.5.3 
Gross fixed capital formation for industry and market serYices by Member State 1 
B 
DK 
D 
F 
I 
NL 
UK 
EUR 7 
USA 
Japan 
Country 
1 A••erage annual growth rate. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table A.5.4 
1980 70 
-1.0 
0,8 
-0,8 
1,7 
0,5 
-2,5 
-2.1 
-0,3 
4,0 
0,2 
Industry 
1983. 80 
-3,8 
-4,5 
-4,2 
-1,7 
-7.2 
-10.6 
4,0 
I QS5 SJ 
5.3 
37,5 
5.9 
10,4 
21.2 
11.7 
Industrial imestment in manufacturing industry by Member State - % change in relation to preceding year 
1984 1985 
Country Value Volume Value Volume 
terms tcrms 1 terms tcrms 1 
B2,6 + 10 +5 +7 +3 
DK2 +44 +39 +37 +33 
D +I -I + 16 +14 
GR2.4 -34 -53 +51 +32 
F + 19 + 13 + 16 +10 
IRL2,5 +21 +14 -5 -II 
I +8 -I -12 +2 
L3 + 17 +II + 17 +14 
NL +29 +27 +23 +21 
UK2 + 19 + 15 + 10 +4 
EUR 10 + 12 +7 + 15 + 10 
19S0,70 
3,9 
-I.I 
3,1 
3,7 
1,4 
1,1 
1.8 
2,6 
3,8 
4,7 
Value 
terms 
+ 16 
+7 
+10 
+69 
+3 
+24 
+ 15 
+20 
+ 10 
+ II 
+ 10 
1 Changes in volume arc calculated by dividing the changes in value by the corresponding dcnators for gross capital formation. For 1985. 1986 forecast dcflators arc used. 
Excluding extractive industries. 
J Excluding the extractive industries, including energy and water. 
Upward fluctuations mainly due to increase in basic material industries in 1985/86. 
Fluctuations in 1985 and 1986 mainly due to decrease in food industry in 1985 and expected increase in 1986. 
6 1986 figures without chemical industry and iron and steel. 
Source: European Community Business Surveys. 
198380 
-9.5 
-3,4 
- 1.9 
- 1.2 
-3,4 
2,2 
6,3 
1986 
\'olume 
terms 1 
+ 13 
+5 
+8 
+41 
+I 
+ 19 
+8 
+ 17 
+9 
+6 
+7 
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Table A.5.5 
Capacity utilization in manufacturing industry(%) 
Rangc 1 1984 1985 Januan 
1986 
Peak Trough 
1979,80 1982,83 
B 79,1 74,4 76,0 78,8 80,9 
D 86,0 75,3 80,2 83,7 85,2 
F 85,3 81,1 81,9 82,8 83,4 
IRL 68,1 56,8 61,5 67,3 74,8 
I 77,3 69,1 72,0 74,0 74,3 
L 83,0 66,5 77,8 80.9 87,8 
NL 83,0 75,8 82,3 83,8 83,7 
UK 87,6 73,0 82,5 85,8 85,4 
EUR 82 83,9 76,4 79,1 81,6 82,3 
I These arc the highest and lowest values reached in the period 1979-83. 
2 Sum or above eight. 
Source: European Community Business Surveys. 
Table A.5.6 
Net capital stock as a % of gross capital stock in manufacturing industry 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK 
1960 77,4 66,6 50,3 58,9 80,8 67,6 
1970 78,8 81,4 61,7 80,5 56,7 77,7 55,9 70,2 80,6 68,4 
1980 75,4 78,6 54,7 81,5 53,3 79,8 51,7 71,7 75,6 64,9 
1981 74,9 54,3 81,3 52,6 51,7 75,0 64,1 
1982 74,7 53,7 51,9 51,0 74,3 63,4 
1983 74,4 53,1 51,3 49,4 73,8 62,7 
1984 52,6 50,6 48,4 62,2 
1985 52,4 50,0 47,7 61,7 
Source. Eurostat. 
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conceivably take any value between zero and a hundred. 
For example a decline in the ratio would indicate an in-
creased ageing of a nation's capital stock. An increase on 
the other hand. could be taken to indicate that the weight 
of depreciation in the total is decreasing. The actual levels 
shown in the table will vary across countries because of 
different asset lifetimes assumed but the trends in individual 
countries are in general consistent over time. Looked at in 
terms of the ratio of net to gross in the 1960s, the capital 
stock of the Community was becoming progressively more 
modern. This was particularly true in France. the United 
Kingdom and Belgium, whereas in Germany and, to a lesser 
extent in Italy, some ageing was already apparent due largely 
to the effects of the investment boom in the early I 950s. In 
the Netherlands the ratio remained broadly unchanged over 
the 1960s. However, in the second period covered, 1970 to 
1980, the average age of the capital stock increased in all 
Community countries for which data are available, except 
Ireland and Greece. where foreign inward direct investment 
undoubtedly played an important part, and in Luxembourg. 
Table A.5.7 gives further evidence of the slowdown in the 
growth of output and the capital stock which has occurred 
from the mid-l 970s onwards.The table gives rates of growth 
of output. gross fixed capital formation and an estimate of 
the growth rate of the capital stock (all for manufacturing 
industry) from 1960 until the forecast period 1986 and 1987. 
Although the rate of growth of gross value-added for manu-
facturing i!ldustry lies in the range of 2,5 to 3.5 % for the 
1984-87 period and investment growth is in the 6 to 8 % 
range it can be seen the growth rate of the gross capital 
stock is of the order of 1,5 % . In other words a significant 
proportion of output growth during these four years is 
attributable to an increase in capacity utilization, as indi-
cated by the fourth column of Table A.5. 7 which gives an 
adjusted capital stock figure. 
It is possible to make a purely mechanical calculation to 
give the order of magnitude of gross fixed capital formation 
and increase in the investment ratio which would be needed 
to bring output growth in line with that required for the 
cooperative strategy, although rather stringent assumptions 
are required. First of all the growth of capacity and output 
in the manufacturing sector of EUR 43 is assumed to move 
proportionally in line with total capacity and output growth 
for the Community. 4 Secondly it is assumed that capital-
3 EUR 4 = Germany, France. Italy and the UK. The assumption is 
necessar) because of the need to use data on capital stock and capital 
formation for EU R 4 manufacturing. 
4 For problems linked with this hypothesis. sec Chapter B.3 dealing with 
sectoral aspects. 
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output ratios in manufacturing industry are unchanged and 
that the extra output required to fulfil the strategy from 
I 987 is produced from net additions to the capital stock, 
and not from further increases in capacity utilization. If one 
assumes, for example, that to achieve the strategy in 1987 
Community output growth must rise from 2,8 % to 3,5 % 
and EUR 4 manufacturing growth from 3,4 % to 4,0 %, 
then this would require that gross fixed capital formation in 
manufacturing industry increase by about 18 % in 1987 
rather than the envisaged 6,2 % (such a growth rate is by 
no means unprecedented as is indicated by Table A.5.7, see 
figures for 196 I. 1969 and I 970). Equivalently the investment 
share (in manufacturing industry) would have to rise by just 
over one percentage point from about 11,8 % to about 
13.1 %. 
One question that arises at this point is whether there are 
any specific supply constraints that would jeopardize the 
increases in capacity and output alluded to above. Clearly 
the problem of bottlenecks is one that concerns particular 
sectors or types of goods and is not easy to answer. But at 
an aggregate level it may be possible for effective capacity 
to increase. without requiring that all extra output growth 
comes from new capacity. This may be true for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the lower oil price renders some existing 
capacity profitable again, secondly, some capacity can be 
used more intensively and thirdly. some sectors such as 
services have less of a capacity constraint. A second con-
sideration is the source of savings to finance higher invest-
ment ratios. As far as the savings ratio itself is concerned. 
increased growth of output and incomes (real income is 
expected to rise due to lower oil prices) can be expected to 
lead to increases in the saving rate (see chapter on consump-
tion and savings). 
A.5.4. Prospects 
Essentially a summary of the above would be that output and 
investment are recovering, although in an uneven fashion 
between countries and sectors. There is, however, a need for 
the recovery to accelerate in order that capacity and output 
growth are sufficient to create the employment that is necess-
ary to fulfil the requirements of the cooperative strategy. It 
is instructive, therefore, to examine the economic back-
ground to this investment recovery in order to assess the 
prospects for the forthcoming period. 
First of all output has recovered from about the end of 1982 
onwards. For the Community of Twelve, GDP increased by 
2,0 % and 2,3 % for 1984 and 1985 respectively and nearly 
3 % growth is forecast for 1986 and 1987. This growth is 
expected to sustain the investment recovery. Secondly, real 
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Table A.5.7 
Output growth, capital stock and gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing industry 1 
Gross Gross fixed Gross Cap11,il Sh..lt,:l 
value- capital capital adjusted for 
added fom1ation stock utihlation 
1961 5,5 15,l 6,9 6.3 
1962 4,6 3,4 6,7 3.6 
1963 4.2 -3,7 5,8 6.1 
1964 7,8 -0,5 5, I 7.5 
1965 5.2 0,4 4.6 3.9 
1966 4.1 3,6 4,7 3.9 
1967 2,1 -4.2 4.1 -1.1 
1968 8,7 7.5 4.2 8,8 
1969 8,7 18,5 5.1 9.4 
1970 4.7 15.6 5.7 5.6 
1971 1,2 -1.3 5.2 0.6 
1972 3,8 -5,4 4,4 3.5 
1973 7.8 3.2 4.2 8.5 
1974 2.1 -0.6 3.8 0.4 
1975 -5.6 -14.0 2.7 -5.3 
1976 6,9 2.1 2.7 5.3 
1977 2.6 3.1 2,6 4.6 
1978 1.5 -0.5 2,4 , , 
1979 3,3 7.5 2,4 6,6 
1980 -0.5 5.6 2.4 -0.7 
1981 -2,2 -9,4 1.6 -2.7 
1982 -1,0 -7.6 1.2 0.8 
1983 0,3 - 1.7 1.2 1.6 
1984 3.3 7.9 1.3 5.3 
1985 2.7 9.5 1.3 4.5 
1986 3.2 7,6 1.5 4.1 
1987 3,4 6.2 1.7 4,4 
1 Annual growth rates (in constant prices) for EUR 4, i.e. Germany, France. ltal} and the United Kingdom. for 111,111ufacturing industr~ only. 
Source: Commission services. 
long term interest rates. following dramatic increases during 
1980 and 1981 have stabilized and long-term nominal inter-
est rates have begun to fall. Although inflation rates have 
also been falling. the real long-term interest rate for the 
Community is estimated as 4.6 % for 1985 compared to 
5,3 % for 1984. 5 
Thirdly, profitability has recovered during the recent period. 
Graphs A.5.2 and A.5.3 show rates of return for manufatur-
ing industry and for the non-agricultural business sector for 
EUR 4, USA and Japan from 1960 onwards. Rates of return 
in Europe declined during the 1970s and early 1980s and 
have only recovered from about 1983 onwards, (in fact from 
' On the basis of GDP price detlators. 
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1982 for Germany and the UK. from 1983 for France and 
from 1984 for Italy) although the general trend has not been 
substantially different in the USA and Japan. Two factors 
have been instrumental in the recovery of profitability. The 
first is the growth in output and consequent increase in 
capacity utilization which have taken place. The second 
reason is that wage increases have moderated substantially. 
The real rate of increase of employees· compensation was 
of the order of 2,3 % annually for the Community during 
the 1970s (implying an average increase of real unit labour 
costs of 0,4 % ) but real unit labour costs have declined by 
about I % annually during 1982-85. Further ·evidence of 
this moderation is given by the share of wages in value-added 
(corrected for employment structure) which. following the 
sharp increases between 1971 and 1981. has in the last few 
years in the Community returned to the level experienced in 
GRAPH A.5.2: Net rate of return on gr~ capital stock: 
manufacturing industry 
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the 1960s. These three factors , o utput growth a nd increased 
capacit y utiliza ti on, higher profitability and the possib ility 
of fa lling real interest rates (in the wake of fa lling no minal 
rates and lower. more sta ble leve ls of inOatio n) have com-
bined to bring abo ut and susta in a recovery in inves tment. 
C lea rl y these fac to rs have no t wo rk ed in a unifo rm fashi on 
across the Community. Neither has the mi x of intern a l a nd 
ex terna l effec ts on o utput and in vestment necessaril y been 
the same. Coun tries ha ve no t for insta nce benefited eq ua ll y 
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from the st imulus to export sec to rs brought abo ut by output 
grow th in the USA. Similarly some countries have disco-
vered that wage moderation policies have no t only increased 
profitability and in vest ment genera lly but have been instru-
mental in improving competitivity a nd stimula tin g o utput 
grow th in expo rt-related sectors. Denmark a nd the Nether-
la nds are examples of this second feature . 
In assessing in vestment prospects for the short term, a fourth 
factor has to be added to the picture. namely the effect of 
lower oil prices . Wit h the exception of ce rtain secto rs in 
certa in co untries (related to o il production a nd exploration) 
lower o il prices can be expected to have a favo urable effect 
on both o utput and productive capacity. 
First of a ll to the extent that lower o il prices imply increased 
incomes for a ll or some of enterprises. households a nd 
gove rnment s in the Comm un ity. consum ption. outpu t and 
in vest men t wi ll be stimulated. This effect, which is essentia lly 
demand induced. wi ll lead to new investment. The effect wi ll 
be offset by lower exports to o il producing countries. a nd 
in any case will be subject to indetermina te lags . 
A second effect arises from the lowering of production cos ts 
of exis ting capacity so that increased profitability is partly 
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, and 
eq uilibrium o utput increases. T hi s leads to an ex tension of 
productive capacity. This effect which depends o n lower 
production costs can be expected to vary significan tl y across 
sectors depending on the importa nce of o il inputs. The effect 
of increased profitability can a lso be expected to stimula te 
investment to the extent that financing cos ts for implement -
ing new projects is red uced. 
A further effect on productive capacity arises because of th e 
postponement of scrapping o r retirement of inves tment. 
Essenti a lly lower o il prices reduce unit production cos ts a nd 
enable ex istin g capacity to compete for longer with potential 
new plant . which in ge nera l wi ll have lower va riable costs 
but higher fi xed cos ts. Although the effect on productive 
capacity is positive, new inves tment may decrease in the 
sense th a t the add ition of new o r replacement ca pacit y is 
postponed. 
Finally, if ene rgy a nd capital a re complement s, as they are 
genera lly beli eved to be . a fall in the price of o il will lead to 
hi gher inves tment. 
The overa ll effect o f lower o il prices, therefore, leads to both 
higher productive ca pacity and higher o utput though it is 
difficult to make estimates o f the magnitudes invo lved. 
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In summary, the investment recovery in the Community is 
expected to continue and indeed intensify. Gross fixed capi-
tal formation will grow on average by 4,9 % in the Com-
munity in 1986 and 1987 and the recovery will spread to the 
construction component of investment. The forecast output 
growth of 2,7 and 2,8 % for the Community in 1986 and 
1987 will be produced both from higher capacity utilization 
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and from an extension to productive capacity due to net 
investment and slower retirements (due to the effect of lower 
oil prices). Significantly, however, if existing policies in the 
current outlook are broadly maintained, there is a danger 
that the increases in productive capacity envisaged will fall 
short of those required to fulfil the cooperative growth 
strategy. 
A.6. l\1onetary policy and the European Monetary System 
In 1986 monetary policies are being conducted on the basis c!f guidelines and targets defined 
at the end o( 1985, i.e. hejcJre the fill! in oil prices. Policies arc therefore generally more 
accommodating than initially e1111isagcd hut this does hm1·e1•cr not endanger the stability and 
the increasing degree of' convergence ll'hich has been achieved. Since the beginning of 1985, 
110111i11al short-ter111 and !011g-ter111 interest rates have been progressi1•ely reduced in the 
Co111111u11ity. This 11·as more marked for !011g-ter111 than fiir short-ter111 rates. an indication 
that disinflationary policies are te11di11g to beco111e 111ore credible. Ne1•ertheless real interest 
rates remain high. The EMS realign111ent of April 1986 corrected accumulated divergences 
i11 relative co111pctitive positio11s rather tha11 acco111111odati11g diverging tre11ds. In the context 
of' i11creased co11verge11ce, stable exchange rate expectatio11s led to i11creasi11g 111obility of 
international capitalfloll's after the realig11111ent and national.financial 111arkets hm•e progress-
ively beco111e 111ore closely interrelated. The spread offina11cial i1111ovatio11 a11d accelerated 
financial integratio11 are having a groll'ing impact on the conduct, o~jectives and instruments 
of' 111011etary policies. At the national level mo11etary policies are increasingly subject to an 
external co11strai11t and the room fiir 111ana•111'/'e for the i11depe11de11t conduct o( interest rate 
policies is bei11g reduced. This gives rise to a need/or a closer coherence betll'een 111011etary 
and other policies. 
A.6.1. The stance of monetary policies in the 
Community 
Convergence of monetary policy has improved in recent 
years. The dispersion of money growth rates relative to the 
average is expected to decline to 3.2 this year as compared 
to 3,9 last year. and will thus be substantially below the 1981 
peak of 4.1 (Table A.6.1 ). Convergence in the growth of 
monetary aggregates has progressed even more among EMS 
countries and dispersion with respel:l lo the lowest monetary 
growth rate shows an even more promising picture. How-
ever. lower oil prices and the depreciation of the dollar 
have undoubtedly eased the external constraint on monetary 
policy. The threat to domestic stability from rising import 
prices has been virtually removed. 
However. the deceleration of monetary growth which had 
been under way since the early 1980s did not continue 
last year. Developments however differed between member 
countries: among the countries where monetary policy can 
play a more independent role, the target range was generally 
respected. In the Federal Republic of Germany a target 
range of 3 - 5 % (MZ) compares with an outturn of 4,4 %, 
while the target range was slightly exceeded in France (target 
range 4- 6 % (M2R); outturn 6,9 %) and in Italy (target 
16,8 % (TDCE); outturn 17,9 %) although monetary expan-
sion in Italy remains very high. In the United Kingdom the 
target range for sterling M3 (UKLM3) was substantially 
overshot.while the target range for narrow money was re-
spected (MO target range 3- 7 %; outturn 6 %)(Table 
A.6.2). 
A further deceleration in the growth of the money stock has 
occurred in Belgium, where it had already decelerated from 
8, 7 % in 1984 to 6, 7 % in 1985 and will probably slow down 
to 3,8 % in 1987. In some countries money creation is still 
undoubtedly too high to permit the al:hievement of greater 
price stability. The remarkable slow-down which has oc-
curred in Ireland since the early 1980s has become less rapid. 
In Greece, a continuing reduction in the growth of monetary 
aggregates is essential to the process of achieving a pro-
longed fall of inflation. Monetary expansion in Spain and 
Portugal is high compared with that of most other Com-
munity countries, and a progressive reduction is necessary, 
particularly in Portugal. where excessive liquidity is prevent-
ing a more rapid deceleration in inflation. 
Countries which have already achieved a high degree of price 
stability, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Netherlands, have tolerated some acceleration in the 
growth of their money stocks since the middle of 1985. In 
the particular case of the Federal Republic of Germany, this 
is reflected in a slightly higher target range for monetary 
growth in 1986 than in 1985. A further deceleration should 
be envisaged in countries where the underlying rate of in-
flation is still high. This strategy is a prerequisite for lasting 
reductions in nominal and real interest rates. Indeed, if 
inflationary expectations decline because monetary policy 
seeks to reduce the nominal growth of the money stock and 
thus carries conviction, nominal long-term interest rates 
could even fall further than they otherwise would. The 
flattening of yield curves in some countries (e.g. France) 
shows the close relationship between inflation expectations 
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Table A.6.1 
Money and credit targets 
1980 198 1 1982 
Obj . Real. Obj. Real. Obj . 
0 MZ 1 5-8 4.8 4-/ 6.0 4 7 
F M22 11.0 9.8 10.0 l l .4 12.5-13.5 
E M3 16-20 16.5 14.5- 18.5 16.0 
ALP8 15-19 
TOCE3 7.5 18.4 16.0 18.2 15.5 
PSCE8 
M 2 UKL 
UK' M 3 7-11 18.6 6- 10 13.8 8- 12 
MO 
USA6 Ml 4.5-6 7.3 3.5- 5.5 2.3 2.5-5.5 
M2 6-9 8.4 6-9 9.2 6-9 
TOCE3 
1 Central bank money. 
For 1984 a nd 1985 M 2R (M2 residents) . 1986 M .l. 
J TOCE = Total domestic credit expansion. 
4 Change over the thrcc-month-avcrngc ccntcrcd on December of the preceding year. 
5 Targe ts have also been de fined for MI and PSL 2 (liqu idity broadly defined} in 1982 and 1983. 
Ann ual rates for the charge from February to Apri l of the nc:(t yea r. 
The United States a lso have a t:ugct for MJ. 
For the period February-Ma rch 1983 10 fou rth q uarter o f 1983 . a t a nnual ra te . 
8 Credit of the public sector. 
Table A.6.2 
Nominal monetary aggregates 
1969/6 1 1977/70 1978 19 79 
B 8,3 13,3 10,9 9, 1 
DK 10.8 I L7 9.3 9.8 
D 10.4 10.0 10.6 9.5 
GR 17,6 2 1,6 24.4 19.2 
E 22,4 19,5 19,2 
F 13.2 15.0 13,5 13.2 
IRL 9,7 16.7 19.7 29.0 
I 14,0 18.9 22.6 20.7 
NL 8.9 13.5 4.6 4.8 
p 18.5 23.3 27.0 
UK 5,3 13.2 14.7 13,2 
EU R 14.8 14.8 13.9 
EMS 11.7 14.0 13.8 12.9 
Sm,rc,· : Commission se rvices; 1986. 1987 : Economic Forecasts May 1986. 
48 
1980 
7.4 
9.4 
5.3 
19.8 
17.9 
11.0 
14.5 
15.2 
8.0 
28.5 
15.2 
11.9 
9.7 
1983 1984 19S 5 19S6 
Rea l. Obj . Real. Obj . Real. Obj . Rl·al. OhJ. 
h,0 4-7 7.0 4-6 4,6 J-5 4.4 -'5·5.5 
11.5 9.0 10.2 5.5-6.5 7.6' 4-6 6.9 J-5 
16.6 14- 18 15.9 11 -14 l .l .2 11.5-14.5 12.S 9.5. \ 2.5 
20.8 18.2 20.6 19.J 16.S 17.9 
7 
7- 11 
10.8 7- 11 9.4 6- 10 11.9' 5-9 15. 1 11 - 15 
4-8 5.7 1 3- 7 6,0 2-6 
8.5 4-8 9.6 4-8 6.0 4-7 11.9 .1-S 
9.9 7-107 7.87 6-9 8.0 6-9 s.o 6-1.J 
8.5- 11.5 10.6 9- 12 IJ.6 9- 122 12.7 S- 11 
198 1 1982 198, 1984 1985 1986 l'JS7 
7.8 9.7 5,4 8.7 6.7 5.7 3.8 
5.2 11 ,0 19.6 19. 1 14.3 10.0 6.0 
6.3 6.5 6.6 4.0 5,0 5.8 4.8 
30.4 32.9 21.7 25. 1 29.9 22.0 16.5 
16.2 18.1 16. 1 14,0 13.9 13.6 9.4 
10.7 11.2 9,3 9.6 7.6 5,6 4.8 
20.6 13.7 9.3 8.0 7.8 6.9 10.4 
I I.I 12,0 16.5 12.2 13,6 10.2 9.5 
4.3 7.4 9.5 7.2 8.4 4.7 4.2 
31.3 24.0 20.5 19.9 26.7 24.0 20.0 
16.9 11.5 10.9 8,9 12.4 11.3 8.7 
11.5 11.3 11.2 9.5 10.2 8.7 7. 1 
8,7 9,5 10.2 8,4 8.3 6.8 5.9 
and long-term interest rates. In order to be successful and 
to carry conviction, a policy which seeks additional re-
ductions of monetary growth must be accompanied by con-
sistent behaviour on the part of public finance and wages, 
and current wage settlements must take account of the 
improved prospects for inflation. 
Some countries with budgetary problems (like Italy or 
Greece) will use part of their terms of trade gain to reduce 
their deficits. Such a strategy will, to the extent that it 
Table A.6.3 
Convergence of money growth 
1969'61 1977 70 1978 1979 1980 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
succeeds in narrowing the deficit, support the process of 
reducing monetary expansion by lowering the public sector's 
demand for credit. 
In low inflation countries, targets for monetary growth 
which remain unchanged while external prices fall will lead 
to lower interest rates. This will support both the cyclical 
upswing and the rise in investment needed to increase the 
rate at which output capacity expands. Unchanged policy 
rules will thus prove to be relatively expansionary as they 
will increase liquidity in the economy. 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Weighted average 
EUR 14,8 14,8 13,9 11,9 11,5 I 1,3 11,2 9,5 10,2 8,7 7,1 
EMS 11,7 14,0 13,8 12,9 9,7 8,7 9,5 10,2 8,4 8,3 6,8 5,9 
Measures of dispersion related to average 
EUR 9,5 4,2 4,0 3,9 4,1 4,1 2,7 3,6 3,0 3,9 3,2 2,5 
EMS 2,1 3.4 4,2 4,0 3.4 2,5 2,3 3,5 3,1 2,8 1,8 1,8 
Measures of dispersion related to lowest 
EUR 9,5 6,5 10.2 9,0 6,6 
EMS 4.8 5,2 9.2 8, l 4.4 
Source: Commission services; 1986 and 1987: Economic Forecasts of May 1986. 
A.6.2. The development of liquidity in the Com-
munity 
Money grew faster than nominal GDP in the majority of 
countries in 1985. The liquidity ratio in the EMS countries 
( + I, I % ) increased more slowly than in the Community as 
a whole ( + 1,6 %) (Table A.6.4). It will probably fall in six 
Community countries in 1986 while the Community average 
is expected to remain virtually unchanged. A fall in the 
liquidity ratio by -0,7 % is expected for EMS countries. 
However, the significance of the figures for 1986 should not 
be exaggerated: since import prices are falling and external 
current positions are improving, nominal GDP is rising 
faster than nominal domestic demand; but it may be more 
appropriate to measure liquidity as the ratio of money to 
domestic demand rather than to GDP, and on this basis the 
7,3 4,8 5,8 5,5 5,2 4.1 3,3 
4.4 3,0 4,8 4.4 3,3 2.1 2,1 
stance of monetary policy is more accomodating than is 
indicated by other calculations. On the other hand, the 
development of liquidity has to be interpreted in light of 
declining nominal interest rates bacause of decelarating in-
flation rates. The implied fall in velocity of money lead to a 
rising money demand, which does not necessarily indicate a 
more expansionary stance of monetary policy. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the liquidity ratio 
will probably decline slightly in 1986 but this should be 
interpreted in the light of the German practice of defining 
monetary policy in a medium-term framework designed to 
produce price stability. The pronounced decline in the liquid-
ity ratio in France reflected the tightness of monetary policy 
in that country. The ratio is expected to rise in Denmark 
and in the Netherlands, without however creating immediate 
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Table A.6.4 
Monetary developments 
1969/6 1 1977 /70 1978 1979 1980 19SI 1982 198.1 1984 1"85 19l'\6 198 7 
(a) Liquidity ratio : M/Nominal GDP (annual % changes) 
B 0,1 1.3 3,3 2.2 - 0.2 3.7 1.3 - 0.9 1.8 - 0.0 - 0.4 0.0 
DK - 0,4 - 0.9 - 2,0 - 1.5 1.6 - 3.5 - 3.1 8.5 8.9 4.4 2.6 1.0 
D 2.4 0.9 2,9 1, 1 - 1.0 2,0 2.8 2.3 - 0.4 0.3 - 0.5 0.3 
GR 6,1 3,6 3,2 - 3.1 0,0 9.7 6.8 1.3 1,7 8.6 0.5 4.2 
E 3. 1 - 2.4 1,9 1.9 1.8 3.0 1.7 - 0.2 2.3 - 0.4 0.9 
F 2,9 1.6 -0, 1 -0.8 -2. 1 - 1.5 -3.0 - 1.4 0.7 0.4 - I. I - 0.4 
IRL 0,1 - 1,6 1, 1 10,8 - 2.9 0. 1 - 3.2 - 1.8 - 2.9 - 0.4 - 2.4 4.2 
I 3.4 2,0 4.8 - 0.7 -8, 1 - 6.2 - 4.6 2.5 - 1.2 2. 1 - 1.7 0.8 
NL - 1.3 0.9 - 3,2 - 1,5 1.4 - 0,5 2.8 6.7 2.8 3.8 2.8 2.7 
p 
- 0, 1 - 2.0 0.6 3.3 10. 1 - 1.6 - 2.3 - 3.6 0.7 I. I 4.0 
UK - 1,5 - 1.8 - 0.4 - 3.2 - 1.6 5.9 2.3 2. 1 2.8 2.6 4.7 1.9 
EUR 0.9 1,0 - 0.5 - 2. 1 0.6 0.1 1.5 0.6 1.6 0.4 0.9 
EMS 2,3 1.3 1.9 0.0 - 2,8 - 1.3 - 1.0 1. 5 0.3 I. I - 0.7 0.4 
(b) Real moneta ry aggregate: M/GDP prices (a nnua l % changes) 
B 4.8 5,0 6.4 4.3 3.3 2.4 2.4 - 0. 5 3.1 1.3 1.6 2. 1 
DK 4,4 1,7 - 0.2 2.0 I. I - 4.4 - 0.3 10.6 12.7 8.5 5.3 :u 
D 7.0 4,0 6.1 5.2 0.9 2. 1 1.8 3.2 2. 1 2.9 3.0 :u 
GR 14,2 9. 1 10.I 0.5 1.8 9.3 6.7 1.6 4.4 10.9 0.2 4.0 
E 8.0 - 0.6 2.1 3.5 2.3 3.9 3.9 2.0 4.4 2.3 3.6 
F 8.6 6,0 3.7 2.5 - 1.0 - 1.3 - I. I - 0.4 2.3 1.8 I. I 2. 5 
IRL 4,5 2.7 8,3 14.0 0.3 3.0 - 1.3 - 1.2 1.4 1.6 0.8 8.0 
I 9.3 5.2 7.6 4.1 - 4.5 - 6. 1 - 5.0 1.3 1.3 4.4 1.0 4.7 
NL 3.6 4.7 - 0,8 0.9 2.2 - 1.2 1.3 7.7 4.5 6.2 4.6 4.5 
p 5.3 1.3 6.9 7.6 10.9 1.5 - 2.4 - 5.6 4.5 5.0 7.7 
UK 1.4 0.4 3.2 - 1.2 - 3.8 4. 7 4,2 5.5 4.6 6.0 7.4 4.3 
EUR 4.3 4,2 2.7 - 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.6 2.7 4.0 3.0 3.7 
EMS 7.5 4.8 5.2 3.8 - 0.8 - 1.3 - 0.8 1.9 2.5 3.2 2.0 3.5 
(c) Rati o money stoc k to real G DP (annual % cha nges) 
B 3,4 9.3 7.7 6,9 3.8 9.2 8.5 5.0 7.4 5.3 3.6 1.7 
DK 5,7 8,8 7.4 6,0 9.9 6.2 7.8 17.3 15.0 10.2 7.3 3.7 
D 5.6 6.8 7.2 5.2 3.3 6.1 7.5 5.6 1.4 2.5 2.2 1.7 
GR 9.4 15.4 16.6 15.0 17.7 30.8 33. 1 21.3 2 1.9 27.2 22.5 16.7 
E 16.9 17.4 18.9 16.1 15.7 17. 1 13.7 11.6 11 .6 10.6 6.5 
F 7.3 10.4 9.3 9.5 9.9 10.4 9. 1 8.3 7.9 6.2 3.2 1.8 
IRL 5.1 11 .8 11 .7 25.5 10.9 17.3 11 .5 8.6 3.5 5.6 3.6 6. 5 
I 7.8 15.3 19.4 15.0 10.9 11.0 12.5 17.9 9.4 I I. I 7.3 5.5 
NL 3.7 9,4 2. 1 2.4 7. 1 5.0 9.0 8.5 5.4 5.9 2.9 2.4 
p 12.4 19.2 19.6 23.4 30.2 20.2 20.6 22.4 22.2 19.3 15.8 
UK 2.3 10.7 10.6 10.8 17.8 18.3 9.5 7.4 7.0 8.8 8.5 (1 .2 
EUR 11.0 I 1.2 20.3 20.4 11.7 10.6 10.0 7.2 7.7 5.9 2.2 
EMS 6.3 10.2 20.3 8.8 7.5 8.7 9.3 9.7 6. 1 6. 1 4.0 2.8 
Soura : Commission Sl.'f\ icL"s. 1986 and 1987: Econom ic Fo n.·ca~ts o f May I 986. 
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problems for the conduct of monetary policy: the exchange 
rate objective has not been called into question by rapidly 
rising liquidity in the past. A continuous and rapid rise may, 
however, endanger domestic stability in the medium-term. 
In conclusion present stance of monetary policy in the Com-
munity is characterized by a deceleration of growth of the 
nominal money stock but, in the presence of the disinflation 
process which has been encouraged by similar policies in the 
past. the outcome is a more rapid growth of the real money 
stock which in its turn is supporting growth in real GDP. 
A.6.3. Counterparts of money creation 
Structural and institutional factors do not permit a standard 
assessment of the counterparts of money creation between 
countries (Table A.6.5) but an analysis of this type neverthe-
less reveals the various pressures on monetary policy. In 
1985 the contribution of the public sector to money creation 
remained negligible in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and in the Netherlands and was negative in the United 
Kingdom. It was less expansionary in Denmark, mainly 
because of lower public sector borrowing requirements. Pub-
lic sector transactions were more expansionary in Italy. The 
contribution of the public sector was reduced in Belgium 
and Ireland although remaining a major source of money 
creation as it was in Greece. In 1986 a further reduction of 
the public sector counterpart is envisaged in France and 
Belgium. Credit to the public sector will, however, remain a 
major counterpart in countries where public deficits remain 
high. It is highly desirable that the public sector impact 
on money creation in member countries should converge 
towards zero. but the persistence of fundamental differences 
Table A.6.5 
Counterparts of money creation 
1980 1981 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
among budgetary situations means that progress towards 
this goal will at best be very slow. 
The external counterpart of money creation has moved 
closer to zero. In countries where lasting current account 
deficits have in the past caused a considerable destruction 
of money, such as France, where the cumulated effect of 
external money destruction was 7,5 % of money growth over 
the period 1981-83, the improvement in the current account 
balance is the main factor behind this welcome development. 
The Federal Republic of Germany and, even more so, the 
Netherlands will still face a positive and significant external 
counterpart mainly because of current account external sur-
pluses in their non-bank private sectors, although the net 
effect is reduced by capital exports. The contribution of the 
external sector will probably will be negligible in Belgium, 
Denmark and Ireland, countries in which the destruction of 
liquidity by the external sector was high in the past. Greece 
still shows a high rate of destruction of liquidity by the 
external sector. In general terms, the reduction of large 
external counterparts corresponds to a reduction of external 
disequilibria and pressure on exchange rates; to that extent 
the process by which external counterparts return towards 
zero represents an increase in the room for manreuvre en-
joyed by monetary policy, making further convergence in 
this area possible within the Community. 
Lending to the private sector has decelerated less than mone-
tarygrowth over the period 1983-85. It would thus appear 
that the policies which sought to curb nominal money 
growth did not have an excessively restrictive effect on 
the availability of bank credit to the private sector. This 
impression is reinforced by the fact that corporlale profita-
bility, and the scope for enterprises to finance their expan-
sion from internal resources, have risen over the same period. 
19H~ 1983 1984 1985 1986 
(I) Money creation: Rate of growth of M2/3 ( I = 2 + 3) 
B 6.2 10.0 7,6 7.1 6.5 6.7 5,5 
DK 8.1 9.6 11,8 25,5 17,0 15,8 8,5 
D 6.1 4,9 7,1 5.5 4.7 5,0 5,7 
GR 24,7 34,6 29,0 20.2 29,4 26,8 19,4 
E 
F 8,4 10,4 10,8 11.2 8.3 5,6 5,5 
IRL 17,9 17,7 12,9 5,5 10,0 5,3 10,7 
I 15,0 9,5 18,9 11.4 12,1 12,8 8,1 
NL 3,8 5,3 8,2 10.4 7,6 10,2 5,8 
p 28,8 23,8 24,1 16,3 24,5 28,5 25.0 
UK 18,5 13,7 8,9 10,3 9,6 13.4 9,4 
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·Table A.6.5 ( continued) 
Counterparts of money creation 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
(2) Internal counterpart 
B 15,7 21,1 15,5 12,9 12,7 11,5 7,7 
DK 15,5 18,4 25,4 29,6 16,2 13,4 8,5 
D 7,6 3,2 6,5 5,3 4,6 1,7 1,3 
GR 27,I 39,3 34,7 23,8 34,1 29,9 24,5 
E 
F 7,2 12,7 14,3 13,0 8,3 1,9 5,0 
IRL 16,9 17,9 13,6 10,7 15,2 5,2 8,6 
I 7,1 5,4 13,9 6,9 5,3 7,5 4,5 
NL 7,7 1,6 4,3 8,1 2,4 7,6 2,6 
p 23,2 1,9 22,0 16,0 18,7 23,2 22,6 
UK 16,9 15,0 12,9 10,9 13, l 11 ,5 9,9 
(3) External counterpart 
B -9,5 -11,1 -7,9 -5,8 -6,2 - 4,8 - 2,2 
DK -7,4 -8,6 -13,7 - 4,l 0,8 2,4 0,0 
D -1,5 1,6 0,6 0,1 0,1 3,3 4,4 
GR -2,4 -4,7 -5,7 - 3,6 - 4,7 - 3,l - 4,5 
E 
F 1,2 -2,3 -3,5 -1,8 0,0 3,7 0,5 
IRL 1,0 -0,2 -0,7 -5,2 -5,2 0,1 2,1 
I 8,2 5,6 5,0 5,7 8,6 7, 1 5, l 
NL -3,9 3,6 3,9 2,2 5,2 2,6 3,2 
p 5,6 21,9 2,1 0,3 5,8 5,3 2,4 
UK 1,6 -1,3 -4,0 -0,6 -3,5 1,9 - 0,5 
Components of internal money creation 
(4) Internal money creation (4 = 5 + 6 + 7- 8) 
B 15,7 21,1 15,5 12,9 12,7 11 ,5 7,7 
DK 15,5 18,4 25,4 29,6 16,2 13,4 8,5 
D 7,6 3,2 6,5 5,3 4,6 1,7 1,3 
GR 27,1 39,3 34,7 23,8 34,1 29,9 24,5-
E 
F 7,2 12,7 14,3 13,0 8,3 1,9 5,0 
IRL 16,9 17,9 13,6 10,7 15,2 5,2 8,6 
I 15,0 9,5 18,9 11 ,4 12,1 12,3 8,1 
NL 7,7 1,6 4,3 8,1 2,4 7,6 2,6 
p 23,2 1,9 22,0 16,0 18,7 23,2 22,6 
UK 16,9 15,0 12,9 10,9 13, l 11 ,5 9,9 
(5) Lending to the public sector 
B 13,5 19,3 20,0 17,4 13,4 15,l 12,8 
DK 11,1 13,5 15,9 15,8 1,5 5,4 - 0,5 
D 3,9 6,7 4,9 2,4 2,1 1,7 1,9 
GR 12,9 24,4 18,7 12,4 18,7 18,3 14, l 
E 
F -0,5 2,5 2,2 3,5 1,0 0,9 0,9 
IRL 4,5 9,6 6,1 5,0 10,0 2,4 5,9 
I 7,1 5,4 13,9 6,9 5,3 7,5 4,5 
NL 4,2 3,7 4,4 4,8 5,2 2,8 2,2 
pi 10,6 -3,3 11 ,8 7,3 9,8 10, l 11 ,7 
UK 1,9 - 0,9 -6,9 - 0, l - 1,4 -4,0 0,0 
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(6) Lending to the private sector 
B 6,9 4,5 2,1 2,8 1,6 2,8 2,2 
DK 7,1 5,5 10,7 17,2 14,3 14,4 13,2 
D 14,5 11,l 8,5 11,1 10,4 8,9 5,6 
GR 16,4 20,1 17,0 11,9 12,8 12,8 9,1 
E 
F 14,7 11,7 15,2 12,1 10,5 9,4 7,4 
IRL 14,7 12,1 6,4 8,8 5,7 2,0 3,8 
I 8,2 5,6 5,0 5,7 8,6 7,1 5,1 
NL 17,9 10,1 5,6 6,9 7,3 9,5 4,6 
pi 26,8 25,1 25,3 23,4 22,4 17,0 14,1 
UK 17,5 16,8 20,8 14,0 16,2 18,6 14,9 
(7) Other components 
B 3,1 3,8 1,8 -0,9 1,3 0,8 -1,8 
DK 0,8 2,8 2,2 3,6 2,9 -2,8 -0,5 
D -1,9 -3,0 -9,9 -0,l 0,1 -0,7 0,8 
GR 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
E 
F -2,5 1,4 0,7 1,6 0,8 -3,0 0,0 
IRL 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
I 1,8 2,4 1,4 1,2 0,6 0,2 0,3 
NL -1,3 -1,3 -2,1 -1,7 -2,5 1,0 1,8 
p 
-1,6 -6,7 -0,2 -0,l 0,5 6,1 3,8 
UK -1,6 0,6 0,5 -1,0 -0,5 -0,3 -2,9 
(8) Non-monetary liabilities 
B 7,8 6,5 
DK 3,5 3,4 
D 8,9 11,6 
GR 2,2 5,2 
E 
F 4,5 2,9 
IRL 2,3 3,8 
I 2,1 3,9 
NL 13,1 10,9 
p2 12,6 13,2 
UK 0,9 1,5 
I Public enterprises included. 
' 
Assets of non-residents included. 
Source: Commission services. 
A.6.4. Interest rate and exchange rate develop-
ments 
Both short-term and long-term interest rates in Europe have 
shown a clear downward trend since the beginning of 1985 
(Graph A.6.1 ). In the Community as a whole, long-term 
nominal rates fell more sharply (by 3,5 percentage points) 
than short-term rates (2,5 percentage points) between the 
end of 1984 and early May I 986, and this flattening of the 
yield curve reflects to a certain degree the success of monet-
8,4 6,4 3,6 7,2 5,5 
3,4 7,0 2,5 3,6 3,7 
6,0 8,1 8,0 8,2 7,0 
1,0 0,5 -2,6 -1,2 -1,3 
3,8 4,2 4,0 5,4 3,3 
-1,1 3,1 0,5 -0,8 1,1 
1,4 2,4 2,4 2,0 1,8 
3,6 1,9 7,6 5,7 6,0 
14,9 14,6 14,6 10,0 7,0 
1,5 2,0 2,2 2,8 2,1 
ary authorities in reducing and stabilizing inflationary expec-
tations. Several factors contributed to declining interest 
rates: lower US interest rates, a falling dollar and more 
importantly in this respect, a reversal of market views on 
exchange rates as well as lower inflationary expectations. 
Graph A.6.1 shows that the interest rate decline was even 
more marked in the United States than in the Community, 
as a consequence of a more expansionary stance in US 
monetary policy. There has been a positive interest rate 
differential between the majority of European rates and US 
rates; it tended to narrow last autumn and then widened 
S3 
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GRAPH A.6.1: Interest rate developments : USA, Japan and Europe 
( a) Short-term nominal interest rates ( c) Short-term real interest rates1 
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Source : Commission services. 1 Adjusted for consumer prices. 
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temporari ly aro und the end of the yea r and into the ea rly 
months of 1986. The spread between the Federa l Republic 
of Germany and the Netherlands on the one hand and the 
United States on the o ther has been nega ti ve; it widened 
slight ly during the summer and has no t changed significantly 
since then. However, in the early summer. US market ra tes 
tended to strengt hen, despite a reduction in the US discount 
ra te; it is not clea r how long this phenomenon will persist. 
Current acco unt disequilibria a t world level have accentu-
ated the need fo r exchange rate adjustments; this need had 
implica tions fo r moneta ry policy and , in pa rticul ar, for 
interest rate policy. Thus it was tha t, while US interest rates 
have declined since the second quarter of 1984, the fa ll in 
Euro pean rates only began in ea rly 1985 . This coordina ted 
approach to exchange ra tes was further developed in the GS 
agreement of September 1985 which sought to bring down 
the US dolla r and push up the Yen. After tha t agreement 
Japan tempora rily increased its short-term interest rates 
while in teres t ra tes in Eu rope basically continued their 
downwa rd movemen t. 
The adj ustment in exchange ra tes (Graph A.6. 2) which has 
occurred so fa r - between February 1985 and July 1986 
the ECU rose by more then 30 % against the doll ar while 
the yen rose by about 10 % aga inst the ECU - reOects to 
some ex tent the policy of the coordinated use of interest 
ra tes . In this process a substantial reduction in the general 
level of interest ra tes has been achieved without adverse 
effects on exchange rates . 
However, the substantial adjustment in exchange rates can-
not be ex pla ined primarily by interest ra te developments . 
The fac t tha t the exchange rate adjustment has occurred 
without very markedchanges in interest rate differentials 
shows that a reversal in exchange rate expecta tions has been 
of pa rticul ar importance. Exchange rate expectations were 
inOuenced by several factors: first, the GS agreement ma rked 
a change fro m the US authorities' previ ous attitude of de-
cla red ' benign neglect ' to a more pragma tic approach to 
exchange rates; secondly the dynamic factors linking persist-
ently high current account deficits, rising external indebted-
ness and · ex ternal interest payments in the US case have 
been given increasing a ttention and ha ve revea led the unsus-
tainable cha racter of the US externa l position; finall y Europe 
and in pa rticul ar Japan are expected to ga in relatively more 
than the US fro m the fall in oil prices . 
The downward movement in European short-term interest 
ra tes was interrupted a t some po ints as a result , mainly, of 
exchange ra te developments. These ra tes firmed towards the 
end of 1985 and a t the beginning of 1986 in France, Belgium 
and Ireland as a result o f exchange ra te tensions within 
the EMS. Short-term interes t ra tes a lso strenghthened in 
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GRAPH A.6.2: Dollar exchange rate indices 
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GRAPH A.6.3 : Determinants of exchange rate trends 
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December and January in the United Kingdom in response 
to the depreciation of sterling following the oil price decline. 
Exchange rate tensions subsided following the EMS realign-
ment in April 1986 and - in the case of the United Kingdom 
- after the adoption of the budget. Short-term interest rates 
in these countries then strongly resumed their downward 
trend supported by cuts in official interest rates in some 
instances. 
Nominal long-term interest rates continued to fall during 
the second half of 1985. The decline was more continuous 
than that of short-term rates, largely because short-term 
exchange rate considerations play only a minor role at the 
long end of the market. The fall became more pronounced 
in the first months of 1986, reflecting both declining short-
term interest rates and reduced inflationary expectations. 
Nominal interest rates are at present below the levels experi-
enced in the 1970s in some countries. 
Although nominal interest rates have generally declined , 
most real interest rates still appear to be high . However, 
the measurement of real rates of interest is fraught with 
methodological and conceptual difficulties which become 
more acute in periods of strong external price shocks. In 
countries where the actual inflation rate is lower than wha t 
is thought to be the underlying ra te, real interest rates 
measured on the basis of current consumer prices will prob-
ably be overstated . Based on unit labour costs, used as a 
proxy for the general view of underlying inflation, real 
interest rates appear to be relatively low in countries where 
core inflation has already been low for some years (e.g. the 
Federal Republic of Germany) and high in countries where 
inflationary expectations are high either because of la rge 
wage increases (United Kingdom) or because of large budget 
deficits (Italy, Belgium). These examples show that economic 
policies which carry conviction and which seek to reduce 
inflation are an effective way of cutting real interest ra tes. 
Further, the persistence of a la rge gap between long-term 
nominal interest rates and current infla tion during a tran-
sitional period may be seen as the na tural consequence of a 
disinfla tion stra tegy. A reduction in rea l interest ra tes will 
depend essentially on both the continuation of disinflation 
in a manner which ca rries conviction and on the elimina ti on 
of public sector deficits. 
A.6.5. The April 1986 realignment, EMS funda-
mentals and implications for monetary 
policy 
The EMS rea li gnment which took effect on 7 April 1986 
was the fi rs t general adjustment in centra l ra tes fo r three 
years, although the lira deva lued by 7,8 % in July 1985 . T he 
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D-mark and the guilder reva lued by 3 % while the French 
franc devalued by the same amo unt. The Belgian fra nc and 
the Danish krone reval ued by I %. 
An immediate effect of the rea lignment was to provoke 
capital outflows from the Federa l Republic of Germany into 
other EMS countries, in particula r F rance, on a sca le which 
was not experienced after past rea lignments. In the process 
of resisting these forces and defending the new pa rity grid 
EMS Central Banks bought more than 25 billion marks in 
the weeks following the rea lignment. Subsequently, the D-
mark and the French fra nc have remained the weakest and 
strongest currencies respectively in the EMS (gra ph A.6.4). 
Although there are some precedents for these developments, 
for example in the sequel to the rea lignment of 1983 , their 
size and duration are grea ter than in previous cases. 
The realignment took place a fter a period in which markets 
had clearl y expected a change in EMS parities a t some 
stage because of past divergencies of prices and costs; such 
expecta tions were particula rly evident in the development 
of Euro-currency interest ra tes. At the beginning of the yea r 
Irish interest rates increased significantly fo llowing pressure 
on the Irish pound. In Februa ry and March Euro-franc 
interest rates rose in turn because of specula tion on a fra nc 
devaluation within the EMS. In addition to interes t ra te 
movements, substantial cent ra l bank intervention in the 
forei gn exchange market became necessary on severa l oc-
casions to prevent exchange ra tes from crossing the upper 
or lower limit of their fluctua tion bands . 
The development of fund amenta l fac to rs cannot of itse lf 
adequately explain the timing and the ex tent of the parity 
changes which occurred a t the las t reali gnment. None of the 
depreciating countries was faced by an ex terna l current 
account deficit , altho ugh the d istribution of current acco un t 
balances between countries was uneven and their rela ti ve 
cyclical positions va ried sharply. Coun tries which had pre-
viously experienced large current acco unt de fi cits had made 
significant progress, and the fa ll in oil prices improved the 
current account outlook in a lmost a ll EM S countries . As 
regards intra-EMS prices and cost, although rela tive levels 
continued to di ffer , no further di vergent developments had 
recently taken place. The primary effect of the rea lignment 
was therefore to remove accumulated di ffe rences in relati ve 
competiti ve positions ra ther than to accommoda te curren t 
divergences in fundamental fac to rs. 
The convergence of fund amenta l fac to rs remains the most 
important prerequisite fo r EMS stability. Present fo recasts 
suggest that no substantia l shift is li kely to occur in the 
current acco unt positions of EMS countries, altho ugh the 
competiti ve positions vis-a-vis the USA will certainly work 
against a further improvement in the real trade ba lances of 
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GRAPH A .6.4: The EMS exchange rates in the fluctuation band 
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EMS member countries as a group. Moderate wage settle-
ments in many EMS countries are contributing to higher 
convergence of domestic cost changes. lnf1a tion rates within 
the EMS are therefore expected to fa ll to low levels. This 
outlook is particula rly encouraging for 1987, when the oil 
price effect is likely to play only a minor role in restra ining 
domestic inf1ation . For the foreseea ble future , fundamentals 
will therefore probably not justify any general realignment. 
Looking further ahead, however, excessive budget deficits 
in some countries and their effect on public indebtedness 
give cause for concern because of their likely repercussio ns 
on inf1a tionary expectations and therefore on sta bility within 
the EMS. 
It was because the realignment significantly reduced expec-
tations of exchange rate changes in the foreseeable future , 
and because interest rate differentials thus became the pre-
dominant factor in portfolio adjustments that such la rge 
capital f1ows between EMS currencies occurred. 
Interest rate differentials have already narrowed consider-
ably among EMS countries since the rea li gnment: interes t 
rate differentials between France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany narrowed by about 1,5 % points in the two 
months after the realignment a t both the short and the long 
end - this is a na tural consequence of higher convergence 
in a fixed exchange ra te regime with free capital movement. 
However, this would suggest that , in general. interest rate 
policy cannot be used exclusively to pursue domestic stabili-
za tion objectives. It follows that monetary policy has to be 
strongly supported by and coordinated with other aspects 
of policy in order to achieve domestic economic ta rgets and 
ensure the stability of the EMS. 
At the EMS level, the issue of interest rate coordina tion 
has increased in importance because or the stabilization 
of exchange ra te expectations. Increasing convergence of 
fundamentals will heighten the conviction in the market 
that the parity grid will not change; a nd the grea ter the 
determination with which the libera li za tion o f capita l move-
ments is pursued, the closer will be the interdependence o f 
monetary policies within the EMS. Increasingly, nat ional 
monetary policies have to be formulated with due rega rd 
for a larger zone o f monetary stability. Present diffi culties 
therefore make it much more necessa ry to coo rdina te monet-
ary policies, and, in particular, interes t ra te policies. More 
fundamentally, it is becoming progressively more necessa ry 
to establish a common framework for monetary policy and 
to set intermedia te monetary targets by a coopera tive pro-
cess. One possible common concept would be that of a 
monetary policy formi ng part of a med ium- term growth 
framework , with priority given to price stabi lity. 
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As the EMS increasingly becomes a coherent monetary area 
and isevident as such to the externa l world . the development 
ofa common dollar po licy will be facilitated. Greater conver-
gence of inf1ation rates and the increased degree of substitu-
tability among EMS currencies wou ld mean that capital 
inf1ows from third countries would tend to be more evenl y 
spread across members' currencies . With con tinued progress 
in convergence and capita l libera lization the external role ot' 
the ECU could grow. 
A.6.6. Financial innovation and the conduct of 
monetary policy 
The relationship between moneta ry aggrega tes and nominal 
demand has been distorted in recent years by structural 
factors such as the deregulation of fin a ncia l markets. the 
diffusion of new financial products, changes in tax systems 
and the growing intensity of international li nkages in the 
areas o f money a nd banking. 
At present, there is no clear empiri ca l evidence as to whether 
these financial innova ti ons sho uld . in the presence of greater 
interdependence within the EMS, be ref1ected in changes to 
monetary targe ts. It is possible to indentify four types o l" 
inplica ti on which these developments might in theory have: 
(a) they have no effec t, (b) they lead to a o ne-step impact 
on the demand for money but have no lo ng-run implications 
for the appropri a te pace of mo netary growt h, (c) they have 
predictable effects on money demand or (d) they lead to 
unpredictab le f1uctuatio ns in tha t demand. An unpred ictab le 
impact wo uld have mos t far-reaching implica ti o ns for the 
value of mo netary aggrega tes as intermediate target vari-
ables and their function as indica tors wo uld be seriously 
distorted . A careful empiri ca l exami na ti on of this subject is 
necessa ry in o rder to assess the im plica ti ons fo r monetary 
policy in a more precise way. 
Some monetary au thorities have a lready respo nded to these 
changes . In some cases , moneta ry aggrega tes have been 
redefined in acco rd a nce with structural changes. The main 
type of redefinition has been the inclusion in the broad 
definition of money ofshort-term marketable assets, some 
of which are issued by non-ba nks. In other cases the focus 
has shifted to include price va ri ables - exchange rates a nd 
interest ra tes - as ana lytica l too ls fo r monitoring monetary 
developments. In ge nera l. struct ura l changes in the financial 
sector have not yet given rise to fund amen ta l changes in the 
procedures adopted by monetary a uthorities, which continue 
to make extensive use of quantitative target s. Money or 
cred it targets cont inue to be used in the Federa l Republic 
of Germany, Greece, Spain, France. Italy and the United 
Kingdom. 
There have been a number of changes recently in the choices 
made among monetary policy instruments. Monetary autho-
rities have shown growing preference for control techniques 
which influence money market interest rates and bank 
liquidity. Italy and Ireland have abolished certain direct 
measures, including ceilings on bank loans and formal credit 
guidelines; Denmark has substituted a system of marginal 
reserve requirements for the previous regulations on bank 
lending; France is in the process of replacing its fairly rigid 
system of credit ceilings by a more market-oriented regime 
designed to allow banks more initiative in managing their 
balance sheets and to increase competition. The general 
tendency is towards an increasing use of open-market oper-
ations for influencing money market conditions, while redis-
count operations or direct central bank loans have lost their 
importance. This strategy enables central banks to control 
money market conditions without having to resort to 
changes in compulsory reserve ratios or rediscount ceilings 
or rates. Changes in these latter instruments have very often 
sent signals to the market at the wrong time, whereas open-
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market operations enable money market conditions to be 
influenced in a less conspicuous way. This strategy helps 
monetary authorities to test market reactions to changes in 
interest rates before giving strong interest rate signals which 
might prove difficult to reverse. 
A few Community countries continue to use credit control 
as a regular instrument of monetary policy (Greece, the 
Netherlands, Portugal). Some countries however consider 
domestic credit controls as a necessary tool for protecting 
domestic monetary expansion from undesirable capital in-
flows even if their efficiency is not entirely satisfactory. 
Within Europe the higher degree of convergence, financial 
innovations and capital liberalization have a growing impact 
on the conduct, objectives and instruments of monetary 
policies. It increases the need for closer coordination of 
monetary policies, in particular among EMS Member States. 
The efforts to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe 
should therefore be reinforced. 
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A. 7. Budgetary trends and policies 
Budgetary consolidation efforts , allied to the improvement in the economic climate, should 
result in 1986 in some reduction of the importance of general government in Community 
GDP, both on the receipts and expenditure sides, as well as in a fall in net borrowing. The 
strengthening of internal demand, to which the the fall in the oil bill has contributed, is 
improving tax receipts, helped in some Member States by higher taxes on oil products, while 
Spain and Portugal have broadened their tax bases by introducing VAT. A t a structural level, 
the strategy of the majority of Member States consists in keeping the growth of budgetary 
receipts and expenditure below that of GDP in order to produce a lasting reduction in the 
taxation and redistribution functions of the public sector. Although the necessity of improving 
public accounts in 1986 means that the weight of public receipts in several Member States 
will increase, the share of public expenditure should, on the other hand, fall in almost all 
countries. In some Member States, the weight of past budgetary policy management, which 
has resulted in a rapid increase in the magnitude of public debt and in a heavy burden of 
interest rate charges, increasingly necessitates a marked turnaround in public accounts. 
A. 7 .1. The Community as a whole 
The trend in public finance in the Community up to mid-
1986 conforms in aggregate to budget decisions taken for 
1986. The improvement in the outlook for growth on tha t 
foreseen last autumn, due to a large extent to the fall in the 
dollar and in the price of oil , increases tax receipts and 
thus facilitates the achievement of budget balanceobjectives. 
Since the slowing of inflation and the fall in the oil bill 
are having a positive effect on domestic demand, public 
authorities can limit the growth of transfers more easily. In 
addition the fall in interest rates is reducing the debt-interest 
rate burden. Member States have generally integrated these 
elements which are favourable to the correction of public 
accounts into budgetary management without seeking to 
reinforce consolidation trendsfurther. Denmark is, however, 
the main exception to this trend . 
The primary objective of budgetary policies in 1986 is a 
gradual reduction in the level of deficits as a percentage of 
GDP at the same time as reducing the weight of the public 
sector. This result should be obtained by a fas ter slowdown 
in the growth of public expenditure than tha t achieved on 
the receipts ' side. The estimates shown in Table A.7 . 1 indi-
cate that current receipts for EUR 12, which increased by 
8,6 % in 1985, are likely to grow this year by 7,3 %; current 
expenditure for its pa rt , which was 8 % higher in 1985 than 
a year earlier, should adva nce by 6,6 % in 1986 . It can 
also be seen tha t the rate of increase of both receipts and 
expenditure is expected this yea r to be below the increase in 
nominal GDP, which will reduce the share of the public 
sector in the economy. Current receipts should also fall back 
from 45.1 % of GDP in 1985 to 44,6 % in 1986 and current 
expenditure from 46,4 % in 1985 to 45,6 % this year. General 
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government net borrowing which was 5,4 % of GDP in 1984 
(EU R 12) eased to 5,2 % in 1985; this year it should be 
4,6 % of GDP. 
This section also presents budgetary forecasts for 1987. This 
is a preliminary exercise drawn up before those Member 
States with a finance law sys tem based on civil years have 
really begun their budgetary procedures for nex t yea r and 
before the Community has agreed on quantitative budgetary 
guidelines for 1987. These forecasts are consistent with those 
for economic activity and include, as far as possible, the 
medium-term intentions of governments. These generally 
envisage the continuation of efforts to modera te the growth 
in receipts and public expenditure a t the same time as reduc-
ing budget deficits as a percentage of GDP. The forecasts 
for the Community as a whole (see Table A.7. 1) show a 
continuation in the slowdown in budgeta ry receipts and 
expenditure in 1987, which should permit a modest fa ll in 
the rate of tax and socia l security contributions (44,3 % of 
GDP as against 44,6 % in 1986) and the sha re of curren t 
expenditure of general government (45, 1 % as aga inst 
45 ,6 % in 1986). Net borrowing should fa ll by two tenths of 
a percentage point to 4,4 % of GDP. 
The enlargement of the Community to include Spain and 
Portuga l from 1 January 1986 has somewhat modified the 
statistical picture as fa r as public sector accounts are con-
cerned . The rate of tax and social security contributions of 
the two new Member States, which amount to aro und 33 % 
of GDP in 1986 (see Table A.7.3), are more than 10 points 
below the Community average, which is acco rdingly reduced 
by one point in comparison to the Community of ten. The 
effect is much the same on the expenditure side. Following 
accession, Spain and Portugal have introduced VAT which 
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Table A.7.1 
General government revenue and expenditure 1 EUR 12 
'OOO million ECU % o[GDP % change 
1985 1986 1984 1985 19862 19872 1985 19862 19872 
Indirect taxes 434,5 463,1 13,5 13,3 13,5 13,6 7,3 9,6 7,0 
Direct taxes 417,4 433,6 12,6 12,8 12,5 12,4 9,9 5,8 5,1 
Social security contributions received 494,6 525,6 15,2 15,1 15,0 15,0 8,0 7,6 5,7 
Total taxes and social security contributions 1 346,5 1 422,3 41,3 41,3 41,0 40,9 8,4 7,7 5,9 
Other current revenue 126,1 126,9 3,7 3,8 3,6 3,4 11,8 - 3,0 -1,2 
Total current revenue I 472,6 I 549,2 45,0 45,1 44,6 44,3 8,6 7,3 5,4 
Current transfers paid 736,4 765,6 22,8 22,6 22,0 21,8 7,4 5,6 5,2 
Actual interest payments 162,1 174,3 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,1 12,2 10,2 3,2 
Government consumption 604,9 631,6 18,7 18,6 18,3 18,2 7,6 6,7 5,3 
Total current expenditure 1 503,4 1 571,4 46,5 46,4 45,6 45,1 8,0 6,6 5,0 
Gross saving -30,8 -22,2 -1,5 -1,3 -1,0 -0,8 
Net capital transfers 36,7 33,4 1,1 1,2 1,0 0,9 17,1 -10,0 3,5 
Gross capital formation 88,6 91,8 2,8 2,8 2,7 2,7 8,3 5,4 5,3 
Net lending(+) or borrowing( - ) -156,1 -147,4 -5,4 -5,2 -4,6 -4,4 
Memorandum: nominal GDP 8,5 8,4 6,2 
I National accounts definition, excluding loans, advances and participations. 
l Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table A.7.2 
Member States' general government revenue and expenditure, 1 % change, 1985-87 
Total current Indirect taxes Direct taxes Social security Other current 
revenue contrihutions received revenue 
1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 
B 7.3 4,l 4.2 5.0 5,0 3,6 6.7 5,3 3 ) 10.3 3,5 6.5 5.4 -7.6 0,5 
DK l l,2 9.4 3,5 l l.4 13,2 7.4 13,5 9.6 u 8.2 -7,5 3.7 3.9 5.6 2,3 
D 4,9 5,2 5.l l.6 4.8 5.l 7.8 5.l 6.8 5.l 6.3 4.7 5.7 l,7 0,6 
GR 20,3 32,7 16.8 22,3 33.4 17.8 11.5 53.0 19,0 21,0 22.7 13.9 28.3 24,6 15,5 
E 14,2 13.8 9.8 16.0 26.4 13.5 13,8 8.5 8.5 10,2 10.4 8.0 28.8 5,0 8,0 
F 7,l 5.3 4,0 7.4 5.7 5,0 6,0 4.8 4.6 7.3 5,1 2.8 7.4 6.5 4,9 
IRL 6,7 7,2 4.9 3.7 7,5 5.6 6,1 11,0 5.9 6.7 6.0 5,4 19,6 -3.5 -1,5 
I 11.2 1 l.1 6,2 8,4 12.9 9.3 12.5 9,4 5,5 10.6 12.1 7,7 20.3 6.8 - 13.8 
L 10.2 3.9 2.2 4,8 5.7 4.8 15,8 0.8 -3.0 5.2 5.6 6,4 16.8 5.6 2,8 
NL 4,2 1.2 -0,8 5,3 2,9 5,0 3,5 4,9 l.4 l.6 -0.l 3.2 10,7 -2,9 -19.5 
p l 7.0 35. l l 7,8 14.6 39.3 16.0 28,4 5,0 15.5 21.5 34,9 14.5 -30.6 220.9 43.0 
UK 9.7 3.4 4.7 8.3 8. l 6.8 l 1.5 -0.9 2.6 7.9 7.9 7.l 12.7 - 7,4 -0,8 
EUR 12 8.6 7,3 5,4 7.3 9.6 7.0 9.9 5.8 5. l 8.0 7.6 5.7 l l.8 3,0 - 1.2 
Total Current transfers Actual interest Government Net capital 
expenditure paid pa}mcnts consumption transfer!, and gross 
capital fonnation 
1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 1985 1986' 1987' 1985 J<JRW 1987' 
B 6,2 3.7 2,7 3.8 3.4 3, 1 15.0 6.8 4.8 5.2 3.l l .4 3.3 - l,9 -0,3 
DK 7.0 l,6 2.l 4.7 3.0 2.9 l l.6 -4,6 -5.7 5.8 2,8 3.8 21,2 2,2 4,3 
D 3. l 4.3 4,2 l,9 4.0 3.9 5,9 4.5 2.5 4.3 4,3 4,4 0,7 5.3 5.7 
GR 30.3 18.5 8.4 33.6 l 7.7 3.2 41.5 42.7 17.3 24,3 16.6 10.l 32,4 3,0 8.5 
E 17.2 10.7 8.4 9.8 8.2 10.l 78,5 27,3 0.5 13.5 12.l 8,6 32,2 3.7 8.5 
F 6.4 5.l 4,3 6,9 5. l 4.5 8.8 7.8 7.2 6.2 5,l 3,2 l,O 2,4 5.3 
IRL 10.4 4.l 4.0 8,2 5.2 4.4 2 l.l 0.5 l.8 7.6 7.4 4.6 8.8 -7.2 4.l 
I 13.2 8.8 6.9 12,3 8.5 7.4 8.0 14.9 2.7 l l.9 9.5 7,8 30,5 -0.5 9.2 
L 5.0 4.4 4,2 5,5 4.3 4,0 l 7,3 10.7 3.3 5. l 5,3 6,3 l,3 l.9 l ,3 
NL 2.4 l.4 0,4 2.3 2.3 -0.4 8.8 5,8 6.3 l.4 0,3 0.2 - l,O -5.3 -3.0 
p 29.6 32.0 17.l 33.8 32.5 19.2 37.0 59.2 16.6 24.5 l 8.3 l 3.7 18.6 26,4 22,2 
UK 7.0 3.8 4.2 8.6 l.6 3,9 10.5 4.6 l.8 6.3 6.7 5,7 - 3.5 -8.4 - 5.3 
EUR 12 8.2 6.1 5.0 7.4 5.6 5.2 12.2 10.2 3.2 7.6 6.7 5.3 10.7 0.8 4.9 
I National accounts ddimtion. C'-duding loans. advances and partu.:ipat10ns. 
' 
Forecasts. 
Sourff. Commission services. 
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should improve tax receipts by enlarging the tax base and 
reducing possibilities for fraud and evasion. In time. the 
installation of this modern system of indirect taxes should. 
therefore. tend to bring Spanish and Portuguese rates of tax 
and social security contributions more into line with the 
Community average. Greece will also introduce VAT in 
1987. The principal objective of these three countries is 
therefore to modernize their tax system and increase returns 
on the receipts side. rather than to limit tax pressure as in 
the other member countries. 
A. 7 .2. Budgetary trends in the Member States 
The fall in oil prices has led Member States to study the 
question as to how appropriate it is to take advantage of 
the fall in the oil bill by taxing part of the gains. The attitude 
of Member States here has not been uniform. Some have 
decided not to modify existing or planned taxes on oil 
(Belgium. Germany. France. Luxembourg) while others 
have taxed some of the gains (Spain. Ireland. the United 
Kingdom) and an umber have sought to neutralize practically 
all of the gains through taxation (Denmark. Greece, Italy, 
Portugal). The Netherlands has also announced supplemen-
tary taxes to compensate for budgetary losses due to the fall 
in natural gas prices. If decisions on oil taxation are linked 
to the overall situation on the budgetary accounts. it is 
apparent that the relationship between. on the one hand. 
low budget deficits and the absence of increases in taxation 
and, on the other, between higher deficits and an increase 
in oil taxation. which could have been hoped for. is not 
totally respected. Thus Belgium, where the public deficit is 
large, did not increase oil taxation. At the opposite end of 
the scale, Denmark. where the improvement in the budgetary 
position has already been substantial, decided to compensate 
in total for the fall in oil prices by increased taxation. It can 
equally well be seen that the two main Community producers 
of oil and/or gas, that is to say the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. where receipts from this activity are declining 
rapidly (in the United Kingdom. they have been halved). 
have reacted differently. the Netherlands deciding to intro-
duce additional taxation on energy while in the United 
Kingdom policy action has been limited to raising excise 
duty on petrol. an adjustment which is traditionally carried 
out annually in the budget. 
Eight Member States should. this year. record a fall in the 
share of taxes and social security contributions in GDP, i.e. 
Belgium. Germany, France. Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg. the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see Table A.7.3). As 
a matter of fact tax pressure as a whole has not been 
tightened in these countries in 1986. In France, the direct 
tax burden was reduced slightly in the 1986 budget; a sup-
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plementary budget. adopted in April 1986, includes a plan 
for youth employment and an increase in grants to indus-
tries, expenditure being totally covered by economies on the 
budget and the sale of assets of public enterprises. Ireland, 
where the budget was introduced at the beginning of the 
year. has lowered somewhat direct taxes on employees and 
reduced the number of VAT rates at the same time as 
increasing the general rate from 23 to 25 %. In Italy, tax 
rates on individuals were eased. Luxembourg reduced its 
solidarity levy. In the budget for 1986/87. presented in 
March, the United Kingdom authorities reduced the basic 
income tax rate by one point. 
In the four other Member States. the weight of taxes and 
social security contributions will remain unchanged this year 
(Spain), or will increase as a proportion of GDP (Denmark, 
Greece, Portugal). Denmark increased indirect taxation in 
December 1985 and March I 986 to absorb the increase in 
purchasing power brought about by the improvement in the 
terms of trade and to avoid too great a surge in domestic 
demand. The increase in taxation on energy will account for 
the major part of supplementary receipts. Greece. following 
thedevaluation of the drachma in October and the granting 
of a Community Joan in November, decided on a stabiliza-
tion plan with the principal objective of reducing substan-
tially the financing needs of the public sector by taking 
action on the budgetary aggregates, increasing public service 
charges. intensifying the fight against tax fraud and by 
introducing a special levy on companies and the self-em-
ployed. In Portugal. the introduction of VAT will also boost 
budgetary receipts but the increase expected for indirect 
taxes is a lot higher than in Spain as a result of the more or 
less complete taxation of the gains due to the fall in the price 
of oil (see Table A.7.2). These four countries have reinforced 
the priority given to indirect taxes; the improvement in direct 
tax receipts is essentially due in Greece to the intensification 
in the fight against tax fraud. 
Looking at the expenditure side of general government, it is 
seen that the Community is tending. in a convergent manner, 
to put into practice its objectives of limiting the share of 
public spending in GDP: 11 Member States should indeed 
see a fall in the proportion of public spending in GDP 
this year. The one exception is Portugal where the total 
expenditure of general government could reach 43,9 % of 
GDP this year as against 40, 7 % in 1985. The budget ad-
opted by the Portuguese parliament at the beginning of April 
provides for a large rise in public debt interest payments as 
well as a marked rise in public investment. Portuguese net 
borrowing could rise to 11,2 % of GDP in 1986 as against 
11, I % in 1985. Controls on expenditure within the Com-
munity should continue in 1987 and the forecasts of the 
Commission services anticipate a fall as a proportion of 
GDP in the Member States. 
63 
Macroeconomic developments and outlook 
Table A.7.3 
Member State's general government revenue and expenditure,1 as a% of GDP, 1985-87 
Total current Indirect taxes Direct taxes Social security Other current 
revenue contributions received revenue 
1985 19862 19872 1985 19862 19872 1985 19862 19872 1985 19862 19872 1985 19862 19872 
B 47,6 46,7 46,9 11,5 11,3 11,3 19,3 19,2 19,1 14,6 14,3 14,6 2,2 1,9 1,8 
DK 57,6 58,8 58,1 18,6 19,7 20,1 28,7 29,3 28,3 2,9 2,5 2,5 7,5 7,4 7,2 
D 46,4 45,9 46,2 12,6 12,4 12,5 12,6 12,4 12,7 17,5 17,5 17,5 3,8 3,6 3,5 
GR 34,4 37,6 39,3 15,9 17,5 18,5 5,6 7,0 7,5 11,0 11,1 11,3 2,0 2,0 2,1 
E 33,6 33,5 33,9 9,2 10,2 10,6 8,2 7,8 7,8 12,9 12,5 12,5 3,3 3,0 3,0 
F 50,0 49,2 48,7 15,1 15,0 14,9 9,3 9,1 9,1 21,8 21,5 21,0 3,7 3,7 3,7 
IRL 42,2 41,3 40,9 16,9 16,6 16,6 14,5 14,7 14,7 5,7 5,5 5,5 5,1 4,5 4,2 
I 44,4 44,0 43,0 10,8 10,9 11,0 15,3 14,9 14,5 15,8 15,8 15,6 2,5 2,4 1,9 
L 56,8 54,5 52,8 15,1 14,7 14,6 19,9 18,6 17,1 13,5 13,2 13,3 8,2 8,0 7,8 
NL 55,3 54,9 53,7 12,1 12,2 12,6 12,8 13,2 13,2 20,4 20,0 20,4 10,0 9,5 7,5 
p 29,6 32,6 33,3 13,7 15,5 15,6 8,4 7,2 7,2 6,5 7,2 7,1 1,1 2,7 3,4 
UK 42,0 40,9 40,1 16,2 16,5 16,5 14,9 13,9 13,3 6,9 7,0 7,0 4,1 3,5 3,3 
EUR 12 45,1 44,6 44.3 13,3 13,5 13,6 12,8 12,5 12,4 15,1 15,0 15,0 3,8 3,6 3,4 
Total Current transfers Actual interest Government Net capital 
expenditure paid payments consumption transfers and gross 
capital formation 
1985 19862 1987' 1985 19862 19872 1985 19862 1987' 1985 19862 1987' 1985 19862 19872 
B 56,9 55,6 55,0 25,3 24,6 24,5 10,9 10,9 11,0 17,6 17,1 16,7 3,1 2,9 2,8 
DK 59,5 56,4 54,9 21,5 20,6 20,2 9,8 8,8 7,9 25,2 24,2 24,0 3,0 2,8 2,8 
D 47,5 46,6 46,5 20,6 20,1 20,0 3,0 3,0 2,9 20,0 19,6 19,6 3,9 3,9 3,9 
GR 48,3 47,1 45,7 17,6 17,1 15,8 5,5 6,4 6,7 20,0 19,2 18,9 5,2 4,4 4,3 
E 39,8 38,6 38,6 18,4 17,4 17,7 3,5 3,9 3,6 13,6 13,4 13,4 4,2 3,9 3,9 
F 52,5 51,7 51,2 30,4 29,9 29,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 16,3 16,0 15,7 3,0 2,9 2,9 
IRL 53.5 50,9 50,0 19,7 19,0 18,7 10,7 9,8 9,4 19,0 18,6 18,4 4,1 3,5 3,4 
I 58,4 56,7 55,9 23, 1 22,3 22,1 9,3 9,5 9,0 19,5 19,0 18.9 6,6 5,8 5,8 
L 52,7 50,7 50,1 28,8 27,7 27,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 15,2 14,8 14,9 7,4 6,9 6,6 
NL 60,4 60,2 59,5 32,8 32,9 32,3 6,3 6,5 6,9 16,3 16,0 15,8 5,0 4,7 4,5 
p 40,7 43,9 44,5 15,1 16,3 16,9 7,7 10,0 10,1 14,5 14,0 13,8 3,4 3,5 3,7 
UK 45,1 44,0 43,0 16,5 15,7 15,3 5,0 4,9 4,7 21,2 21,3 21,1 2,4 2,0 1,8 
EUR 12 50,3 49,3 48,7 22.6 22,0 21,8 5.1 5,2 5,1 18,6 18,3 18,2 4,0 3,7 3,6 
I National accounts definition. excluding loans, advances and participations. 
l Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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An improvement in budgetary balances is likely to come 
about in a greater number of Member States this year (see 
Table A. 7.4). While in 1985 five countries experienced an 
increase in their net borrowing as a proportion of GDP 
(Spain, Ireland, Italy. Greece and Portugal, the increase 
having been particularly substantial in the latter two 
countries). in 1986, only three Member States. the Nether-
lands. Portugal, and the United Kingdom, could experience 
some slight increase in their public deficit as a percentage 
of GDP and the surplus in Luxembourg could fall somewhat. 
In the eight other countries an improvement in budgetary 
positions as a percentage of GDP is to be seen. The degree 
of budgetary disequilibrium is however very different as 
between countries: deficits remain considerable in Italy and 
Portugal. where they still substantially exceed I O % of GDP, 
and are large in Belgium, Greece and Ireland, where they 
are around 9 % of GDP. The most marked improvement in 
budgetary positions was recorded in Denmark where a net 
borrowing position of 1.9 % of GDP in 1985 became a net 
lending figure of 2,4 % of GDP in 1986. A continuation of 
the fall in budget deficits in the majority of Member States 
is expected next year. 
Table A.7.4 
General government budget balances, as% of GDP, 1984-87 
(a) 
Net lending { - ) or borrowing ( - ) 
1984 19X.5 J9Xh 19X7 1984 
B -9,8 -9.3 -8,9 -8.1 10.1 
DK -4,2 - 1.9 2.4 3,2 9,6 
D -1,9 -1,1 -0.7 -0.6 3,0 
GR -10,1 - 13.9 -9.5 -6.4 4,6 
E -5.0 -6.2 -5.1 -4.7 2.2 
F -2.9 -2.6 -2.4 -2.6 2,8 
IRL -9.7 - 11.4 -9.6 -9.1 9.5 
I -13,0 -14,0 - 12,7 -12.8 9,6 
L 1,5 4.2 3.7 2.6 1.2 
NL -6,3 -5.1 -5.2 -5.8 5, I 
p 
-7.7 - I I.I - 11.2 - 11.2 7. I 
UK -4.2 -3.1 -3.2 -2.9 5,0 
EUR 12 - 5.4 - 5.2 -4.6 -4.4 5.0 
."lour,e c·omm1!>'i1on ,en ice" 
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A. 7 .3. Interest charges and public debt 
Interest payments on public debt, which increased as a 
percentage of GDP in eight Member States in 1985, are 
expected to grow further with respect to GDP in 1986 in 
five Member States (see Table A. 7 .3). Generally the fall in 
interest rates has enabled Member States to consolidate their 
debt at reduced interest rates and the fall in the dollar has 
alleviated the weight of debt in those countries where the 
dollar component is important (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Portugal). The presence of these two favourable factors 
has not, however.prevented debt interest payments from 
continuing to rise in 1986 as a proportion of GDP in Greece, 
Spain. Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The question 
therefore arises as to whether the effort already made at the 
level of budget balances, net of interest payments, has been 
sufficient in these Member States or, in other words, if the 
overall reduction in net borrowing has been sufficiently 
rapid. 
Judgments on the speed of the reduction can be based on 
data presented in Table A. 7 .5 which brings together figures 
(bi (c: 
Interest payments Net lending {+)or borrowing ( - ) less net 
interest payments (c = a + b) 
1985 1981, 1987 1984 1985 1981, 1987 
10,9 10,9 I 1.0 0,3 1.5 2,0 2,9 
9,8 8.8 7,9 5.4 7.9 11,2 11,1 
3,0 3,0 2.9 I.I 1.9 2,3 2,6 
5,5 6,4 6.7 -5,5 -8.4 -3.1 0,3 
3.5 3,9 3,6 -2.8 -2.7 -1,2 -I.I 
2.8 2,8 2,9 -0.1 0,2 0.4 0.3 
10.7 9,8 9,4 -0,2 -0.7 0,2 0,3 
9.3 9.5 9,0 -3.4 -4,7 -3.2 -3,8 
1.3 1.3 1.3 2,7 5,5 5,0 3,9 
6.3 6.5 6,9 -0,2 1.2 1.2 I.I 
7.7 10,0 10,l -0,6 -3,4 -1.2 - I.I 
5.0 4.9 4,7 0.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 
5.1 5.2 5.1 -0.4 -0.1 0,6 0.7 
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Table A.7.5 
Developments in the gross debt of general government, as a% of GDP, 1980-87 
i980 1981 
B2 76,4 88,1 
DK 33,5 43,6 
D 32,6 36,4 
GR3 27,7 33,0 
E 17,4 21,0 
F 25,0 26,0 
IRL3 84,4 89,8 
I 70,2 73,2 
L 13,8 14,0 
NL2 45,9 50,3 
p 47,4 59,0 
UK4 52,3 51, I 
EUR 12 42,4 45,0 
I Forecasts. 
2 General government less social security. 
J State. 
4 Debt valued at market prices. 
Source: Commission scnil:cs. 
for gross public debt of general government for the Member 
States.expressed as a percentage of GDP, in addition to 
forecasts for levels in 1986 and 1987, consistent with fore-
casts for budget deficits and nominal growth. It can be noted 
that Belgian, Irish, Italian and Dutch gross debt should 
continue to rise steadily and rapidly to 1987 and, at the 
same time, the level of debt will far exceed the annual 
level of GDP in Belgium, Ireland and Italy. In these three 
countries, despite the improvement in their economic situ-
ation, corrective measures to trends in the growth and size 
of public debt which threaten financial balance, appear to 
be insufficient. At the other end of the scale. figures for 
Denmark confirm the remarkable turnaround in the growth 
of public indebtedness. the weight of which will diminish in 
1986 and 1987. In Germany and Luxembourg, the trend is 
also towards a reduction in the debt burden. In France, 
where the level of indebtedness remains moderate, some 
increase is foreseen. In Greece a marked moderation in the 
growth of debt as a proportion of GDP should come about 
this year as a result of the stabilization measures taken. In 
the United Kingdom, the weight of public debt (measured 
here at market prices) is likely to increase slightly, but could 
remain in total stable as a percentage of GDP if adjusted 
for the revaluation of debt expected as a result of the 
continuation of the fall in interest rates. 
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19X~ 1983 1984 1985 1986' 1987 1 
96,1 105,6 111,6 (118,3) (122,8) (129,4) 
52,7 62.7 67,6 (66,3) (61,7) (57,6) 
39,5 41,1 42,0 (42.7) (41,7) (41,l) 
36.7 41,7 49,9 56,8 (57,0) (59,6) 
26,2 32, I 39,3 (46.3) (49,0) (52,7) 
29,1 30,7 29,3 (31,8) (33,5) (35.1) 
96,6 107,7 113,6 ( 115,7) (118,1) (123,9) 
80,0 87.6 94,5 (103,0) ( 106,3) (110,5) 
14,4 14,8 (14,8) (14,5) ( 13.8) ( 13,3) 
55,6 62,3 67,0 (70,6) (76,1) (82,0) 
62,2 70,9 75,7 (81,2) (84.5) (89.6) 
57,7 57,4 (58,7) (56,9) (58, I) (58.7) 
49,8 53,5 56,8 (59.7) (61.2) (63,5) 
In total therefore, an examination of the major budgetary 
aggregates leads to the expectation of a fall in budgetary 
expenditure in relation to activity in almost all Member 
States, together with a decrease in the tax and social security 
burden in eight Member States and its stability, or increase, 
in the remaining four. In the great majority of cases an 
improvement in budgetary balances will take place. If this 
analysis of Oows is compared with the outlook for the 
development of the stock of public debt, an analysis of the 
debt situation shows that consolidation of budgetary policies 
has not proceeded at sufficiently fast a pace in Belgium and 
Italy, where interest charges on the debt continue to outpace 
GDP. The Belgian government for its part decided in May 
1986 on an austerity plan to cutback the borrowing require-
ment of the State to 8 % in 1987. This involves a total 
cutback in gross terms of BFR 195 OOO million, or about 
4 % of GDP; it is essentially geared to a reduction in expendi-
ture and will principally affect operations in 1987 1 • Ireland, 
which is in an analogous position to the latter two countries, 
has benefited more from the fall in interest rates and its debt 
1 The budgetary forecasts were drawn up before the publication of the 
austerity plan of May 1986. 
is growing somewhat more slowly. However, on the basis 
of present budgetary policy, no signs are apparent of a 
stabilization of public debt in relation to GDP. In the Ne-
therlands, public debt could rise from around 70 % of GDP 
in 1985 to 80 % in 1987, which leaves little room for a more 
important contribution of budgetary policy to domestic de-
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mand. On the other hand, budgetary consolidation appears 
very substantial in Denmark and the reversal in trend very 
rapid. Trends in public accounts in Germany and Luxem-
bourg are under control and developments in France and the 
United Kingdom do not, on the basis of current forecasts, 
suggest any particular potential risks. 
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A.8. Medium-term outlook 
Since September 1985 the international enl'ironment of the Community has heen subject to 
substantial modijfration with regard to exchange rates, the oil price and the budgetary outlook 
in the USA. This chapter presents a baseline projection assuming a stahili::.ation in real tams 
of the ECU/ USD exchange rate from 1988, an upward trend in the oil price from 11011· until 
the end of the decade, and the maintenance in the medium term of the budgetary and monetary 
policies foreseen for 1986-87. This scenario is hacked up by a set <if' l'ariallls analysing the 
implications of different pro.files for the oil price and the dollar exchange rate. The projections 
are compared with those of the cooperative groll'th scenario presented in the 1985/86 Annual 
Economic Report. 
A.8.1. Baseline projection 
The baseline projection of the Community economies for 
the period 1986-90 is set in an international environment 
which has undergone major modifications since September 
1985: 
(i) the oil price fall has important repercussions on incomes 
and prices at the world level; 
(ii) the revaluation of the ECU against the dollar modifies 
competitive positions with respect to world trade and 
the international distribution of balance of payments 
surpluses and deficits; 
(iii) the stance of US fiscal policy is liable to undergo a 
major shift in order to achieve a sharp reduction in the 
federal deficit. 
The integration of these various elements in a medium-term 
projection raises considerable problems, however, to the 
extent that the movements of the oil price, the dollar and 
the US federal budget deficit after 1986-87 remains very 
uncertain. 
The projection presented here should therefore be regarded, 
so far as the period 1988-90 is concerned, as one of many 
possible scenarios and not as a formal forecast. For this 
reason two variants will be presented, in order to test the 
implications of different profiles for the oil price and the 
dollar exchange rate. 
Finally, the results will be compared with the projections 
obtained for the cooperative growth scenario in the 1985/86 
Annual Economic Report. 1 
1 Annual Economic Review 1985/86, Chapter 6, European Economy No 
26. 
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As a rule, the results presented in this chapter relate to the 
new composition of the Community, consisting therefore of 
12 countries. For all the comparisons v.ith the cooperative 
growth scenario from the 1985/86 Annual Economic Report, 
however, the aggregate EUR 10 is taken. 
A.8.2. Baseline projection - main assumptions 
The baseline projection incorporates the following assump-
tions: 
(i) the average oil import price falls to USO 16 per barrel 
in 1986 and to USO 15 in 1987. Subsequently. the 
pressure of world demand relative to supply induces a 
hypothetical recovery of the (nominal) price to USO 16 
in 1988. USO 19 in 1989 and USO 22 in 1990; 
(ii) the ECU /USO rate, after falling by 19 % in 1986, only 
decreases slowly, leading to a constant real exchange 
rate from 1988 onwards; 
(iii) US fiscal policy achieves a reduction of the federal 
deficit by 0,5 % of GDP per annum on average between 
1988 and 1990. The general government deficit would 
thus fall from 3,4 % of GDP in 1986 to 1,0 % in 1990. 
The monetary policy of the USA would be steered by 
the objective of containing inOation without restricting 
too severely the growth of domestic demand: 
(iv) after falling to 2,3 % in 1996 and to 3.9 % in 1987. 
growth of world imports (excluding the Community) 
would stabilize at around 5 % in 1988 - 90, as a result 
of the recovery of OPEC imports and of the positive 
effects of the lower oil price on growth in non-oil-
producing countries. Within the latter group. however. 
growth in developing countries would continue to be 
affected by a certain terms of trade loss due to the trend 
of non-oil commodity prices; 
(v) in the Community countries. fiscal policy would con-
tinue to be dominated by the desire to reduce the budget 
deficits in terms of GDP. Growth in real terms of public 
consumption and of public investment would thus only 
reach LO% per annum and 1,7 % per annum respect-
ively on average during the 1986-90 period. As far as 
public revenue is concerned, one would see a slight 
easing of the total tax burden in 1990 as compared 
to 1985 as a result of reductions in direct taxation 
implemented or announced in certain member 
countries. Monetary policy would be set so as to ensure 
a reduction of real long-term interest rates. given the 
general slowing of inflation rates relative to the 1991-
85 period and the narrowing of the budget deficits. 
A.8.3. Baseline projection - main results 
(a) Demand components and contributions of 
GDP groll'th 
Table A.8.1 shows growth of GDP and of its components 
for the 1986-90 period. As compared to the previous projec-
tions, 1 there is a slight acceleration of GDP growth, from 
2,5 % to 2,7 % on an annual average, so that GDP is 0,8 % 
higher in real terms in 1990. 
The higher figure is essentially a result of the effects of the 
lower energy costs on domestic demand, the average growth 
rate of which rises to 3,0 % per annum (from 2,4 % before). 
As regards its profile over time, GDP growth remains rela-
tively invariable within the 2,6 to 2,8 % range, but this is in 
spite of more irregular movements of the components. 
The U-shaped profile for the oil price and its repercussions 
on inflation (see section (c) below) lead to a progressive 
decline in the growth of private consumption and of dom-
estic demand in general. 
In contrast. the progressive weakening of the effects of the 
sharp fall of the dollar in 1986 and the slowdown of the 
demand for imports bring about a progressive improvement 
in the real external balance, its negative effect on GDP 
growth (- 0,9 % in 1986) falling to zero in 1990. 
From a more structural point of view, there is a slow recov-
ery of the share of investment in GDP, at the expense of the 
share of public consumption. In addition, the degree of 
openness of the Community economies continues to in-
crease. 
1 Annual Economic Review 1985 :86. Chapter 6, European Economy No 
26. 
Medium-term outlook 
The relative shares of real GDP (in percent) for the years 
1986 and 1990 are as follows: 
Private consumption 
Public consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Domestic demand 
Exports 
Imports 
(b) Wage and employment 
1986 1990 
62,4 
16,8 
19,8 
99,8 
31,9 
31,7 
62,9 
15,8 
21.5 
101,0 
34,2 
35,2 
In the baseline scenario (i.e. with unchanged behaviour), 
real wage costs continue to grow less quickly than labour 
productivity, thus extending the trend observed since 1982. 
This factor, combined with a more favourable development 
of domestic demand, leads to growth of total employment 
by 0, 7 % per annum between 1986 and 1990, as compared 
to the average growth of just 0,2 % between 1960 and 1985 
and even a clearly negative rate between 1981 and 1985. As 
a result the unemployment rate falls by more than one 
percentage point between 1986 and 1990 for the Community 
as a whole. Even with this stronger employment growth, 
however, the unemployment rate remains above 10 % for 
the whole period. 
Wage trends have to be analysed with caution to the extent 
that in 1986 and in 1989-90 they are influenced by the effects 
of oil price movements on the GDP deflator as compared 
to the private consumption deflator. Thus, in 1986, real 
wage incomes grow by 2,4 % (as against 0,5 % for wage 
coses), and by 1,5 % and I, 7 % in 1989 and 1990 (against 
2,0 % and 2,2 % for wage cost). 
(c) Inflation 
The inflation projections for 1987-90 confirm the trend ob-
served since 1985/86. The general inflation rate should thus 
fall to 3,4 % over the 1986-90 period, a rate comparable to 
the 1961-70 average. 
In addition, the rise in the inflation rates in 1989 and 1990 
is a purely mechanical phenomenon linked to the oil price 
development which should not continue later if this price 
stabilizes. 
The present projections indicate a significant convergence 
in the inflation rates of member countries; the extremes of 
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0 % and 22,5 % (Germany and Greece respectively) in 1986 
compare with extremes of 2 % and 10 % (Germany and 
Portugal respectively) in 1990. 
This phenomenon can only contribute towards the stability 
of bilateral exchange rates within the European Monetary 
System. 
Finally, the considerable terms of trade gains registered in 
1986 are to some extent gradually eroded, particularly in 
1989 and 1990, but remain positive throughout the period. 
Table A.8.1 
Central projection 1986-90 - June 1986- EUR 12 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Fixed capital formation 
Stockbuilding (% GDP) 
Domestic demand 
Exports (goods + services) 
Imports (goods + services) 
GDP 
Private consumption price 
GDP deflator 
Export price 
Import price 
Terms of trade 
Long-term interest rate 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Total employment 
Unemployment rate 
Productivity 
Real wages per capita 1 
Wage cost/unit of output 1 
Government net lending(% of GDP) 
Balance on goods+ services(% of GDP) 
I Deflated by the GDP deflator. 
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(d) External trade 
The goods and services balance is also affected in nominal 
terms by the U-shaped profile of the oil price between 1985 
and 1990. Thus despite a difference of 3.2 percentage points 
between the rates of growth in 1986 of real exports and real 
imports to the advantage of the latter, the nominal surplus 
exceeds 2 % of GDP. 
Conversely, the continuous improvement of the real balance 
between 1986 and 1990 is accompanied by a similarly con-
1986 19S7 1488 19S9 PNO :\\t'r,1~t· 
3,5 3.4 3,0 1,6 1.5 3.0 
1,3 1,1 0,8 0,8 0,8 1.0 
4,9 4,9 5.0 4.8 4,5 4.8 
0,8 0,8 0.8 0,8 0,8 0.8 
3.6 3.3 3.0 1.7 1.6 3.0 
2,9 4.1 4.5 4,6 4.6 4.2 
6,2 6.0 5.7 5.1 4.7 5.5 
2,7 1,8 1,6 1.6 1,6 1.65 
3,5 3,1 3J 3.5 3.7 3.4 
5,6 3.3 3J 3.1 3.3 3.7 
-3,6 1.3 2,8 3,8 3.9 1.8 
-9,6 1.7 2,6 5.0 5,1 0.8 
6,6 0.5 0.1 -1.2 - 1.1 1.0 
9.3 8.1 7,8 7.8 8,0 
18.1 - I.I - 1.0 - 1.0 - 1.0 -4.3 
0,8 0.8 0,7 0.7 0.6 0.7 
I 1,5 11.3 11,0 10.7 10.4 
1,9 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.0 1.9 
0,5 1.4 1,6 1.0 1.1 1.5 
-1.4 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.4 
-4,6 -4.4 -3.8 -3.3 -1.8 
2,3 1.9 1.7 I. I 0.8 
tinuous deterioration of the nominal balance, which never-
theless remains positive throughout the period. 
(e) Public sector 
The assumptions made with respect to receipts and expendi-
ture lead to a significant improvement in the budget deficit, 
which falls from -4,6 % of GDP to - 2,8 % between I 986 
and 1990. 
The shares of receipts and expenditure for the Community 
as a whole are as follows: 
(',GDP) 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Current receipts 44.6 44.3 44.1 44.2 44,2 
Total expenditure 49,2 48.7 48.0 47.5 47.0 
Net lending of general 
government -4,6 -4,4 -3.9 -3,3 -2,8 
of which 
Actual interest payments -5.2 -5.1 -5.0 -4.9 -4,8 
One may also note that after 1985 actual interest payments 
increasingly exceed overall net lending. However. the public 
debt consolidation measures envisaged in some Member 
States might increase the sensitivity of the effective cost of 
the debt with respect to the expected decrease in interest 
rates and might generate a larger ran or actual interest 
payments. 
A.8.4. Implications of changes in the inter-
national environment 
Like any other projection. the baseline scenario is built upon 
a set of working hypotheses which, by their very nature, are 
all likely to be called into question by future developments. 
Two specific variants will be analysed in this area, dealing 
with two major uncertainties in the external framework of 
the projections. They are the development of the. oil price 
and the development of the dollar exchange rate. In both 
cases. the variants should be considered as mere sensitivity 
analysis of the results with respect to changes in one of the 
working hypotheses. They should not therefore be inter-
preted as alternative forecasts, since the latter would require 
a revision of all assumptions. 
Medium-term outlook 
Development of the oil price 
The baseline projection is based on the assumption of a 
recovery in the oil price in I 988-90, leading to an average 
import price in nominal terms of USO 22 per barrel in I 990 
compared with USO 15 in 1987. 
The proposed variants can be considered as optimistic in so 
far as it is supposed that the oil price will remain very low 
until I 990. In more precise terms the variant sticks to the 
assumptions of the Economic Forecasts 1986-87 (average 
price per barrel of USO 16 in 1986 and USO 15 in 1987), 
and thereafter it is assumed that the oil price stays constant 
in real terms, which corresponds to a nominal increase of 
about 3,5 % (or USO 0.5) per annum. The nominal average 
price of oil imports thus reaches USO 16,6 in 1990. 
To simplify the analysis the assumptions relating to exchange 
rates and to public expenditure remain unchanged from the 
base simulation. On the side of government revenues, on the 
other hand, the specific oil taxation measures taken in 1986-
87 stay in effect throughout the period. 
Given the paths adopted for the oil price, differences in the 
results only become noticeable in 1989-90. The five-year 
averages are consequently relatively little affected. 
For I 989-90. however. the maintenance of the oil price in 
real terms at the level expected for I 986-87 would lead to 
an addition to domestic growth of about 0,25 % per annum, 
together with a reduction in the domestic inflation rate of 
0,3 % per annum. A weaker rise in nominal wages would 
kt:ep lhe rise in real wage cosls below lhe rate of growth of 
productivity throughout the period. Finally, the gain in 
overall growth would cause the unemployment rate for EUR 
JO to fall to 8,9 % in 1990 instead of 9,2 % for EUR I O (to 
10.2 % instead of 10.4 % for EUR 12). 
On the external side the rise in import prices in I 989 - 90 
would slow down from 5 % to 2,9 % per year, and the 
surplus on the balance of goods and services would be 
increased by about 0.6 % of GDP on average. 
The implications for the Community's budgetary position 
are, by contrast, relatively marginal because of the assump-
tions made about oil taxation. 
The detailed results for EUR 12 are shown in Table A.8.3. 
The present scenario is very stylized in character and must 
be analysed with all the usual reservations. In particular it 
does not consider the longer-term implications of a higher 
energy dependence for oil imports and the risk of an oil 
shock after 1990 that this could bring. 
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Table A.8.2 
Average annual rate of growth 1986-90 (EUR 10) 
Private consumption 
Private investment 
Domestic demand 
External balance (goods + services) 
GDP 
Inflation 1 
Employment 
Unemployment rate2 
Productivity 
Real wage-cost 
Real wage-cost per unit of output 
Gross operating surplus per unit of output 
Current balance(% GDP)2 
Net lending, general government(% GDP)2 
I Private consumption price. 
l Level in 1990, in percent. 
This scenario leads, however, to the same conclusions as 
the base scenario: even in the most favourable case the 
development of the oil price is not of itself enough to ensure 
a strengthening of growth, and employment consistent with 
the aims of the cooperative growth scenario for the period 
1986-90. 
Development of the dollar 
The base scenario assumes that the real ECU/USD exchange 
rate will remain stable from 1987 /88. 
Since exchange rate developments are among the major 
uncertainties attaching to the base projection, it has been 
recalculated on the assumption that the dollar will fall to 
OM 2/USD at the end of 1986 and to OM 1,5/USD at the 
end of 1987, all other things being equal (as against 2.29 
and 2,25 OM/USO in the baseline projection). 
This fall in the dollar should be understood as the use of a 
variant to give some idea of the risks associated with an 
'autonomous· loss of confidence in the dollar, whatever the 
macro-economic environment may be. 
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Baseline Coopcrati,c 8;1sd1nc 
projc.-ction iccnario proj1.-ct1on 
June 1986 Octohcr I 9S5 a..·wbcr 19S5 
3,1 3,3 2,2 
5,1 6,6 5.0 
3,0 3,6 2,4 
-0.3 -0,1 0,1 
2,6 3,5 2,5 
3,0 3,7 4,3 
0,7 1,1 0,4 
9.2 7,0 10,4 
].9 2,4 2,1 
1.7 1,0 1,7 
-0,2 -1,4 -0,4 
0.8 3,8 I. I 
-0.1 -0,9 0,5 
-2.7 -4.0 -3,8 
It will in addition be assumed that the yen and the currencies 
of European OECD countries follow the ECU while other 
currencies follow the dollar. 
As shown in Table A.8.4., a pronounced fall in the dollar 
over two years in succession would lead, other things being 
equal, to a loss of real GDP of the order of 0,25 % per year 
on average over five years. No appreciable reduction in the 
unemployment rate would be evident before 1989. The only 
positive effects would be felt through a reduction in the 
inflation rate and in interest rates, which, via their impact on 
real wage and non-wage incomes would allow the downward 
pressure on domestic demand to be limited. The real external 
balance would reduce the growth of GDP by 0,5 % per year 
on average. The balance in nominal terms, on the other 
hand, would benefit from J-curve effects in 1986 and 1987 
and only deteriorate (as a% of GDP) from 1988 onwards. 
Finally. at the international level and confirming the results 
of previous simulations, such a fall in the dollar would hold 
the current account deficit of the USA to 1.5 % of GDP in 
1990 compared with 2,0 % in the base scenario. 
Medium-term outlook 
Table A.8.3 
Alternative oil price scenario - 20.6.1986 - EUR 12 (Oil price constant in real terms over the l 987-90 period) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average 
Private consumption 3,5 3,4 3,0 2,8 2,8 3.l 
Government consumption 1,3 l.2 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,0 
Fixed capital formation 4.9 4,9 5,0 4,9 4,8 4,9 
Stockbuilding (% GDP) 0,8 0.8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
Domestic demand 3,6 3,3 3.0 2,9 2.9 3.2 
Exports (goods + services) 2,9 4,2 4.5 4,6 4,6 4,2 
Imports (goods + services) 6.2 6,0 5,7 5,2 5.0 5,6 
GDP 2.7 2.8 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,8 
Private consumption price 3,5 3,1 3,2 3,3 3.3 3,3 
GDP deflator 5,6 3,3 3,2 3,2 3,3 3,7 
Export price -3,6 2,3 2,7 2,9 2,9 1,4 
Import price -9,6 1,7 2,5 2,8 2,9 0,0 
Terms of trade 6,6 0,6 0,2 0,1 0,0 1,4 
Long-term interest rate 9,3 8,1 7,8 7,5 7,0 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) -18,8 - I.I - 1,0 - 1,0 -1,0 -4,3 
Total employment 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 
Unemployment rate 11,5 l l,3 l l.O 10,6 10,2 
Productivity l.9 2,0 1,9 2,0 2,l 2,0 
Real wages per capita 1 0,5 l ,4 l,6 l,8 2,0 1,5 
Wage cost/unit of output I -1,4 -0,6 -0,3 -0,2 -0,l -0,5 
Government net lending(% of GDP) -4.6 -4,4 -3,9 -3,4 -2,9 
Balance on goods + services(% of GDP) 2,3 l.9 1,7 l,6 l.5 
I Deflated by the GDP dcflator. 
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Table A.8.4 
Alternative dollar fall scenario - 20.6.1986 - EUR 12 (Revaluation of the ECU by 50 % over two years with respect to the US dollar) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 199() A,i.;ragl' 
Private consumption 3,7 3,8 2.9 2.3 2.2 3.0 
Government consumption 1,3 1.2 0.8 0,8 0.8 1,0 
Fixed capital formation 4,9 4,7 4.8 4,5 4,5 4,6 
Stockbuilding (% GDP) 0,8 0,8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Domestic demand 3.7 3.4 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.9 
Exports (goods + services) 2,3 2,6 4,3 4,6 4.8 3.7 
Imports (goods + services) 6,8 8.0 6.7 4.7 4.4 6.1 
GDP 2,5 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.4 
Private consumption price 3,0 1.7 2.4 3.2 3.6 2,8 
GDP deflater 5.3 2,3 2.7 2.7 3.1 3,2 
Export price -4.5 -0,7 0.6 2.8 3,8 0.4 
Import price -11.6 -4,8 0,0 4,0 4.8 -1.4 
Terms of trade 8.0 4,3 0.6 - 1.2 -1,0 1,8 
Long-term interest rate 9.1 7.4 7.1 7.1 7,3 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) -25.0 -22.5 - 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -9.S 
Total employment 
Unemployment rate 
Productivity 
Real wages per capita 1 
Wage cost/unit of output 1 
Government net lending(% of GDP) 
Balance on goods + services(% of GDP) 
I Deflated by the GDP deflator. 
A pronounced fall in the dollar on the scale presented here 
would thus make the domestic objectives of the cooperative 
growth scenario appreciably more difficult to achieve. It 
should be remembered that in the cooperative growth scen-
ario the revaluation of the ECU was some 30 % over three 
years, compared with more than 50 % over two years in the 
present variant. 
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0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 
11.6 11.7 11.6 11,5 11.2 
1.8 1,6 1.9 2,0 2,0 1.9 
0.6 1.5 1.6 I. 9 2.1 1.5 
-1.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 
-4.6 -4.5 -4.1 -3.S -3.0 
2.3 2.0 1.3 0.8 0,6 
A.8.5. Comparison with the cooperative growth 
scenario 
Table A.8.3. compares the main indicators of the cooperative 
scenario with those of the baseline projection for EUR JO. 
in order to ensure comparability between the projections 
undertaken in 1985 and in 1986. 
It can be seen that the moderate improvement in economic 
conditions between the two baseline projections is essentially 
due to the effects of the oil price fall and the ECU revaluation 
on domestic demand and, more particularly, on private 
consumption. 
As far as investment is concerned, there is a positive impact 
from the growth of domestic demand and the improvement 
in gross profit margins. It is, however, also subject to the 
negative influence of the deteriorating external balance, so 
that the net positive effect on its growth rate is very limited. 
But it should be noted that the new baseline projection may 
underestimate the growth of productive capacity. While the 
investment projection does take account of the effects of the 
oil price fall on demand and the relative costs of factors of 
production. it does not allow for possible complementary 
effects between energy and the stock of fixed capital (see 
Chapter B. I.). 
With regard to employment, the greater dynamism of econ-
omic activity, combined with the long-term improvement in 
relative labour costs (beginning in 1982 and lasting until 
1989/90) results, for the first time since the early 1970s, in 
growth of labour demand faster than that of the working 
population. bringing the unemployment rate for EUR 10 
down from 10,3 % in 1986 to 9,2 % in 1990, a level signifi-
cantly higher than that emanating from the cooperative 
growth scenario. 
Unemployment rate EUR 101 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Baseline projection (June 
1986) 10,3 JO.I 9.8 9.5 9.2 
Cooperative scenario~ 10.8 10.4 9.5 8.3 7,0 
I Aggregate based on national ddinitions. 
Source: Annu.11 economic review. Chapter 6. Tahlc 6.2. 
As regards wage costs, the evolution of the growth of wage 
cost is influenced by the considerable terms of trade gains 
registered in 1986. Thus, wage incomes (deflated by the 
private consumption price index) are growing by 2.4 % m 
1986, whereas unit labour costs are decreasing by I. I % . 
This phenomenon is however limited to the first year and is 
reversed towards the end of the period as a consequence of 
the upward movement hypothesized for the oil price. Thus, 
in 1989 and 1990, wage incomes are only growing by 1,6 
Medium-term outlook 
Real wage costs 1 1986 1987 1988 19X9 1990 
Baseline projection (June 
1986) 0.5 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.2 
Cooperative scenario 0.5 0,6 0.6 1.4 1.9 
I Cxnatcd by the GDP dcllatl1r 
Sourct·: Annual economic review. Ch<.1ptcr 6. St:ction 6.5. 
and I, 7 % whereas unit labour costs slightly increase (0,1 
and 0,2 %). In this way. the average annual rate of growth 
of wage costs in 1986-90 becomes identical to the one contai-
ned in the October 1985 baseline. 
Finally. on the external side. world demand for imports 
(excluding the Community) remains significantly below the 
path foreseen in the cooperative scenario even after eliminat-
ing the sharp reduction in OPEC imports in 1986-87. For 
the period 1988-90, the baseline growth is 5 % per annum, 
against 5,6 % in the cooperative scenario. The difference is 
mainly explained by the effects of weaker growth in the 
Community and in Japan in the baseline projection as com-
pared to the cooperative scenario. 
The main conclusions to be drawn from this comparison are 
as follows: 
(i) the changes in the international environment that have 
occurred since 1985 have a net positive effect on under-
lying growth in the Community. While this positive 
effect brings the trend of private consumption closer to 
that projected in the cooperative scenario, it does not 
appear to ensure, by means of investment, the expansion 
of productive capacity required for this scenario; 
(ii) the low growth in wage costs forecast for 1986 is strictly 
linked to the substantial fall in the average oil price this 
year and for this reason will not necessarily be repeated 
in the coming years; 
(iii) the moderate underlying growth in the Community. the 
USA and Japan limits the scope for expansion in the 
rest of the world as compared to what the cooperative 
growth scenario would permit. This limitation itself 
makes the contribution of the external balance to GDP 
growth in the Community more strongly negative; 
(iv) finally, even if the present forecasts, which do take 
account of the oil price fall, indicate for EUR 10 a 
slightly lower unemployment rate in 1986 and 1987 than 
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in the cooperative strategy, the projected developments 
for the later years lead to an unemployment rate in 
1990 well above 7 %. In the medium term, therefore, 
a more normative growth and employment strategy 
remains a necessity. 
A.8.6. Conclusions 
The changes in the external environment of the Community 
which have occurred since September 1985 should on aver-
age have a positive overall effect on growth, inflation and 
employment in the period 1986-90 compared with the base-
line forecasts made in the middle of 1985. 
As with all projections from econometric models, these pros-
pects must be analysed with care in so far as too much 
weight may be given to behaviour in the past in assuming 
future developments. In particular, the medium-term impact 
of capital/labour substitution (linked to the improvement in 
the relative cost of labour) on the unemployment rate and 
the possible effects of capital/energy complementarity on 
the rate of growth of investment are especially difficult to 
measure precisely. 
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It nevertheless appears that the fall in the oil price will only 
have a small impact on unemployment. With unchanged 
behaviour and policies, unemployment would still be over 
10 % of the labour force in 1990 in the Community of 
Twelve. 
The variants show in addition that, even if the oil price 
remains for five years at a level in real terms 50 % below its 
1985 level, this conclusion would not be appreciably affected. 
Furthermore, the employment and unemployment gains ex-
pected in 1986-87 could be wiped out by an uncontrolled 
fall in the dollar during these two years. 
It follows that the implementation of a more normative and 
employment-creating growth strategy in the spirit of the 
Annual Economic Report 1985-86 remains a prime necessity. 
At this level, the evolution of the oil price has unambiguous 
favourable effects since it is likely to increase, in the medium 
term, available room for manceuvre in the budgetary and 
monetary fields, thanks to its impact on incomes and in-
flation and to the easing of the external constraint. 
PartB 
Specific issues . 

B.1. Economic consequences of the oil price change 
The fall in the oil price ll'hich occurred in the early part of 1986 a.f.fects the outlook for the 
European economies in ma11y d!fferent ll'ays. At the microeconomic level, the immediate 
effect on oil consumption ll'il! be small, but, {f the price fall is sustained in the medium term, 
consumption is generally expected to rise significant~\' and there ll'ill be a rise in dependence 
on oil imports from OPEC and a fall in 11011-0PEC oil production. There ll'il! be macro-
economic effects 011 both the dema11d and supply side. Extra resources for the oil-consuming 
sectors of the economy, after allowing for increased savings, may be used to increase demand 
either through higher consumption or higher investment. In so far as investment is increased, 
there ll'ill probably be a rise in potential output which may be enhanced by delayed scrapping 
of older equipment. In addition the lower oil price is associated ll'ith a large fall in interest 
rates ll'hich emphasi::es the positive effects on both supply and demand. Negative factors 
associated ll'ith the oil price fall are that exports to OPEC will fall, price volatility itself 
imposes costs and there is a threat to the fi11a11cial system from the debilitating effects on oil 
producers. Holl'erer, the bala11ce of the likely effects is expected to be positive. This will 
increase the room for mana?u1•re il'ithi11 the Community and thus facilitate implementation of 
the cooperative groll'th strategy. 
B.1.1. The oil price 
By I 979, following the impact of the two oil shocks, OPEC 
still had a 6 I % share of the world oil market excluding the 
centrally planned economies. However, six years later this 
share had diminished to 37 % as the longer term effects of 
high prices on industrial countries' oil consumption began 
to appear and the output of non-OPEC producers continued 
to rise. Between I 979 and I 985 0 ECD oil consumption fell 
from 41,6 mbd (million barrels per day) to about 34,0 mbd 
while GNP in the OECD area rose by 11 %. Over the six 
years 1979 to 1985, OPEC output fell from 31,5 mbd to 17,1 
mbd with cuts in production in all the member countries, 
particularly Iran and Iraq. The largest fall was in Saudi 
Arabia where output shrank from 9,6 mbd to 3,4 mbd. These 
low output levels were not acceptable and in December I 985 
OPEC changed from a price to a market-share oriented 
strategy. Since then, the oil price in dollars has fallen by 
some 55 % giving an expected average fall of about 40 % 
between 1985 and 1986. Taking account of exchange rate 
movements, the 1986 oil import bill for most Community 
countries is likely to be less than half that of 1985. 
The current lower price level is expected to discourage new 
supplies and to encourage greater oil consumption in the 
OECD countries. creating extra demand for Middle East oil. 
The possibility of a renewed agreement on quotas, perhaps 
involving non-OPEC producers, cannot however be ruled 
out. 
The outlook for the price of oil may be summarized as 
follows: 
(I) Oil is an exhaustible resource and producers must decide 
the timing of its extraction. This leads to upward press-
ure on prices over time. 
(2) In a more fully competitive market the oil price would be 
kept rather above the marginal extraction cost, currently 
estimated at some USD 6-8 per barrel; 
(3) Until recently the policies of OPEC have kept the price 
well above a trend or equilibrium level, however defined; 
(4) The current, rather low price will encourage consump-
tion and, to a somewhat lesser extent, discourage non-
OPEC supply; 
(5) Many commentators believe that a price level of around 
USD 15 per barrel could be sustained for a few years, 
but that thereafter, in the absence of offsetting policy 
action, prices would begin to rise again under the com-
bined pressures of increased world oil demand and re-
duced non-OPEC supplies. 
B.1.2. Prospects for the Community energy bal-
ance to 1990 
Taking as a working assumption a price of USD 15 per 
barrel at constant real ( 1986) prices through to 1990, the 
Commission's Directorate-General for Energy has analysed 
some of the possible effects of lower oil prices on the Com-
munity energy balance. The analysis is based on a growth 
rate of GDP of only 2,5 % in 1988-90 which is lower than 
the 3,5 % envisaged in the cooperative growth strategy for 
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more employment. Clearly stronger growth in these years 
would lead to a higher demand for energy. 
The results of the analysis are presented in terms of ranges 
for the main aggregates which reflect the particular uncer-
tainties attaching to: the structure and energy intensity of 
industrial output; the response of household and automobile 
demand to lower energy prices and higher incomes; the speed 
with which the prices of other fuels adjust to those of 
competing oil products; the prospects for natural gas (and 
Table 8.1.1 
Energy demand EUR 12 with oil at USD 15 per barrel through to 1990 
Gross energy demand2 
Oil2 
Natural gas 
Solid fuels 
Nuclear, hydro, etc. 
Net oil imports 
1 Million barrels per day of oil equivalent. 
1 Including bunkers. 
oil) use in electricity generation: and the impact on the 
Community coal industry of falling coal prices. 
The simulation results are given in Table B. I. I where it can 
be seen that the demand for oil rises by some 7 % to 14 % 
over the period. Of both interest and importance is the 
projected increase in dependence on imports of oil. Oil prices 
at this level should have little direct effect on the outlook 
for nuclear power in the medium-term. In the scenario 
examined here, it was also assumed that the recent accident 
at Chernobyl would have no impact on the energy balance 
by 1990. 
198) 
(provisiona1) 1 
21,0 
9,7 
3,7 
4,8 
2,8 
6,7 
1990 
(llSD I> p,,r harrcl) 1 
22,6-23.43 
10.4-11,1 
3,9- 4. 1 
4,7- 4,9 
3,4 
8,0-8.7 
1990.x, 
1111 .. ·rca~L· 
(',) 
8-12 
7-14 
5-12 
- 2-3 
18-19 
19-30 
3 The range given for total primary energy demand is smaller than the sum of the ranges given for each of the fuds. This is hccausc of intl!rfucl competition. n~us the 111!,!h end of the range fnr oil 
assumes natural gas and coal demand below the maximum and vice-versa. 
Source: Commission services. 
B.1.3. World market - longer-term outlook 
This section takes the oil price outlook indicated in B. I. I 
and examines some of its longer-term implications for oil 
consumption, non-OPEC production and thus, as a residual, 
OPEC output. So as to isolate the effects of the oil price fall 
from changes in fiscal policy a working assumption is made 
that taxation of oil products is not changed. 
The effects on the demand and supply of oil of the recent 
price fall depend crucially on whether oil consumers and 
producers expect the fall to be sustained or regard it as a 
temporary phenomenon. Since oil is an exhaustible resource 
there is an underlying presumption that over time its real 
price will tend to increase. From 1973 until the beginning 
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of 1986, OPEC supply constraints sustained prices above 
some notion of a longer run trend or equilibrium. A working 
assumption might be adopted that, henceforth, the price of 
oil will follow a trend some 40 % lower than had been 
expected prior to the recent price fall (this implies prices in 
excess of USO 20 per barrel in the early 1990s). This is, of 
course, a highly debatable assumption, but it is needed to 
proceed with the analysis. 
Oil consumption and energy intensity 
Oil product taxes have already been raised substantially in 
Denmark, Portugal and Italy and to a lesser extent in Spain. 
Greece, Ireland and the UK, as fiscal policy has been ad-
justed to arrogate some of the benefits of the oil price fall 
(see box on the taxation of oil products). However this 
analysis abstracts from these fiscal changes so as to identify 
fully the magnitude of the effects of the oil price change. In 
the absence of any changes in taxation, oil product prices 
in Europe might be expected to fall by between 19 % and 
48 % depending on the ratio of specific taxation to the 
pre-tax price. On this assumption real Community product 
prices would be on average about 28 % lower than before. 
The consequences for oil consumption depend on the price 
elasticity of demand, a parameter which is very difficult to 
quantify. Some studies have suggested figures of around 
- 0.1 to - 0.2 for the short-term and - 0.3 or more (in 
absolute value) for the longer term. But the estimations were 
carried out on the basis of evidence before the oil price 
declined sharply. and these figures should be used cautiously 
in the new situation. Moreover. any analysis which uses 
such estimates must recognize factors such as the extent to 
which expectations are taken into account. the response of 
government policy to the price fall, the extent to which 
the price fall is passed through to the final consumer. the 
subsequent response in the prices of other forms of energy. 
the continuing response to the oil price rises of the 1970s 
and the effects of technical advance in reducing energy 
needs. 
The response of the price of other forms of energy is uncer-
tain. It seems likely that natural gas will remain competitive 
with oil products. The prospects for coal prices are less easy 
to judge. Current excess capacity world-wide will continue 
to reinforce downward pressure on the world coal price 
short-term. but in a longer term perspective world coal 
prices will be constrained by production costs. The price of 
electricity depends only partly on the cost of energy inputs. 
Thus variation in price response may well lead to some 
substitution between fuels. but it seems likely that this will 
be much more significant in the US than in Europe. 
For the OECD as a whole the ratio of energy use to GDP 
fell by 21 % between 1973 and 1984. This reduction in energy 
intensity was expected to continue. perhaps at a rate as high 
as 2 % per year. prior to the recent price fall. The effect of 
the oil price countershock will be to moderate this trend, 
although the longer term consequences of the two oil price 
shocks and the energy saving bias as the capital stock is 
renewed make it unlikely that the trend will be sharply 
reversed. 
The non-OPEC supply of oil 
Many oil production provinces have already reached or are 
approaching maximum output. In particular, output from 
the North Sea, the United States and the USSR was expected 
Economic consequences of the oil price change 
to fall for geological reasons even in the absence of the oil 
price countershock. The main effect of the oil price fall on 
non-OPEC supply in the years to come will be a more 
marked reduction in output in these areas, especially the 
US, where it has been estimated that oilfield investment may 
well halve in 1986. This will lower output in later years, but 
in the very short term the effects on output of an oil price 
around USO 15 may be expected to be small since marginal 
extraction costs are well below this in most oilfields. How-
ever, the prospects of future price rises from current low 
levels may induce some producers to lower current output 
and thus to defer exploitation of oil reserves with a view to 
profiting from the subsequent price increases. 
The implications for OPEC supply 
If the price of crude oil remains around USO 15-16 per 
barrel for 2 to 3 years rising thereafter at a level some 40 % 
below previous expectations; if, by assumption, governments 
impose no extra taxes on oil products; and taking account 
of a higher ECU/dollar exchange rate, oil product prices in 
the Community fall by some 30 % in real terms - then 
excluding the centrally planned economies, world oil de-
mand in the mid- I 990s is likely to be at least I O % higher. 
World GDP is also expected to be several percentage points 
higher because of the oil price fall and this additional growth 
would also generate extra demand for oil. It therefore seems 
likely that in the 1990s the demand for OPEC oil will be 
some 50 % higher as a result of the oil price countershock. 
Some support for this outcome is provided in the work of the 
United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
where, in the absence of the oil price countershock, total 
non-OPEC oil supply (including net imports from the cen-
trally planned economies countries) is estimated to fall by 
about 3 million barrels per day (mbd) by 1995 due to 
production declines in the United States, the North Sea and 
the USSR, not fully offset by production increases in other 
areas. If the oil price falls and is maintained in the 
USO 15-20 range (measured in 1985 prices), which is similar 
to the price hypothesis used above, non-OPEC oil supplies 
could decline by at least an additional 2 mbd. The EIA 
further assesses an increase in the annual rate of growth of 
world oil consumption over the next I O years from the 0,8-
1,5 % range to the 1,8-2,5 % range as a result of its price 
hypothesis. That is, the 40 % fall in the crude oil price is 
expected to lead to I O % higher consumption over I O years. 
All this implies a faster return to dependence on OPEC oil 
supplies in the 1990s than most observers thought likely 
hitherto. However, government policy reactions in industrial 
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countries, either by raising taxes to keep oil prices high or 
by discouraging oil consumption in other ways, may be 
sufficient to keep demand from rising unduly. 
B.1.4 Effects on resource transfers, prices and 
economic policy in the European Com-
munity 
The main effects on demand and output will be transmitted 
through three channels: 
(i) the effects on the implicit transfer of revenue between 
countries and its division between households, business 
and government; 
(ii) the fall in the general price level, the effects on inflation-
ary expectations and interest rates; 
(iii) less directly through an easing of constraints on econ-
omic policy formation. 
The transfer of resources among economic areas 
The impact of lower oil prices will vary according to a 
country's level of dependence on oil imports or, for exporting 
countries, the share of oil in its total exports. Table 8.1.2. 
shows changes in imports and exports between 1985 and 
1986 for seven large economic regions, using three assump-
tions for oil prices in 1986: USO 20, USO 15 and USO I 0 
a barrel. Oil export levels in 1985 and 1986 are those given 
by the !MF in World economic outlook, April 1986. 
There are major transfers between these economic regions. 
In 1986 OPEC's export receipts will be lower than in 1985, 
by between 32,6 and 84 billion dollars, depending on the 
price of oil. Compared with total exports of 135,5 billion 
dollars in 1985, this represents between 24 and 62 % of 
their total exports. The major part of this will go to the 
industrialized importers. These countries will benefit by be-
tween 42,6 and I 06,5 billion dollars as their oil bill drops by 
between 25 and 62,5 %, assuming prices of USO 20 and 
USO 10 a barrel respectively. 
The impact on the Community is quite considerable (Table 
8.1.3). Taking a price of USO 15 a barrel, the Community's 
oil bill will fall by 1.5 percentage points of GDP between 
1985 and 1986, compared with falls of 0,5 points for the 
USA and 1,9 for Japan. The effect varies significantly from 
one Member State to another. 
At USO 15 a barrel the United Kingdom's export receipts 
would be down by I percentage point of GDP. At the same 
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price the other Member States would see their oil bill fall 
by between 1,3 points of GDP in the Netherlands. to 5.2 
points in Portugal. The main beneficiaries will be Portugal. 
Ireland. Greece and Italy. all of which gain on their oil bill 
by more than 2.4 points of GDP. Many Member States will 
find that their oil bill, in terms of GDP. will be the same as 
it was in 1973. before the two major oil shocks. 
In comparing 1985 with 1973 however. account must be 
taken of the growth in imports of non-oil sources of energy. 
In 1979 the value of net energy imports was almost identical 
with the oil bill. In 1985 net energy imports exceeded the oil 
bill by 0,6 percentage points of GDP. The differences be-
tween the two were particularly significant in Italy ( 1.3 % 
of GDP) and Belgium (2,8 %) reflecting imports of natural 
gas and coal. The Dutch situation is also special: their 
exports of natural gas are balanced by oil imports. 
A further point to note is that falls in the dollar/ECU 
exchange rate reinforce the effect of lower dollar oil prices. 
Thus taking USO 15 a barrel, one third of the Community's 
lower oil bill is due to the appreciation of the ECU against 
the dollar, and two-thirds from lower dollar prices. 
Breakdown of income transfers between the 
economic agents 
For the individual economic agent, the total benefit of lower 
crude oil prices depends both on the actual prices for oil 
products paid in 1986, and on any increase in consumption, 
estimated to be 2 % between 1985 and 1986. 1 Little substi-
tution between energy sources is expected for the short-term. 
The calculation of the relative gains accruing to each sector 
has been made separately for each type of oil product. In 
point of fact the nature of the consumption and taxation 
of oil products differs considerably from sector to sector. 
Households use mainly ordinary or super grade petrol for 
their transport (which bears a heavy taxation) and domestic 
fuel oil for their heating, whereas general government uses 
mainly domestic fuel oil for the heating of offices. As regards 
enterprises, these use a much wider range of oil products: 
heavy oil in industry, domestic fuel oil for services, and 
diesel oil for transport. However, prices and taxation, at the 
point of consumption, differ according to the type of prod-
uct. It has been possible to recalculate the distribution of 
1 All calculations assume an oil price of USO 15 in 1986. The 2 % increase 
in total consumption of oil products in 1986 results from greater economic 
growth. and a greater growth in the use of oil than of other sources of 
energy. The price elasticity of demand is assumed to be low in the short 
term. 
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Table B.1.2 
Evaluation of the first round effects of lower oil prices on the world economy 1986/85 
Exports/imports 
millions of 
barrels 
Changes 1986 85 
in exports of crude oil 
in moncv values based 
on th~ Cl F price 
(LISD btllion) 
per day 
Exporting countries 
- OPEC 1 
- non-OPEC LDCs2 
- Industrialized countries3 
State-trading and other exporting countries 
Total 
Importing countries 
- Industrialized countries4 
- non-OPEC LDCs5 
- Others 
Total 
Errors and omissions 
1 OPEC. except Gabon and Equador. 
1985 1986 
13,6 14,1 
3,9 4,0 
1,7 1,8 
3,6 3.6 
17,1 17,5 
4,7 4,7 
1,6 1,6 
LISD 20 LISD 15 USD 10 
-32,6 -58,3 -84,0 
-9,7 -17,0 -24,3 
-3,8 -7,0 -10,3 
-9,6 -16,2 -22,8 
-55.7 -98,5 - 141,4 
+42,6 +74,6 + 106,5 
+ 12,5 + 21,1 +29,6 
+4.2 +7,1 + 10,1 
+59.3 + 102.8 + 146,2 
+3,6 +4,3 +4,8 
Bahrein, Boli·•ia. Cameroon. China, Congo, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Syria, Trinidad, Tunisia, --- two OPEC members (Gabon. b1uador). 
3 Norway and the United Kingdom. 
4 Industrialized countries cover the countries of the OECD area except the United Kingdom and Norway who arc net exporters of oil. 
5 All less developed countries except OPEC and those mentioned in footnote 2 above. 
Suurcl!. Commission services, I Mr ( Wu,IJ l!tunumic vurlvok. April 1986). 
consumption of oil products for 1985,for the three categories 
of economic agent, using national surveys and the input/ 
output tables for 1980 for four large countries (D, F, I, UK). 
On this basis (Table B.1.4.) it can be seen that the pattern 
of consumption of oil products shows certain national 
characteristics: the weight of industry in Germany, the im-
portance of general government in Italy, and the low con-
sumption of oil products for heating in the case of British 
households. 
The fall in prices between 1985 and 1986 means that each 
sector will benefit by having a lower energy bill to pay. The 
purchasing power so distributed would represent from I, 7 % 
to 2, I % of GDP in the four large countries (Table B.1.5.). 
In Germany and in France the relative gain in the purchasing 
power of households and enterprises carries the same weight 
in relation to GDP (around I %) whereas in the UK, enter-
prises in the non-oil sector are the primary beneficiaries, 
while in Italy general government benefits more than else-
where from the fall in the energy bill. 
It may be helpful to express these savings on the oil bill of 
each sector, in relation to a specific economic aggregate: 
gross disposable income of households, gross operating sur-
plus of enterprises and total current expenditure in the case 
of general government. 
For households, the reduction in expenditure on oil products 
shows up either as an increase in their consumption, which 
should affect mainly goods and services other than energy 
products, or as an increase in the savings ratio. Nevertheless, 
in each country this saving will differ considerably according 
to the level of consumption of oil products (domestic fuel 
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Table B.1.3 
The importance of the net oil import bill (as a % of GDP) 
1973 1979 1981 1985 19~6 
USD 20 USD 15 USD 10 
USA 0,5 2,4 2,6 1,1 0,8 0,6 0.4 
Japan 1,6 3,8 5,1 3,2 1,7 1,3 0,9 
EUR 12 1,51 2,8 3,7 2,6 1,5 1,1 0,8 
BLEU 1.4 2,6 5,3 3,9 2,3 1,7 I.I 
DK 2,3 4,1 4,9 3,0 1,7 1,3 0,9 
D 1,5 3,2 4,2 3,4 1,9 1,5 1,0 
GR 1,3 3.9 4,1 5,6 3,9 2,9 2,0 
E 3,4 5,9 3,7 2,2 1,7 1,1 
F 1,3 2,8 4,3 3,0 1,8 1,3 0,9 
IRL 2,4 6,6 7,5 4,9 2,8 2,1 1,4 
I 1,6 3,7 6,2 4,2 2,4 1,8 1.2 
NL 0,8 2,9 3,9 2,3 1,4 1,0 0,7 
p 5,7 8,2 9,3 5,5 4,1 2,7 
UK 1,8 0,5 -1,l -1,8 -1,l -0,8 -0,5 
I EUR 10,notEUR 12. 
N.B. Exchange rate and GDP assumptions for 1986 arc those predicted in the economic forecasts of March 1986. 
Source: Commission services. 
oil for domestic heating, petrol for transport uses of house-
holds). In Germany there would be a saving of 1, 7 % in 1986, 
which would further consolidate the recovery of internal 
demand, whereas in the UK this saving would only reach 
0,7 % . In fact households in the UK use little oil for heating 
purposes, and their use of petrol is 45 % lower than that of 
German households. In France and in Italy this saving 
would amount to I % of gross disposable income. 
In the case of enterprises, there are also significant differ-
ences between countries, but these are mainly explained by 
the level of the gross operating surplus of the sector. Indeed, 
apart from Germany. where it is lower, the relative gain of 
enterprises on their bill for oil products amounts to some 
5 % of the gross operating surplus. The relatively small gain 
in Germany (2,6 % ) is explained by the high level of the gross 
operating surplus of the enterprise sector. Nevertheless, in 
a highly competitive context. the distribution of the sup-
plementary resources falling to enterprises is not automatic: 
the other possibilities are lower prices to increase market 
shares, the distribution of purchasing power to wage earners, 
etc. However, the calculation of the direct impact on the oil 
products bill paid by each sector does not take into account 
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the dynamic short-term effects of the fall in prices. The 
implicit assumption here is thus that of an unchanged in-
comes policy for 1986. 
The fall in the general price level and its impli-
cations 
In the Community, total oil consumption in 1985 was about 
9,7 mbd, being worth some 127 billion ECU or 3,9 % of 
GDP. The halving of the oil price in ECU terms in 1986 
implies a direct reduction of a little less than 2 % in the 
price level. Government action to increase revenue from 
oil products and improvements, albeit temporary, in oil 
companies· profit margins will tend to offset some of the 
fall in crude oil prices. In spite of that, consequential effects 
on output prices of the fall in a major input price will be 
important and may be expected to occur already in 1986. 
The fall in the general price level will vary between countries 
not only by the energy-intensity of their economies and by 
the increase of taxation on oil products, but also by re-
sponses in exchange rates to the adjustment in their balance-
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Table B.1.4 
Expenditure on oil products, by sector - 1985 (% of gross inland consumption of oil products) 
D 
F 
I 
UK 
Source: Commission estimates. 
Table B.1.5 
Households 
48,7 % 
53,7 % 
45,9 % 
36,7 % 
General 
government 
6,1 % 
3,9 % 
21,2 % 
4,7 % 
Enterprises 
45,2 % 
42,5 % 
32,8 % 
58,6 % 
Total 
excluding exports 
and stock changes 
100% 
100 % 
100 % 
100 % 
Relative gains accruing to sectors between 1985 and 1986 on their consumption of oil products(% of GDP at market prices in 1985) 
Households General Enterprises Total' 
government 
D 1,1 0,1 0,9 2,1 
F 0,9 0,1 0,9 1,9 
I 0,8 0,5 0,6 1,7 
UK 0,5 0.1 1,0 1,6 
Oil price: USD 15 per barrel (1986 average). 
Assumption: 2 ~;. growth in demand for oil products between 1985 and 1986. 
1 The total relative savings on expenditure on oil products docs not necessarily correspond to the fall in the cost of oil. These calculations have been made on the basis of the price of oil products 
actually charged to the consumer i.e. it docs not take account of the cost of the relining of crude oil and changes in tax rates (taxes on the consumption of oil products). 
Source: Commission estimates. 
Table B.1.6 
Relative gains accruing to sectors between 1985 and 1986 on their consumption of oil products(% of disposable income for households and 
enterprises) 
D 
F 
I 
UK 
Source: Commission estimates based on 1986 economic budgets. 
Households 
(% of gross 
disposable income) 
1,7 
1,2 
0,9 
0,7 
General government 
( % of current 
cx.pcnditun:) 
0,3 
0,2 
0,9 
0,2 
Enterprises 
(% of gross 
opcr,Hing surplus) 
2,6 
4,6 
4,7 
5.6 
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of-payments position. To the extent that the rate of inflation 
picks up a little in 1987 due to the rise in activity, a part of 
this fall may be reversed. 
Given a non-accommodating monetary policy, an unantici-
pated fall in the price level would be expected to lead to 
lower nominal interest rates, particularly short-term interest 
rates. Table B. I. 7 shows recent interest rate developments 
in the Community, the United States and Japan - these 
are, of course, influenced by factors other than the price of 
oil. 
Short-term interest rates have fallen in both the USA and 
Japan and rather less markedly in the Community. More 
surprisingly, long-term rates have fallen more steeply every-
where and this is difficult to explain simply by the fall in the 
general price level resulting from lower oil prices. It may be 
that the oil price countershock has caused a substantial 
revision of inflation expectations. The process of disinflation 
has been in train for several years, and the persistence of 
high interest rates may, in part, be blamed on the failure of 
inflationary expectations to respond fully to this process. 
The lower oil price may have acted as a catalyst in increasing 
awareness of the widely successful fight against inflation. In 
so far as the fall in nominal interest rates represents revised 
inflationary expectations, real interest rates need not have 
changed. 
The fall in interest rates is one of the principal ways in which 
the oil price fall affects the world economy. Firstly, the 
position of indebted countries, particularly the LDCs, 
governments, companies and more generally all economic 
agents with high debt loads will be alleviated at least in so 
far as the debt is at variable interest rates. Secondly, lower 
borrowing costs will gradually allow higher investment, resi-
dential construction and consumption. The latter will be 
aided by higher wealth as bond prices rise, but offset by a 
fall in the incomes of rentiers. 
Table 8.1.7 
Interest rate developments between October 1985 and May 1986 
EUR 12 
USA 
Japan 
Soura Commission scniccs 
86 
October 
1985 
9.8 
7.4 
6,5 
Economic policy 
Beyond the economic effects described above, the oil price 
countershock will also have significant consequences for 
economic policy. It will tend to reduce certain constraints 
on budgetary and monetary policy after a delay which will 
vary between countries. 
The disinflation induced by the fall in the oil price should 
eventually facilitate the task of the monetary authorities 
unless, of course, the inflation objective is reduced and thus 
becomes more of a constraint than it would have been in 
the absence of the oil price countershock. The fall in interest 
rates that should follow is a powerful means of boosting 
economic activity (see above). It will allow indebted econ-
omic agents - administrations and companies - to improve 
their balance sheets and reduce the cost of debt carried 
forward from the past as a large part of the debt is at 
variable interest rates. 
At the same time, the transfer of income from oil producing 
to oil importing countries is such as eventually to loosen 
economic policy for two reasons. Firstly, the improvement 
in the current balance of most countries of the Community2 
will remove a constraint on economic policy in countries 
experiencing problems on the external account. Secondly, 
the direct real gains from the oil price cut will almost cer-
tainly reduce the real public sector deficits in most Com-
munity countries, thus easing the constraints still weighing 
on budgetary policy. There arc several reasons for this: the 
fall in the oil price should directly reduce expenditure on 
2 The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, stgnificant producers of oil 
and gas, need to be considered separately: not only will the oil price 
countershock worsen their trade balance, but it will also cut sharply 
government revenues from oil and gas production (this cut is estimated 
to be worth some 1,8 % of GDP in the United Kingdom and 2,6 % in 
the Netherlands). 
Short-lcrm 
May 
1986 
9,2 
6.2 
4.9 
DilTcrcncc 
% 
-0.6 
- 1.2 
- 1,6 
October 
1985 
10.5 
10,6 
6.6 
Long-term 
May DirTcrcncc 
1986 % 
9,0 - 1,5 
8,0 -2,6 
4,8 - 1,8 
energy in the public sector by between 0.1 and 0.5 % of 
- GDP; a part of the real income gain from the oil price 
cut can be retained directly by public administrations by 
increasing the taxation of oil products (see Box I); finally , 
the strengthening of economic activity in Europe (additional 
GDP growth of between 0,5 % and 2,0 % after two years 
depending on the country) should increase the base for 
both direct and indirect taxation and for social security 
contributions (by increasing employment) while reducing 
certain outlays, for example, unemployment pay. Even if the 
sharp fall in oil prices cuts VAT receipts from oil products 
the net effect on taxes and social security contributions 
should be positive in most Community countries, increas-
ingly so as the positive effects of the countershock on econ-
omic activity are felt. The consequent fall in public sector 
deficits will speed the return of budgetary balance and en-
courage budgetary policies which, although currently rather 
restrictive, can become less and less so. 
The indirect consequences of the oil price countershock 
arising from the reappearance of room for manceuvre in 
economic policy could thus eventually become significant: 
and this cannot but be helpful in the implementation of the 
cooperative growth strategy for more employment set out 
in the 1985-86 Annual Economic Report. 
B.1.5. Supply side effects 
In the longer term, on top of the effects described above, 
there will be supply side effects . These are the subject of 
the follow ing section, which is limited to the effects on 
Community countries . 3 
The fall in oil prices has the effect of reducing the running 
costs of energy-using equipment and plant. Irrespective of 
whether the price fall is thought to be sustainable, company 
liquidity will improve because of these lower input costs. 
Such resources can be spent in a variety of ways, on new 
investment , inventories, materials, employment or increased 
dividends. 
If the price fall is perceived as being of a longer run nature, 
there will be other effects arising from the use of both 
existing investment goods and prospective investment. On 
the first of these, lower running costs may have some ben-
3 There is a d ifferent. important micro-economic suppl y side effect affecting 
the OPEC countries. They currently have some 10 mbd of spare oil 
production capacity eq ual to mo re than 20 % of current western world 
oil output. This ex tra output could be brought on stream. implying an 
increase in the volume of world o utput of nearl y I %. at very little cost. 
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GRAPH B. I.I : Saudi light oil price 
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eficial effect on production capacity due to delayed scrap-
ping of older plant. At the same time , where new investment 
is concerned, the expected now of services which thi s new 
equipment provides becomes more attractive. Thus , some 
new projects may become worthwhile and others be brought 
forward so as to take advantage of these higher returns. 
It would require a sustained lowering of prices to encourage 
a return to the use of more energy-intensive investment. In 
the case of an exhaustible resource such as oil, where the 
longer run price is expected to rise, a major reversal would 
seem unlikely. The response in practice will depend heavily 
on how businessmen perceive oil price movements and be-
haviour in the oil market. 
On the basis of some important simplifying assumptions it 
is possible in principle to make some calculations of effects 
on supply nowing from the change in the oil price. The box 
on the impact of the oil price countershock on productive 
capacity and scrapping provides technical details. 
The results suggest that the pure supply side effect of the oil 
price fall could be to increase productive capacity in the 
short-term by between 0,2 and 0,6 % and in the long-term 
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by between 2,4 and 5,4 % for the market sectors of Europe 
as a whole. 
Another approach to estimating the supply-side effects of 
the oil price fall starts by noting that a price of USO 15 per 
barrel compared with previously expected levels implies a 
transfer of rent to the oil-consuming sector of some 66 
billion ECU per year in the Community, of which 45 % goes 
directly to industry. In the first instance much of this will 
accrue to higher profits, implying a higher return to capital. 
In the longer-term it seems likt:ly that some of this extra 
profit will accrue to labour either through higher nominal 
wages or lower non-oil output prices. If wages are indexed 
(as for example in Italy), the effects on profitability will be 
stronger. Moreover the higher level of demand will further 
increase the return to capital in the non-oil sector. It seems 
probable that for some time, the level of profitability will 
remain rather higher than it would otherwise have been. 
The increase in the level of profitability in the short term 
resulting from the oil price fall, measured in ECU, will 
probably be about I % of GDP, falling somewhat in later 
years. If these extra resources were directed to investment, 
the annual rate of growth of potential GDP could then be 
increased by some 0,3 percentage points. 4 However, over 
time some part of the potential increase in profits might be 
diverted to extra consumption through higher wages. This 
would reduce the strength of the supply-side effect, although 
the delayed scrapping of older equipment would still have a 
positive effect on potential output. 
B.1.6. Demand and output 
The fall in the price of oil will affect the level of demand in 
the Community through different channels. By contrast with 
the disinflationary effect. the impact on demand and output 
will be spread out over time. This impact can only be assessed 
consistently through the use of econometric models of whole 
economies or groups of economies that seek to capture the 
interactions between different variables over time. 
4 The implied marginal efficiency of investment is ahout one-third. This is 
rather higher than some estimates of the gross efficiency of investment 
(see for example the Annual Economic Review 1984-85) hecause (i) the 
extra i_nvestment is entirely net. i.e. not for replacement purposes; (ii) the 
incentive to improve energy efficiency at the cost of capital efficiencv 
has been much reduced and (iii) the investment will not he directed 
towards the residential sector. An estimation has been made using the 
Hermes n10del of the French economy: if 30 % of the increase in company 
profitah1hty due to the oil price countershock were used for investment. 
then GDP would be 2 % higher after 5 years. 
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Firstly via the implicit transfer of income from oil producing 
to oil importing countries. For the Community, this transfer 
is worth some 1 ,5 % of GDP. Despite the adjustment under-
taken by the oil producing countries which implies a substan-
tial contraction of their markets for Community exports, 
the consequences of the oil price countershock for the indus-
trialized countries is reckoned to be positive. The relative 
adjustment speeds - downwards for producing countries, 
upwards for importing countries - will be crucial in the 
short term and will determine the overall impact on world 
demand. However, tht: transfer of income from countries 
with a relatively low marginal propensity to consume to 
industrialized countries with a higher propensity should 
eventually increase world demand and, even more so, de-
mand in the European countries by a pure Keynesian effect. 
This supposes, despite everything, the absence of a major 
breakdown which could bring about the bankruptcy of the 
most indebted oil exporting countries. 
Secondly via the fall in interest rates. Even if the impact of 
the oil price countershock on real interest rates is hard to 
assess in the medium term, the fall in nominal interest rates 
is such as to boost demand simply by improving the cashllow 
of economic agents. 
Thirdly via a substitution effect between oil products and 
other products brought about by the change in relative 
prices. This will cause greater demand in the oil market and, 
as a counterpart, less demand in the markets for other goods 
and services - everything else being equal. This effect is 
essentially sectoral and should only have secondary macro-
economic consequences. 
Various analyses of these effects are avl!ilablc using a wide 
variety of oil price scenarios. Although it is difficult to 
compare such analyses which arc based on widely different 
assumptions and calculated using different models, Table 
B. 1 .8 sets out some results drawn from a variety of sources. 
Despite differences in the results, certain conclusions may 
be drawn: 
(i) there is a significant downward impact on inflation in 
all countries except in the UK where there arc offsetting 
effects from the fall in the value of sterling; 
(ii) output increases markedly in 1986 and further in 1987 
bringing in its train increases in employment - these 
effects although positive arc rather weaker in the UK 
because of the fall in the value of oil exports; 
(iii) the current account improves markedly in 1986 in the 
oil-importing countries and in the Community as a 
whole, but this effect is attenuated in 1987 as stronger 
growth sucks in more imports. Once more, the UK is 
differentiated from the Community as a whole. 
Table B.1.8 
Estimates of the effects of an oil price fall 
Drop in price 
per barrel 
From USD 27 to USD 201 
D 
F 
I 
UK 
EUR 10 
From USD 25 to USD J82 
F 
From USD 27 to USD J63 
UK 
From USD 25 to USD J54 
EUR 12 
Sources: 
Level of 
GNP(%) 
1986 1987 
0,8 1,0 
0,5 1,1 
0,2 1,2 
0,2 0,5 
0,5 0,8 
0,7 1,2 
0,4 0,6 
1.0 L8 
Economic consequences of the oil price change 
C onsumcr price 
level(%) 
1986 1987 
-1,0 -1.4 
-0,8 - 1,3 
-0,7 -1,7 
-0,2 0,1 
-0,8 -1,3 
-2.2 -2,8 
-0,2 -0,4 
-2,0 -3.4 
Lcvd or 
employment ( % ) 
1986 1987 
0,5 0,7 
0,5 0,7 
0,1 0.4 
0,0 0,0 
0,3 0,5 
0,2 OJ 
0.4 I.O 
Current acc. 
(% of GNP) 
1986 1987 
0,8 0,2 
0,9 0,5 
0,9 0,5 
-0,8 -0.4 
0,6 0,3 
-0,8 - I.O 
2.4 L5 
1 These estimates were made by Commission services and are not directly based on econometric models. The estimate for the Community (EUR 10) is based on individual country assessments. 
Hermes (Harmonized European Research for Macroscctoral and Energy Systems) assumes that 30% of the increase in profits is invested to modernize industry. 
From the Naticnal Institute of Economic and Social Research ( NIESR) Rrvi,:w nf M:1y I 9R6, ;1,;,;;umcs an accommodating monetary policy and full anticipation or the price fall one year ahead. 
4 Compact mode'. estimates made by Commission services assuming a foll pass·through or the oil price foll to consumers. 
The analyses in the table have generally assumed no change 
in the taxation of oil products. If higher oil taxes intervene 
in consequence of the price fall, the effects on the main 
economic indicators would very much depend on whether 
the extra tax revenue is used to reduce government deficits 
(increasing the level of saving in the economy and thus 
reducing aggregate demand in the short term) or to replace 
other taxes or finance higher government expenditure (with 
a roughly neutral effect on aggregate demand). The effects 
of such possible changes in fiscal policy should be borne in 
mind in assessing the effects of the oil price fall. 
B.1. 7. Conclusions 
There would seem little doubt that the oil price reduction 
has favourable economic effects when judged at the level of 
the European Community as a whole. There are, however, 
substantial differences as between member countries, largely 
depending on the importance of net oil imports in each 
country's energy balance. 
The higher GDP growth expected for 1986 and 1987, pro-
vides a firmer base from which the cooperative growth 
strategy for more employment can be expected to evolve. In 
particular, from a medium-term perspective, a continuing 
lower price of energy input costs is likely to encourage 
more intensive use of existing capital and could increase the 
growth of investment in total. At a time when there are 
some signs of capacity constraints in certain sectors, this 
will help to underpin the useful improvements in investment 
performance which currently are underway. 
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The taxation of oil products 
In all Member States, the sales price of oil products is a function 
of the price excluding tax - which differs little from one country 
to another - and taxes, which do lead to significant differences 
in the price paid by the consumer. Oil products are subject to 
two types of taxation, excise duties and value-added tax. 
Table 1 
Duties and taxes on oil products in April 1985 
B 
Amount ofexise duty (in ECU per I OOO litres) 
Super grade petrol 249,4 
Normal grade petrol 249,4 
Auto gas oil (diesel) 116,9 
Heating gas oil 0,0 
Heavy fuel oil 0,0 
VATrate(in%) 
Super grade petrol 25,0 
Normal grade petrol 25,0 
Auto gas oil (diesel) 25,0 
Heating gas oil 17,0 
Heavy fuel oil 17,0 
Source: Community oil bulletin. 
(i) Excise duties are, in general, levied more heavily on super 
and normal grades of petrol than on heating gas-oil and 
heavy fuel oil. Countries with particularly high rates for 
such taxes on petrol are Italy, France and Ireland. 
(ii) For VAT, the tax rates applied in the Community, in 1985, 
ranged from 14 % in Germany, to 25 % in Belgium, for 
super and normal grades of petrol (data for April 1985 -
see Table I). Five years earlier, in 1980, Ireland had the 
lowest rate (10 %) and Denmark the highest (22 %). Thus 
there was no progressive harmonization of rates of VAT 
ove·r the five years to 1985. Moreover, certain countries. 
namely Denmark. Germany, France and the Netherlands, 
followed a policy of applying the same rate of VAT to all 
oil products. In contrast, other countries applied a more 
favourable tax regime to certain products such as heavy 
fuel oil. or heating gas oil. which benefited certain types 
of consumer and certain kinds of fuel use (industrial uses, 
heating of homes). This is the case for Belgium. Ireland, 
Italy (with regard to heavy fuel oil) and the United 
Kingdom. 
(iii) If the ratio of total taxes per unit to the price excluding tax 
is considered. it will be noted that heavy fuel oil - of which 
I. Taxes on oil products before the fall in prices 
In April 1985, before the fall in oil prices, which began after the 
OPEC meeting of December 1985, taxes on oil products were 
very different, depending on the particular product and the 
country. 
DK 
291,4 
291,4 
50,0 
50,0 
54,2 
22,0 
22,0 
22,0 
22,0 
22,0 
D F IRL NL UK 
237,6 385,0 358,0 451,0 287,3 307,2 
237,6 366,1 358,0 451,0 287,3 307,2 
198,1 193,4 266,0 79,9 78,4 259,4 
7,4 51,9 24,5 79,9 13,7 13,2 
6,7 24,2 14,2 0,7 4,4 13,6 
14,0 18,6 23,0 18,0 19,0 15,0 
14,0 18,6 23,0 18,0 19,0 15,0 
14,0 18,6 23,0 18,0 19,0 15,0 
14,0 18,6 5,0 18,0 19,0 0,0 
14,0 18,6 5,0 9,0 19,0 0.0 
industry is the main user - and heating gas oil - mainly 
used for domestic heating - are not as heavily taxed as 
petrol and automotive gas oil such as diesel. In particular 
for petrol (both super and normal grades) total taxes 
amount to more than the price excluding tax, in almost all 
Member States. 
The average rate of taxation for the total consumption of oil 
products can be calculated by weighting together the individual 
tax rates according to levels of consumption (see the line 'For 
all petroleum products taken together' - Table 2). It will be 
noted that on the one hand, for France, Italy, Ireland and the 
Netherlands the tax on the consumption of oil products is high 
(more than 60 % of the price excluding tax). On the other hand, 
in Belgium, Denmark and Germany, oil products are taxed to 
a significantly lesser extent (less than 52 % ). 
2. The contribution of oil duties and taxes to the total revenues 
of General Government before the fall in prices at the end of 
1975 
It is possible to calculate the total receipts, received by General 
Government, from oil duties and taxes, by considering the 
Economic consequences of the oil price change 
Table 2 
Ratio of total taxes per unit to price excluding tax in April 1985 (%) 
B 
Super grade petrol 107,4 
Normal grade petrol 112,8 
Auto gas oil (diesel) 67,1 
Heating gas oil 17,0 
Heavy fuel oil 0 
For all petroleum products taken together 46,1 
Sauret•: Community oil bulletin. 
structure of tax rates and the consumption of oil products by 
each type of economic agent (Enterprises, General Government, 
Households). However, in each Member State enterprises benefit 
from tax exemptions on the consumption of certain oil products 
Table 3 
DK D F IRL NL UK 
112,9 98,4 159,3 130,8 182,9 I 16,1 113,4 
I 16,5 105,2 154,1 135,5 199,2 122,0 I 16,9 
36,1 79,5 82,1 95,8 44,2 45,6 92,8 
37.3 16,8 36,0 16.7 46,2 24,0 3,4 
19.2 2.7 10.1 4.6 0,3 1,7 4,7 
48,2 51,9 78,9 60,7 61,2 68,4 57,0 
of which, clearly, account must be taken in such a calculation. 
A complete calculation can only be made for the four large 
Member States (D, F, I, UK); the figures for the other Member 
States are only estimates (see Table 3). 
The share of oil duties and taxes in the total resources of General Government in 1985 (%) 
B DK D F IRL NL UK 1 
Relative to receipts of indirect taxes 18,7 11,0 14,3 19,2 21,3 26,6 13,6 12,0 
Relative to total tax receipts 4,4 3,5 3,9 5,8 8,6 6,5 3,0 4,6 
l In the case of the United Kingdom the figures given in this table do not include revenues raised from taxing the actual operations of oil companies. If these taxes were taken into 
account then total oil taxation would be about IO % of the total resources of General Government. 
Source: Community oil bulletin. 
The proportion of taxation on oil products in indirect taxes 
received by General Government is particularly high and ranges 
from I I % in Denmark to 26,6 % in Italy. Indeed as a pro-
portion of the total resources of General Government taxes 
on products make a significant contribution (about 5 % as a 
Community average). 
In view of the fall in the price of oil products which began in 
December 1985, General Government has found itself faced 
with a choice: either to pass the price fall on to consumers or 
to increase the level of taxation on oil products in order to 
generate additional revenue. 
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3. The new oil tax situation following the fall in the price of oil 
Table 4 shows the evolution of the sales price for oil products 
between 15 December 1985 and 15 May 1986, i.e. during the 
five months when the fall in the price of crude oil occurred. This 
fall in the price of crude oil has had a different direct effect on 
the pre-tax price of oil products in each of the Member States. 
The differences observed between Member States in the fall in 
pre-tax prices is explained by many different factors. Firstly, by 
Table 4 
the structure of the markets for oil products which may be 
more or less competitive depending on the country concerned. 
Secondly, by the pricing policy applied in these countries (free 
markets or price-fixing). Thirdly, by changes in the rate of 
exchange, since crude oil is billed in dollars and the pre-tax 
price is expressed in domestic currency values. Finally, by the 
respective weight of each oil product in consumption and im-
ports for each country. Thus certain products are the result of 
the refining of the original crude oil. in the importing country. 
or are imported directly as refined products. 
Evolution of the sales price of oil products between December 1985 and May 1986 (%) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL P' l'K 
Super 2 -32,9 -43,1 -45,6 -61,8 - 31.9 -33,2 -26,2 -41.1 -35.3 -30,8 -22.3 -37,6 
Price fall net of tax 
Price fall after tax -18,1 +5,3 -25,7 -3,8 -5,7 -10,7 - 8.4 -8,6 -21,8 - 14,7 -2,6 - 15,2 
Heating gas oil -32.4 -30.4 -33.4 -35,9 -41,6 -24.4 -38.4 -44.1 -34,2 -36,0 -30.2 
Price fall net of tax 
Price fall after tax -32,9 + 10,6 -32,5 -8,5 -12.5 -20.1 -35,8 -20.6 -34.2 -34.3 -27.4 
Heavy fuel oils3 -54 -34,5 -50,8 -58,1 -53,9 -50,9 -43.3 -60.6 -55.8 -50,9 -38,1 -46.7 
Price fall net of tax 
Price fall after tax -54,0 -34,5 -49,1 -8.9 -12,1 -35,3 -42,2 - 58,5 -55.2 -49,7 -17.5 -43.9 
All oil products4 -34,7 -33,0 -39,4 -50,2 -30,1 -33.1 -44,6 - 35,5 -33 -36.8 
Price fall net of tax 
Price fall after tax -26,1 +4,2 -28.4 -7.0 -15,7 -19,2 -19,9 -26,8 - 21.7 -20,5 
I 15 January 1986 instead of 15 May 1986. 
l The fall in price for normal petrol corresponds more or less to that observed for super. On the contrary. for diesel the differences arc much greater. 
J For heavy fuel oil the effective sales price is given here (with VAT deducted by firms). 
4 The calculation for total oil products is only possible for those countries which provide data on the structure of consumption of oil products. 
Source: Commission services. 
The repercussion of the fall of the pre-tax price on the tax 
inclusive price depends, for each country, on one hand on the 
relative share of two types of taxation (excises and value-added 
tax) and, on the other, on changes in tax levels which occur 
after the fall in price. Table 5 presents succinctly the principal 
measures which have been adopted by the Member States in 
this regard. 
Overall one finds that certain countries have passed on fully to 
the consumer the fall in price (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg). 
The fall in the price of all oil products together was over 25 % 
for five months. The fall was particularly sharp for heavy fuel 
oil destined mainly for industry, on account of the special tax 
advantages from which these products benefit. 
Economic consequences of the oil price change 
Table 5 
Changes in oil taxation 
Measures implemented at a national level (between December 1985 and May 1986) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Measures adopted 
No measures envisaged 
Significant increase in excise duties ( + 65% on petrol. + 22% on 
heavy fuel and diesel) 
No measures envisaged 
Objt.-clive sought 
To neutralize the effects on con-
sumption and the current ac-
count 
Germany 
Greece Price fixed by the public authorities (70% of the fall in price Public finances 
Spain 
----- - -
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
compensated by excise duty) 
60% of the fall in price compensated by increased taxes Public finances 
Increase in excise duty ( + 6% on petrol in April) already planned l 986 budget 
in the finance bill l 986, subsequently increased in June l 986 
Increase in excise duty on petrol by 7% in January and increase Public finances 
in VAT by two points in March 
Freezing of the consumer price for petrol until June l 987 by regular Public finances 
changes in the level of excise duty. Tax on heavy fuel oil unchanged 
No measures envisaged 
No measures envisaged. The decision to increase VAT by l % on 
all products will be postponed 
Public finances 
United Kingdom 
Increase on excise duty to compensate for the fall in price of oil 
Increase in March l 986 in excise duties on petrol and diesel. No 
increase for heavy fuel oil 
To compensate for falling tax re-
ceipts on oil production 
Source: Commission Services. 
Table 6 
Tax revenues from oil products 1985-86 
D F UK 
Tax revenues from oil products 
1985 (in billions of national currency) 32,8 134,0 19 779 6,8 
Tax revenues from oil products 
1986 (in billions of national currency) 30,0 128,5 21 102 7,1 
Difference 1986/ 1985 
- in billions of national currency -2,8 -5,5 + l 323 +0,3 
- as a % of total tax receipts -8,5% -4,1% +6,7% +4,4% 
Source: Commission Services. 
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In contrast, there are those countries which have compensated 
entirely, or to a large extent, for the price fall by an increase in 
oil-based taxes (Denmark, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal). This type of policy is particularly evident if one considers 
the developments on the price of the super grade of petrol. 
However, some of these same countries have tried to pass on 
the fall in the price of heavy fuel oil in order to help enterprises. 
The increase in taxation on oil products has been made almost 
entirely via an increase in excise duties, whereas the level of 
VAT has remained generally unchanged. · 
4. General Government revenues from oil taxation in the light of 
the fall in the price of oil 
For four Member States, on the basis of data presently available, 
it is possible to calculate the development of public finance 
receipts from oil, taking into account, on the one hand, an 
increase of 2 % in 1986 compared to 1985 in the consumption 
of total oil products, and on the other hand, the changes in 
taxation introduced by the Member States. For Italy, the change 
should be quite high and positive since the price of oil products 
remains almost unchanged, while the growth in demand for such 
products should be just below 2 %. 
Nevertheless this calculation of the change of tax receipts from 
oil sources does not prejudge the growth of the total tax receipts 
of General Government. The recovery of economic activity will, 
in effect, lead automatically to an increase in public sector 
revenues. Such indirect effects can prove even greater than the 
direct effects which only take account of the taxation of oil 
products. 
Economic consequences of the oil price changen 
World trade growth and the price of oil 
In its 1984/85 annual report on international trade, GA TT noted 
that 'Between 1950 and 1973 a I % increase in world income 
was, on average, accompanied by a 1.6 % increase in the volume 
of world trade, but only by a 1,1 % increase in trade in the 
period from 1973 to 1984'. Using data provided by GATT it 
Table 1 
World trade growth before and after 1973 
1950-73 
1973-84 
Growth rates 
(% per year) 
is possible to break down world trade into three categories: 
agricultural goods, minerals (mainly oil) and manufactures. Cal-
culating growth rates for trade in each category and relating 
them to the growth in world income reveals the fact that the 
apparent slowdown in the ratio of world trade to growth to 
world income was due entirely to a fall in the volume of trade 
in minerals (see table). 
Total 
8,25 
3,00 
Volume of world track 
Agriculture 
4,27 
3.29 
Minerals 
(inc. fuels) 
7,41 
-1.39 
Manufactures 
9,79 
5.19 
World 
output 
5.09 
2.55 
Ratio1 of growth of t•xports to grou th of world output 
1950-73 
1973-84 
Total 
1,62 
1.18 
Agriculture 
0,84 
1.29 
Minerals 
1.46 
-0.55 
Manufactures 
I.92 
2.02 
1 These rat,os do not represent elasticities since they include the efTect of influences on world trade ether than GDP (e.g. relative prices. time trends, interest rates, etc.) 
Source: GATI report ·International trade 1984,'85" 
The obvious explanation of the post-1973 fall in world oil trade 
is that the two oil price increases caused a fall in demand and 
an increase in non-traded (i.e. domestically produced) oil. The 
question then arises as to what is the sensitivity of the level of 
trade in oil to a change in the real price of oil. 
In practice, there are severe problems m estimating such an 
elasticity. These include: 
(i) the 'identification' problem involving the impossibility of 
distinguishing between movements of the supply and de-
mand curve; 
(ii) availability of data on the volume of oil traded; 
(iii) the oil price rises which themselves influenced GDP, imply-
ing an econometric simultaneity that is ignored in this 
analysis; 
(iv) the stability of parameters over time given technical devel-
opments, the spread of the internal combustion engine, etc.; 
and, most importantly. 
(v) the two oil price shocks so outweigh all other price changes 
that it is very likely that their effects would not be pro-
portionate: this more or less invalidates econometric analy-
sis, since the assumption of fixed parameters would be 
incorrect. 
Notwithstanding these pitfalls, an attempt has been made to 
estimate an equation explaining the level of world trade in 
minerals (of which fuels in 19841 constituted 84 % and oil 73 %). 
based on annual data from 1950 to 1984. The main results of 
this exercise, which are of course subject to very large margins 
of error, can be summarized as follows: 
(i) a negative time trend of 2.1 % per year; 
(ii) the short-run price elasticity of world trade in minerals is 
-0,19; 
1 In 1973 fuels only constituted some 66 % of minerals. The increase to 84 °,~1 as a result 
of the oil price rises should be considered in in1crpr•:1ing the results of 1he equalion. 
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(iii) the long-run price elasticity (after five years) is - 0,57; 
(iv) the GDP elasticity is 1,84. These figures are higher than 
might have been expected: however the dependent variable 
is trade in, rather than consumption of minerals and if the 
rest of the world is treated as a residual supplier by each 
country, this would induce an upwards bias (because of the 
accelerator effect). If oil consumption were the dependent 
variable, significantly lower elasticities might be expected. 
Using these coefficients as a guideline as lo what may be ex-
pected to happen to world trade in minerals over the next few 
years unsurprisingly yields the conclusion that it starts to in-
crease again (albeit at a much lower price level so the actual 
value of oil trade will fall). The effect on the growth in the 
volume of world trade will be quite marked, even though the 
weight of the minerals category will fall as a result of lower oil 
prices. A price fall in oil of 40 % yields a fall of perhaps 30 % 
for the whole minerals sector which implies directly, in the long-
term, a volume of minerals trade some 17 % higher than it 
would otherwise have been. Moreover the fall in oil prices is 
expected to lead to a higher level of world output which would 
give a further boost to world trade in minerals. 
Even at the new lower prices, minerals might be expected to 
provide some 18 % of world trade in 1986. The 17 % increase 
in mineral trade mentioned above implies an extra 1/2 to 3/4 % 
of world trade growth each year for the next five years. The 
indirect effects via stronger GNP would be additional to this 
'pure price effect'. If world GNP growth is around 3 % over the 
next five years, the implication is that world trade growth would 
be at least 5 % per year. 
However in so far as the extra growth in world trade derives 
from higher oil trade it will be of only limited benefit to the 
poorer oil-importing countries. They will benefit from a lower 
oil import bill, but demand for non-oil commodities will not 
grow very strongly and they are faced with many problems in 
increasing their exports of the simpler manufactured goods, 
for example processed foods, textiles and clothing. Developed 
countries, on the other hand, will benefit from both a lower 
import bill and any increase in world trade in manufactures 
consequent upon stronger world output growth. 
Effect of the fall in oil prices on productive capacity and scrapping 
The recent fall in oil prices can be expected to have a number 
of economic consequences. While certain effects have already 
been well documented, this is not the case for the so-called 
'supply' effects. The lack of theoretical support and econometric 
estimations renders such an analysis difficult. The attempt pre-
sented here limits itself to the two following aspects: the effect 
of lower oil prices on profitable productive capacity and its 
effect on scrapping. Based initially on theoretical considerations, 
this study furnishes quantitative evaluations of these two effects 
using parameters estimated in Community econometric models 
(Compact, Eurolink and Hermes). 
( a) Profitable production and loll"er oil prices 
For enterprises or sectors in a situation of classical unemploy-
ment, lower oil prices will increase the level of profitable pro-
duction capacity. In such a situation, enterprises in effect are 
confronted by excess demand and will only be willing to satisfy 
a part of it by a loss of profitability, be this due to insufficient 
productivity, too low a price (caused by competition) or too 
high a price of factor inputs. If the price of a factor falls, as is 
the case with the fall in oil price, and this fall is expected to be 
permanent, then companies will be able to implement their 
investment plans. This applies to those companies that would 
have had low profits if the oil price had stayed at its former 
level but who, following the change, now have greater profit 
margins. 
Formally such behaviour is characterized using the theory of 
the firm, i.e. profit maximization taking account of technological 
possibilities. This depends on a three factor (capital, energy and 
labour) putty-clay production function. Ex-ante, substitution 
possibilities exist which can be represented by the following 
nested Cobb-Douglas, CES production function: 
-a 
Q = Q
0
e gt [o 1-r + (I - o) E-r] P . 0 
where Q, I, E and L represent respectively output of the vintage 
of the capital stock considered, the volume of investment incor-
porated in this vintage, and the volumes of energy and labour 
used. The role of technical progress is represented by g, scale 
economies are equal to a + ~ < 1, the elasticity of substitution 
1 
between capital and energy is equal to cr = --- and the 
1 + p 
elasticity of substitution between labour and the other factors 
is equal to one. 
If this formalization and the underlying hypotheses (in particular 
the constancy of wages and the user cost of capital in real terms) 
are accepted, an oil price fall has the following direct effects on 
profitable productive capacity: 
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dQ 
Q 
dPe 
where --
pc 
a + ~ 
-----Se --
-(a + ~) Pe 
designates the relative change of the real oil price 
and se is the proportion of oil costs in total f&ctor costs (invest-
ment cost + labour costs + oil costs). 
In the short-run the effect is only on the new generation of 
equipment. In the long-run, when all vintages have been re-
placed, it is the whole of productive capacity wliich will be 
increased by the improvement in profitability. This increase is a 
pure supply effect because it results only from the behaviour of 
producers. If it remains a potential rather than actual effect 
for enterprises constrained by demand on the goods markets 
(Keynesian situation), it is certainly real for companies in a 
situation of classical unemployment. At a macroeconomic level, 
this supply effect of the reverse oil-shock (increase of profitable 
productive capacity) will be more important, as the proportion 
of markets in a situation of classical unemployment is higher. 
According to Compact, this share could be in the region of 70 % 
of Community enterprises. 
The elasticities of productive capacity relative to the oil price 
depend on the importance of economies of scale: Any econo-
metric estimation of such scale economies is generally imprecise 
and depends significantly on the method chosen. Using Eurolink 
for example, economies due to scale for all market sectors are 
the following: 0,94 for Germany, 0,84 for France, 1,40 for 
Italy and 0,89 for the United Kingdom. Taking account of the 
imprecise nature of these evaluations, a plausible range for the 
value of scale economies can be taken as 0,8 to 0,9. The strong 
non-linearity of the elasticity of productive capacity with respect 
to the oil price renders the results very sensitive to the assump-
tions regarding economies of scale, especially when these ap-
proach unity (see Table I). 
Taking account of the proportion of companies in a situation 
of classical unemployment (from Compact) it is possible to 
estimate that the pure supply effect from the reverse oil-shock 
would increase productive capacity in the whole of the Com-
munity (all market sectors) by between 0,2 and 0,6 % in the. 
short-term and by between 2,4 and 5,4 % in the long-term. 1 
( b) Scrapping and the reverse oil-shock 
Under the assumption of putty-clay production technology, 
production factors are taken as complementary once the new 
generation of equipment is incorporated into the capital stock. 
For existing capital, no possibility exists for substitution between 
the different factors of production, following an oil price change. 
The sole effect of the lower oil price would, therefore, be a 
reduction in production costs or, equivalently, an increase in 
profit margins. This increase in the rate of return on older 
vintage of equipment should enable certain enterprises to retain 
capital which would otherwise have been scrapped. 
1 Ranges correspond to the two values retained for economics due to scale, i.e. 0,8 and 
0.9. 
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Table 1 
Variation of productive capacity following the reverse oil shock 1 (maximum effect where 100 % of enterprises are in a situation of 
classical unemployment) 
(%) 
Economies of scale D DK F NL UK EUR 
Short-term effect2 
Manufacturing 0,9 1,0 0,9 1,3 1,8 2,5 1,8 1,4 
industry 0,8 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,1 0,8 0,6 
Intermediate 0,9 1,0 1,7 3,2 4,1 7,7 4,0 3,5 
goods 0,8 0,5 0,7 1,4 1,8 3,4 1,8 1,5 
Equipment 0,9 2,4 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,3 0,9 0,5 
goods 0,8 1,1 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,4 0,2 
Consumption 0,9 0,4 0,9 1,1 1,1 0,6 1,5 I, I 
goods 0,8 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,7 0,5 
Manufacturing 0,9 0,5 0,8 0,7 1,1 0,9 1,0 0.8 
and services3 0,8 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,5 0.4 0.4 0,3 
Long-term effect 
Manufacturing 0,9 10,4 8,6 12,6 18,0 24,8 18.4 14.4 
industry 0,8 4,6 3,8 5,6 8,0 11,0 8,2 6.4 
Intermediate 0,9 23,8 16,7 31,5 41,0 76,5 39,6 34,7 
goods 0,8 10,6 7.4 14,0 18,2 34,0 17,6 15.4 
Equipment 0,9 4,1 3,2 3,2 5,9 3,2 9.4 5,0 
goods 0,8 1,8 1,4 1,4 2,6 1,4 4,2 2,2 
Consumption 0,9 9,9 9,0 10,8 11,2 6,3 14,9 10,8 
goods 0,8 4,4 4,0 4,8 5,0 2,8 6,6 4,8 
Manufacturing 0,9 5,4 8,1 7,2 10,8 9,0 9,9 7,7 
and services3 0,8 2,4 3,6 3,2 4,8 4,0 4,4 3,4 
On the basis of a 50% fall in the oil price between 1985 and 1986. 
Impact after one year, assuming that the productive capacity of the marginal vintage represents 10 % of total productive capacity. 
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J Market sectors excluding agriculture and housing. 
The reduction of the unit costs of production due to the reverse 
oil-shock will moderate the increase in costs from a newer to an 
older production vintage (with the latter incorporating less up-
to-date techniques and for which wear and tear is greater). 
The lower oil price therefore delays the rate of scrapping by 
improving profitability. This delay, expressed in numbers of 
years, is equal to the ratio of two changes: that due to the 
reverse oil-shock and that due to the ageing of capital stock 
vintages. Formally it can be shown that: 
Delay of scrapping in years = 
WL 
Where WL and PcE represent labour costs and energy costs for 
the oldest vintage of equipment; nl and nc are the apparent 
productivities of labour and energy. 
This relationship allows an estimation of the delay in scrapping 
to be made, following the reverse oil-shock of the winter of 
1985-86. The trend in apparent productivity has been estimated 
from the parameters of the model Hermes (using an approxi-
mation for the rate of technical progress affecting combined 
factors of production). The figures obtained are set out in Table 
2. 
The delay in scrapping induced by the reverse oil-shock seems 
to be significant. For intermediate goods where energy costs are 
particularly high the delay is greatest. In the case of the UK. 
even taking account of low technical progress, it reaches a level 
which seems hardly credible. In contrast the effect on equipment 
goods is weaker, between 0,2 and 1,2 years (except for UK 
where the estimate is 6,5 years). For consumption goods the 
estimates for scrapping delays lie between the estimates for the 
two other sectors. 
Table 2 
Economic consequences of the oil price change 
In general, if the case of the UK is excluded, the reverse oil 
shock could delay scrapping by between one and six years for 
intermediate goods, by between 0,2 and one year for equipment 
goods and by between 0,6 and four years for consumption 
goods; Germany and Denmark represent respectively the low 
and high values of the last two ranges cited above. 
(in years} 
Delay in scrapping for the oldest vintages of capital equipment following a lowering in the oil price' 
Intermediate goods 
Equipment goods 
Consumption goods 
1 The calculation is based on a 50 % decrease in the oil price between 1985 and 1986. 
D 
1,1 
0,2 
0,6 
The shares P,E/(P,E + WL) are based on the year 1980 except in the case of Italy ( 1981). 
DK 
1.2 
4,3 
F 
5,4 
0.4 
0.8 
NL UK 
2,6 6,6 15,5 
0,2 0,2 6,5 
1.0 I.I 3.4 
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B.2. Productive supply in the Community 
The groll'th of productive supply in the Community sloll'ed down considerably through the 
J970s. When adjustments are made to capital and labour inputs so as to account .f11r hours 
ll'orked and capacity utili::.ation, a picture of a marked sloll'doll'n in the groll'th rates(>( both 
labour productivity and of capital per employee emerges. Jn addition, the groll'th of capital 
productivity has been negative or very l\'eak for some time. The oil price fall can be expected 
to produce beneficial effects operating through both demand and supply channels. As far as 
productive potential in the future is concerned, the concept is com•entionally measured in 
terms of the ll'eighted groll'th of capital and labour together ll'ith an estimate of total factor 
productivity. Holl'ever, where unused resources exist, as is the case in the Community ll'ith 
its high level of unemployment, these can be integrated into supply at appropriate levels of 
factor rewards. A rough calculation shows that on the basis of recent levels o_f growth in the 
labour force, the capital stock and total factor productivity, productive potential in the 
Community will groll' by 2,8 %. Jn order to reduce unemployment significantly, at existing 
rates of technical advance and the same groll'th in the capital/labour ratio, it is sholl'n that a 
growth in output o_( about 3 J / 2 % l\'ould be required, a rate consistent ll'ith that ji1reseen in 
the cooperative growth strategy for more employment. 
B.2.1. Potential output and unused resources 
An assessment of the major factors which might determine 
longer term potential supply constitutes a basic building 
block of any strategy for growth and employment. For 
an economy, potential output measures that production 
capability, over the longer term, which is compatible with 
full utilization of the available factors of production and 
reasonably stable prices. A country's potential output ex-
pands primarily because of increased labour and capital 
inputs, technical advance and improvements in efficiency 
and the organization of these inputs. In a situation where 
spare resources exist, either labour, capital, or both, actual 
growth must exceed potential growth if such under-utilized 
and unused resources are to be integrated into the growth 
process. It follows therefore, that where output grows below 
or at only the same rate as productive potential. the gap will 
not narrow and some resources will continue to remain 
unused. This is a part of the unemployment problem in 
Europe. 
B.2.2. The main components of productive supply 
The growth of a nation's capacity to produce real output 
depends firstly on increases in the availability and quality 
of factors of production. secondly on the efficiency and 
organization of these factors and thirdly on the pace of 
technological advance. Thus, to have more output. an econ-
omy must (a) have additional factors of production or. (b) 
be able to use existing factor supplies more efficiently either 
by a more effective allocation of resources or by taking 
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advantage of technical improvements. Initially we can con-
fine attention to the two primary resource inputs: labour 
and capital. At a later stage the currently important question 
of energy is introduced. 
Inputs to a production process are subject to a number of 
uncertainties particularly with respect to their measurement. 
In the case of the labour input, over a conventional medium-
term period, the growth in the numbers of persons of work-
ing age can be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy. 
Labour force participation rates and hours worked however, 
can vary appreciably with economic activity. Moreover, the 
input of each additional worker to the process is not uniform 
given differences in training and experience. 
As far as the capital input is concerned, it is to be noted 
that what capital provides to the production process, is a 
flow of services from an existing stock. In statistical terms, 
given that what we observe in practice is a stock rather than 
a flow, various factors must be taken into account such as 
the amount of the stock which is being utilized and the 
possibility of increased capital services, for example, through 
more intensive use over longer periods. In addition, measure-
ment of the capital stock poses particular problems which 
cannot always be allowed for. such as accelerated obsol-
escence due to changing tastes or changes in relative prices. 
Quite apart from those problems concerned with the 
measurement of inputs, the way in which technical progress 
is characterized will also influence the results obtained. Tech-
nical progress implies a widening of knowledge which im-
proves national welfare in terms of increased real income 
per head and through a widening of consumers' choice over 
goods and between work and leisure activities. All of the 
various aspects of technical progress are impossible to meas-
ure precisely, but its effect in general is to expand potential 
supply for any given volume of inputs. In most aggregated 
explanations of growth in output it is usual to treat technical 
change as being disembodied, or something which is exogen-
ous to the economic system. The existence of embodied 
technical progress is more difficult to handle empirically 
implying, as it does, that technical progress does not drop 
like manna from heaven on all machines, equipment and 
buildings but only on certain types of capital. This leads 
to a requirement for data on the age structure of capital 
equipment since various degrees of technical progress and 
knowledge are embodied in machines installed of different 
vintage. This implies in turn that in a measure of the supply 
of capital in aggregate, the most recent additions to the 
capital stock must be weighted differently to those in-
crements occurring in earlier periods and which has the 
effect of increasing the output growth response to changes 
in the capital stock. 
Table B.2.1 
Output and employment 
B DK l) GR E 
GDP 
1960-68 4,5 4,6 4,2 7,3 7,5 
1968-73 5,6 4,1 4,9 8.2 6,8 
1973-79 2,2 2,0 2,4 3,7 2,5 
1979-83 0,9 0,9 0,5 0,4 1,2 
1983-86 1,6 3,1 2,9 1,4 2,3 
Employment 
1960-68 0,6 1,1 -0,1 -0,6 0,7 
1968-73 0,7 1,1 0,8 -0,3 1,1 
1973-79 0,1 0,5 -0,5 0,7 -1,3 
F 
5,4 
5,9 
3.1 
I, I 
1,8 
0.5 
1,0 
0.3 
1979-83 - 1,1 -0,2 -0,8 -0,1 -2.3 -0,3 
1983-86 0,3 2,3 0,8 0,2 -1,0 -0,5 
GDP per person 
in employment 
1960-68 3,9 3,4 4.3 8,0 6,8 4.9 
1968-73 4,9 3.0 4,1 8,6 5,6 4,9 
1973-79 2,1 1.5 3.0 3,0 3,9 2,9 
1979-83 2,0 1,1 1,4 0,5 3,6 1,4 
1983-86 1,3 0,8 2,2 1,2 3,4 2,2 
Source: Commi~sion services. 
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B.2.3. The productivity slowdown 
In the past decade there has been a marked shift in pro-
ductivity performance as indicated by the growth of output 
per employee, when compared with those increases recorded 
before the first oil shock. This slowdown in productivity 
growth appears quite clearly in Table 8.2.1 which gives data 
at the level of the whole Community economy. In the period 
1960-68 annual average GDP growth rates in Community 
countries have been in the range 3, I % (Luxembourg and 
the United Kingdom) to over 7 % (Greece and Spain), the 
average growth rate for EU R 12 being the same as that in 
the United States (4,5 %), but considerably lower than that 
achieved in Japan (10,5 %). Although growth rates outside 
the Community eased in the immediate pre-oil price shock 
period, this trend was not apparent in Community countries 
where output accelerated further in all countries apart from 
Denmark, Spain and Italy. The impact of the first oil shock 
in 1973 was associated with a significant reduction in growth 
rates achieved over the period 1973-79 which in the great 
,, Annual //l'l'ftlg<' ",. ch,mgt•.,} 
IRL L 1'l I' UK HJR le USA Japan 
4,2 5,7 3.1 4.8 6,6 3.1 4.5 4.5 10.5 
4,8 4.6 6,5 5.3 7,4 3.2 4.8 3.3 8,8 
4,6 2.6 1,4 2.5 3,1 1.4 2,4 2,6 3.6 
2,2 0.6 -0,9 -0.1 2.0 0,4 0.6 0,7 3,8 
3,2 2,6 2,9 1,8 0,3 2,4 2,4 3,9 4,8 
0.1 -0.6 0.3 1,1 -0,4 0.3 0.1 2.1 1.5 
-0,1 0 2,1 0.5 -0,6 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.9 
1,3 0,8 0,8 0,2 -0,3 0,2 0,2 2,2 0,7 
-0,4 0,3 0,1 - 1,3 -0,1 - 1,6 -0,7 0,0 1,1 
-0,2 0,3 0,4 0,3 -0,7 I.I 0,5 2,6 1,1 
4,1 6,4 2,8 3.7 7,0 2.8 4,4 2.4 8.9 
4.9 4,6 4,2 4.8 8.0 3.1 4,3 1.8 7.9 
3,2 1,8 0,6 2,2 3,4 1,2 2,2 0,4 2.9 
2,6 0,3 - 1,0 1,3 2,1 2.1 1,3 0,7 2.6 
3,4 2.3 2,4 1,5 1,0 1,3 1,9 1,3 3,7 
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majority of countries were half the annual average growth 
rates reached in the 1960s. A further substantial slowdown 
took place between 1979 and 1983 and it is only in the most 
recent period ( 1983-86) that any significant pick up appears 
to have taken place, albeit to a far less significant degree 
than in the United States. 
During the initial period 1960-68, in most Community 
countries there was a modest increase in aggregate employ-
ment which was sufficient to keep unemployment for the 
Community (EUR 9) at 1,9 % as compared to the present 
level of 10,8 %. Rates of employment growth however, 
slowed down appreciably over subsequent periods, although 
not as substantially as output growth, leading to a marked 
reduction in the growth rate of output per person in employ-
ment. Thus for the Community as a whole the growth of 
labour productivity was more than halved after 1973 and 
has not recovered significantly since then. The decline in 
employment together with demographic factors have there-
fore served to emphasize the unemployment problem in 
recent years. 
It is now recognized widely that the factors making for 
apparent weakening in productivity performance in the in-
dustrialized world are both numerous and complex in their 
effect overall. Lower rates of investment, higher energy input 
costs, poor rates of utilization of existing capacity, weak 
effective demand and worsening terms of trade of manufac-
turing as against raw materials and the effects of inflation 
have all played a part. It is possible that between 1973 and 
1980/81, the rate of growth of productive supply in OECD 
industrialized countries fell from around 3,5 % to some-
where between 1,0 and 2,0 % . 1 
To gain further insight into the comparative pattern of 
development in the European economy, the analysis in what 
follows concentrates largely on the non-agricultural business 
sector (excluding the renting of dwellings). In the tables 
however, figures are given for manufacturing also. 2 
1 Sec Assar Lindbeck. "The recent slowdown of productivity growth'. 
Economic Journal, March 1983. 
2 Some concentration on manufacturing is desirable given the leading role 
assigned to growth of manufacturing industry in economic growth in 
total. Thus for instance Boyer and Petit in E111ploymell/ and productil'ity 
in the EEC show that year on year changes in manufacturing value-
added correlate more closely than those in any other sector with changes 
in the economy as a whole. the only other sector showing anything like 
the same degree of correlation being market services. 
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B.2.4. Evolution of output, employment, hours, 
capital and capacity utilization in the non-
agricultural business sector 
The pattern of development of various productivity aggre-
gates of the non-agricultural business sector is shown in 
brackets in Table 8.2.2. The first panel gives output per 
person employed in the business sector of the economy. The 
comparison with the data for the whole economy in panel 3 
of Table 8.2.1 is quite close although some minor divergen-
cies have appeared in the most recent past associated with 
different patterns of activity in agriwltural and the govern-
ment sectors. Thus in the UK and Japan, growth in the 
period 1979-83 was higher in the business sector than in the 
whole economy, while in the USA and Italy the opposite 
was the case. The main figures in the table take into account 
an adjustment for working time. 3 Between 1960 and 1983 
average weekly hours worked fell by as much as 27,7 % in 
Italy, 18,6 % in Germany, 16,6 % in France, 14,4 % in the 
United Kingdom. In Japan the decline was 14.2 % while in 
the United States there was an actual increase of0.3 %. This 
factor alters substantially the labour input component of a 
conventional productivity calculation. The result can be seen 
in panel I of Table 8.2.2 where output per person employed 
per hour is shown. Given the movements in working hours, 
the calculations yield labour productivity figures which are 
considerably higher for the European economies and Japan. 
The US picture is one of a lower increase in the labour 
productivity and at the same time a reduced decline in the 
rate of growth in the post oil-shock period. 
The rate of increase of the measured capital stock slowed 
down appreciably in the Community after 1973 (see panel 
2 of Table 8.2.2). Inevitably, certain reservations must be 
entered at this stage concerning the whole issue of capital 
stock measurement. These are taken up in Box I where an 
alternative formulation is presented in an attempt to illus-
trate the sensitivity of the results of this analysis and what 
follows from the assumption that a significant margin of 
capacity was destroyed or taken out of use in the post 1973 
period, a factor which may not have been fully taken into 
account in the various official statistical series generally 
used for the measurement of the capital stock. The data in 
brackets in Table 8.2.2 show a very substantial slowdown 
in the rate of growth of the capital stock except for the 
United States. However, since, as noted above, some meas-
3 Data are unavailable for this sector as a whole, so average working hours 
for manufacturing has had to be taken as a proxy for their development. 
The adjustment does not allow for increased holidays etc. which was 
undoubtedly an additional factor at work. particularly in Europe, over 
the period covered. 
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Table B.2.2 
Labour and capital productivity (non-agricultural business sector - excluding the renting of dwellings) I 
Output per person employed per 
hour 
1960-68 
1968-73 
1973-79 
1979-83 
1979-872 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 
Adjusted capital stock 
1960-68 
1968-73 
1973-79 
1979-83 
1979-872 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 
Adjusted capital stock per person 
per hour 
1960-68 
1968-73 
1973-79 
1979-83 
1979-872 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 
Output per unit of the adjusted 
capital stock 
1960-68 
1968-73 
1973-79 
1979-83 
1979-872 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 
l) 
5.4 (4,2) 
5.1 (4.1) 
4.3 (3,5) 
2.0 (1.5) 
2,2 (1,6) 
-3,4 (-2,7) 
6,5 (7, 1) 
7.4 (6,8) 
3,9 (4,5) 
1.5 (3.8) 
3,8 (3,2) 
-5,0(-3,3) 
7.6 (6.9) 
7,3 (5,7) 
5,6 (5,3) 
3,4 (5,2) 
4,6 (3.5) 
-4,2 (- 1.7) 
- 2,1 (- 2,6) 
-2,1 (-1,5) 
-1,2 (- 1.8) 
-1,4(-3,5) 
-2,4 (-1,9) 
0,7 ( -0,9) 
F 
5.6 (4.9) 
5,2 (4.8) 
3.7 (2,8) 
2,9 (1.4) 
3,0 (1,8) 
-2,7 (-3,5) 
5.1 (5,0) 
8.1 (6,4) 
4,6 (5,2) 
3.1 (4,0) 
3,8 (3,5) 
-2,0 (- 1,0) 
4.3 (3,7) 
6,5 (4,4) 
5,0 (4, 7) 
5,0 (4.4) 
5,2 (3,8) 
0,7 (0,7) 
1.2 ( 1,2) 
-1.3 (0,3) 
- 1_.2 ( - 1.8) 
-2:0 (-2,9) 
-2,2 (-1,9) 
-3,2 (-4.1) 
1 Figures in brackets arc not adjusted for hours worked or capacity utilization. 
2 Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
ure of capital services is the appropriate definition, account 
must be taken of the utilization of the existing capital stock 
in the production process. 
This is attempted in the main figures in the table which 
provide an estimate after taking account of capacity utiliza-
tion rates. The rate of capacity utilization used is that indi-
cated in the Community business surveys with earlier data 
coming from national sources or being based on deviations 
from trend rates of growth in the early 1960s. The data are 
standardized to equate the historical peak in each country 
to 100. The resulting adjustment to the capital stock thus 
serves to emphasize the decline in the growth rate of the 
1 Am11uil 1m:rage % cl,angt.•) 
l Is. Et.:R 4 USA J.ipan 
7,1 (6,0) 3,5 (2,9) 5.2 (4.3) 2,6 (2.9) 9.5 (8.5) 
7,9 (4,7) 4,1 (3.4) 5.4 (4,2) 1.9 ( 1.9) 9,7 (8.5) 
2.4 (1.9) 1.9 (1.0) 3,2 (2.4) 0,6 (0,3) 3,0 (2,7) 
1.4 ( -0.l) 3,0 (2.5) 2.4 ( 1,4) 0,5 (0,3) 3,2 (3,1) 
2.1 (1,0) 2,5 (2.0) 2.4 (1,6) 
-5.7 (-6,1) -0,5(-0.4) -2,8 (-2.9) -2,1 (-2,6) -6.3 ( -5.4) 
7.2 (6.9) 3.6 (4,5) 5,3 (5,7) 5,1 (4.0) 11.3 (9.3) 
4.4 (5,9) 5,5 (4,3) 6,3 (5,7) 4.5 (4.5) 12.6 (13.4) 
3,8 (4.l) 3,2 (4.0) 3,8 (4.4) 3.3 (3,8) 5,1 (6.6) 
1J (3,2) 0,7 (3.0) 1,6 (3.5) 0,8 (4.2) 3,4 (5.0) 
3,6 (3,0) 3,7 (2.9) 3,7 (3.1) 
-5,9 (-3,7) - 2,9 ( - 1.5) - 3,7 ( - 2,2) -4,3 (0.2) 7.9 (-4,3) 
7,4 (6,0) 3,9 (4.2) 5,5 (5.1) 2,7 (2,0) 8,7 (5,8) 
6,8 (5.1) 6,2 (4.3) 6,6 (4,8) 2.5 (2.4) 11.1 (10.6) 
3,2 (2,9) 4.1 (4.0) 4,6 (4.3) 1.0 (1.2) 4.3 (5.4) 
2,2 (2,5) 3,4 (5,3) 3,5 (4,4) 0,9 (4,2) 1.9 (3,3) 
4,0 (2,2) 4,8 (3,5) 4,7 (3,3) 
-5,2 (-3,5) -0,5 ( 1.1) -2,0 (-0,7) -1,8 (2.2) -6,8 (-2,5) 
-0,3 (-0.0) -0,3 (- 1.3) -0,4 (-0,8) -0,1 (0,9) 0.7 (2.6) 
1,1 (-0.4) -2.0 (-0,8) -1,1 (-0,5) -0,6 (-0,6) - 1.2 ( - 1.9) 
-0,8 (- 1.0) -2,1 (-2,8) - IJ (-1,9) -0,4 (-0,9) - 1.2 (-2,5) 
-0,7 (-2.5) -0.4(-2.7) - 1.1 ( - 2,9) -0,4 (-3,7) 1.3 (-0,2) 
-1,8 (-1,2) - 2,3 ( - 1.5) -2,2(-1,6) 
-0.4 (-2.5) -0,1(-1,4) -0,7 (- 2,1) -0,3(-4,6) 0,6 -2,8) 
capital stock in the post- 1973 period. One reservation which 
must be made concerns the quality of this adjustment. This 
is that, in the recent period of structural change, observed 
capacity utilization rates may increasingly be biased by the 
fact that a large number of firms operating at low capacity 
rates have actually gone out of business and are thus not 
included in the survey sample. 
The growth in the capital/labour ratio, adjusted for hours 
worked and capacity utilization. shows a marked decline in 
the period 1979-83 on the average annual rates of growth 
recorded in the 1960s, in the Community countries studied, 
with the exception of France (Table B.2.2, panel 3 ). A similar 
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deceleration is evident in the USA, on the basis of the 
adjusted figures, but this was from a much slower average 
rate of growth in the ratio just prior to the oil shock (2,5 %) 
than the Community (6,6 %). The Japanese experience was 
even more dramatic with a slowing of the growth in the 
capital/labour ratio from I I ,I % to just under 2 %. When 
forecasts up to 1987 for the Community are taken into 
account the decline in the growth of the capital/labour ratio 
is somewhat less pronounced, suggesting a recent upturn, 
particularly in Italy. 
Although there has been a decrease in the trend rate of 
growth of capital productivity since the early 1960s, this 
structural shift is less evident in the adjusted data (see Table 
B.2.2, panel 2). It is interesting to note also that with the 
exception of Italy, in all of the countries studied, the deceler-
ation in capital productivity is more pronounced in the 1968-
73 period rather than in 1973-79. In the most recent period 
1979-83 there were quite significant divergencies in move-
ments between countries. Thus in Germany and France the 
rate of capital productivity declined further, in Italy and the 
USA it remained broadly unchanged from the previous 
period, while in the United Kingdom and Japan capital 
productivity appears to have recovered significantly. 
This initial investigation of the data on the productivity of 
labour and capital shows the importance of adjusting for 
hours worked and capacity utilization. When the data are 
adjusted a clear picture emerges of a very marked slowdown 
in the growth rates of output per man hour and a similar 
decline in the growth of the capital/labour ratio except in 
France. The United States and the United Kingdom. for 
which raw data would suggest an increase in the growth of 
the capital/labour ratio. revert to the trend experience in 
other countries when the adjustments suggested here are 
applied. In general, the trend in capital productivity began 
to turn downwards before the first oil shock which re-
inforced this movement. In the most recent period studied, 
there is some evidence of a slower decline than in the 1970s 
but this is not generalized across countries. 
B.2.5. Total factor inputs, total factor pro-
ductivity and capital labour substitution 
A natural extension of the above is to combine the pro-
ductivity performance of both labour and capital to obtain 
a measure of what is usually termed 'total factor pro-
ductivity'.4 Thus the growth of real output can be broken 
4 Sec European Economr No 20. Julv 1984 and No 22. N,n-cmhcr 198..\. 
Also sec Douglas T~dd. ·Factor· producti,itv growth in four EEC 
countries. I 960-81 '. Ca/zicrs <"<'t111omi1111c de Br;n;·llc., I\" I 07 .kmc 
trimestre 1985. 
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down into that part which is accounted for by the growth 
of inputs of labour and capital and a part which is due to 
the combined productivity growth of these two factors. In 
addition and under certain assumptions. the growth of real 
output per employee can be separated into the contribution 
from increases in capital per employee and secondly, the 
growth of total factor productivity. Table B.2.4 provides a 
breakdown of the above kind for the period 1960-85, and 
also for the sub-periods referred to already. The employment 
and capital stock series are adjusted for the effects of hours 
worked and capacity utilization respectively. 
The first point to note is that amongst Community countries 
over the whole period, in both private non-agricultural busi-
ness and manufacturing sectors, the contribution of the 
combined total of factor inputs to the growth of real output 
is a good deal less than that of total factor productivity. 
Such experience is rather different to that observed in the 
United States and Japan. In addition. the table indicates 
that the relative contribution of the volume of factor inputs 
declined as the period progressed. This is a reflection of the 
picture as described above in Tables B.2.2 and B.2.3 where, 
the growth of both capital and labour inputs but particularly 
the latter began to fall away in all countries after 1973. 
A second observation which can be drawn from Table B.2.4 
is that increases in capital per employee. or 'capital deepen-
ing' have tended to explain between one quarter and one 
half of the growth of labour productivity, with the major 
part again being accounted for on average by total factor 
productivity growth. Significantly, however, amongst Com-
munity countries, in Germany and Italy. the rate of capital 
deepening fell through the period. whereas in France and 
the United Kingdom, it changed very little. Japan experi-
enced by far the biggest decline, with the USA exhibiting a 
tendency not dissimilar to that in France and the United 
Kingdom. 
Turning to the last decade. Table B.2.5 provides for the 
manufacturing sector a comparison of factor productivity 
growth performance through the cyclical peak years 1973 
and 1979 with that of the most recent period 1979 to 1987. 
Across the four Community countries considered here. 
manufacturing output growth fell by an average of 1.4 
percentage points between the two periods. Of this. the 
major contributing factor was the decline in total factor 
inputs with total factor productivity, on average. playing 
only a minor role. Experience however. varied markedly. 
particularly in the comparison between Germany and the 
United Kingdom. In the latter country. we see that between 
the two periods. both output per employee hour and total 
factor productivity in the manufacturing sector rose 
strongly. This is a reflection also of the reversal of the trend 
decline in capital productivity in the United Kingdom noted 
earlier. 
Table B.2.3 
Labour and capital productivity (Manufacturing industry)' 
D F 
Output per person employed per 
hour 
1960-68 6,2 (5,0) 7,4 (6,7) 
1968-73 5.3 (4,3) 6,4 (6.0) 
1973-79 4.7 (3.8) 5.1 (4.1) 
1979-83 2,4 (1,9) 4,0 (2.5) 
1979-872 3,3 (2,7) 4.5 (3.3) 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 -3,8 (-3.1) - 3,4 ( -4,2) 
Adjusted capital stock 
1960-68 6,4 (6.9) 5.2 (5, I) 
1968-73 6,5 (5.9) 7.9 (6,2) 
1973-79 1.7 (2,3) 3.0 (3.6) 
1979-83 -0,5 (I, 7) 1,5 (2.5) 
1979-872 2,2 (1,6) 2.6 (2,4) 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 -6,9 (-5,2) -3,3 (-2,6) 
Adjusted capital stock per person 
per hour 
1960-68 7,8 (7, I) 5.5 (4.8) 
1968-73 6,7 (5,1) 6,6 (4,5) 
1973-79 4,6 (4,3) 5.2 (4,8) 
1979-83 2,5 (4,3) 5,4 (4,8) 
1979-872 3.7 (2.6) 6.1 (4.6) 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 -5.3 (-2.8) -0,1 (0,0) 
Output per unit of the adjusted 
capital stock 
1960-68 - 1,4 (- 2,0) 1.7 ( 1.8) 
1968-73 -1,3 (-0,7) -0,1 ( 1.5) 
1973-79 0,1 (-0,4) -0.1 (-0,7) 
1979-83 -0,1 (-2,4) - 1,3 (- 2,2) 
1979-872 -0,4 (0.2) - 1.5 ( - 1,3) 
Difference 1960-68 & 1979-83 1,3 (0.4) -3,0 (-4.0) 
1 Figures in brackets are not adjusted for hours worked or capacity utilization. 
2 Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
The arithmetic on which Table B.2.5 is based suggests that 
when compared with the European economy, both the USA 
and Japan have experienced a decline in the growth of 
output per employee hour of which one half is accounted 
for by the fall in the growth of capital per employee hour. 
In Europe on the other hand, the picture is different. For 
Productive supply in the Community 
( Anmwl an'rtl,~(' 0 o ch,mgt•) 
UK EUR 4 USA Jap;.in 
8,3 (7.2) 4.3 (3.6) 6.1 (5,2) 3,1 (3,4) 10,5 (9.5) 
8,3 (5,0) 4,5 (3.8) 5.9 (4,7) 3,7 (3,7) 12.2 (10,9) 
3.3 (2.7) 1.7 (0.8) 3.8 (3.0) 1,4 (1.2) 6.6 (6.3) 
2,9 ( 1,4) 3,4 (2,9) 3.3 (2.3) 2,6 (2,4) 6.9 (6.8) 
4.0 (2.8) 3,9 (3,4) 3,9 (3.1) 
-5,4 (-5,8) -0.9 (-0,7) -2.8 (-2,9) - 0.5 ( - 1.0) - 3.6 (-2.7) 
5,9 (5.6) 2,9 (3.9) 4.8 (5.3) 4.3 (3,2) 11.7 (9.7) 
3,2 (4.7) 4,7 (3,5) 5,5 (4,9) 3.3 (3,3) 12.8 ( 13,6) 
2,5 (2,7) 2,0 (2.7) 2.2 (2,8) 3.2 (3.7) 4.0 (5,4) 
-0,5 ( 1,3) -1,2 ( 1.1) -0.3 ( 1.6) 0,1 (3,5) 4,4 (6.0) 
1.9 ( 1,3) 1.9 ( 1.1) 2.1 ( 1.5) 
-6,4 (-4,3) -4.1 (-2.8) 5,1 (3,7) -4,2 (0,3) - 7,3 (- 3.7) 
6,2 (4.9) 4.0 (4,2) 5.7 (5,2) 1.7 (1,0) 8,3 (5.4) 
5.3 {3,7) 6,4 (4,4) 6,1 (4,4) 3.1 (3,0) 11.9 ( 11.4) 
2,7 (2,4) 4,4 (4.3) 4,3 (4,0) 2.5 (2.8) 5,5 (6.6) 
2,4 (2.8) 5,5 (7,5) 3,9 (4,9) 3,6 (6,9) 3,4 (4.8) 
4.5 (2.7) 6.1 (4.7) 5,0 (3.5) 
-3,8 (-2,1) 1,5 (3,3) 1.8 (0,3) 1.9 (5,9) -4,9 ( - 0,6) 
2,0 (2,2) 0.3 ( -0.6) 0,4 (0.0) 1,4 (2,4) 2.0 (3.9) 
2,8 ( 1,3) - 1.8 ( - 0,6) -0,3 (0,3) 0,6 (0.6) 0.3 ( -0,4) 
0,6 (0,4) - 2.6 ( - 3,3) -0,5(-1,0) -1,1(-1.6) I. I (-0,3) 
0,5 ( - 1,3) -2,0 (-4.3) -0,6 (-2,4) -1.0 ( -4.2) 3.5 (1,9) 
-0,4 (0,2) - 2,0 ( - 1,2) -1.0 (-0,4) 
- 1.5 ( - 3.5) -2,3 (-3.7) -1.0 (-2,4) -2,4 (-6.6) 1.5 (-2.0) 
France and Germany the main factor behind the fall in 
output per employee hour is the decline in total factor 
productivity growth. This is consistent with the figures for 
Italy and the United Kingdom where labour productivity 
growth improved together with an increase in total factor 
productivity. 
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Table B.2.4 
Total factor productivity, inputs and substitution (manufacturing and non-agricultural business excluding dwellings) 
1960-68 1968-7.1 1973-79 1979-83 1979-87 
M NAB M NAB M NAB M NAB M NAB 
D Q 4,8 4,3 5.1 5,1 1,9 2,6 -0,7 0,2 1.8 1,3 
TFI 1,4 1,6 2,0 2,6 -1,6 0,0 -2.4 -0,7 -0,6 OJ 
TFP 3,4 2,7 3,0 2,5 3,5 2,6 1,8 0,9 2.4 0,7 
Q/L 6,2 5,4 5,3 5,1 4,7 4,3 2.4 2,0 3,3 2,1 
S"K/L 2,8 2,6 2,2 2,5 1.2 1.7 0,6 l.l 0.8 1.5 
F Q 7,0 6,3 7,8 6,7 3,0 3,3 0,3 1.0 !,! 1.5 
TFI 0,9 2,2 2,9 3,7 -0,8 1,2 -2,5 -0.4 -2,0 0,1 
TFP 6,0 4,0 4,8 2,9 3.8 2,0 2,8 1.4 3, l 1.3 
Q/L 7.4 5,6 6.4 5,2 5,1 3,7 4,0 2,9 4,5 3.0 
S"K/L 1,2 1,5 1,6 2,2 1,3 1,7 1,2 1.5 1.3 1,5 
Q 8,0 6,9 6,1 5,5 3,1 3,0 -0,l 0.6 1.4 1,8 
TFI 1,4 2,0 -0,7 -0.4 0.4 1.3 -2.3 -0,3 - 1.4 0,5 
TFP 6,5 4,8 6,9 5,9 2,7 1,7 2,3 0,9 2,7 1,3 
Q/L 8,3 7.1 8,3 7,9 3,3 2,4 2,9 1.4 4.0 2,1 
S"K/L 1,7 2,1 1,3 1,9 0,6 0,7 0,6 0,5 !,! 0,9 
UK Q 3,2 3,2 2,8 3,5 -0,7 I.O -3,2 0,2 -0,2 1.4 
TFI 0.2 0,8 0,1 1,2 -1,3 0.3 - 5.4 -1,7 -2,8 0,3 
TFP 3,0 2,4 2,7 2,3 0,6 0,7 2.3 2,0 2,6 !,I 
Q/L 4,3 3,5 4,5 4,1 1,8 1,9 3.4 3.0 3,9 2,5 
S"K/L 1.2 !,! 1,8 1,8 0,7 !,! l.l 1,0 I,! 1,3 
EUR4 Q 5,2 4,9 5,2 5,1 1,7 2,5 -0.9 0,5 !,I 1.5 
TFI 0,9 1,5 !,! 1,9 -1,0 0,6 -3,l -0.9 -1,6 0,4 
TFP 4,3 3,4 4,1 3,2 2,7 1,9 2.4 1.4 2,8 !,I 
Q/L 6,1 5,2 5,9 5,4 3,8 3,2 3,3 2.4 3,9 2,4 
S"K/L 1.7 1,8 1,7 2,1 I. I 1,3 0,9 1.0 !,I 1.3 
USA Q 5,7 5,0 3,9 3,8 2,1 2,9 -0.9 0,4 
TFI 2,9 3,0 0,9 2,6 1.2 2,6 -2,6 0.1 
TFP 2,7 2,0 2,9 1,2 0,8 0,3 1.8 0,3 
Q/L 3,1 2,6 3,7 1,8 1.4 0,6 2,6 0,5 
S"K/L 0,4 0,7 0,8 0.6 0,6 0.2 0,8 0,2 
Japan Q 13,9 12,l 13,l 11,2 5,1 3,9 8.0 4,8 
TFI 7.0 5,5 6,2 5,7 0.8 2.3 2,1 2,0 
TFP 6.5 6.2 6,5 5.2 4.4 1,6 5,8 2,7 
Q/L 10,5 9,5 12,2 9,7 6,6 3,0 6,9 3.2 
S"K/L 3,7 3,1 5,3 4,3 2,2 1.4 l.l 0,5 
Note: Sec European Economy No 22 for methodology to derive the additive approximation (I) Q = TFI + TFP and (2) TFP = Q/L - snK/L where 
Q = potential supply 
TFP = total factor productivity 
TFI = total factor inputs 
L = labour force 
K = capital stock 
SW = wage share 
Sn = profit share 
and arc growth rates of the variables in question. 
Figures for labour arc employment hours and for capital arc the capital stock adjusted for capacity utilization. 
M = Manufacturing industry. 
NAB = Non-agricultural business (excluding dwellings). 
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Table B.2.5 
Change in factor productivity growth, manufacturing industry 1979-85(83) less 1973-79 
(%) 
ll F n.: ll'R 4 t·sA Japan 
Q - 1,9 -0,1 -1,6 0,5 -0,6 -3.0 2.8 
TFI - l.2 1,0 - 1,8 -1,6 -0,7 -3,9 1.3 
TFP -0,7 -I.I 0,2 2,2 0,1 1,0 1.4 
Q/L -0.6 -l,4 0,7 2,3 0,1 l.2 0,3 
SnK/L 0.0 -0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0,2 - I.I 
Note: See European Economr No 22 for mclhodology LO derive the additiv': appn.n!ma~ion {I)_ Q - T~l + !_FP ~nd (2) TFP 
Figures for Jabour ard employment hours and for capital arc the capll<il stock adJustcd for capacity ut1hzat1on. 
Q.L S11 K1Lg 
B.2.6. The effect of energy 
Following the two oil shocks, much interest has centred on 
the possible effects which sharply changi?g ener~y input 
costs might have on potential supply. Whilst the !mks are 
undoubtedly complex, most attention has focused on the 
effects of energy costs on the adjustment process leadmg to 
changes in the utilization of existing capital equipment and 
in the willingness to undertake new investment. 
Higher energy costs reduce the profitability of existing eq~ip-
ment. To the extent that improved energy conservat1011 
methods take time to develop and introduce, the profitability 
of some new investment projects will be reduced also. In 
other words, the present worth of the flow of services pro-
vided by new and existing capital might be expected to fall. 
This will tend to reduce rates of utilization and lower the 
productivity of capital and total factor productivity also. 
Estimates of the effects of higher energy input costs on 
productivity growth are thought to have been rather small; 
primarily because such costs form a mmor part of total costs 
to industry - around 0,5 %. 
The current situation is now the reverse of that which ap-
peared in 1973 and I 978. Oil prices h~ve fallen by some 
40 % and the real dollar price per barrel 1s broadly the same 
as that which obtained in 1979. 
Considering the pure oil price effect alone, a ques_tion which 
arises therefrom is whether the decline in energy mput costs 
will improve potential supply conditions. In so far as the 
price fall is thought in some sense to be of a more permanent 
nature, which is an important proviso, lower input costs will 
raise both current and expected future profitability. This 
will make some future projects more worthwhile and hence 
some investment will be advanced in time. From the pure 
supply side taken in isolation, it is this latter effect which 
could affect the growth of productive supply but how signifi-
cant the influence may be is not easy to say. New investment 
accounts for around 3 % or so of the existing capital stock. 
Only a part of this investment will consist of the latest 'best-
practice' equipment which embodies new developments and 
technical knowledge. At the macroeconomic level and over-
all, therefore, the effect on supply potential via this particular 
route is not likely to be very significant. On the other hand. 
looked at in microeconomic terms. it is quite possible, indeed 
likely, that particular firms in given situations will experience 
substantial increases in their capacity to produce new output. 
In addition, one would expect the beneficial effects of lower 
energy prices to be widely diffused and operate through both 
demand and supply channels. The improvement in both real 
wealth and real income will serve to stimulate demand for 
new investment and increase the degree of utilization of 
existing capacity. The first will tend to increase potential 
supply, the second enables the economy to use existing 
supply potential more effectively. 5 
' Chapter B. I of this review includes some more detailed analysis of this 
particular point and draws attention to the possible importance of longer 
run demand constraints. 
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Table B.2.6 
Projections of the growth in the population of working age (Average annual growth 1985-90)1 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK ELIR 12 
0,0 0,2 -0,2 0,5 0,8 0,4 0,8 0,2 0,1 0,7 0,7 0,0 0,2 
I 1986-91 fu, I, IRL. P, E. 
Source: Eurostat, Demographic Statistics 1985. IRL: Interdepartmental group report higher migration hypothesis. 
B.2. 7. Implications for the growth of potential 
supply: Summary and conclusions 
Bringing together the various points discussed it is possible 
to venture some rough estimates of how potential supply 
has evolved in the European Community and in particular, 
what the implications might be for the cooperative growth 
strategy for more employment. 
The strategy starts from a base which includes an unemploy-
ment level in the Community (EUR 10) of 11 %; This 
suggests two approaches to an interpretation of productive 
supply potential in Europe. The first is to consider jointly 
what the underlying growth of the effective labour force, 
growth of the capital stock plus total factor productivity 
growth imply for capacity growth. For any given estimate, 
actual GDP growth would then have to evolve at a faster 
rate than this in order to make a significant inroad into the 
pool of unemployed. 
Projections of the population of working age for Community 
countries 1985-90(91) suggest an average increase of 0,2 % 
per annum (Table B.2.6). From Table B.2.2, the capital 
stock for the non-agricultural sector of the four largest 
Community countries has grown at a rate of 3,5 % in I 979-
83. It is likely that investment in the housing and public 
sectors has evolved at a slightly lower rate than this which 
would bring the whole economy figure down a little. Model 
simulation exercises at the whole Community level in fact 
suggest a figure of 3,0 %. 
Total factor productivity growth has grown at a little less 
than 2,0 % which provides a broad estimate for productive 
potential of: 
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(Q) = (TFP) + (L X S,.,) + (K X S1l) 
2,8 = 1,8 + 0,2 (0, 7) + 3,0 (0,3) 
where 
Q potential supply 
TFP total factor productivity 
L labour force 
K = capital stock 
Sw = wage share 
s1l = profit share 
and are growth rates of the variables in question. 
The strategy indicates that an annual average growth rate 
of GDP of 3,5 % would offer the prospect of bringing 
unemployment down to around 7,0 % by (1990). Since the 
stock of unemployed is a reserve of supply potential, if 
unemployment was reduced at a rate which added say I % 
to labour force growth, then in order to maintain the same 
growth of the capital/labour ratio this would require a 
growth of the capital stock of 3,8 %. If the rate of technical 
advance remains unchanged this would imply: 
Q = TFP + (L X SW) + (K X S1l) 
3,6 = 1,8 + (J,0 X 0,7) + (3,8 X 0,3) 
This figure is just a little in excess of that in the growth 
strategy. Higher maintained rates of capacity utilization 
will increase this figure somewhat. The above numerical 
examples, however. omit numerous factors. For the purposes 
here, the most important is the possible effects of the oil 
price reductions. Model simulations suggest that the pure 
oil price effect could add perhaps 0,5 % to the growth of 
the capital stock at the level of the whole Community econ-
omy and, which in terms of the two examples above would 
raise the growth of potential supply over the medium term 
to 3,3 % and 4,0 % per annum respectively. This takes no 
account of any benefits transmitted in the form of increases 
in total factor productivity. Table B.2.4 illustrates that an-
nual average rates of growth of total factor productivity of 
below 2,0 have been unusual. In so far as new investment 
embodies the latest technology which becomes diffused more 
widely and increases productivity more generally, such fig-
ures as those set out here could easily be regarded as under-
estimates of what might occur given the general demand 
boost occasioned by the decline in oil prices. 
Productive supply in the Community 
In addition, given the experiences of the 1970s and early 
1980s, as the growth of actual output approaches that of 
capacity, many countries fear the possible consequences 
arising from inflationary pressures. In these circumstances, 
the so-called Nairu would set an effective limit on what 
might be achieved. 6 This in turn would turn part of the 
burden of adjustment on to constraints which inhibit labour 
and product market adaptability and the efficient working 
of the market mechanism more generally. 
6 Nairu - non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. See Chapter 
4, European Economy No 22. for a discussion of estimates of the Nairu. 
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Sensitivity of productivity estimates to possible capital stock 
measurement problems 
Although considerable work was undertaken to arrive at figures 
for the capital stock which were consistent with the flow and 
labour force aggregates and as between countries, all estimates 
of the capital stock are based on the perpetual inventory method 
used in the construction of the basic data. This method is 
essentially accounting in nature and as such does not take 
adequately into account the destruction of capacity brought 
about in periods when relative prices alter radically.' In order 
to assess and test for the impact of possible measurement errors 
of the economically viable capital stock on the results derived 
elsewhere in this chapter, it was assumed that the trend of the 
capital/labour hours ratio remains essentially stable over long 
periods. Trend rates of growth of the capital/labour hours ratio 
over the period 1960-73 in manufacturing industry were calcu-
lated, and on the assumption of an unchanged capital/labour 
ratio in 1983, these trends were used to calculate a predicted 
value in 1983, 2 which was compared with the actual recorded 
capital/labour hours ratio. The regression figures calculated 
were significant with high R 2 , but a certain amount of auto-
correlation was present in the residuals, in particular in the 
figures unadjusted for capacity utilization due to cyclical move-
ments. Given the actual number of employment hours worked 
in 1983, the predicted figure for capital in 1983 was calculated 
and this was compared with the actual value. This method was 
used for both the capital/labour hours ratio and the capital 
(adjusted for capacity utilization)/labour ratio. The divergencies 
between the actual and predicted figures were as follows: 
Actual/predicted figures for capital stock % 
Capital Capital adjusted 
for capacity 
EUR4 22,0 11,5 
USA 35,9 17,6 
Japan 28,l 9,1 
Maintaining the original assumption on the stability of the trend 
in the K/L ratio, the results suggest the imp.ortance of an 
appropriate adjustment for capacity utilization on capital stock 
figures. This factor is estimated to have accounted for approxi-
mately half the measured increase in the K/L ratio post-1973 in 
the Community and the USA and approximately two thirds in 
Japan. 
The remaining 11,5 % discrepancy between the actual and pre-
dicted figures could be accounted for by two factors: 
1 Manin N. Baily in "Productivity and the services or capital and Jabour'. Brookings 
papers on economic activity. No 2 1981. offers some evidence to support :his contention. 
He arg,ucs _that the low stock market valuation of firms suggests that there was greater 
scrappmg m the 1970s than measured or that the old capital was of limited economic 
value. In a more recent study 'The productivity of growth slowdown Jy industry' he 
suggests that a cumulative decline in capital services of the order of 28 % for the United 
States would be reasonable. 
2 This assumption is quite crude since other institutional factors such as different degrees 
of labour hoarding will undoubtedly influence the rc-corded ratio. 
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(a) further capital measurement problems; or 
(b) an upward shift in the trend of the capital/labour ratio after 
1973. 
One plausible interpretation of the first factor could, however, 
include both explanations and this is the destruction in 1973-74 
of a certain proportion of the capital stock by the abrupt shift 
in oil prices. Thus if 11,5 % of the capital stock was destroyed 
in economic terms in 1974 in the Community, the capital/labour 
hours ratio would have had to have grown faster to reach the 
measured level of the capital stock in 1983 when the majority 
of the oil intensive machines had dropped out of the perpetu~l 
inventory. The implications of this alternative for calculations 
of total factor productivity etc. are sketched out in Table 8.2.7, 
together with results for the assumption of a second smaller 
shock in 1979-80. 
The results of these alternative assumptions shown in Table I 
suggest that estimates of total factor productivity are relatively 
robust to plausible shocks to the measures at present used for 
capital stock. These hypothetical shocks need not necessarily be 
taken to have resulted from energy price developments, but 
could also have arisen (perhaps at different points in time) 
from increased bankruptcies and the consequent accelerating 
scrapping. It should, however, be noted that the latter factor 
could have played a more important role than indicated through 
its effect on measures of capacity utilization, i.e. the removal of 
firms operating at low capacity utilization rates will increase the 
national average capacity utilization and consequently actually 
increase our measure (adjusted for capacity utilization) of the 
capital stock, rather than reducing it. 
A similar calculation was carried out for the broader sector of 
the economy i.e. non-agricultural business (excluding dwellings). 
Here the results showed a more substantial gap between pre-
dicted and actual values when adjusted for capacity utilization, 
undoubtedly due to the inclusion of the energy sector in the 
broader aggregate. 
Sensitivity of results of total factor productivity calculations to 
labour hoarding 
In the chapter it was considered that under-utilization of ca-
pacity reflected only on the capital factor in the production 
process. However, it can equally well be argued that when a 
machine and its operator are standing idle both factors are 
under-utilized to the same extent. This is particularly true in 
periods when labour is being hoarded as was the case in a 
number of countries in the period 1973-79 and possibly in Japan 
over the whole period. To assess the effects of this different 
way of approaching the problem Table 2 gives the results of 
alternative methods of adjusting for capacity utilization. Col-
umns K adj. represent the method used in the rest of this chapter 
ascribing utilization totally to capital. The columns Q adj. show 
the results on the basis of adjusting output for capacity utiliza-
tion, thus implying that a higher output could have been 
achieved with the existing two factors. Thus effectively both 
capital and labour are adjusted for capacity utilization. The 
results as can be expected boost both total factor productivity 
and total factor inputs and measures of labour productivity 
the capital/labour ratio and also the measure of capital/labour 
substitution. 
Productive supply in the Community 
Table 1 
Some illustrative sensitivity scenarios for manufacturing industry 
( Average annual% changes) 
1960-68 1968-73 1973-79 1979-83 1979-85 
D TFI 1,4 2,0 -1,6 (- 1,2) -2,4 ( - 2,2) [-2,0] -1,1 (-1,0) [-0,8] 
TFP 3,4 3,0 3,5 (3,2) 1,8 (1,6) [1,3] 2,1 (2,0) [1,8] 
Q/L 6,2 5,3 4,7 2,4 2,9 
S"K/L 2,8 2,2 1,2 ( 1,5) 0,6 (0,8) [1,1] 0,8 (0,9) [1,1] 
F TFI 0,9 2,9 -0,8 (-0,4) -2,5 ( - 2,3) [-2,1] -2,2 ( - 2,1) [-1,9] 
TFP 6,0 4,8 3,8 (3,4) 2,8 (2,6) [2,4] 3,1 (3,0) [2,7] 
Q/L 7,4 6,4 5,1 4,0 4,3 
S"K/L 1,2 1,6 1,3 (1,6) 1,2 ( 1,4) [1,6] 1,2 (1,3) (1,5] 
TFI 1,4 -0,7 0,4 (0,7) -2,3 (-2,0) (-1,8] -1,6 (- 1,5) (-1,2] 
TFP 6,5 6,9 2,7 (2,4) 2,3 (2,0) (1,7] 2,7 (2,6) (2,3] 
Q/L 8,3 8,3 3,3 2,9 3,6 
S"K/L I, 7 1,3 0,6 (0,9) 0,6 (0,9) (1,2] 0,9 (1,0) (1,2) 
UK TFI 0,2 0,1 -1,3 (-0,9) -5,4 (-6,2) (-5,0) -3,5 (-3,4) [-3,2) 
TFP 3,0 2,7 0,6 (0,2) 2,3 (2, I) (1,9) 2,4 (2,3) (2,1] 
Q/L 4,3 4,5 1,7 3,4 3,6 
S"K/L 1,2 1,8 1,1 (1,4) 1,1 (1,4) (1,5) 1,2 (1,3) [1,4) 
USA TFI 2,9 0,9 1,2 ( 1,8) -2,6 ( - 2,3) (-2,0] 
TFP 2,7 2,9 0,8 (0,3) 1,8 (1,4) (I, I) 
Q/L 3,1 3,7 1,4 2,6 
S"K/L 0,4 0,8 0,6 (I, I) 0,8 (I, I) (1,5] 
Japan TFI 7,0 6,2 0,8 (1,2) 2,1 (2,3) (2,6] 
TFP 6,5 6,5 4,4 (3,9) 5,8 (5,5) [5,3) 
Q/L 10,5 12,2 6,6 6,9 
S"K/L 3,7 5,3 2,2 (2,6) 1,1 ( 1,3) (1,6] 
Noce: Sec Europeon Economy No 22 for methodology to derive (I) Q = TFI + TFP 
and (2) TFP = Q/L - S,K/L 
Figures for labour are employment hours and for capital are the capital stock adjusted for capacity utilization. The alternatives presented are: 
() An assumption of one oil shock which provoked the destruction of 11,5% of the capital stock at a point in time at the end of 1973 and reflected in the 1973-79 average 
increase and not in the 1968-73 average increase. The capital stock was thCn assumed to grow to its measured level in 1983. The corresponding figures for the United States 
and Japan were 17.6% and 9,1 % respectively. 
II An assumption of a further shock of 4 % for the Community al end 1979. Shocks for the USA and Japan were 6 % and 3 % respt..~tively. 
Table 2 
Alternative adjustment of the period 1973-79 to reflect possible labour hoarding 
D F UK USA Japan 
Qadj. K adj. Qadj. K adj. Qadj. K adj. Q adj. K adj. Qadj. K adj. Q adj. K adj. 
TFI -1,4 -1,6 -0,6 -0,8 0,4 0,4 -1,1 -1,3 1,4 1,2 1,3 0,8 
TFP 3,9 3,5 4,2 3,8 2,9 2,7 1,1 0,6 1,2 0,8 5,2 4,3 
Q/L 5,3 4,7 5,7 5,1 3,6 3,3 2,4 1,7 1,9 1,4 8,1 6,6 
Q/K 0,1 0,1 -0,1 -0,I 0,6 0,6 -2,6 -2,6 -1,1 -1,1 1,1 l,l 
K/L 5,2 4,6 5,8 5,2 3,0 2,7 5,2 4,4 3,0 2,5 6,9 5,5 
S"K/L 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,3 0,7 0,6 1,3 1,1 0,7 0,6 2,8 2,2 
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Specific issues 
Measures of potential output in the Member States 
Belgium 
No official estimates are published of potential output in 
Belgium. However, two models (Maribel and Hermes) developed 
by the Planning Office contain a supply block which can be 
used to generate a measure of potential GDP. 
Denmark 
No official estimates are published of the potential growth of 
the Danish economy. A preliminary approach was published by 
the Ministry of Finance in December 1984 'Finansredegorelsen' 
estimating trends for labour productivity by sector with a view 
to explaining the impact on employment. The estimate took into 
account changes in relative factor costs, technical progress and 
working hours. The study showed a tendency in recent years for 
any rise in output to be accompanied by a lower rise in labour 
productivity particularly in manufacturing industry. The results 
confirm the increased potential of the economy to generate jobs 
noted in European Economy No 23, March 1985. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Analysis of production potential in Germany has been a factor 
influencing economic policy decisions for more than a decade. 
Estimates of future growth of potential are, however, only 
published by the Bundesbank in connection with the monetary 
targets for the year ahead. 
Three German institutions have developed different methods of 
measuring production potential. 
The Council of Economic Experts first introduced the estimation 
of production potential in its 1967 annual report. Productive 
potential is defined as the sum of possible value-added of all 
sectors. For the public sector and all other private sectors exclud-
ing enterprises, it assumes full use of capacity, so that potential 
output corresponds to recorded value added. Consequently, 
potential output has only to be estimated for the enterprise 
sector by calculating capital stock and capital productivity, the 
latter being assumed to follow a declining trend. In addition, 
the Council bases its analysis on normal use of production 
potential, indicated by a rate of capacity utilization of 97 l /4 %. 
Criticisms of the Council's method focus on the relationship 
between capital stock and investment, the valuation of the 
'unuseable' part of capital stock and the assumptions on declin-
ing capital productivity. 
In 1973, the Ministry of Economics published a study on pro-
duction potential, in which potential was estimated taking capi-
tal as the dominant production factor but without any assumR-
tions on average productivity. No results of the estimation were, 
however, published. 
In 1973, the Bundesbank adopted a new approach to monetary 
policy, in the context of which estimates of production potential 
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became necessary for monetary targeting. The Bundesbank 
method of calculating production potential was based initially 
on a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital and labour 
as production factors (see 'The growth in productivity in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and its determinants'. B1111desbank 
monthly report, January 1980). In 198 L energy was added as an 
additional production factor ('Recalculation of the productive 
potential of the Federal Republic of Germany'. Bunde shank 
monthly report, October 1981 ). The Bundesbank changed its 
method of estimation following the revision of the national 
accounts statistics in 1985 hut has not yet published details of 
its new method or its results. Nevertheless. it is likely that it will 
introduce a new production function which will take account of 
changes in income distribution and re-assess the role of energy 
as a production factor. 
The growth of productive potential calculated by the Bundes-
bank for 1986 is 2 1/2 %. For previous years, the figures were 
as follows: 
Growth rate of production potential, as estimated by 
the Bundesbank, % 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 
2 3 3 2.5 1.5-2 1,5-2 2 2 2.5 
Greece 
No regular official estimates are published of productive poten-
tial in Greece. Attempts have however been made. within the 
framework of the medium-term plans, to produce estimates 
based on the capital stock. 
Spain 
No official estimates are published on productive potential in 
Spain. 
France 
No official estimates are published of productive potential in 
France. 
On the other hand. estimates have been carried out by some 
authors in specific studies. The most recent of these studies was 
published by P. Dubois 'Ruptures de croissance et progres 
technique· - Economic et statistique, pp. 3-31. 
In order to estimate the growth of productive potential to the 
year 2000, the author used a Cobb-Douglas production function 
(letters with a point indicate rates of growth): 
6 = o. 1 N + o.3 i< + n 
Where Q represents output, N the volume of labour. K the 
capital stock and the level of technical progress. Assuming that 
the productivity of capital is constant (Q = K) this reduces to: 
6 = N + 1.4 Ii 
For projections of the volume of labour, the following assump-
tions were made: 
(i) a growth in available manpower of 0,5 % per annum; 
(ii) a fall in the rate of unemployment to 5 % necessitating a 
growth in the numbers at work of 0.6 % per annum. 
(iii) a reduction in the annual working-time of0.4 % per annum; 
(iv) a continuation of the trend improvement in the quality of 
the labour force and a slowdown in numbers leaving the 
land. 
In total. the volume of labour would grow by I, 7 % per annum. 
For technical progress two assumptions were taken. 1.5 % and 
2,5 % per annum. Under these conditions the growth potential 
of the French economy from now to the year 2000 would be 
between 3,8 and 5,8 % per annum. The minimum rate of growth 
required so that unemployment did not accelerate would be 
between 2,6 and 4 % per annum. 
Ireland 
No official estimates are published of productive potential in 
Ireland. 
For the manufacturing sector, however, estimates have been 
made (e.g. O'Reilly and Nolan, 'The measurement of capacity 
utilization in manufacturing industry in Ireland', Economic and 
social review, Vol. 11, No I. pp. 47-65 (1979)) of capacity 
utilization and productive potential using mainly the Wharton 
(peak-linking) method and based on manufacturing output data 
and figures for electricity output (on the assumption of an 
electricity based capital stock). 
ltaZv 
Occasional estimates have been carried out by Istat 'Problemi 
relativi alla definizione, stima rilevazione ed utilizzazione del 
capitale'; Annuali di statistica, Series VIII - Vol. 28, 1975 
and the Banca d'Italia in 1981 'Misura e analisi della capacita 
produttiva', Bollettino uni co 1981, p. 441 but no regular figures 
are published on the growth of productive potential. 
Luxembourg 
No official estimates are published on potential output m 
Luxembourg. 
Productive supply in the Community 
Netherlands 
The Centraal Planbureau has published a number of studies 
concerning productive capacity. These studies have been carried 
out within the framework of the preparation of medium and 
long-term forecasts. The research is carried out at a sectoral 
level. 
The Victor model for example covers four sectors. A brochure 
published by the Economics Ministry 'Een vier sectoren-model 
voor de Nederlandse economic' Johan Verbruggen, sets out the 
methods used. Other references include De Economist, No 3, 
1985, pp. 327-351: 'A putty-clay model with three factors of 
production and partly endogenous technical progress' and Den 
Hartog and Tjan 'A clay-clay model approach for sectors of 
industry in the Netherlands', published in De Economist, Vol. 
128, No 2, 1980. pp. 129-188 which also contains graphs of the 
development of productive capacity and real output over the 
period 1952-72. 
Portugal 
No official estimates are published on potential output in Por-
tugal. 
United Kingdom 
The most recent published work giving the official approach to 
UK productive potential was an annex to a Green Paper on 
public expenditure (The next I O years: public expenditure and 
taxation into the 1990s), which was presented with the March 
1984 budget. 
Three main factors are considered to be relevant to UK growth 
in the long term. These are: 
(i) North Sea oil production; 
(ii) Labour supply; 
(iii) Productivity growth. 
In the Green Paper, the first factor was expected to peak between, 
1986 and 1987, declining by 5 % p.a. over the period 1988-89 
to 1993-94, equivalent to a reduction in the GDP growth rate 
of about 1/4 % p.a. Labour supply growth was expected to grow 
by about 120 OOO per annum up to 1988 and remain virtually 
unchanged from then until 1991. The third factor, productivity 
growth, was considered to be more uncertain since the causes 
of the slowdown in measured productivity growth after 1973 
have not yet been identified clearly. However, it was felt that 
some potential reasons had been reversed and productivity 
growth was therefore expected to improve substantially on that 
of the 1970s. The result of an assessment of these three factors 
was assumed growth rates of 2 I /4 % a year to 1988-89 and I I/ 
2 % to 2 % thereafter to 1993-94. 
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B.3. The cooperative growth strategy from a sectoral point of view 
The objective of the cooperative groll'th strategy is to significantly and sustainably reduce 
unemploymem in the Community. For this purpose it suggests a variety of changes in policies 
and behaviour in order to accelerate economic growth and to make this groll'th more 
employment creating. It is not, ho\\'ever, intended to restrain productivity groll'th in any 
economic area. Productivity growth and a stronger employment intensity of economic groll'th 
have to be reconciled. One important contribution to this is a continuation of the process of 
sectoral change which has already steadily expanded the share of economic actil'ities ll'ith 
high employment content in the Community. This has been particularly visible ll'ith regard 
to services. Over the last 25 years, agricultural and industrial production on the one hand 
significantly lost shares in total gross value-added as ll'el! as in total employment. Market 
and non-market service sectors on the other hand gained in importance. A continuation of 
these trends has to be facilitated by appropriate policies and adjustment measures. Real ll'age 
moderation across sectors combined with an appropriate adjustment of relative prices rather 
than systematic sectoral wage differentiation appears to be the superior strategy ll'ith regard 
to an efficient allocation of" resources, with regard to a positive structural change as ll'el! as, 
in the medium term, with regard to higher income and employment. In the short run, spec(/1c 
temporary wage concessions in problem sectors may provide· one possibility to ease the 
pressure on the labour market and to facilitate an orderly structural adjustment process. 
B.3.1. The sectoral dimension of the cooperative 
growth strategy 
The cooperative growth strategy for more employment (as 
presented in the European Commission's Annual Report 
1985-86 1) aims at a significant and substantial reduction of 
unemployment in the Community until 1990. Quantitative 
illustrations - based on the Commission's Compact model 2 
- indicated that an unemployment rate of about 7 % in 
1990 would be feasible for the Community of Ten, which 
had 11,0 % of its labour force registered as unemployed in 
1985. 
For this purpose the cooperative strategy implies changes in 
the institutional framework, in policies and in behaviour, to 
achieve a dynamic acceleration of real economic growth in 
the Community. The feasible order of magnitude for such 
an accelerated expansion (the cooperative growth scenario 3 
assumes an average annual rate of growth of real GDP of 
3,5 % between 1986 and 1990) does, however, not seem to 
be sufficient to achieve the unemployment target if the 
relation between output and employment growth remains 
1 Annual Economic Report 1985-86. in: European Eco110111y, No 26. No-
vember 1985. pp. 5-80. 
See Annual Economic Review 1985-86, 'The medium term: central pro-
jection and policy scenarios·. in: European Economy. No 26, November 
1985, pp. 5-80. 
3 Annual Economic Report 1985-86: op. cit., p. 23. 
114 
the same as in the past. The acceleration of growth has, 
therefore, to be supported by a further increase in the em-
ployment intensity of growth in the Community. 
The employment intensity of its economic growth, the re-
lation between the growth of employment and output 
growth, has already shifted in favour of employment cre-
ation: in the 1960s, average GDP growth of just under 
5 % a year was accompanied by an annual increase in 
employment of only 0,2 %. At the end of the 1970s ( 1978/ 
79), with growth at 3,2 %, the annual increase in employ-
ment was already 0,5 %. The cooperative scenario now 
implies an even stronger increase of net employment creation 
(I to 1,5 % per year) along with the accelerated growth (3 
to 3,5 % per year). 
The cooperative growth strategy is, however, not a strategy 
of putting the brakes on productivity growth. On the con-
trary, to achieve the desired significantly higher rate of 
economic growth as well as to defend international competi-
tiveness, it recommends strong efforts: 
(i) to accelerate technical progress, e.g. by increased R&D 
- nationally and at Community level - and by a faster 
implementation of product and process innovations, 
(ii) to improve economic efficiency via higher market adap-
tability and production factor mobility, and 
(iii) to utilize economies of scale in the internal market. 
Labour productivity growth is augmented by these and other 
measures. 
Labour productivity growt h, however. is by de finiti on just 
fhe opposite of the employment intensity of growth. There 
is therefore a need to reconcile the efforts to increase the 
growth of labo ur productivity with the desire to see in the 
whole of the economy a higher employment intensity of 
growth than in the past. 
This reconciliation may occur in severa l ways. The one to 
be explored here is a cha nge in the composition of total 
output. If an economy experiences a n increasing share of 
activit ies where growth has an above average employment 
content, overa ll employment intensity of growth may in-
crease even if other activities increase their productivity 
growth at the same time. Among the first to describe this 
'productivity gap' between different economic activities and 
to a nalyse its structural a nd macroeconomic implica tions 
was Fourastie.~ 
One economic ac ti vity, which has in the pas t experienced 
relatively low ra tes of productivity grow th, is the production 
of services. This is due to some of its typica l properties : 
Personal contact between producer and consumer of services 
is often necessa ry, production and consumption often have 
to take place simultaneously, with the result tha t small 
scale establishments dominate. Moreover possibilities for 
technical progress , although differing significa ntl y across 
service activities , are more limited than in the other sectors 
of the economy. In the Community (EUR 6 5 ), observed 
labour productivity of market services grew at a n annual 
rate of 2,6 %, but at 4,2 % in industrial production between 
1960 and 1983 . 
In the following, the process of structural change which is 
to enhance the employment intensity of growth is illustrated 
by sectoral developments in the Community. This provides 
only part of the picture, however, because some services are 
provided by service firms (and thus statistically accounted 
for under 'service sector'), others by firms predominantly 
producing industrial goods (thus sta tistically accounted for 
under the sector ' industry' ). For the sake of simplicity no 
effort is made here to analyse the development of service-
type jobs within industry.6 
• Fourastie. J .: La Productivite, Paris 1952. In Germany, it was publi shed 
under the title Die groj]e Hoffmmg des : 11·,111: igste11 Jahrh1111der1.1· (The 
great hope of the 20th century), 2nd ed ., Kii ln 1969. 
' For the purpose of thi s chapter, EUR 6 refers to Belgiu m, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France. Ita ly, the Ne therla nds a nd the U nited 
Kingdom. 
0 Data for some Member States arc presented in J .I. Gershun y and I.D. 
Miles. The 11e1\' service eco11omy. Lo ndon 1983. 
The coopera ti ve growth strategy from a sectoral point of view 
B.3.2. Major sectoral developments in the Com-
munity 
Over the las t 25 years, there has been a significa nt shift in 
the shares of the major sectors in nomina l gross va lue-added 
of the Community. The main thrust of thi s movement has 
been a steady decline in shares of ma nufac tured a nd agricul-
tural products on the o ne hand a nd an expansion of both 
market a nd non-market services on the o ther ha nd (Table 
B.3. 1). 
At current ma rket prices. the share of manufactured prod-
ucts in gross value-added in the Communit y (EUR 6 5) has 
declined from 33 % in 1960 to about 26 % in 1983 (Graph 
B.3. 1 ). This occurred in two stages during the ea rly 1960s 
and, after a period o f abo ut 10 yea rs, resumed more rapidly 
after 1974. The share of agricultural value-added also shrank 
from 7 % to just above 3 %. This declining pattern is mi rro-
red by the corresponding sha re of ma rket services. which 
expanded from 36 % to over 43 %. T he share of no n-ma rket 
se rvices, which include essen ti a ll y genera l public serv ices as 
well as se rvices of educa ti on, hea lth , etc., a lso grew stead il y 
but less strongly fro m 11 % to 15 % .7 
GRAPH 8.3.1 : Sectoral shares in gross value added in current 
prices ( as percent) 
(EUR 61) 
I 
40 Market services 
30 
Manufactured products 
20 
Non-market services _ 
-----lo ----r---
"' - --- Agriculture 
----.... -----
I B, D. f. I. NL. UK. 
Source : Eurostat. 
---- --· 
7 The sectors o mitted here a rc fuel and power as well as building a nd 
constructio n. 
115 
Specific issues 
Table B.3.1 
Shares in gross value-added at current prices 
B DK [) F 
1970 83 70 83 70 82 70 
Agriculture 4 3 6 5 3 2 7 
Fuel and power products 5 5 2 3 5 5 5 
Manufactured products 30 23 21 19 37 29 29 
Building and construction 8 6 II 6 9 7 8 
Market services 41 47 44 43 35 43 40 
Non-market services 12 16 16 24 II 14 II 
I Estimate. 
Source: Eurostat. 
This general pattern of structural change is clearly discern-
ible in most Member States (Table B.3.1). One of the notable 
exceptions is Denmark, where the relative contributions of 
the agricultural sector remained virtually unchanged and 
the share of non-market services grew more strongly than 
elsewhere to become far bigger than in any other Member 
State. In Ireland, the share of manufactured products still 
expanded somewhat during the 1970s; the same could be 
observed with regard to agriculture in Greece. The import-
ance of the service sector in Luxembourg is due to its role 
as a major European financial centre. 
A somewhat different picture emerges if nominal sectoral 
value-added is adjusted by the sectoral price deflator (see 
Table B.3.2 
EUR 6, 1 shares of gross value-added at 1975 constant sectoral prices 
Agriculture 
Fuel and power products 
Manufactured products 
Building and construction 
Total services 
of which 
Market services 
Non-market services 
I B. D. F. I. NL, UK. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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83 
4 
5 
26 
6 
45 
14 
(%) 
IRL GR L NL L'K EUR 10 
70 83 70 80 70 82 70 81 70 81 70 82 70 81 1 
8 6 16 10 18 19 4 2 6 4 2 2 5 3 
6 5 3 4 3 4 3 2 5 10 4 11 5 6 
29 27 24 25 20 18 45 23 26 17 32 24 33 26 
8 8 9 9 9 6 6 5 8 7 7 6 8 6 
38 40 34 35 39 38 34 57 42 47 42 41 36 44 
II 14 14 17 II 15 8 II 13 15 13 16 13 15 
Table B.3.2). It shows that a significant part of the sectoral 
change which has occurred since 1960 was a change in 
relative prices rather than in volume terms. The gap between 
the share of manufactured products and market services ha.s 
widened by nearly three times as much in value as in volume 
terms between 1960 and 1983. The implicit price deflator on 
the other hand has risen 1 ,4 times as much in the market 
service sector as for manufactured products. This indicates 
that manufactured products have become relatively cheaper 
nearly to the extent provided for by the productivity growth 
differential. 
The evolution of the sectoral structure of employment was 
determined by the combined effects of the slow expansion 
("o) 
1960 1970 1980 1982 
6,1 4,5 3,9 4.1 
5.0 5,2 6,0 5,9 
27,0 30,1 28,5 27,7 
8,6 8,3 6,4 6,0 
53,3 51,9 55,2 56,3 
37,8 38,4 42,0 42,9 
15,5 13.5 13.2 13.4 
in real output share of market services and their significantly 
smaller ra te of labour productivity growth (see G raph B.3.2). 
Whereas the Community (EU R 6) has lost ro ughly 20 % (6,3 
million) jobs involved in the production of manufactured 
products between 1970 and 1983. employment in the market 
service sector grew by 17 % (5,8 million) and in the non-
market service secto r by 25 % (3,8 million) during the same 
period . 
For the fu ture, it seems to be unclea r. however, if it is the 
service sector as a whole which is to serve as the ·employer 
of las t resort ' for the Community as in the 1970s. The 
future expansion of public employment is constrained by 
consolidation priorities. Employment crea tion in the market 
service sector depends on the one hand on its further expan-
sion and on the o ther on a continua tion of the 'producti vity 
gap' . The latter seems to be narrowing but , so fa r, only 
very gradually. A process of assimilation of producti vity 
developments may, however, be accelerated by the increasing 
impact of info rmation technologies on the production of 
services and the growing extent of tradability of services. 
GRAPH 8 .3.2 : Sectoral shares in total employment (as per-
cent) (EUR 61) 
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The coopera tive growth stra tegy from a secto ral point of view 
With rega rd to the demand fo r services, a va riety of fac to rs 
have to be considered: 
(i) T raditiona l consumer services should profit fro m in-
come growth , because many of them continue to be in 
the nature of' luxury' goods. T hat is to say, expenditure 
on these tends to rise more than proportionally to 
increases in either di sposable income or to tal expendi-
ture. They should profit from growing leisure too , as 
working time is expected to continue to be reduced . 
They will continue. however, to become rela ti vely more 
expensive. In pa rt , services a re therefo re replaced by 
rela ti vely cheaper manufac tured goods (e.g . tools) com-
bined with self-service acti vities . Furthermore, if income 
differenti als narrow, especia lly between net disposable 
income of the higher income brac kets and effecti ve 
labour costs in the se rvice sector, service demand is 
adversely a ffected . 8 
(ii) Intermedia te producer services, se rvices which a re used 
as inputs fo r the producti on of primary goods, manu fac-
tured products or o ther services, have ga ined in import-
ance. In part icular, services purchased by industry have 
grown significantl y fas ter than industri a l producti on 
itself (3,6 % as compared to 2,4 %, ave rage annual 
growth ra tes 1975-8 1 in EU R 69 ) . In this rega rd , the 
growth of industry serves as a direct 'engine of growth ' 
for an important pa rt of the se rvice secto r too. 
The process of a structural change towa rds a higher employ-
ment intensity is not necessa rily adversely affected by ob-
stacles against a fas ter expansion of the service sector, as 
long as low productivity growth activities in a ll sectors 
continue to expand their sha re in the Community economy. 
This can be facilita ted by appropria te adjustments of pro fit s, 
wages and prices. 
B.3.3. The role of wage, price and profit diff eren-
tiation in the process of structural adjust-
ment 
The appropriate wage po licy with rega rd to secto rs is a 
much debated issue. The 1985-86 Annual Report of the 
Commission notes cautiously that ' it does appear to be the 
case tha t Community countries have shown a rela ti vely 
8 Scharpf, F ri tz W .. ·Beschii fti gun g in der Dienstleistungsgcsell schaft' . in . 
!111em atio11a/e Chro11 i/.; : 11r Arbeits111ark tpo/i1i/.;, No 20. A pril 1985. pp. 1-
5. 
9 See G reen. Michael, T he development of ma rke t services in the European 
Communi ty, the Unit ed Sta tes and Ja pan·. in : European Eco110m1". No 
25, September 1985. p. 87. Ta ble 16. 
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low real wage flexibility, both inter-sectorally and at the 
macroeconomic level, this running alongside increasing un-
employment' (p. 27). A recent OECD study 10 finds that the 
'notion that wage earnings may need to reflect more closely 
the profit position of individual firms implies that wages 
need to be lower in "sunset" than in "sunrise" industries 
and that total payments to labour ... become more responsive 
to cyclical and structural changes'. German research insti-
tutes which frequently report on structural developments 
and policies are divided on the issue. The IFO Institute for 
example claims that 'a policy of wage differentiation is at 
the same time a policy of structural conservation'. 1 1 
It is therefore to be discussed whether sectoral wage differen-
tiation for labour of similar qualification and experience, 
sex, age, degree of unionization and proportion of part-time 
work is appropriate. The question could be put differently: 
should one and the same worker doing identical work be 
paid differently as a result of its employmen~ in differe~t 
sectors, if resources are to be allocated efficiently and 1f 
output and employment are to be improved? It should be 
pointed out that the following discussion does not predeter-
mine an analysis neither of the appropriate regional wage 
structure nor of the most suitable wage differentiation for 
different qualifications. 
In the Community (EUR 6) the spread of remuneration 
per employee across the industrial production and market 
service sectors, measured by the dispersion coefficient (ratio 
of the standard deviation to the average) was 0,05 in 1970 
and 0,12 in 1982. For industrial production alone, coef-
ficients in the range between 0, I O and 0, 16 in October 1972 
and somewhat lower in April 1983 were observed in the 
Community. 12 This indicates that between 1970 and 1982 a 
visible gap in remuneration arose in the Community between 
market services and industrial production: the annual aver-
age rate of growth of remuneration per employee was 12, 7 % 
in industrial production as compared to 11,8 % in the market 
service sector over this period. This ran contrary to declining 
wage differentiation across industries alone. Overall_ wa_ge 
differentiation in the Community was furthermore still s1g-
1 o Klau. F. and Mittelstadt. A.: 'Labour market flexibility and external 
price shocks'. OECD ll"orking papers No 24, Paris 1985. p. 8. 
11 Gerstenberger, Wolfgang: 'Analyse der strukturcllen Entwicklung der 
deutschen Wirtschaft'. Band I zur S1ruk111rherich1er.11at11mg 1983 
Hauptband, IFO-Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Miinchen 1983, p. 
205. 
" Buigues. Pierre and Goy bet. Philippe: The determinants of supply in 
industry in the Community'. in: European Economy. No 25, September 
1985, p. 48. Table 4. 
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nificantly smaller than in the USA, where comparable dis-
persion coefficients were higher and increased from 0,23 in 
1970 to 0,32 in 1982. 13 
As has been pointed out, an important factor separating 
sectors and particularly the service sector from manufactur-
ing is the divergent development of productivity. This implies 
in principle a permanent need for restructuring the economy: 
wages and prices have to be adjusted and resources reallo-
cated. 
For an efficient adjustment process, undistorted market 
signals, the lack of adjustment barriers and a su°!cient 
investment performance are prerequisites: the key signals 
for the adjustment process being prices, wages and profits. 
The main distortions are all kinds of specific subsidies and 
administered prices. The financial markets should allow 
capital to flow more freely to perceived new profit oppor-
tunities. Even in a full employment situation sectoral mo-
bility of labour of similar qualification level is relatively low 
due to special searching requirements, lack of informatio?, 
costs of moving, uneven regional distribution of better paid 
employment opportunities, etc. In a period of high and 
persistent unemployment, labour mobility is ev~n low~r. 
In fact, the emerging wage dispersion between mdustnal 
production and market services in the Commu?ity during 
the 1970s can be seen as indicating to a certain extent a 
declining degree of labour mobility between those sectors. 
In order to discuss some aspects of sectoral mobility, flexi-
bility and differentiation a simplified example may facilita~e 
the understanding of the relations between movements m 
labour productivity and changes in prices, wages, profits, 
output and employment. For that purpose it (s assumed _t~at 
in a two-sector economy one sector increases its productivity 
significantly faster than the other. It is further assumed that 
the demand for the products of the sector that experiences 
faster growing productivity reacts strongly to a change in 
relative prices (high price elasticity of demand), but less to 
a change in real income (low income elasticity of demand); 
these are typical assumptions for an industrial sector. The 
other sector is assumed to have the opposite properties (low 
price elasticity, high income elasticity of dem_and), ""'.hich are 
characteristics of a service sector. Three stylized adJustment 
paths could then be constructed: 
(a) no transfer of increased productivity to other economic 
agents (profit differentiation); 
13 Bell. Linda and Freeman, R.: 'Docs a flexible industry wage structure 
increase employment? The US experience'. NBER l\"orking paper No 
1604, New York 1985. 
(b) transfer of increased productivity by lower relative 
prices (price differentiation); 
(c) transfer of increased productivity by higher relative 
wages (wage differentiation). 
The first case occurs if prices and wages do not adjust to 
the differences in the sectoral productivity increases. The 
higher productivity growth is then reflected in lower unit 
labour costs and higher profits. The higher rates of return 
will induce capital to move to this sector. Its expansion will, 
however. be limited because - according to the elasticity 
assumptions - the income gain from the stronger increase 
in productivity will more than proportionally be used to buy 
products from the sector with lower productivity growth. 
The higher productivity growth sector is therefore to be 
expected to lose employment; labour will have to move to 
the other sector. 
Profit differentiation is transitory, however. because it is 
profitable for the firms in the sector with higher productivity 
growth to expand sales more strongly by (relatively or even 
absolutely) lowering product prices. In addition new inves-
tors, which are attracted by higher profits in this sector, will 
try to gain market shares. Eventually, if capital moves freely 
between sectors and there are no barriers to entry for new 
investors, the profit differential between the sectors will be 
bid away by competition. 
The transitory case of profit differentiation will then give 
way to a situation of price differentiation, where products of 
the higher productivity growth sector have become cheaper 
relative to the products of the other sector. In this case 
lower prices transfer the above-average productivity gain 
to consumers which will - again based on our elasticity 
assumptions - now more strongly turn to the cheaper 
products of the higher productivity growth sector. It is in 
this case that this sector will experience the strongest expan-
sion of sales and production. Depending on the extent of 
production expansion compared to the increase in labour 
productivity, its employment may be maintained or even 
increased. For the other sector gains in demand from higher 
purchasing power of consumers may be cancelled out by 
losses in demand because its products become relatively 
more expensive. A need for a reallocation of labour is much 
less likely than in the first case. The eventual outcome of 
adjustment by price differentiation is a stable and efficient 
equilibrium. 
So far wages have grown at the same rate. A third case 
emerges if the stronger gain in productivity is immediately 
matched by higher wages in the sector with higher pro-
ductivity growth. Sectoral wage increases now differ whereas 
the relation of unit labour costs, prices and profits across 
sectors remains unchanged. The stronger productivity gain 
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is reaped by those employed in the higher productivity 
growth sector; the income of employees in the lower pro-
ductivity growth sectors will increasingly fall behind. The 
higher productivity growth sector will expand output only 
to the very limited extent that its employees, with their 
higher incomes, expand demand for the products of their 
own sector. It will shed employment as far as its higher 
productivity is not met by higher demand and production. 
As no profit differential is allowed to emerge there is no 
incentive for additional investment in the higher productivity 
growth sector. Furthermore, there is no room for relatively 
lower prices in this sector as unit labour costs are unchanged. 
In this case, labour trying to move to the better paying 
sector has to bear the burden of providing the dynamics to 
sectoral adjustment. Due to low labour mobility - particu-
larly in a situation of high unemployment - wage differen-
tials will only slowly be bid away. Only after that profit 
differentials could emerge, which might in turn give way to 
price differentiation (according to cases one and two of the 
example) and provide the efficient and stable equilibrium. 
It is clear that in reality the process will never occur in 
such a highly stylized form. Due to permanent productivity 
changes in a large number of sectors all three kinds of 
adjustment will to some extent be present at the same time. 
Nevertheless, the different properties of the adjustment 
paths may allow some conclusions with regard to the advis-
ability of sectoral wage differentiation for comparable kinds 
of labour. Sectoral labour mobility is limited in a situation 
of high unemployment. A strategy of sectoral wage differen-
tiation, which links sectoral wages to sectoral productivity 
performance, may thus he temporarily sustainable. In terms 
of the three cases presented above this would mean an 
attempt to keep sectoral adjustment on path three (wage 
differentiation). 
(i) Sectoral wage differentiation for comparable kinds of 
labour sustains an inefficient allocation of labour as 
well as capital between sectors. The productive potential 
of a given amount of factors of production and a 
given technology is not fully materialized; losses of 
production and income have to be taken into account. 
(ii) 'Such proposals (i.e. proposals to link wages and pro-
ductivity at industry level) are not only unfair but self-
defeating for they strike at the sources of increased 
productivity' .14 The productive potential of an econ-
omy is in reality not exogenously given. It depends 
among other things on dynamic investment as well 
as international competitiveness. Both are likely to be 
impeded by sectoral wage differentiation. 
14 Salter. W.E.G.: Productil'in· and technical chan,:e, Cambridge 1966, p. 
157. 
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If wages are too closely tied to sectoral productivity 
performance the initial additional profits from pro-
ductivity increasing investment are passed on to the 
remaining employees; these temporary additional pro-
fits may, however, be a key incentive for the 'innovative 
entrepreneur' to take the risk of reorganization and 
employing new technologies. 
Furthermore, sectoral wage differentiation prevents 
prices in the higher productivity growth sectors to be 
(relatively) lowered. As P. Buigues and Ph. Goybet 
have pointed out, 15 the European Community has lost 
ground in the world markets precisely in the dynami-
cally growing sectors. A key factor they found was the 
lacking ability of these parts of Community industry to 
generate sufficient productivity growth and to translate 
it into lower prices to sustain a competitive world mar-
ket position. Sectoral wage differentiation would en-
danger the position particularly of these sectors even 
further. 
Sectoral wage differentiation is a rather defensive, con-
serving strategy. It may, in the longer run, severely 
hamper the modernization and expansion of the Com-
munity's economy. 
(iii) Sectoral wage differentiation eases, however, the adjust-
ment pressure on the low productivity growth sectors. 
It may, therefore, temporarily, be considered an instru-
ment to sustain employment in these sectors, which may 
be especially welcome in a situation of high overall 
1 5 Buigues, Pierre and Goy bet, Philippe: op. cit. 
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unemployment. Indeed this is suggested by the Sachver-
stiindigenrat, an economic advisory council to the Fed-
eral German Government, which claims in its recent 
annual report that 'it may indeed be appropriate for 
particular sectors ... to react defensively to structural 
change, as long as the pull of faster growing sectors is 
not sufficient to generate a satisfactory overall level of 
employment' . 16 Thus specific temporary sectoral wage 
concessions may contribute to an orderly sectoral ad-
justment process especially in connection with other 
forms of sectoral subsidies. 
To achieve a substantial and sustainable reduction of unem-
ployment, economic growth in the Community has to accel-
erate further and has to become even more employment 
creating. Especially for reasons of international competitiv-
ity, productivity growth is, however, not to be impeded. 
Productivity growth and a higher overall employment inten-
sity of growth can be reconciled in a variety of ways. An 
important contribution to this is a continuation of the ongo-
ing process of structural change towards a growing share of 
activities with low productivity growth. In the Community, 
this has taken in part the form of a steady increase of 
the share of services in total value-added as well as in 
employment. This process can be supported by appropriate 
adjustment of profits, wages and prices. A sustained and 
systematic sectoral wage differentiation, which ties sectoral 
wage increases to sectoral productivity growth, impedes 
rather than supports a structural change towards higher 
production, income and employment. Adjustment of relative 
prices is a better way to reconcile expansion and competitiv-
ity of sectors with high productivity growth with employ-
ment increases in the economy as a whole. 
16 Sachverstiindigenrat zur Bcgutachtung dcr gcsamtwirtschaftlichcn Ent-
wicklung. Jahresg11tachte11 19//5-lin. p. 147. No 290. 
Some aspects of job gains and losses at the sectoral level 
This chapter demonstrates again the political need to increase 
macroeconomic employment. This need. however. has to take 
account of the fact that the overall employment performance of 
a country is the result of a continuing process of job gains and 
losses at the sectoral level. In order to increase total employment 
it will, therefore. be necessary to create conditions resulting in 
a process in which sectoral job creations considerably outweigh 
sectoral job losses. Setting up such conditions will however be 
facilitated if those who decide on these conditions have a realistic 
view on how this process is working. The present box, therefore, 
tries to shed some more light on these aspects. It takes the 
development in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1960 
and 1983 as an example. 1 
The loss of occupied population in production enterprises by 
2,8 million between 1960 and 1983 can essentially be traced back 
to a fall of 2,7 million in the self-employed and family workers 
(Table I). The relatively 'small' reduction in wage and salary 
earners of 0, l million hides however much bigger changes in 
its components. On the one hand there was, at this stage of 
aggregation, a fall of 1,8 million in wage and salary earners 
in 'Manufacturing', 'Energy, water, mining, construction' and 
'Agriculture'. On the other hand the categories 'Other services' 2 
and 'Trade and transportation' increased their employment by 
1,7 million. Of special interest is the sector 'Other services· which 
increased its wage and salary earners by 83 % between 1960 and 
1983; it was also the only sector with no decrease in self-
employment. 
One central element in the understanding of this process is the 
development of relative prices and their incidence on the sectoral 
performance of such variables as production, productivity, rates 
of return, etc. 3 Nominal net value-added at current prices of a 
sector divided by the specific price index of the same sector gives 
output of that sector at constant prices, i.e. in volume terms. 
This procedure eliminates not only the increase in the price level 
but also the changes in the price structure. However, for an 
economic agent, i.e. a sector or enterprise, it is of little import-
ance whether an increase in its earned purchasing power orig-
inates in a change in production in volume terms or in a change 
in relative prices. An analysis of the overall performance of a 
sector - e.g. in terms of production, investment or employment 
- has therefore to be centred on the overall purchasing power 
1 The time path between these two years is not analysed in this box. Such an exercise 
could show how far the process of structural change has been influenced by disturbances 
such as the oil price shocks. 
2 The 'Ot:1.cr services' sector is composed or credit and insurance institutions. restaurants, 
hotels, health, education. research. editing, cultural and personal services, etc. 
3 The analysis in this box was largely inspired by proposals made by the Gcnnan 
Sachverstiindigcnrat zur Begutachtung der gcsamtwirtschaftlichcn Entwick)ung in their 
Jahresgurachren /984-85 (points 246-253) and by the lcller of Ihe Presidenl of !he 
Statistisches Bundesamt commenting on these proposals (cf.Jahrcsgutachtcn 1985-86, 
Annex. V). 
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created by that sector. For an analysis in purchasing power 
terms it is necessary to eliminate from the sectoral movement 
of a variable in current prices the inflation component. This can 
be done by dividing the sectoral value-added at current prices 
by an index for the general price level, e.g. the deflator of gross 
domestic product. This results in a figure for the purchasing 
power created by a sector independent of its possible origin, i.e. 
higher production or a change in relative prices. 
Table 2 gives an example of this type of analysis for the sectoral 
evolution of net domestic product at factor costs. In 'Manufac-
turing' the volume of production increased by DM 111 OOO 
million. This component was, however. reduced by DM 41 OOO 
million due to the fall in relative prices, resulting in an increase 
of purchasing power of only DM 70 OOO million. On the other 
hand 'Other services' increased production in volume terms by 
DM 27 OOO million. The increase in relative prices raised the 
purchasing power created by another DM 26 OOO million. so 
that the total purchasing power created was DM 53 OOO million. 
As the movement of relative prices cancels out at the macro-
economic level, the increase in purchasing power for the whole 
economy is equal to the increase in production in volume terms. 
This is not true at the sectoral level. since relative price move-
ments bring about a sectoral ·redistribution' of the results in 
terms of real output. At the macro-economic level these sectoral 
'redistributions' cancel out as relative prices do. 
If the table for net domestic product (Table 2) is divided by 
occupied population (Table I). the corresponding breakdown 
by sectors and components for trends in labour productivity 
emerges (Table 3). It shows the 'redistribution' or the 'transfer' of 
productivity performance between sectors. In 'Manufacturing' 
relative prices reduced the absolute increase in labour pro-
ductivity in volume terms by nearly one third. In 'Other services· 
the relative price component more than doubled the absolute 
increase in labour productivity in volume terms. In other words, 
developments in relative prices in the 'Other services' were even 
more important for productivity performance in purchasing 
power terms than increased production in volume terms. Tra-
ditional ideas on the relative performance of sectoral pro-
ductivity in volume terms are thus more or less reversed when 
considering productivity in purchasing power terms. This would 
suggest that developments in purchasing power terms also have 
an important influence on the sectoral use of factors of pro-
duction and on the capacity to create new jobs. 
This method of analysis can also be applied to other economic 
variables, such as wages, relative factor rewards, etc. Table 4 
summarizes the results of this procedure for a number of vari-
ables which are of interest for the understanding of the process 
of sectoral employment gains and losses. The presentation how-
ever is limited (a) to the two sectors which are responsible for 
nearly 70 % of the absolute change in wage and salary earners 
in production enterprises (i.e. 'Manufacturing' and 'Other ser-
vices') and (b) to the absolute and relative changes between 1960 
and 1983. 
The development of the sectors mentioned seems to have largely 
been determined by two broad factors which are largely out of 
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Table 1 
Employment 1960-831,2 in the Federal Republic of Germany 
1960 Change 1960-83 1983 1960 Change 1960-83 1983 1960 Change 1960-83 1983 
Wage Volume Wage Self- Volume Self- Occupied Volume Occupied 
Sectors and component and employed component employed population component population salary salary and family and family 
earners earners workers workers 
I UOO I OOO I OOO I OOO I OOO 
Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute I OOO 
0 2=4:1 3=4-1 4=1+3 6= 8:5 7=8-5 8=5+7 9 10= 12:9 II= 12-9 12=9+11 
I. Agriculture 491 50 -244 247 3 090 37 - I 946 I 144 3 581 39 - 2 190 I 391 
2. Energy, water, min-
ing, construction 2 654 83 -442 2 212 219 86 -31 188 2 873 84 -473 2400 
3. Manufacturing 8 855 87 -I 122 7 733 769 53 -361 408 9 624 85 - I 483 8 141 
4. Trade and trans-
portation 3 615 111 399 4 014 I 144 65 -397 747 4 759 100 2 4 761 
5. Other services I 596 183 I 317 2 913 768 102 19 787 2 364 157 I 336 3 700 
6. Production 
enterprises 17 211 99 -92 17 119 5 990 55 -2 716 3 274 23 201 88 -2 808 20 393 
7. General govern-
ment3 2 862 170 2 017 4 879 2 862 170 2 017 4 879 
8. Housing 
9. All sectors 20 073 110 I 925 21 998 5 990 55 -2 716 3 274 26 063 97 -791 25 272 
I The source used in setting up the tables of this bo:,; is the Statistische Bundcsamt, Vo/kswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen. Fachrcihe 18 and the Siatisti.s,·he Juhrhuch (various editions). 
) 
The relative changes (columns 2, 6 and IO) arc expressed by indices 1983 (1960= 100). 
Including private non-profit institutions. 
the range of policy decisions by public authorities: demand and 
costs. The share of services in total demand is highly dependent 
on the level of income. Costs are made up essentially of labour 
costs which are, to a large extent, determined by negotiations 
between the social partners. 
The relatively strong demand for services was certainly at the 
origin of the increase in net value-added in purchasing power 
terms of 'Other services'. This increase was more than twice as 
strong as in 'Manufacturing' (index of 376 in 'Other services' 
compared to an index of 174 in 'Manufacturing'"). The strong 
demand for 'Other services' was apparent in spite of an increase 
of 55 % in relative prices. This increase occurred while relative 
prices in manufacturing fell by 20 %. Such figures illustrate the 
strength of demand for services. 
4 Indices mentioned in this box arc those in the tables and refer to the period 1960-83 
(1960= 100). 
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In spite of the very favourable development of demand for 
'Other services' real wage per head in this sector grew less rapidly 
than in 'Manufacturing' (Table 4). This difference is even more 
pronounced in terms of real unit labour costs. 5 In spite of the 
important demand-pull for 'Other services' they fell by 10 % 
while rising by 20 % in 'Manufacturing'. 
Thus, in the sector 'Other services' a strong increase in value 
added in purchasing power terms combined with a decrease in 
real unit labour costs can be observed. The combination of these 
two trends had important consequences for the net operating 
surplus. In purchasing power terms it more than tripled in 
'Other services' (index 350) while it remained nearly constant in 
'Manufacturing' (index 98). 
5 Comixnsation of employees per wage and salary earner (deflated by the price of GOP) 
divided by real net domestic value-added per head of occupied population. This 
indicator is equivalent to the corrected wage share (share of compensation of employees 
in nominal net domestic value-added divided by the share of wage and salary earner 
in occupied population). It, therefore, takes account of the increased share of wage 
and salary earners in the occupied population. 
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Table 2 
Net domestic product at factor cost, 1960 = 1001 in the Federal Republic of Germany 
1960 Change 1960-83 1983 Change 1960-8} 1983 Change 1960-83 1983 Change 1960-83 1983 
Current Volume Prices Relative Relative Purchasing Relative Inflation Current 
Sector prices component 1960 price prices power prices component prices 
component 1983 component 1983 
DM 1000 DMIOOO 
relative absolute relative 
0 2=4:1 3=4-1 4=1+3 5=7:4 
I. Agriculture 15,7 99 -0,2 15,5 55 
2. Energy, water, 
mining, construe-
tion 32,3 147 15,3 47,7 110 
3. Manufacturing 95,0 217 110,8 205,8 80 
4. Trade and transpor-
tation 45,1 243 64,5 109,6 80 
5. Other services 19,3 243 27,5 46,9 155 
Statistical divergence -3,4 -3,4 
6. Production 
enterprises (I to 5) 207,5 203 214,5 422,0 92 
7. General govern-
ment2 25,2 204 26,1 51,3 161 
8. Housing 7,2 232 9,5 16,6 148 
Statistical divergence +3.9 +3,9 
9. All sectors 239,8 206 254,0 493,8 100 
I The relative changes (colums 2. 5, 8 and I I) arc expressed as indices (1960= 100). 
Including private non-profit institutions. 
These sharply contrasting sectoral developments of operating 
surplus had important consequences: 
(i) rates of return 6 in 'Other services' shrunk in purchasing 
power terms by 'only' 34 % while they fell by 60 % in 
'Manufacturing'; 
(ii) relative rewards of labour to capitaF in 'Other services' 
increased significantly less than in 'Manufacturing' (index 
331 in 'Other services', index 616 in 'Manufacturing'). 
6 Net operating surplus (without imputed labour income of the self-employed) per unit 
of gross capital stock. Imputed labour income of self-employed is assumed to be equal 
to compensation of employees per wage and salary earner. It is however imputed only 
to self-employed in the narrow sense and not to unpaid family workers. 
7 Labour income per head of occupied population divided by the rate of return. 
DMIOOO DMIOOO 
absolute relative absolute relative absolute DMIOOO 
6=7-4 7=4+6 8= 2x5 9=3+6 10= I +9 11 = 13:10 12= 1)-10 IJ= 10+ 12 
-7,0 8.4 54 -7,2 8,5 259 13,4 21,9 
4,6 52,2 162 19,9 52,2 259 82,9 135,1 
-40,5 165,3 174 70,3 165,3 259 262,3 427,7 
-21,4 88,2 196 43.1 88,2 259 140,0 228,2 
25,8 72,7 376 53,3 72.7 259 115,3 188,0 
+3.4 
-35,1 386,9 186 179,4 386,9 259 614,0 I 000,8 
31,1 82,4 327 57,2 82,4 259 131,0 213,1 
8,0 24.6 343 17,5 24,6 259 39,0 63,7 
-3,9 
0,0 493,8 206 254,0 493,8 259 783,7 I 277,6 
Movements in these variables had important consequences for 
other factors which are important for sectoral employment: 
(i) growth of the real capital stock in 'Other services' exceeded 
that of 'Manufacturing' by 80 % . This can. to a great extent, 
be attributed to the less unfavourable performance of rates 
of return in 'Other services'; 
(ii) 'Other services' experienced significant capital widening, 
while this was completely absent - at least on the sectoral 
level - in 'Manufacturing'. This difference is due, to an 
important extent, to the much slower increase in relative 
rewards of labour to capital in 'Other services'; 
(iii) the relatively strong growth of the capital stock in 'Other 
services' made it possible for both capital widening and 
capital deepening to take place. Contrary to traditional 
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Table 3 
Net domestic product at factor cost per head of occupied population 1 in the Federal Republic of Germany 
1960 Change 1960-83 1983 Change 1960-83 1983 Change 1960-83 1983 
Current Volume Prices Relative Relative Purchasing Relative 
Sectors prices component 1960 price prices power pril."CS 
component 1983 component 1983 
DM DM DM DM 
relative absolute relative absolute relative absolute 
0 2=4:1 3=4-1 4=1+3 5= 7:4 6=7-4 7=4+6 8=:!+5 9=3+6 IO=l+9 
I. Agriculture 4 390 254 6 751 11 141 55 -5 050 6 091 139 I 701 6 091 
2. Energy, water, mining, 
construction 11 250 176 8 593 19 842 110 I 917 21 759 193 10 501 21 759 
3. Manufacturing 9 872 256 15 413 25 285 80 -4 979 20 306 206 10 434 20 306 
4. Trade and transportation 9 475 243 13 552 23 027 80 -4 499 18 527 196 9 053 18 527 
5. Other services 8 168 155 4 494 12 662 155 6 973 19 635 240 11 467 19 635 
6. Production enterprises 
(I to 5) 8 941 231 11 752 20 693 92 - I 723 18 971 212 10 029 18 971 
7. General government2 8 802 119 I 710 10 512 161 6 370 16 882 192 8 080 16 882 
8. Housing 
9. All sectors 9 202 212 10 339 19 541 100 0 19 541 212 10 339 19 541 
The relative changes (columns 2, 5, 8 and 11) arc expressed as indices in 1983 (1960= IO<l). 
Including private non-profit institutions. 
thinking capital intensity" in volume terms increased faster 
in 'Other services' than in 'Manufacturing' (index 404 in 
'Other services', index 337 in 'Manufacturing'). The remark-
able development of capital intensity certainly contributed 
- in one way or the other - to improve the range, quality 
and rapidity of services, which in turn has again fostered 
demand for services. 
It follows that demand is not something which sectors have to 
accept passively. The feedback to demand mentioned above 
shows that sectors can actively contribute to the expansion of 
demand for their products, provided that they have sufficient 
resources after paying costs incurred. 
These trends substantially influenced the conditions which from 
the production side as well as from the capital side determine 
sectoral employment performance. On the one hand high de-
mand for 'Other services' was an essential factor in the accumu-
lation of an important positive gap between the increase in 
production and that of labour productivity, thus fulfilling the 
8 Gross capital stock per head of occupied population. 
124 
condition necessary for employment creation. On the other hand 
the combined effect of high demand and lower labour costs 
increased operating surplus and capital stock in 'Other services' 
to such an extent that it largely exceeded the growth of capital 
intensity which in turn was above that in 'Manufacturing'. Thus 
the necessary condition for employment growth was also realized 
on the capital side. Total employment in this sector rose by 
57 % and that of wage and salary earners by 83 % . 
The reverse was. mutatis mutant/is, true for the development of 
employment conditions in 'Manufacturing'. Demand for manu-
factured products was so weak that it resulted in a negative gap 
between the increase of demand and that of productivity. This 
happened in spite of the fact that productivity in purchasing 
power terms grew less than that of 'Other services'. Under these 
circumstances on the production side employment in 'Manufac-
turing' was bound to fall. On the other hand the combination 
of slow demand and increased real unit labour costs resulted in 
such a weak development of operating surplus that the growth 
in the capital stock was significantly smaller than that of the. 
already relatively slow, increase in capital intensity. Thus, con-
ditions on the capital side, too, made for a sizeable reduction in 
employment ( - l 5 % ). 
The cooperative growth strategy from a sectoral point of view 
Table 4 
Development of some key variables in 'Manufacturing' (M) and 'Other services' (S) 1 - Federal Republic of Germany 
(C/Jange /960-83) 
Relative Absolute 
Key variables Volume Relative Purchasing Volume Relative Purchasing 
component pncc power component price power 
component component component component 
0 4 = 2 X J 7 = 5 + 6 
Indices 1960 = I 00 Absolute change 
I. Occupied M 85 -1 483 
population s 157 I 336 
2. Wage and M 87 -1 122 
salary earners s 183 I 317 
3. Capital stock M 285 79 226 283 -91 193 
s 633 95 601 201 -12 189 
4. Contribution to M 217 80 174 Ill -41 70 
net domestic product s 243 155 376 28 26 53 
5. Compensation of M 267 80 214 104 -33 71 
employees s 258 155 400 16 14 31 
6. Net operating M 122 80 98 7 200 -7 909 -709 
surplus s 226 155 350 11 462 11 329 22 791 
7. Wage per head M 306 80 246 14 418 -4 219 10 200 
s 141 155 219 2 630 4 967 7 598 
8. Labour M 256 80 206 15 413 -4 979 10 434 
productivity s 155 155 240 4 494 6 973 11 467 
9. Capital M 76 101 77 -15 I -14 
productivity s 38 163 63 -32 12 -19 
10. Real unit M 119 100 119 14 0 14 
labour costs s 91 100 91 -7 0 -7 
11. Wage share M 123 100 123 15 0 15 
s 106 100 106 3 0 3 
12. Capital M 337 79 267 37 679 - II 118 26 561 
intensity s 404 95 384 48 678 -3 259 45 382 
13. Rate of return M 39 101 40 -II 0 -II 
s 41 163 66 -9 4 -5 
14. Relative reward of M 777 79 616 
labour/capital s 348 94 331 
I Each line corresponds to a table of the same type as Tables B.3.3 and B.3.4 (cf. line 4 and Table B.3.3; line 8 and Table B.3.4). 
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B.4. Government budgets and social protection 
The steep increase in the share of public expenditure in GDP over the past 15 years has its 
origin, principally, in the large rise in transfers to households. At the same time, taxes and 
social security charges have become a growing charge on income. The 1985-86 Annual 
Economic Report has set out the risks which the size and structure of the public sector can 
have on economic performance. This chapter adds some additional elements to the analrsis. 
Firstly, it traces the trends in budgetary expenditure since 1970 briefly, moving on to s·tudy 
in detail the importance of social protection in the member countries and, in particular, 
spending on health, employment and pensions. It then approaches the problem of the groll'ing 
'wedge' between net wages and the cost of an employee to the firm, showing that growing 
compulsory charges on incomes have an influence on the determination of wages and on 
production costs. Some implications can consequently be drawn for employment and growth. 
B.4.1. Trends in major categories of public ex-
penditure since 1970 in the Community 
In all Community countries, public expenditure has in-
creased its share in GDP over the period 1970-85. Total 
general government expenditure, which was 37,8 % of Com-
munity GDP in 1970, reached just over half of GDP (50,3 %) 
in 1985 (see Table B.4.1 ). This movement, which had already 
been apparent in the 1960s, accelerated over the 1970s, 
before, it seems, peaking in 1984-85. 
Expenditure on transfers recorded proportionally the largest 
increase. The strengthening of government's functional role 
in income redistribution did not take place in a uniform way 
over the past 15 years. Up to 1973, the increase in public 
spending, at a rate slightly above that of nominal income, 
reflected the acceptance, and even the desire, to extend 
social protection gradually, to increase staff numbers to meet 
greater demands for public services due to demographic 
growth and to improve the quality of services. Spending on 
capital equipment was still given a high priority. The arrival 
of the first oil shock very rapidly led, in 1974 and 1975, to 
a considerable expansion in public finance relative to GDP. 
The fall in activity in 1974, together with the spontaneous 
growth in transfers brought on by the crisis, led to a marked 
increase in the relative share of public spending. At the same 
time, the fact that this crisis was still very often considered 
as the adjustment cost necessary for the rise in oil prices 
before the hoped-for return to levels of growth close to 
those recorded previously, plus the existence of budgetary 
practises which were not especially restrictive, led to an 
underestimate of the difficulties involved in controlling this 
movement. The recovery in activity in the second half of the 
1970s effectively resulted in a slowdown in the growth of 
the public expenditure share in GDP. without however stop-
ping it. At the beginning of the 1980s the second oil shock. 
by depressing economic activity, indirectly led to a further 
increase in certain social transfers. 
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From the beginning of the 1980s the necessity of adequately 
controlling public expenditure was recognized on account 
of structural dimensions of the phenomenon. It also became 
apparent that the large share of the State could restrain 
growth. From 1984, the authorities succeeded in stabilizing 
the share of public expenditure in GDP on average for 
the Community; it was reduced slightly in 1985 and this 
movement is expected to continue in 1986. 
Three of the main expenditure categories are shown in Table 
B.4.1, the fourth being debt interest payments. Between 1970 
and 1975, transfers have increased by more than 5 percentage 
points of GDP on average for the Community, this increase 
stemming mainly from the growth of transfers to households 
which represent 80 % of total current transfers. The increase 
in these transfers in relation to GDP then continued at a 
generally less rapid pace. It can be seen that several Member 
States, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Luxembourg, suc-
ceeded in stabilizing in 1985, with respect to 1980, the share 
of current transfers in GDP. In Chapter A.7 (in the first 
part of this Review) which deals with budgetary trends, 
Table A.7.3 shows that the great majority of Member States 
have succeeded in stabilizing, or even reducing slightly, the 
weight of current transfers over recent years. In so far as 
public consumption is concerned, growth over 15 years has 
been less dynamic than that of transfers, rising only by a 
little over 3 percentage points of GDP on average for the 
Community between 1970 and 1985. Two points of this 
increase are explained by the growth in compensation of 
officials, the recruitment of which has been progressively 
limited, and I point by purchases of goods and services. 
Finally, capital transfers and gross capital formation has 
been the only category which has fallen as a share of GDP 
during the period considered. Indeed, expenditure and sub-
sidies on capital equipment have very often been the target 
of downward adjustments when budgetary economies have 
been sought. 
Government budgets and social protection 
-Table B.4.1 
Trends in expenditure of general government as a % of GDP - 1970-85 
Total expenditure Current transfers Public consumption Net capital transfers and 
of 
which 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 
B 38,6 46,7 53,7 56,9 17,0 22,1 
DK 42,1 48,2 56,2 59,5 14,9 17,7 
D 38,7 49,0 48,4 47,5 15,9 21,6 
GR 48,3 8,5 9,9 
E 22,1 24,7 32,4 39,8 9,5 11,5 
F 38,9 43,5 46,4 52,5 20,1 23,5 
IRL 46,3 50,4 53,5 16,6 
I 34,2 43,2 46,1 58,4 14,7 18,9 
L 33,7 48,9 54,4 52,7 17,4 25,6 
NL 42,3 51,8 57,5 60,4 18,4 26,3 
p 37,4 40,7 
UK 36,9 44.2 43,2 45,1 10,5 13.5 
EUR 1 37,8 45,8 47,4 50,3 15,5 20,0 
I 1970: EUR IOexcludingGR and IRL; 1975-80: EUR IOexcludingGR: 1985: EUR 12. 
Source: Commission services. 
B.4.2. The size and trends in social protection in 
the Community economies 
The preceding section has shown that the marked increase 
in the share of public expenditure in GDP was due, to a 
very large extent, to the increase in current transfers, in 
particular transfers to households and more specifically so-
cial benefits. As the problem of controlling the growing 
importance of State redistribution in the economy has be-
come more urgent, there has been a renewal of interest in 
the analysis of trends in social benefits and the financing of 
these benefits. 
Up to the beginning of the 1970s, systems of social protec-
tion, which were progressively widened to the whole popu-
lation after the second world war, were being improved to 
give greater coverage of the risks involved. Rapid economic 
growth meant that the costs of social protection incurred in 
this period appeared substantially less than the collective 
well-being brought about by extending protection. The oil 
shocks and the slowdown in growth led to a considerable 
increase in the costs of social protection, the system being 
stretched by the extension of unemployment, the ageing of 
the population and increased recourse to medical services. 
fixed capital fom1ation 
1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
24,4 25.3 13,7 16,8 18,4 17,6 4,5 4.3 4,8 3,1 
2L6 21.5 20,0 24,6 26,7 25,2 6,0 4,7 4,0 3,0 
20,9 20,6 15,8 20,5 20,1 20,0 6.1 5,5 5,4 3,9 
11,5 17,6 12,6 15,2 16,4 20.0 5,2 
16,9 18,4 8,5 9,2 11,5 13,6 3,5 3,5 3,2 4,2 
26,2 30.4 13,4 14,4 15,2 16,3 4,2 4,3 3,4 3,0 
16,7 19,7 18,5 19,9 19,0 6,6 6,3 4,1 
18,8 23,1 13,8 15,4 16,4 19,5 4,0 5,0 4,6 6,6 
28,5 28,8 10,7 14,9 16,5 15,2 4,6 7,6 8,5 7,4 
30,4 32,8 15,4 17,4 17,9 16,3 5,7 5.0 5,6 5.0 
14,4 15.1 14,8 14,5 5.1 3,4 
14,3 16.5 17.6 21,8 21.3 21.2 5,0 5,1 2,9 2,4 
21,0 22,6 15.3 18,2 18,5 18,6 5,0 4,9 4,3 4,0 
Today, the problem is raised of the possible adjustment of 
the system of social services set up in a period of economic 
prosperity. Can the share of social protection in GDP be 
expected to be stabilized or even to be limited in size, given 
the outlook for growth? If corrective measures are necessary, 
should these concern mainly the resources of social protec-
tion or spending on benefits? In what areas should the 
restructuring of these resources and expenditure be sought? 
The present section does not presume to provide precise 
answers to these questions but presents the statistical back-
ground on social protection so that comparisons can be 
made of the respective position in the Member States. 
The Statistical Office of the European Communities has 
developed accounts on social protection which have been 
designed as satellite figures to the European system of inte-
grated economic accounts (ESA). These accounts group 
together all social protection operations and the resources 
which go to finance them. Social protection is defined as the 
total of all collective arrangements covering charges on 
households resulting from certain risks being realized. Be-
cause of the collective nature of this definition, arrangements 
entered into at the initiative of individual households for 
their own benefit, such as saving plans or the subscription 
to private life assurance policies, are excluded. 
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On the expenditure side of the account, social benefit pay-
ments are to be found broken down into several functions 
(or risks) in addition to the administrative costs of social 
protection systems. These functions are the following: sick-
ness, invalidity, occupational accidents, old-age, survivors, 
maternity, family, unemployment, placement etc. and others. 
Social contributions paid by employers, those paid by in-
sured persons, public current contributions to social protec-
tion regimes as well as a category 'other current receipts' 
appear on the income side of the same account. 
The social protection accounts, so constructed, are consider-
ably more comprehensive than those for social security in 
two respects. On the one hand, although social security 
bodies are the major suppliers of social protection services, 
they are not alone in providing these services. Mutual in-
surance bodies can also exercise this function. In addition, 
all institutional sectors participate in social protection when 
they distribute benefits directly to households as an employer 
without passing through a specialized service. As a counter-
part to such social benefits, imputed social contributions are 
found on the resources side of the account. In addition, the 
concept of social protection benefits is wider than that of 
social benefits, including, in addition, the benefits provided 
by the social services. Social benefits include, as in the 
framework of the national accounts statistics, all current 
transfers, in cash or in kind, to households in order to 
cover charges resulting from the appearance or existence of 
predetermined risks, without an equivalent and simul-
taneous counterpart being provided by the beneficiary. Ben-
efits provided by the social services correspond to the total 
cost of services provided free of charge or with a minimal 
charge (non-market services) and of goods and market ser-
vices provided to households at reduced prices because of 
the existence of these risks. The concept of social protection 
benefits is particularly useful since it enables comparable 
statistics to be produced for countries where institutional 
arrangements for financing social protection are different. 
Some countries have, for instance, a national health service 
which provides non-market medical services (social service 
benefits) and which is financed through the budget and not 
through social security regimes. A comparison of social 
security accounts alone between the countries of the Com-
munity is, therefore, biased; however, the broad coverage 
of the social protection accounts allows such comparative 
studies. 
The Statistical Office of the European Communities has 
built up a data base on social protection for nine Member 
States (EUR 10 except Greece) with the series beginning in 
1970 for most countries and 1975 for the others. Table B.4.2 
shows the trend of social protection in the Community 
between 1970 and 1983. Three categories are included: the 
category Health covers sickness, invalidity-disability. occu-
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pational accidents and diseases, the category Employment 
gathers together expenditure related to unemployment and 
placement, guidance, resettlement and, finally, the category 
Pensions is the total of old age and survivors benefits. 
The total of social protection benefits, which represented 
substantially less than 20 % of GDP on average for the 
Community in 1970, continued to grow at a faster rate than 
activity up to 1983, when it represented 26,7 % of GDP. It 
was during the first half of the 1970s and at the beginning 
of the 1980s that its growth was most rapid. During the 
period 1975-83, Germany stood apart from the general 
trend, in so far as it succeeded in reducing marginally the 
size of social protection benefits as a share of activity. 
In 1983 social protection was above 30 % of GDP in the 
Netherlands (32,7 %) and Denmark (30,1 %), while it was 
close to this level in Belgium (29,5 %). Each of the three 
major groups of function has increased at a faster rate than 
GDP over the period, with health benefits approaching 10 % 
of GDP on average for the Community in 1983. It was in 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg that they increased fastest 
between 1970 and 1983, rising from 8,8 % to 14,7 % of GDP 
in the first country and from 5,6 % to 11, I % of GDP in 
the second. Denmark was an exception to this rising trend, 
with a reduction in the weight of health spending since 1975, 
while there was quasi-stability between 1975 and 1983 in 
Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Employment benefits have increased strongly in the Com-
munity to reach 2,5 % of GDP in 1983 or almost double 
their level in 1975 ( 1,3 % ). These benefits are important in 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands as a result 
of the magnitude of unemployment but also, in some 
countries, to the high levels of unemployment protection. 
Pensions have also increased over the period as a result of 
the ageing of the population and also to the increase in 
coverage, particularly over the 1970s. It can be noted that the 
proportion of pensions is quite similar as between countries, 
except in Ireland where it is substantially lower and, at the 
other end of the scale, in Germany, which is subject to 
important problems in so far as the ageing of its population 
is concerned, and in Luxembourg; both Germany and Lux-
embourg have succeeded in stabilizing the weight of their 
expenditure on pensions over the period 1977-83. 
Since the latest year available from the Eurostat data base 
in 1983, it is useful to estimate developments in benefits over 
more recent years. This has been done for Germany, France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom for the period 1984-87. These 
calculations were based on work carried out in these 
countries on the medium-term trends in these categories. 
These were adapted to correspond to the assumptions used 
Government budgets and social protection 
Table B.4.2 
Social protection benefits and benefits in respect of the categories: Health, Employment and Pensions I as a % of GDP 
Social protection benefits 
1970 1975 1977 
B 17,4 22,6 24,2 
DK 19,0 25,2 24,8 
D 28,7 28,2 
F 18,2 21,6 22,6 
IRL 13,3 19,0 16,9 
I 21,0 20,3 
L 15,4 21,5 24,7 
NL 19,0 25,8 27,1 
UK 13,8 19,2 19,2 
EUR9 23,2 23,3 
Employment benefits 
1970 1975 1977 
B 0,7 1,9 2,6 
DK 0,5 2,6 3,2 
D 2,0 1,4 
F 0,4 0,9 1,1 
IRL 0,4 2,0 1,8 
I 0,5 0,5 
L 1,2 I, I 
NL 1,5 2,1 2,0 
UK 0,4 1,2 1,3 
EUR9 1,3 1,3 
I Health category = sickness + invalidity + occupational accidents and diseases 
Employment category = unemployment + placement, vocational guidance, resettlement 
Pensions categcry = old age + survivors. 
Source: Eurostat, integrated social protection statistics (Scspros). 
in the Commission economic forecasts. The variables in-
cluded in the category Employment were numbers unem-
ployed, the proportion of those entitled to benefit and an 
assumption regarding payments to the unemployed as a 
proportion of the average wage. For the Health category, 
national assumptions on the size of health benefits in volume 
Health benefits 
1980 1983 1970 1975 1977 1980 1983 
26,1 29,5 6,1 7,9 8,4 9,0 9,9 
27,9 30,1 8,3 10,5 10,0 10,0 9,6 
27,6 27,8 11,0 11,1 11,3 10,7 
24,5 27,4 6,7 8,0 8,2 8,5 9,2 
19,7 23,2 5,4 8,0 7,1 8,4 8,4 
20.9 25,5 9,4 9,1 9,6 11,2 
24,8 25,5 5,6 8,6 9,9 10,1 11, I 
29,3 32,7 8,8 12,4 13,5 14.6 14,7 
20,8 23,2 5.1 6.8 6,6 6.8 7,0 
24,3 26,7 9,1 9,1 9,5 9,8 
Pension benefits 
1980 1983 1970 1975 1977 1980 1983 
3,6 4,7 7,1 9,0 9,4 10,1 11,5 
3,6 5,3 7,0 8,2 7,9 9,9 10,5 
1,6 2,6 12,6 12,9 12,0 12,1 
1,7 2,9 7,5 9,1 9,7 10,3 11,2 
1,6 3, I 5,0 5,8 5,5 6,5 7,4 
0,5 0,8 8,4 8,8 9,1 11,5 
0.5 0,8 7,8 10,7 12,2 11,9 12,0 
1,8 4,2 7,7 9,0 9,2 9,7 10,3 
2,0 2,6 6,7 8,8 8,9 8,9 9,8 
1,6 2,6 9,8 10,1 10,1 1'1.1 
were adjusted for price developments on the basis of prices 
in the economic forecasts and those in value were adapted 
to the common price assumptions. The trend in pensions 
depends on retirements, the expected trend in purchasing 
power of pensioners and the price assumptions used. 
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Graph B.4.1 which shows the development of the category 
Health from 1975 to 1987 shows, of the four countries 
studied, that Germany, up to 1982, devoted the largest part 
of GDP to health expenditure (around 11 % of GDP) and 
the United Kingdom the least, with a little less than 7 % of 
GDP. Although Germany succeeded, from 1982, in reducing 
the weight of health expenditure, in Italy it continued to 
grow and by 1984 and 1985 it had passed out the level in 
the former country, representing a little over 11 % of GDP. 
France was in an intermediate position with health expendi-
ture on a moderate but regular growth trend up to 1985 
when it had reached 9,2 % of GDP. In the United Kingdom, 
health expenditure has remained stable at around 7 % of 
GDP since 1981. Reinforced controls on health spending, 
which are generalized in the Community, could lead to a 
slight fall in the size of this cateogy with respect to activity 
in 1986 and 1987. 
Graph B.4.2 shows that expenditure on the ca tegory con-
cerned with employment has increased very substantially as 
a proportion of GDP from 1979 to 1982 except in Italy 
where progress has been more regular. The size of spending 
here is quite close in Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom while it is lower in Italy. The years 1984 and 1985 
appear to be the peak years for this type of expenditure. 
Spending on pensions appears in Graph B.4.3. While Ger-
many devoted 12,5 % of GDP to pensions in 1975 and the 
three other countries between 8 and 9 %, a regrouping has 
since taken place between Germany, Italy and France: by 
1985 levels in these countries were quite close: between 11 ,3 
and 11 ,5 % of GDP. Growth has been strongest in Italy 
since 1975 while it has been smoothest in France. Efforts to 
control spending on pensions were begun earliest in Ger-
many where the trend of their percentage in GDP has fallen 
since 1978; in the United Kingdom this expenditure category 
could be stabilized from 1984. In France and Italy, some 
stabilization is likely to be achieved in 1986. The outlook 
for this year and next fits into the general picture of the 
reinforced control on public expenditure as described in the 
section on budgetary trends in the first part of this Review. 
Table B.4.3 shows the development of total current receipts 
of social protection as a percentage of GDP in the nine 
Member States for which data are available . Resources 
provided for social protection have risen from a little over 
20 % of GDP on average for the Community in 1970 to 
nearly 30 % in 1983. They even end up, at the end of the 
period, at 41,5 % in the Netherlands; Ireland (24 % of GDP) 
and the United Kingdom (with 27,7 % of GDP) have the 
lowest levels. Germany again differs from the rest in having 
maintained the level of resources devoted to social protection 
stable, as a proportion of GDP, between 1975 and 1983. 
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GRAPH B.4.1 : Health expenditure as a o/o of GDP 
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GRAPH B.4.2 : Employment expenditure as a o/o of GDP 
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GRAPH B.4.3: Pensions expenditure as a %, of GDP 
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Source : Eurostat, integrated social protection statistics and Commission 
services. 
Table B.4.3 
Current receipts of social protection as a % of GDP 
1970 
B 19,2 
DK 19,7 
D 
F 20,0 
IRL 14,2 
I 
L 18,0 
NL 24,8 
UK 16.7 
EUR9 
Source: Eurostat. integrated social protection statistics (Sespros). 
In Table B.4.4 the three major types of contributions to 
social protection are set out, i.e. employers' social insurance 
contributions, those of protected persons themselves and 
current contributions of public authorities. The gaps be-
tween the relative shares of the three contributions that 
can be observed between Member States is linked to the 
institutional differences in social protection systems. In Ire-
land and Denmark, direct contributions of the State to social 
protection represent the greater part of total receipts (60 % 
and 80 % respectively). This situation reflects the importance 
of taxation and the State budget in financing social protec-
tion expenditure. In the other Member States, current contri-
butions of public authorities range from around 20 % or 
slightly less of the total (Netherlands) to a little more than 
40 % (Belgium, United Kingdom). It is also interesting to 
note than on average for the Community employers' social 
contributions, with more than 40 % of the total, are twice 
as important as those paid by persons who are protected 
(around 20 % ). The importance of employers' contributions 
vis-a-vis those of protected persons is least in Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands (33, I % as against 25,5 % respectively 
in 1983 in Luxembourg and 32 % as against 36,3 % in the 
Netherlands, where in this particular year the portion paid 
by protected persons thus exceeded that transferred by em-
ployers). At the opposite end of the scale, the relative gap 
between the two types of contributions is particularly high 
in Italy (53,3 % as against 13,9 % in 1983) and was wide in 
France in the 1970s. 
A further dominant trend is the progressive reduction in the 
share of employers' social contributions in the total of cur-
Government budgets and social protection 
1975 1977 1980 1983 
24,9 26,3 27,6 30,9 
27,2 26,9 30,6 33,3 
30,4 29,7 30,1 29,9 
23,6 24,9 27,0 29,5 
19,2 17,8 20,8 24,0 
22,2 21,8 24,4 29,3 
24,3 28,5 27,8 29,0 
33,3 33,8 36,9 41,5 
23,6 23,3 25,7 27,7 
25,8 25,8 27,6 29,9 
rent resources. This shows the desire to restructure the 
financing of social protection by reducing the relative contri-
bution sought from firms and increasing that levied on wage 
earners. Thus, on average for the Community, the share of 
employer's contributions has declined from 47,5 % in 1975 
to 42,5 % in 1983 while contributions of protected persons 
have risen from 20,6 % to 22,2 % and public contributions 
from 27 ,3 % to 31 % . The greatest increases in the call on 
public resources came in Belgium, where it rose from 23,5 % 
of total receipts in 1970 to 44,2 % in 1983, and in Italy, 
where the increase was from 13,4 % in 1975 to 30,6 % in 
1983. Elsewhere, the share of public financing has increased 
less and it has even fallen somewhat since 1975 in Denmark 
and Germany. To the extent that current contributions of 
public authorities can be regarded as the adjustment variable 
to the financing needs of the system, it can be considered 
that a limited increase in the share of public contributions 
is a good indicator of the degree to which the authorities 
have the development of their social accounts under control. 
B.4.3. The problem of the tax wedge 
Faced with a trend increase in the burden of tax and social 
security payments, it is not unreasonable to expect that there 
will be some response in labour markets. Indeed, given 
the tax induced reduction in net incomes, in mature and 
efficiently organized labour markets it is likely that there 
will be some attempt to shift at least some part of the direct 
tax and social security burden falling on dependent workers 
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Table B.4.4 
Contributions to current receipts of social protection as a % of total current receipts 1 
Employers' social contributions Contributions of protected persons Current public contributions 
1970 1975 1977 1980 1983 1970 1975 1977 1980 1983 1970 1975 1977 1980 1983 
B 51,0 46,8 45,5 43,9 43,5 21,2 19.7 18.6 17.8 18.7 23,5 30,0 32.7 34.0 44,2 
DK 11,7 11,0 11,3 10,2 9,7 1,9 1,6 1,8 2,1 3,8 83,5 84,4 83,3 83,2 81.7 
D 38,6 40,4 41,5 40,2 27,8 28.7 28,3 29,6 29.1 26,8 26,8 26,9 
F 59,2 58,2 57,9 55,7 52.8 18,9 19,2 21,0 23,8 23,6 18,6 19,4 17,7 17.5 20.5 
IRL 21,2 22,9 25,0 24,8 23,0 12,0 12.9 l l.3 l l,3 12,5 55,7 62,0 62.7 61.9 63J 
I 72,9 68,3 58,7 53,3 10,5 10,4 13,8 13,9 13,4 17,7 25.0 30,6 
L 36,0 37,1 36,6 35,3 33, I 25,0 24,2 24,6 23,2 25,5 30,3 31. l 31.0 31.6 32,8 
NL 43.3 40,0 39,2 37,l 32,0 35,8 33,8 32,5 31,0 36,3 12,5 17.0 18,4 20,5 18.4 
UK 36,6 37,9 36,l 33,4 32,0 20,5 16,6 16.l 14,6 16.2 34,2 39.7 40,5 43.2 43,7 
EUR9 47.5 47.0 44.8 42.5 20.6 21. l 21,4 22,2 27,3 27.1 28,9 31.0 
I The existence of a residual, other current resources, results in a total for the three contributions of less than 100. 
Source: Eurostat, integrated social protection statistics (Scspros). 
onto higher Jabour costs. Similarly, in the case of indirect 
taxes, since for a given wage rate the effect is to reduce 
the real purchasing power of the net income of dependent 
workers, it is to be expected that there will also be some 
shifting forward onto higher costs in much the same way. 
Thus, the degree of shifting forward in practice is likely 
to be stronger the more labour reacts by attempting to 
compensate partly or wholly for any reduction in real after 
tax wage incomes. This real wage resistance phenomenon is 
thought to be an important behavioural feature of typical 
industrialized economies. 
Table B.4.5 shows how total general government taxes and 
social security contributions expressed as a percentage of 
GDP at market prices has evolved through the past decade 
and a half. The increase in Europe over the period averages 
some 7 percentage points which is about the same as in 
Japan, whereas the ratio in the USA has changed very little. 
Tax and social security burdens in Europe, however, are 
generally much higher than in these two countries. 
Within a European Community setting, some very prelimi-
nary analysis by the Commission Services sug~ests that 
shifting forward in response to increases in both direct and 
indirect tax, probably has been fairly substantial and in the 
accompanying box some of these initial results are reported. 
In other words, industrial costs have been subject to signifi-
cant upwards pressure from this particular source. 
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Whilst the results inevitably must be judged as tentative, the 
analysis presented in the box suggests that in the eight 
industrial countries considered, the degree of shirting for-
ward of total taxation of real wage income onto labour costs 
to firms was on average: 
social security contribution 
indirect taxes 
income taxes 
20%, 
35%, 
60%. 
From these calculations we see that the response or resist-
ance on the part of employees to increases in personal 
income taxes appears to be greatest. In many respects this 
is not surprising since income tax is relatively transparent 
and perception here is likely to be strongest. It is possible 
that realization of income deflating power of indirect taxes 
is not as great as that of income taxes since the price effects 
of changes in indirect taxes vary considerably in their timing. 
VAT changes, for example, appear visibly in the consumer 
prices index with hardly any lag, whereas certain other 
consumption taxes may take much longer for their full effect 
to appear in final prices. In addition, part of any increase 
in indirect taxes falls on retired people. Finally, the smallest, 
although still significant degree of resistance appears to 
hold with respect to social security contributions. Whilst 
contributions which fall on employees reduce gross income 
in a way which is virtually identical to an income tax, it is 
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Table B.4.5 
Total general gol'ernment taxes and social security contributions as a % of GDP 
1970 
B 34,3 
DK 43.6 
D 36,5 
GR 24.6 
E 18.1 
F 36.9 
IRL 
I 28,6 
L 31.2 
NL 37.6 
UK 35.8 
EUR2 35, I 
USA 28.1 
Japan 19.6 
I Forecasts. 
' 
Excluding Greece. Spain. Ireland and Portugal. 
J Data for 1983. 
Source: Commission services. 
possible that such imposts are not perceived in exactly the 
same way. Moreover, these contributions are associated with 
specific benefits received or expected by employees. 
Of at least equal interest is that over the sample period, the 
results point to the existence of fairly substantial differences 
in the degree of shifting forward as between European 
countries on the one hand, and Japan and the USA on the 
other. 
It is observed also that the degree of shifting forward of 
direct taxation and social security contributions in the USA 
appears to be significantly smaller than for the other 
countries, whereas for indirect taxation, no significant differ-
ences could be detected. In the case of Japan, indirect tax 
increases appear to be associated with substantial reductions 
in real wage costs and increases in social security contri-
1973 1975 1979 1986 1 
36.7 40,0 43.0 44,8 
43.l 42,2 45.3 51,4 
40,4 41,1 42,3 42,3 
23,3 24,7 28,4 35,6 
20,1 20,6 24,3 30,5 
36,8 38,3 41,9 45,5 
30,6 30,5 36,8 
28.5 29,5 33.6 41,6 
34,8 43,7 46,7 46.5 
42.0 44,0 45,1 45,4 
31.5 35,5 33,9 37.4 
35,5 37,4 39,l 42,4 
28,7 27,7 29,3 28,53 
21.1 22.5 24.8 27.83 
butions with a very high degree of shifting forward. How-
ever, the reliability of the results for Japan could be influ-
enced by data problems. 
The increase in all of the broad categories of tax receipts 
considered here has been much stronger in Europe than 
in the USA; moreover, the degree of shifting forward as 
characterized appears to be much higher in European 
countries. The implication, therefore, is that tax factors in 
Europe may well have created some upwards pressure on 
the growth of labour costs to the enterprise sector. Other 
things being equal and assuming, as seems reasonable, that 
a higher cost of labour discourages the demand for labour by 
firms, private employment will be discouraged and economic 
growth will be lower at least during the adjustment period. 
This makes the task of reducing the pool of unemployed 
that much more difficult. 
133 
Specific issues 
The long-run shifting forward of taxation on wages 
This box presents a pooled cross-country and time series esti-
mates of a wage equation. The countries included in the sample 
are USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. The sample period is 1960-83; annual data are 
used. 
The equation estimated is: 
lnw = a0 + a 1lnp + a2lnq + a3ln (I + ty) 
+ a4ln (I + td) + a 5ln (I + t5) + a6ln (I + t;) 
+ a7u + a' 3Du5ln (I + ty) + a"3D-ln (I + tvJ 
a'4Du5ln (I + td) + a"4D}n (I + td) + a' 5Du5ln (I + t.) 
+ a"5D}n(l + t5) 
The symbols used in the equation stand for: 
w = gross yearly compensation per worker 
P = GDP deflator 
q = Y = labour productivity 
L 
tv = Total indirect tax receipts divided by net compensation 
of employees 
= direct tax revenues falling on dependent labourers div-
ided by net compensation of employees 
= total social security contributions divided by net com-
pensation of employees 
t; = inflation tax divided by net compensation of employees, 
where inflation tax = PD. (it - i) where n = inflation 
rate measured by the GDP deflator, i = long term 
government bond yield and PD = gross public debt of 
general government 
u = unemployment rate 
Dus = Dummy variable for the USA which assumes a value of 
+ I for the United States and zero for other countries 
Di = Dummy variable for Japan 
The wage equation is derived from a wage bargaining model in 
which workers or labour unions bargain for the net wage and 
in which the final wage is a weighted average of the net wage 
demanded by workers and the gross wage offered by firms, with 
weights reflecting the relative strength in the bargaining process. 
The estimated parameters and their t- statistics are reported in 
Table I. The t- statistics are indicated in parentheses. The 
parameters marked by an asterisk are constrained in estimation. 
The estimated parameter a, implies that an increase in the 
productivity of labour leads to a somewhat less than pro-
portional increase in the gross compensation per worker. In-
direct taxes are shifted forward by 35 %. a3 = 0 would imply 
that indirect taxes are fully shifted forward, since the GDP 
deflator at market prices includes indirect taxes, a3 = - I would 
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imply no shifting forward. The degree of shifting forward of 
direct taxes on dependent labour is 0,58, while for social security 
contributions it is 0,20. 
It is seen readily that all shifted parameters are highly significant. 
Thus the evidence above suggests significant differences in the 
degree of shifting forward of various categories of taxes. For 
the inflation tax no significant effects could be found for the 
group of countries as a whole. This might be partly due to the 
crude way in which the inflation tax is measured. Japan and the 
USA show signifiqrnt differences in the tax shifting from the 
European countries. For the USA the coefficient of indirect 
taxes is the same as for the group as a whole, while for direct 
taxes it is negative (a4 + a '4 = - OJ I). Also for social security 
contributions the coefficient of shifting forward is negative for 
the USA (a5 +a'5 = -0,41); hence the evidence presented here 
suggests no shifting forward of direct taxes and social security 
contributions for the USA. For Japan the coefficient of indirect 
taxation is - 2,48 (a3 + a 3) indicating a ·perverse' effect of 
higher indirect taxation on Japanese wages. For direct taxation 
the Japanese coefficient does not differ significantly from the 
other countries, while the degree of shifting forward of social 
security contributions is much higher (a5 + a 5 = 1.42). However 
the results for Japan should be treated with caution. There may 
be multicollinearity in the Japanese data between indirect taxes 
and social security contributions. 
The equation estimated includes 6 country dummy variables, as 
usual in pooled gross country-time series regressions. They arc 
not reported here. 
Increased taxation can also have negative effects on the incentive 
to work. Assuming less than full shifting forward of direct 
taxation, an increase in direct taxation reduces the after-tax 
wage. At the margin this tends to reduce the supply of labour 
as the opportunity cost of leisure falls (the pure substitution 
effect). However the reduced income reduces the demand for 
leisure and increases the number of hours worked (income 
effect). Which of these two effects prevails is ambiguous. Econo-
metric studies suggest that substitution effect prevails over the 
income effect for married women and for men close to retirement 
age. For married men the empirical evidence suggests that the 
two effects are of about equal strength. However, the studies 
made tend to estimate the short-run elasticity of the supply of 
labour with respect to the after-tax wage rather than the long-
run elasticity. The decision by men not to work, or to work in 
the hidden economy or to emigrate where tax rates are lower is 
more a long-run decision especially in rigid labour markets. 
Hence an increase in taxation is likely to influence the partici-
pation of men in the workforce only with long delays which 
depend in turn on institutional factors such as the existence of 
early retirement schemes, the job prospects in the hidden econ-
omy, or the possibility to emigrate to countries with lower tax 
burdens. 
The effects of taxation on the supply of labour are likely to be 
more important in countries where taxation is shifted forward 
to a smaller degree, such as in the USA. Vice versa in Europe, 
where the shifting forward is larger, the effect of taxation on 
employment occurs more via the cost of labour and the demand 
for labour by private firms. 
An additional important factor influencing the supply of labour 
both in the USA and in Europe are generous unemployment 
Table 1 
Government budgets and social protection 
compensations. Since leisure has some value to the worker, 
unemployment benefits in the order of 70-80 % of the last wage, 
a not uncommon proportion in European countries, could make 
the unemployed worker better off than the employed. If in 
addition the unemployed worker is able to work in the hidden 
economy, he may also be financially better off when he is 
registered as unemployed. 
Pooled cross-country time series regression; 8 industrial countries, annual data 1960-83 
USA 
Constant 
13,47 
(125,22) 
Japan 
p 
I* 
Numbers in parentheses are t- statistics. 
0,94 
(31,73) 
The regression contains in addition 6 country dummy variables. 
-0,65 
(12.07) 
I +td 
0,58 
(7,10) 
D,(l+t) 
o• 
-1,83 
(7,10) 
0,20 
(4,42) 
R' DW 
0* o• 1,0 1,78 
D,(I +10) D,(l+t,) 
-0,89 -0,61 
(5,25) (2,70) 
o• 1,22 
(5,89) 
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Community totals are for EUR12 unless otherwise stated. Community totals for national 
accounts data are aggregated using purchasing power parities, except in Tables 6, 28, 29, 
32 to 36 and 45 to 47, where current exchange rates have been used. 
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Table 1 
Population; total 
('OOO persons) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EURl2 USA JA 
1960 9 119 4 581 55 433 8 327 30 303 45 684 2 832 50 198 314 11 483 9 037 52 372 279 682 179 979 93 260 
1961 9 166 4 617 56 185 8 398 30 592 46 163 2 818 50 523 317 II 637 9 032 52 807 282 255 182 992 94 090 
1962 9 218 4 647 56 837 8 448 30 917 46 998 2 830 50 843 321 11 801 9 020 53 292 285 172 185 771 94 980 
1963 9 283 4684 57 389 8 480 31 246 47 816 2 850 51 198 324 11 964 9 082 53 625 287 941 188 483 95 900 
1964 9 367 4 720 57 971 8 510 31 741 48 310 2 864 51 600 328 12 125 9 123 53 991 290 650 191 141 96 890 
1965 9 448 4 758 58 619 8 550 32 085 48 758 2 876 51 987 331 12 293 9 129 54 350 293 185 193 526 97 950 
1966 9 508 4 797 59 148 8 612 32 453 49 164 2 884 52 332 334 12 455 9 109 54 643 295 438 195 576 98 860 
1967 9 556 4 839 59 286 8 716 32 850 49 548 2 900 52 667 335 12 597 9 103 54 959 297 357 197 457 99 920 
1968 9 590 4 867 59 500 8 741 33 240 49 914 2 913 52 987 336 12 726 9 115 55 214 299 142 199 399 101 070 
1969 9 613 4 891 60067 8 773 33 566 50 318 2 929 53 317 338 12 873 9 097 55 461 301 242 201 385 102 320 
1970 9 638 4 929 60 651 8 793 33 876 50 772 2 950 53 661 339 13 032 9044 55 632 303 317 203 984 103 720 
1971 9 672 4 963 61 284 8 831 34 190 51 251 2 978 54 005 342 13 194 8 990 55 907 305 608 206 827 104 750 
1972 9 709 4 992 61 672 8 889 34 498 51 701 3 024 54400 347 13 330 8 970 56 079 307 611 209 284 107 180 
1973 9 738 5 022 61 976 8 929 34 810 52 118 3 073 54 779 350 13 438 8 976 56 210 309 420 211 357 108 660 
1974 9 768 5 045 62 054 8 962 35 147 52 460 3 124 55 130 355 13 543 9 098 56 224 310910 213 342 110 158 
1975 9 795 5 060 61 829 9 047 35 515 52 699 3 177 55 441 359 13 660 9 426 56 215 312 223 215 465 111 520 
1976 9 811 5 073 61 531 9 167 35 937 52 909 3 228 55 701 361 13 773 9 666 56 206 313 363 217 563 112 768 
1977 9 822 5 088 61400 9 308 36 367 53 145 3 272 55 929 361 13 856 9 736 56 179 314 463 219 760 113 880 
1978 9 830 5 104 61 327 9 430 36 778 53 376 3 314 56 127 362 13 939 9 797 56 167 315 551 222 095 114 920 
1979 9 837 5 117 61 359 9 548 37 108 53 606 3 368 56 292 363 14 034 9 842 56 227 316 701 223 567 115 880 
1980 9 847 5 123 61 566 9 642 37 386 53 880 3 401 56 416 364 14 148 9 884 56 314 317 971 227 236 116 800 
1981 9 852 5 122 61 682 9 729 37 751 54182 3 443 56 502 365 14 247 9 938 56 379 319 193 229 518 117 660 
1982 9 856 5 118 61 638 9 790 37 961 54480 3 483 56 639 366 14 312 10 OOO 56 335 319 978 231 786 118 440 
1983 9 855 5 114 61 423 9 850 38 173 54 729 3 508 56 836 366 14 365 10 064 56 377 320 660 233 981 119 259 
1984 9 855 5 112 61 175 9 910 38 387 54 947 3 535 57 002 366 14442 10 134 56 488 321 353 236 108 120 018 
1985 9 855 5 113 61 015 9 959 38 602 55 180 3 560 57 060 366 14 510 10 195 56 528 321 943 238 235 120 777 
1986 9 855 5 118 60 936 10 008 38 818 55 401 3 581 57 114 366 14 586 10 256 56 597 322 637 240 362 121 536 
1987 9 855 5 120 60 869 10 057 39 037 55 638 3 603 57 170 366 14 654 10 318 56 684 323 370 242 489 122 295 
Table 2 
Employment; total economy 
( Annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR12 USA JA 
1961 0,8 1,5 1,4 1,1 0,2 0,1 -0,2 0,2 1,1 1,5 -0,3 1,2 0,7 -0,4 1,4 
1962 1,6 1,5 0,3 -1,7 0,8 0,2 0,7 -1,1 0,3 2,0 -0,3 0,7 0,2 2,0 1,3 
1963 0,7 1,2 0,2 -1,4 0,5 1,0 0,6 -1,5 -0,4 1,4 -0,3 0,1 0,1 0,8 0,9 
1964 1,3 2,1 0,1 -1,3 0,5 1,1 0,5 -0,6 1,7 1,8 -0,3 1,1 0,5 1,8 1,3 
1965 0,2 1,8 0,6 -0,7 1,0 0,4 -0,2 -1,7 0,9 0,9 -0,3 0,9 0,2 3,3 1,6 
1966 0,5 0,5 -0,3 -0,9 1,0 0,8 -0,3 -1,5 0,5 0,8 -0,6 0,6 0,0 4,5 2,1 
1967 -0,3 -0,6 -3,3 -1,2 0,5 0,3 -0,6 1,1 -1,1 -0,3 -0,6 -1,5 -0,8 2.5 1,9 
1968 -0,1 0,8 0,1 -1,2 0,8 -0,3 0,3 0,0 -0,4 0,9 -0,6 -0,7 -0,1 2,4 1,7 
1969 1,7 1,2 1,6 -0,3 1,0 1,5 0,3 0,5 1,4 1,7 -0,6 0,1 0,9 2,5 0,8 
1970 -0,5 0,7 1,3 -0,1 1,0 1,4 -1,2 0,0 2,0 1,1 -0,7 -0,5 0,5 -0,8 1,1 
1961-70 0,6 1,1 0,2 -0,8 -0,7 -0,6 -0,0 -0,5 0,6 1,2 -0,5 0,2 0,2 1,9 1,4 
1971 1,0 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,2 -0,1 3,2 0,5 -0,3 -1,0 0,1 -0,4 0,5 
1972 -0,1 2,1 -0,2 0,5 0,1 0,6 -0,5 -1,1 2,7 -0,9 -0,6 -0,2 -0,1 2,4 0,1 
1973 1,3 1,2 0,7 1,0 2,4 1,4 0,7 0,8 1,9 0,1 -0,8 2,3 1,3 4,0 1,9 
1974 1,4 -0,3 -1,3 0,1 0,5 0,9 1,1 1,5 2,8 0,2 -0,8 0,3 0,3 1,5 -0,4 
1975 -1,4 -1,2 -2,8 0,1 -1,7 -0,8 0,4 0,2 1,2 -0,7 -3,0 -0,4 -1,l -2,5 -0,3 
1976 -0,6 1,8 -0,8 2,3 -1,0 0,7 -0,8 0,8 -0,1 0,0 0,4 -0,9 -0,1 2,7 0,9 
1977 -0,2 0,8 -0,2 0,8 -0,6 0,8 1,8 0,6 -0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,1 0,2 3,4 1,3 
1978 0,0 1,0 0,6 0,4 -2,3 0,4 2,5 0,6 -0,6 0,7 -1,5 0,6 0,2 5,1 1,2 
1979 1,2 1,2 1,4 0,6 -2,0 0,0 3,2 1,0 0,4 1,3 3,0 1,5 0,8 3,3 1,3 
1980 -0,0 -0,4 1,1 1,3 -3,6 0,1 1,0 0,9 0,8 0,7 1,4 -0,3 0,1 0,3 1,0 
1971-80 0,3 0,7 -0,1 0,7 -0,8 0,5 0,9 0,5 1,2 0,2 -0,2 0,2 0,2 2,0 0,8 
1981 -2,0 -1,3 -0,7 4,9 -2,8 -0,6 -0,9 0,5 0,3 -1,5 0,6 -3,9 -1,2 0,9 0,8 
1982 -1,3 0,3 -1,7 -1,0 -0,5 0,1 0,2 -0,1 -0,3 -2,5 -0,5 -1,8 -0,9 -0,5 1,0 
1983 -1,1 0,4 -1,5 0,5 -0,8 -0,5 -2,0 0,1 -0,1 -2,0 -1,7 -1,2 -0,8 1,0 1,7 
1984 0,0 2,2 0,1 -0,2 -4,1 -1,0 -1,3 0,4 0,0 -0,5 -1,3 1,6 -0,2 4,8 0,6 
1985 0,3 3,1 0,7 0,4 -1,4 -0,4 -0,3 0,5 0,4 0,9 -0,5 1,3 0,4 2,0 0,7 
1986 0,3 1,6 1,3 -0,3 0,6 0,1 0,6 0,7 0,7 1,0 0,5 1,0 0,8 2,2 0,5 
1987 0,1 0,8 0,9 -0,0 1,0 0,5 1,3 1,3 0,6 0,9 0,6 0,7 0,8 1,7 0,5 
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Table 3 
Unemployment rate 
( Registered unemployetf'as ~rcrntage of cil'ilian labow fora } 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR9 EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 3,1 1,6 1,0 0,7 4,7 7,2 0,1 0,7 1,6 2,5 5,5 1,7 
1961 2,5 1,2 0,7 0,6 4,3 6,6 0,1 0.5 1,4 2,2 6,7 1,5 
1962 2,0 1,1 0,6 0,7 4,2 5,5 0,1 0,5 1,9 2,0 5,5 1,3 
1963 1,5 1,5 0,7 0,7 4,5 5,1 0,2 0,6 2,3 2,1 5,7 1,3 
1964 1,5 0,9 0,6 0,6 4,3 5,2 0,0 0,5 1,6 1.9 5,2 1,1 
1965 1,8 0,7 0,6 0,7 4,5 5,7 0,0 0,6 1,4 1,9 4,5 1.2 
1966 2,0 0,8 0,6 0,7 4,3 5,5 0,0 0,8 1,4 1,9 3,8 1,3 
1967 2,6 1,0 1,8 1,0 4,5 5,0 0,1 1,7 2,2 2,4 3,8 1,3 
1968 3,1 1,7 1,2 1,3 4,8 4,7 0,1 1,5 2,3 2,3 3,6 1,2 
1969 2,3 1,4 0,7 1,1 4,6 4,4 0,0 1,1 2,3 2,0 3,5 1,1 
1970 2,1 1,1 0,6 1,2 1,3 5,3 4,4 0,0 1,3 2.5 2,0 4,9 1,1 
1961-70 2,1 1,1 0,8 0,1 0,9 4,5 5,2 0,1 0,9 1,9 2,1 4,7 1,2 
1971 2,1 1,3 0,7 1,5 1,6 5,2 5,1 0,0 1,8 2,9 2,4 5,9 1,2 
1972 2,7 1,3 0,9 1,5 1,8 6,0 5,2 0,0 3,0 3,2 2,7 5,6 1,4 
1973 2,8 0,8 1,1 1,1 1,8 5,5 4,9 0,0 3,1 2,2 2,4 4,9 1,3 
1974 3,1 2,1 2,3 1,1 2,3 5,9 4,9 0,0 3,7 1,0 2,2 2,9 2,6 5,6 1,4 
1975 5,1 5,0 4,1 1,9 3,9 8,4 5,3 0,2 5,3 2,7 3,6 4,3 3,9 8,5 1,9 
1976 6,5 5,2 4,0 2,9 4,2 9,3 5,6 0,3 5,6 4,5 4,9 4,8 4,5 7,7 2,0 
1977 7,5 6,3 4,0 4,2 4,8 9,1 5,4 0,5 5,4 5,6 5,3 5,0 4,8 7,1 2,0 
1978 8,1 7,1 3,8 6,3 5,2 8,3 6,1 0,7 5,4 6,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 6,0 2,2 
1979 8,4 5,8 3,3 8,0 5,9 7,4 6,7 0,7 5,5 7,2 4,7 5.2 5,5 5,8 2,1 
1980 9,1 6,7 3,4 9,9 6,4 8,2 7,2 0,7 6,2 6,7 6,0 5,8 6,1 7,1 2,0 
1971-80 5,5 4,2 2,8 3,8 3,8 7.3 5,6 0,3 4,5 3,5 4,0 4.1 3,3 6,4 1,7 
1981 11,1 8,9 4,8 12,0 7,7 10,2 8,0 1,0 8,8 5,8 9,2 7,7 7,8 7,6 2,2 
1982 13,0 9,5 6,9 14,3 8,7 12,2 9,7 1,3 11,8 5,7 10,6 9,3 9,4 9,7 2,4 
1983 14,3 10,2 8,4 7,9 16,0 8,8 14,9 10,9 1,6 14,3 5,6 11,6 10.4 10,6 9,6 2,7 
1984 14,4 9,8 8,4 8,1 18,6 9,9 16,5 11,9 1,7 14,5 6,7 11,8 10,9 11,2 7,5 2,7 
1985 13,6 8,6 8,5 8,5 19,8 10,3 17,6 12,8 1,6 13,4 7,7 12,1 11,1 11,6 7,2 2.6 
1986 13,0 7,4 7,8 9,3 19,8 10,6 17,8 12,7 1,4 12,4 7,6 12,0 10,8 11,4 6,9 2,9 
1987 13,0 7,0 7,4 10,0 19,6 10,6 17,4 12,5 1,2 11,6 7,4 11,8 10,5 11,2 6,6 2,9 
Table 4 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
( National currency; 'OOO ml/lion) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 557,0 41,15 302,7 105,2 685,5 296,5 0,631 23 207 26,11 44,42 71,4 25,73 265,5 505,4 15 865 
1961 592,4 45,66 331,7 118,6 780,8 323,5 0,680 25 810 26,12 46,90 76,9 27,46 289,5 523,4 19 609 
1962 633,7 51,45 360,8 126,0 902,3 361,2 0,736 28 998 27,50 50,49 81,8 28,76 316,3 563,6 21 748 
1963 681,3 54,76 382,4 140,7 1 064,8 404,9 0,791 33 215 29,34 54,77 88,7 30,59 346,7 595,0 25 115 
1964 762,5 62,60 420,2 158,0 1 202,2 449,2 0,901 36 360 33,49 64,45 96,3 33,33 383,5 635,8 29 691 
1965 830,0 70,32 459,2 179,8 I 398,9 483,5 0,959 39124 35,10 71,98 107,5 35,78 418,2 689,0 32 800 
1966 892,1 77,18 488,2 200,0 I 618,3 523,4 1,010 42 391 36,88 78,38 117,8 38,17 452,1 754,2 38 085 
1967 955,3 84,81 494,4 216,I 1 817,8 565,4 1,104 46 695 37,12 85,99 131,6 40,36 482,4 797,9 44 629 
1968 1 022,3 94,36 533,3 234,5 2 037,5 614,5 1,245 50 614 40,61 95,35 145,7 43,78 525,0 871,0 52 923 
1969 1 134,2 107,32 596,9 266,5 2 317,0 700,7 1,438 55 876 47,02 107,99 159,8 46,76 584,0 941,4 62 259 
1970 1 262,1 118,63 675,3 298,9 2 576,2 782,6 1,620 62 883 54,97 121,18 177,8 51,30 652,6 989,5 73 345 
1971 1 382,0 131,12 750,6 330,3 2 920,0 872,4 1,853 68 510 55,94 136,53 199,1 57,63 726,0 I 074,2 80 701 
1972 1 545,4 150,73 823,7 377,7 3 432,3 981,I 2,238 75 124 63,07 154,26 231,8 63,81 81o,6 I 181,3 92 395 
1973 I 755,0 172,86 917,3 484,2 4 139,7 I 114,2 2,701 89 746 76,67 176,04 282,2 73,58 935,3 I 317,1 112 497 
1974 2 056,8 193,63 984,6 564,2 5 102,0 I 278,3 2,988 110 719 93,78 199,78 339,3 83,77 I 076,0 I 423,4 134 244 
1975 2 271,1 216,26 1 026,9 672,2 6 018,3 I 452,3 3,792 125 378 86,44 219,96 377,2 105,76 I 225,9 I 542,2 148 328 
1976 2 573,2 251,21 I 121,7 824,9 7 234,2 1 678,0 4,653 156 657 99,71 251,93 468,9 126,18 I 433,2 I 709,9 166 573 
1977 2 776,8 279,31 1 197,8 963,7 9 178,4 I 884,6 5,703 190 083 102,35 274,93 625,8 145,24 I 639,7 I 907,5 185 622 
1978 2 982,2 311,38 I 285,3 I 161,4 11 230.7 2141,1 6,757 222 254 111,82 297,01 787,3 167,46 I 862,5 2 145,7 204 405 
1979 3 182,9 346,89 1 392,3 I 428,8 13 130.5 2 442,3 7,917 270 198 122,00 315,96 993,3 195,98 2 130,8 2 388,4 221 547 
1980 3 434,2 373,79 1 478,9 I 710,9 15 185,1 2 769,3 9,361 338 743 132,92 336,74 I 254,9 229,46 2 434,0 2 606,6 240 177 
1981 3 459,9 407,79 I 540,9 2 046,8 17 327,4 3 110,6 11,348 401 579 141,74 352,85 I 468,2 252,99 2 696.5 2 934,9 257 364 
1982 3 859,1 464,47 1 597,9 2 547,8 19 870,4 3 567,0 13.262 470 484 157,03 368,86 I 851,3 275,93 2 998,9 3 045,3 269 628 
1983 4 101.7 512,34 I 670,9 3 065,8 22 682,8 3 935,0 14,636 538 998 174,70 378,44 2 290,0 299,62 3 287,1 3 275,7 280 094 
1984 4 381,5 559,87 I 745,6 3 772,3 25 870,4 4 277,2 16,282 612 112 195,31 394,86 2 826,7 318,30 3 576,3 3 634,6 298 089 
1985 4 674,9 612,87 1 827,8 4 512,8 28 795,1 4 579,2 17,634 681 495 210,62 412,45 3 558,5 348,91 3 879,1 3 850,0 316 790 
1986 4 961,0 656,90 I 942,3 5 476,5 32 836,9 4 891,3 19,305 764 127 228,34 419,91 4 364,7 370,89 4 203,9 4 064,7 329 543 
1987 5 147,8 688,80 2 029,2 6 124,9 35 603,5 5 146.3 20,442 829 594 240,70 426,24 5 037,8 395,75 4 463,8 4 353,9 340 428 
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Table 5 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
(National currency: annual percemage change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR12 USA JA 
1961 6,4 11,0 9,6 12,8 13,9 9,1 7,7 11,2 0,0 5,6 7,6 6,7 9,1 3,6 23,6 
1962 7,0 12.7 8,8 6,2 15,6 11,7 8,3 12,4 5,3 7,7 6,4 4,8 9,3 7,7 10,9 
1963 7.5 6,4 6,0 11,7 18,0 12,1 7,5 14,5 6,7 8,5 8,5 6,4 9,6 5,6 15,5 
1964 11,9 14,3 9,9 12,3 12,9 10,9 13,8 9,5 14,2 17,7 8,5 9,0 10,6 6,9 18,2 
1965 8,8 12,3 9,3 13,8 16,4 7,6 6,5 7,6 4,8 11,7 11,7 7,4 9,1 8,4 10,5 
1966 7,5 9,8 6,3 11,2 15,7 8,3 5,4 8,4 5,1 8,9 9,6 6,7 8,1 9,5 16,I 
1967 7,1 9,9 1,3 8,1 12,3 8,0 9,2 10,2 0,6 9.7 11,8 5,7 6,7 5,8 17,2 
1968 7,0 11,3 7,9 8,5 12,l 8,7 12,8 8,4 9,4 10,9 10,7 8,5 8,8 9,2 18,6 
1969 10,9 13,7 11,9 13,6 13,7 14,0 15,5 10,4 15,8 13,3 9,7 6,8 11,2 8,1 17,6 
1970 11,3 10,5 13,1 12,2 11.2 11,7 12,6 12,5 16,9 12,2 11,3 9,7 11,7 5,1 1,7,8 
1961-70 8,5 11,2 8,4 11,0 14,2 10,2 9,9 10,5 7,7 10,6 9,5 7,1 9,4 7,0 16,5 
1971 9,5 10,5 11,l 10,5 13,3 11,5 14,4 8,9 1,8 12,7 12,0 12,3 11,3 8,6 10,0 
1972 11,8 15,0 9,8 14,4 17,5 12,5 20,7 9,7 12,7 13,0 16,4 10,7 11,7 10,0 14,5 
1973 13,6 14,7 11,4 28,2 20,6 13,6 20,7 19,5 21,6 14,1 21,7 15,3 15,4 11,5 21,8 
1974 17,2 12,0 7,3 16.5 23,2 14,7 10,6 23,4 22,3 13,5 20,2 13,9 15,0 8,1 19,3 
1975 10,4 11,7 4,3 19,1 18,0 13,6 26,9 13,2 -7,8 10,1 11,2 26,3 13,9 8,3 10,5 
1976 13,3 16,2 9,2 22,7 20,2 15,5 22,7 24,9 15,4 14,5 24,3 19,3 16,9 10,9 12,3 
1977 7,9 11,2 6,8 16,8 26,9 12,3 22,6 21,3 2,6 9,1 33,5 15,1 14,4 11,6 11,4 
1978 7,4 11,5 7,3 20,5 22,4 13,6 18,5 16,9 9,3 8,0 25,8 15,3 13,6 12,5 10,1 
1979 6,7 11,4 8,3 23,0 16,9 14,1 17,2 21.6 9,1 6,4 26,2 17,0 14,4 11,3 8,4 
1980 7,9 7,8 6,2 19,7 15.6 13,4 18,2 25,4 8,9 6,6 26,3 17,1 14,2 9,1 8,4 
1971-80 10,5 12,2 8,2 19,1 19,4 13,5 19,2 18,3 9,2 10,8 21,6 16,2 14,1 10,2 12,6 
1981 3,4 9,1 4,2 19,6 14,1 12,3 21,2 18,5 6,6 4,8 17,0 10,3 10,8 12,6 7,2 
1982 8,7 13,9 3,7 24,5 14,7 14,7 16,9 17,2 10,8 4,5 26,1 9,1 11,2 3,8 4,8 
1983 6,3 10,3 4,6 20,3 14.2 10,3 10,4 14,6 11,3 2,6 23,7 8,6 9,6 7,6 3,9 
1984 6,8 9,3 4,5 23,0 14,1 8,7 11,2 13,6 11,8 4,3 23,4 6,2 8,8 11,0 6,4 
1985 6,7 9,5 4,7 19,6 11,3 7,1 8,3 11,3 7,8 4,5 25,9 9,6 8,5 5,9 6,3 
1986 6,1 7,2 6,3 21,4 14,0 6,8 9,5 12,1 8,4 1,8 22,7 6,3 8,4 5,6 4,0 
1987 3,8 4,9 4,5 11,8 8,4 5,2 5,9 8,6 5,4 1,5 15,4 6,7 6,2 7,1 3,3 
Table 6 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
(£CU: 'OOO million) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 10,5 5,6 68,2 3,3 10,8 56,9 1,7 35,2 0,5 11,1 2,4 68,2 274,4 478,5 41,7 
1961 11,1 6,2 77,0 3,7 12,2 61,4 1,8 38,7 0,5 12,0 2,5 72,0 299,1 490,4 51,0 
1962 11,8 7,0 84.3 3,9 14,1 68,4 1,9 43,4 0,5 13,0 2,7 75,3 326,3 526,9 56,5 
1963 12,7 7,4 89,4 4,4 16,6 76,7 2,1 49,7 0,5 14,1 2,9 80,l 356,5 556,1 65,2 
1964 14,3 8,5 98,2 4,9 18,7 85,0 2,4 54,4 0,6 16,6 3,1 87,2 394,0 594,3 77,1 
1965 15,5 9,5 107,3 5,6 21,8 91,5 2,5 58,5 0,7 18,6 3,5 93,7 428,7 644,0 85,2 
1966 16,7 10,4 114,1 6,2 25,2 99,1 2,6 63,4 0,7 20,2 3,8 99,9 462,5 705,0 98,9 
1967 17,9 11,4 116,1 6,8 27,9 107,5 2,8 70,2 0,7 22,3 4,3 104,1 492,1 749,3 116,4 
1968 19,9 12,2 129,6 7,6 28,3 121,0 2,9 78,7 0,8 25,6 4,9 102,l 533,6 846,6 142,9 
1969 22,2 14,0 148,3 8,7 32,4 132,4 3,4 87,5 0,9 29,2 5,4 109,8 594,2 920,9 169,2 
1970 24,7 15,5 180,5 9,7 36,1 137,8 3,8 98,4 1,1 32,7 6,1 120,4 666,9 968,0 199,3 
1971 27,2 16,9 205,9 10,5 40,2 151,4 4,3 105,8 1,1 37,3 6,7 134,5 741,6 I 025,2 221,8 
1972 31,3 19,4 230,3 11,2 47,7 173,4 5,0 114,8 1,3 42,9 7,6 142,1 827,0 I 053,0 272,0 
1973 36,7 23,3 280,0 13,1 57,6 203,8 5,4 125,3 1,6 51,3 9,3 146,5 953,9 I 069,3 337,7 
1974 44,3 26,7 319,3 15,8 74,1 222,9 5,9 142,7 2,0 62,4 11,2 164,3 I 091,4 I 193,4 386,3 
1975 49,8 30,4 336,8 16,8 84,6 273,0 6,8 154,9 1,9 70,2 12,0 188,9 I 225,9 I 242,9 403,4 
1976 59,6 37,2 398,4 20,2 96,8 313,9 7,5 168,4 2,3 85,3 13,9 203,0 I 406,5 I 529,4 502,9 
1977 67,9 40,7 452,3 22,9 105,7 336,2 8,7 188,8 2,5 98,2 14,4 222,2 I 560,5 I 671,6 607,0 
1978 74,4 44,4 502,9 24,8 115,3 373,0 10,2 205,7 2,8 107,8 14,l 252,2 I 727,7 I 684,l 765,3 
1979 79,2 48,1 554,5 28,1 142,8 419,0 11,8 237,3 3,0 115,0 14,8 303,2 I 956,9 I 742,5 737,3 
1980 84,6 47,8 585,9 28,8 152,3 471,9 13,8 284,8 3,3 122,0 18,0 383,4 2 196,7 I 872,1 762,4 
1981 86,0 51,5 613,0 33,2 168,8 515,0 16,4 317,9 3,4 127,1 21,4 457,4 2 411.1 2 628,8 I 048,0 
1982 86,3 56,9 672,5 39,0 184,7 554,6 19,2 355,4 3,5 141,1 23,7 492,3 2 629,5 3 108,3 I 107,1 
1983 90,3 63,0 735,9 39,3 177,9 581,2 20,5 399,3 3,8 149,2 23,2 510,4 2 793,9 3 679,7 l 325,2 
1984 96,4 68,7 779,9 42,7 204,4 622,4 22.4 443,1 4,3 156,5 24,4 538,9 3 004,3 4 605,1 I 593,2 
1985 104,1 76,4 821,0 43,1 223,2 673,9 24,7 471,1 4,7 164,2 27,4 592,6 3 226,2 5 059,5 I 754,5 
1986 112,8 82,7 900,9 38,5 238,2 716,6 27,2 517,0 5,2 172,7 29,3 584,8 3 425,7 4 348,7 I 929,4 
1987 117,1 87,3 949,6 39,4 246,8 744,1 28,8 557,4 5,5 177,0 30,3 621,6 3 604,9 4 606,1 2 090,2 
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Table 7 
Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population 
(£CU) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 I 157 I 231 I 231 399 357 I 245 591 700 I 574 964 260 I 303 981 2 658 447 
1961 I 211 I 341 I 371 441 399 I 330 633 766 I 545 I 034 277 I 364 I 060 2 680 542 
1962 I 285 1498 I 483 465 455 I 455 680 853 I 603 I 105 295 1413 I 144 2 836 595 
1963 I 372 I 582 I 557 517 531 I 603 727 970 I 692 I 182 318 1493 I 238 2 951 680 
1964 I 522 I 795 I 694 578 591 I 760 823 I 054 I 910 I 373 343 I 616 I 356 3 109 796 
1965 I 642 2 OOO I 831 655 680 I 877 873 I 126 I 979 I 512 383 I 723 1462 3 328 869 
1966 I 754 2 177 I 929 724 778 2 016 917 I 212 2 065 I 625 420 I 828 I 565 3 605 I OOO 
1967 I 878 2 361 I 958 776 850 2 171 982 I 332 2 081 I 771 472 I 894 I 655 3 795 I 165 
1968 2 072 2 512 2 178 869 851 2424 997 I 485 2 350 2 012 540 l 850 I 784 4 246 1414 
1969 2 309 2 862 2 468 990 965 2 632 I 153 1640 2 726 2 267 598 I 980 I 972 4 573 1654 
1970 2 562 3 139 2 976 I 109 I 066 2 715 I 289 I 834 3 170 2 513 669 2 165 2 199 4 745 I 922 
1971 2 809 3 408 3 359 I 190 I 177 2 949 I 452 I 959 3 212 2 829 747 2 405 2 427 4 957 2 118 
1972 3 225 3 876 3 734 I 263 I 382 3 354 I 648 2111 3 686 3 215 848 2 535 2 688 5 032 2 538 
1973 3 770 4 641 4 517 1467 I 656 3 910 I 750 2 287 4 576 3 821 I 039 2 606 3 083 5 059 3 107 
1974 4 538 5 287 5 146 I 759 2 109 4 250 I 876 2 589 5 692 4 607 I 233 2 923 3 511 5 594 3 507 
1975 5 088 6 OOO 5 447 I 858 2 381 5 181 2 131 2 794 5 284 5 137 I 270 3 359 3 926 5 769 3 617 
1976 6 076 7 324 6 475 2 201 2 693 5 934 2 319 3 024 6 403 6 190 1443 3 612 4488 7 030 4460 
1977 6 915 8 007 7 366 2 463 2 906 6 325 2 666 3 376 6 925 7 086 I 475 3 955 4962 7 607 5 330 
1978 7 573 8 691 8 199 2 633 3 134 6 989 3 071 3 666 7 709 7 737 I 439 4491 5 475 7 583 6660 
1979 8 056 9 404 9 037 2 947 3 848 7 816 3 511 4 216 8 368 8 191 I 505 5 392 6 179 7 760 6 363 
1980 8 591 9 321 9 517 2 991 4 074 8 758 4072 5 049 8 985 8 623 I 825 6 808 6908 8 239 6 527 
1981 8 725 10 049 9 937 3 414 4 470 9 505 4 769 5 627 9 394 8 925 2 157 8 113 7 554 II 454 8 914 
1982 8 757 11 126 10 911 3 983 4 867 10 181 5 521 6 275 9 607 9 860 2 373 8 739 8 218 13 410 9 347 
1983 9 159 12 320 11 981 3 986 4 660 10 619 5 836 7 025 10 505 10 383 2 306 9 054 8 713 15 726 11 112 
1984 9 784 13444 12 749 4 309 5 325 11 328 6 345 7 774 11 743 10 835 2 411 9 541 9 349 19 504 13 275 
1985 10 561 14 949 13 455 4 325 5 78 1 12 212 6 926 8 256 12 808 11 320 2 683 10 483 10 021 21 237 14 527 
1986 11443 16 166 14 785 3 847 6 135 12 934 7 583 9 052 14 175 JI 842 2 860 10 333 10 618 18 092 15 875 
1987 II 886 17 043 15 601 3 920 6 322 13 374 7 997 9 750 14 952 12 076 2 938 10 966 11 148 18 995 17 091 
Table 8 
Gross domestic product at constant market prices 
( Nalional C'urrt nq,· annual percentage changt) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 5,0 6,4 4,6 11,1 11,8 5,5 4,7 8,2 3,8 3,1 5,5 3,3 5,5 2,6 14,6 
1962 5,2 5,7 4,7 1,5 9,3 6,7 3,7 6,2 1,4 4,0 6,7 1,0 4,7 5,7 7,1 
1963 4,4 0,6 2,8 10,1 8,8 5,3 4,8 5,6 3,4 3,6 5,9 4,2 4,6 4,0 10,5 
1964 7,0 9,3 6,7 8,3 6,2 6,5 4,2 2,8 7,9 8,3 6,6 5,1 5,8 5,0 13,2 
1965 3,6 4,6 5,5 9,4 6,3 4,8 2,0 3,3 1,9 5,2 7,5 2,3 4,3 6,2 5,1 
1966 3,2 2,7 2,9 6,1 7,1 5,2 1,0 6,0 1,1 2,7 4,1 1,9 3,9 5,8 10,5 
1967 3,9 3,4 -0, l 5,5 4,3 4,7 5,1 7,2 0,2 5,3 7,5 2,7 3,5 2,8 10,4 
1968 4,2 4,0 5,6 6,7 6,8 4,3 8,1 6,5 4,2 6,4 8,9 4,1 5,3 4,0 12,6 
1969 6,6 6,3 7,5 9,9 8,9 7,0 6,1 6,1 10,0 6,4 2,1 1,3 5,9 2,9 12,1 
1970 6,4 2,0 5,1 8,0 4,1 5,7 3,5 5,3 1,7 5,7 9,1 2,3 4,7 - 0,2 9,4 
1961-70 4,9 4,5 4,5 7,6 7,3 5,6 4,3 5,7 3,5 5,1 6,4 2,8 4,8 3,9 10,5 
1971 3,7 2,7 2,9 7,1 5,0 5,4 3,4 1,6 3,1 4,2 6,6 2,7 3,5 3,1 4,2 
1972 5,3 5,3 4,2 8,9 8,1 5,9 6,4 3,2 6,6 3,3 8,0 2,3 4,5 5,4 8,4 
1973 5,9 3,6 4,7 7,3 7,9 5,4 4,7 7,0 8,8 4,7 11 ,2 7,6 6,2 5,7 7,9 
1974 4,1 -0,9 0,3 - 3,6 5,7 3,2 4,3 4,1 4,1 4,0 1,1 - 1,0 2,0 - 0,9 - 1,2 
1975 - 1,5 - 0,7 - 1,6 6,1 1,1 0,2 3,7 - 3,6 - 5,7 - 0,1 - 4,3 - 0,7 - 1,0 - 0,8 2,6 
1976 5,3 6,5 5,4 6,4 3,0 5,2 1,4 5,9 2,4 5,1 6,9 3,8 4,9 4,7 4.8 
1977 0,4 1,6 3,0 3,4 3,3 3,1 8,2 1,9 1,8 2,3 5,6 1,0 2,4 5,5 5,3 
1978 3,0 1,5 2,9 6,7 1,8 3,8 7,2 2,7 3,7 2,5 3,4 3,6 3,1 4,7 5,1 
1979 2,1 3,5 4,2 3,7 0,2 3,3 3,1 4,9 3,1 2,4 6.2 2,2 3,2 2,6 5,2 
1980 4,0 - 0,4 1,4 1,8 1,5 1,1 3,1 3,9 1,5 0,9 4,5 -2,3 1,2 - 0,4 4,4 
1971-80 3,2 2,2 2,7 4.7 3,7 3,6 4,5 3,1 2,9 2,9 4,8 1,9 3,0 2,9 4,6 
1981 - 1,5 - 0,9 0,2 - 0,3 0,4 0,5 2,6 0,2 - 1,4 - 0,7 0,4 - 1,4 - 0,l 3,4 3,9 
1982 1,5 3,0 - 0,6 - 0,2 0,9 1,8 0,8 - 0,5 0,8 - 1,4 3,5 1,5 0,6 - 3,0 2,8 
1983 - 0,1 2,0 1,2 0,3 2, 1 0,7 - 0,0 - 0,4 2,8 0,9 - 0,3 3,4 1,2 2,9 3,1 
1984 1,4 3,4 2,6 2,6 2,2 1,3 4,4 2,6 4,9 1,7 - 1,7 1,8 2,0 7,2 5,8 
1985 1,3 3,8 2,5 2,1 2, 1 1,3 2,1 2,3 2,1 2,3 3,7 3,3 2,3 2,5 4,6 
1986 2,0 2,5 3,5 - 0,4 2,7 2,3 3,2 2,7 2,2 1,7 3,9 2,6 2,7 2,5 3,2 
1987 2,1 2,2 3,0 - 0,2 2,7 2,9 3,7 3,8 2,5 1,8 3,6 2,4 2,8 2,7 3,2 
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Table 9 
Industrial production 
( Annual percentage change) 
8 DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 10 USA JA 
1960 6,8 8,7 11,7 8,9 6,9 15,7 9,0 10,0 6,8 10,6 2,2 24,4 
1961 6,2 5,1 6,1 5,5 8,6 10,8 2,9 3,6 0,0 5,5 0,7 19,6 
1962 5,1 8,9 9,2 10,1 5,1 7,1 9,6 - 4,2 3,5 1,1 5,1 8,3 8,0 
1963 7,4 1,3 3,5 10,4 11,9 7,1 5,8 8,8 1,0 5,1 4,0 5,7 6,0 11,5 
1964 6,5 11,7 7,7 10,9 11,2 6,1 7,7 1,2 9,2 9,7 7,9 6,2 6,8 15,4 
1965 2,5 6,6 5,3 8,5 14,3 1,9 4,2 4,6 0,8 4,4 3,3 4,0 10,0 4,1 
1966 2,0 2,9 1,3 16,0 15,2 5,4 3,0 11,4 -3,2 4,2 1,4 4,4 8,8 12,8 
1967 1,8 3,9 -2,5 4,6 5,9 2,5 8,1 8,3 -0,6 2,7 0,2 1,8 2,3 19,2 
1968 5,5 7,4 9,7 7,8 7,4 3,5 10,4 6,4 6.0 9,2 6,7 7,0 6,3 15,2 
1969 9,7 12,4 12,7 11,8 15,8 10,4 7,1 3,7 12,8 10,8 8,0 3,3 8,3 4,5 16,0 
1970 3,1 2,5 6,1 10,5 10,0 5,3 4,4 6,5 0,5 7,8 6,3 0,5 4,8 -3,0 13,6 
1961-70 5.0 6,2 5,8 5,3 6,6 7,1 2,4 6,2 2,8 5,3 5,0 13,4 
1971 1,7 2,4 1,4 11,3 3,2 4,8 3,7 -0,6 -1,1 5,5 7,8 -0,2 1,7 1,7 2,7 
1972 7,5 4,4 4,2 14,1 15,9 6,7 4,3 4,9 4,2 5,1 13,0 2,2 4,7 9,2 7,3 
1973 6,2 3,4 7,2 15,3 15,2 6,7 9,8 9.7 11,9 7,7 11,8 8,7 8,0 8,4 14,9 
1974 4,0 -0,8 -1,l -1,5 9,2 2,3 3,0 4,0 3,5 4,7 2,8 -2,4 0,8 -0,3 -3,9 
1975 -9,8 -6,0 -6,2 4,3 -6,5 7,5 -6,I -8.9 -21,9 -5,l -4,9 -4,7 -6,7 -8,9 -10,5 
1976 7,8 9,6 7,4 10,6 5,1 8,7 8,7 11,6 3,8 7,7 3,4 2,7 7,6 10,8 11,0 
1977 0,5 0,8 2,1 1,5 5,3 1,9 8,0 0,0 0,5 0,5 13,l 4,7 2,0 5,9 4,1 
1978 2,4 2,3 3,0 7,5 2,3 2,4 7,9 2,1 3,2 0,8 6,9 3,8 2,8 6,5 6,2 
1979 4,5 3,6 5,1 6,0 0,8 4,1 7,7 6,7 3,4 3,1 7,2 3,8 4,9 3,9 7,1 
1980 -1,3 0,2 0,2 0,9 1,2 -0,5 -0,8 5,0 -3,3 -0,9 5,4 -6,7 -0,5 -1,9 4,6 
1971-80 2,2 1,9 2,3 6,9 5,0 2,9 4,5 3,3 0,0 2,8 6,5 1,1 2,4 3,4 4,1 
1981 -2,7 0,0 -1,9 -0,6 -1,0 -2,4 2,2 -2,2 -5,1 -1 ,3 0,5 -3,4 -2,3 2,2 1,0 
1982 0,0 2,7 -2,9 -4,2 -1,l -1,2 0,3 -3,1 0,9 -3,7 4,6 1,9 -1,5 -7,1 0,3 
1983 2,0 3,2 0,6 -0,7 2,7 1,1 6,5 -2,4 5,4 1,9 1,6 3,6 0,9 5,9 3,6 
1984 2,5 9,7 3,0 3,5 0,8 2,5 12,9 3,3 13,3 4,6 -0,1 1,3 2,9 11,5 11,1 
1985 2,2 4,2 5,7 2,6 2,2 0,5 2,2 1,4 6,9 3,6 4,2 4,7 3,3 2,2 4,6 
1986 3,0 4,7 4,5 -1,0 2,4 3,7 2,3 2,0 4,2 2,5 3,0 
1987 2,9 4,0 3,5 1,0 2,7 5,5 3,6 3,2 3,3 2,3 3,0 
Table 10 
Private consumption at current prices 
( As percentage o/GDP at current market prices) 
8 DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 69,2 62,0 59,4 80,3 71 ,6 61,9 76,6 62,7 54,0 58,5 73,1 66,3 63,6 63,8 58,9 
1961 67,9 62,1 59,5 76,8 71 ,1 62,l 75,0 61 ,7 56,9 59,1 73,6 65,3 63,2 63,6 54,6 
1962 66,6 61 ,9 59,5 76,4 70,5 62,1 74,7 62,0 56,9 60,3 69,7 66,1 63,3 62,7 57,2 
1963 67,1 61 ,4 59,6 74,3 71,7 62,6 74,l 63,3 51,5 61,8 69,4 66,1 63,8 62,7 58,1 
1984 64, l 60,3 58,4 73,6 70,6 61,6 72,6 62,7 56,7 59,4 68,2 64,8 62,6 62,8 57,2 
1965 64,3 58,9 59,2 72,8 71,2 61,1 71 ,7 62,3 58,2 59,4 67,9 64,3 62,5 62,2 58,5 
1966 63,9 59,6 59,1 72,3 70,6 61,0 71,8 63,4 58,2 59,3 67,9 63,7 62,7 61,4 51,9 
1967 62,9 59,9 60,8 72,4 70,5 61,2 70,l 63,7 59,1 58,7 65,4 63,3 62,9 61,3 56,7 
1968 63,7 58,8 60,1 71 ,9 70,1 61,4 71,0 62,8 51,7 51,9 68,5 62,8 62,4 61,6 54,6 
1969 62,2 51,5 59,1 69,2 68,1 61,2 69,8 62,3 53,4 58,5 69,1 62,3 61,8 61,8 53,5 
1970 59,8 57,4 58,4 69,2 68,0 60,0 68,9 62,6 50,4 58,4 65,9 61,8 61,2 62,8 52,3 
1961-70 64,3 59,8 59,4 72,9 70,2 61,4 72,0 62,7 56,5 59,3 68,6 64,0 62,6 62,3 56,1 
1971 60,3 55,8 58,7 68,0 68,0 60,5 68,0 62,4 54,7 57,8 68,3 61 ,6 61,3 62,8 ~3,6 
1972 60,2 53,4 59,3 65,7 67,8 60,4 65,0 62,6 53,5 57,3 64,2 62,9 61,5 62,6 54,0 
1973 60,6 54,5 58,8 63,4 67,7 60,0 64,4 62,5 48,9 56,7 64,8 62,2 61,1 61,9 53,6 
1974 59,8 54,3 59,6 67,7 67,9 61,1 68,4 62,8 45,9 56,8 72,7 63,0 61,9 62,6 54,3 
1975 61,2 55,5 63,0 67,5 68,2 61,9 64,1 64,3 57,8 58,6 77,1 61 ,3 63,0 63,5 57,1 
1976 61,0 56,6 62,5 65,8 69,3 62,1 64,5 62,8 56,5 58,7 75,0 59,6 62,4 63,8 57,5 
1977 61 ,9 56,9 63,0 65,9 69,4 62,2 64,1 62,1 59,1 59,8 72,0 59,2 62,4 63,5 57,7 
1978 61 ,6 56,2 62,7 65,2 68,6 62,0 63,7 61,6 58,2 60,3 68,0 59,1 62,1 62,9 51,1 
1979 62,6 56,4 62,4 63,3 69,0 62,1 65,3 61,1 57,9 60,9 67,5 60,0 62,2 63,2 58,7 
1980 62,9 55,9 63,0 64,0 69,8 63,0 65,7 61,5 58,8 61 ,1 67,4 59,4 62,6 64,3 58,8 
1971-80 61 ,2 55,5 61,3 65,6 68,6 61 ,5 65,3 62,4 55,2 58,8 69,7 60,8 62,0 63,1 56,3 
1981 65,5 56,0 64,1 66,6 69,8 64,6 66,6 62,3 61,0 60,4 68,9 59,9 63,5 63,5 58,0 
1982 65,3 55,0 63,8 66,5 70,0 64,5 62,3 62,4 61,7 60,1 68,2 60,0 63,4 65,6 59,2 
1983 65,0 54,5 63,6 66,0 69,3 64,7 59,9 62,4 60,5 60,5 68,6 60,4 63,4 66,2 59,9 
1984 65,1 54,6 63,0 64,0 66,8 64,1 58,1 62,2 57,9 59,2 69,7 60,7 62,8 64,8 59,0 
1985 64,4 54,6 62,4 65,4 66,0 64,6 57,4 62,4 56,8 59,1 66,5 60,l 62,6 65,2 58,4 
1986 63,2 53,5 61,6 65,1 64,2 63,7 55,7 60,6 54,5 59,8 63,5 60,8 61,8 65,0 58,2 
1987 63,1 53,4 62,0 65,0 63,8 63,7 55,6 61 ,0 54,6 60,3 62,3 61,4 62,0 64,5 58,2 
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Table 11 
Private consumption at constant prices 
( National <'lf!'rcnry; annual pcrcentag~ chanK~ J 
B DK D GR E F JRL L NL p UK EURl2 USA JA 
1961 1,6 7,3 5,8 6,8 11.0 5,9 2,8 7,5 5,0 5,2 6,7 2,2 5,4 2.1 8,4 
1962 3,9 5,9 5,5 4,3 8,8 7,1 3,6 7,1 4,4 6,1 2,1 2,2 5,4 4,5 9.5 
1963 4,4 0,0 3,0 5,1 11,3 6,9 4,1 9,3 4,6 7,0 6,7 4,6 5,9 3,8 9,6 
1964 2,6 7,8 5,3 8,8 4,3 5,6 4,3 3,3 9,2 5,9 -1,4 3,0 4,4 5.5 11,6 
1965 4,3 3,4 7,0 7,7 7,0 4,0 0,4 3,3 4,0 7,5 4,5 1,5 4,4 5,6 5,6 
1966 2,7 4,3 3,7 6,8 6,9 4,8 1,7 7,2 1,6 3,2 0,9 1,7 4,2 5,1 9.7 
1967 2,8 2,9 1,4 6,2 6,0 5,1 3,4 7,4 -0,0 5,4 4,9 2,4 4,0 3,1 9,4 
1968 5,3 1,9 4,9 6,9 6,0 4,0 8,5 5,2 4,3 6,6 26,6 '.!,8 4,8 5,4 8,3 
1969 5,4 6,3 7,6 6,2 7,0 6,0 5,7 6,6 5,2 7,9 4,4 0,6 5,5 3.7 10.1 
1970 4,4 3,5 7,3 8,8 4,2 4,3 2,9 7,6 6,1 7,4 2,6 2,7 5,4 2,3 6,9 
1961-70 3,7 4,3 5,1 6,7 7,2 5,4 3,7 6,4 4,4 6,2 5,6 2,3 4,9 4,1 8,9 
1971 4,8 -0,8 5,5 5,6 4,9 6,6 3,2 2,9 5,4 3,3 12,7 3,1 4,6 3,7 5,6 
1972 5,9 1,7 4,9 7,0 8,3 6,1 5,1 3.4 4,9 3,5 4,0 6,1 5,3 5,7 9,3 
1973 7.8 4,8 3,5 7,6 8,0 5,8 7,2 5,9 5,8 4,0 12.0 5,1 5,5 4,0 9,'.! 
1974 2,6 -2,9 1,3 0,7 5,2 2,9 1,6 2,6 4,4 3,7 9,7 -1,5 1,9 -0,7 -0.3 
1975 0,6 3,7 3,8 5.5 2,4 3,4 -2,7 -1,6 5,3 3,3 -0,9 -0,7 1,7 2,1 4,4 
1976 4,6 7,9 3,9 5,3 4,7 5,6 2,8 3,4 3,1 5,3 3,5 0,3 3,8 5,6 3.5 
1977 2,3 1,1 3,9 4,6 2,5 3,1 6,8 1,4 2,5 4,6 0,6 -0,5 2,4 4,8 4,2 
1978 2,6 0,7 3,9 5,7 1,3 4,2 9,0 2,7 3,0 4,3 -1,7 5,6 3,7 4,2 5.4 
1979 4,4 1,4 3,5 2,6 1,2 3,5 4,5 4,9 3,3 3,0 0,9 4,5 3,6 2,7 6.5 
1980 1,8 -3,7 1,5 -0,3 1,3 1,5 0,4 4,8 2,7 0,0 3,2 -0,4 1,5 0,6 1.4 
1971-80 3,7 1,3 3,6 4,4 4,0 4,3 3,7 3,0 4,0 3,5 4,3 2,1 3.4 3,2 4.9 
1981 -0,4 -2,3 -0,1 0,9 -0,9 2,1 1,4 0,8 1,9 -2,5 2,3 -0,3 0,3 2,0 1,3 
1982 1,0 1,4 -1,3 2,6 0,7 3,1 -5,7 0,2 1,2 -1,2 2,0 0,7 0,6 1,2 4.1 
1983 -1,6 2,0 1,0 0,7 0,7 0,9 -2,0 -0,5 1,1 0,4 -1,0 3,9 1,1 4,5 3,2 
1984 1,0 2,7 1,1 1,1 -1,0 0,3 -0,5 2,0 0,6 -0,5 -3.0 1,7 0,9 5,3 2.8 
1985 0,7 4,3 1,7 3,2 1,3 2,4 1,5 1,9 1,7 2,0 0,7 2,8 2,1 3,3 2.7 
1986 2,8 2,6 4,9 -1,3 2,8 2,9 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,1 4,6 3,6 3,5 2,7 3.2 
1987 1,9 2,4 4,0 -0,9 2,8 2,9 4,3 4,2 3,7 2,0 3,6 3,6 3,4 2,2 3.6 
Table 12 
Public consumption at current prices 
( As pt•rc-cnlagr of GDP at current markc·t prin-.f) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR12 USA JA 
1960 12,4 13,3 10,7 11,7 7,4 13,0 12,5 12,8 9,8 12,6 10,5 16,4 12,8 16,9 7,9 
1961 11,9 14,4 11,l 11,3 7,3 13,1 12,4 12,7 9,9 13,1 12,5 16,6 12,9 17,8 7,5 
1962 12,3 15,2 11,9 11,6 7,2 13,3 12,5 13,1 10,9 13,7 12,9 17,0 13,3 18,0 7,8 
1963 13,0 15,4 12,6 11,3 7,5 13,4 12,7 13,9 12,3 14,4 12,3 16,9 13,7 17,8 8,0 
1964 12,5 15,6 11,9 11,7 7,3 . 13,3 13,3 14,3 10,8 14,6 12.3 16,4 13,4 I 7.5 7.8 
1965 12,8 16,3 12,1 11,7 7,4 13,1 13,6 15,1 10,9 14,6 12,0 16,8 13,6 17,1 8,2 
1966 13,1 17,I 12,1 11,8 7,7 13,0 13,6 14,9 11,4 14,9 12,1 17,1 13,7 IS.I 8,0 
1967 13,5 17,8 12,6 13,0 8,4 13,0 13,4 14,4 12,1 15,3 13,1 17,9 14,0 19,4 7,6 
1968 13,6 18,6 11,8 12,9 8,2 13,5 13,4 14,5 12,l 14,9 13,1 17,6 13,8 19.2 7.4 
1969 13,6 18,9 11,9 12,7 8,3 13,3 13,5 14,2 11,0 15,0 12,9 17,2 13,7 18,9 7,3 
1970 13,4 20,0 12,0 12,6 8,5 13,4 14,6 13,8 10,5 15,4 13,8 17,6 13,8 19,2 7.4 
1961-70 13,0 16,9 12,0 12,1 7,8 13,3 13,3 14,1 11,2 14,6 12,7 17,1 13,6 18,3 7,7 
1971 14,1 21,3 12,7 12,5 8,6 13,4 15,2 15,5 11,7 16,0 13,5 17,9 14,4 18,5 8,0 
1972 14,5 21,3 12,7 12,2 8,6 13,2 15,3 16,1 11,8 15,8 13,4 18,4 14,4 18,4 8,2 
1973 14,5 21,3 13.0 11,5 8,6 13,2 15,7 15,5 11,3 15,6 12,8 18,2 14,4 17,8 8,3 
1974 14,7 23,4 13,9 13,8 8,8 13,6 17,2 15.1 11,4 16,2 14,1 20,0 15,0 18,5 9,1 
1975 16,4 24,6 14,4 15,2 9,2 14,4 18,6 15,4 15,0 17,4 15,0 21,9 15,9 19,1 10,0 
1976 16,5 24,1 13,7 15,1 9,8 14,6 18,0 14,8 14,7 17,3 13.7 21,4 15,6 18,7 9.9 
1977 16,8 23,9 13,6 16,0 10,0 14,7 17,I 15,3 15,9 17,4 14,0 20,3 15,6 18,2 9,8 
1978 17,4 24,5 13,7 15,9 10,4 15,0 17,2 15,9 15,7 17,7 13,9 20,0 15,7 17,7 9,7 
1979 17,6 25,0 13,7 16,3 10,9 14,9 18,1 16,2 16,0 18,1 13,9 19,8 15,8 17,6 9.7 
1980 17,9 26,7 13,9 16,4 11,5 15,2 19,9 16,4 16,7 17,9 14,6 21,3 16,3 18,3 9,8 
1971-80 16,1 23,6 13,5 14,5 9,6 14,2 17,2 15,6 14,0 16,9 13,9 19.9 15,3 18,3 9,2 
1981 18,9 27,8 14.2 18,0 11,6 15,8 19,8 18,3 17,4 17,8 15,0 21,9 17,0 18,2 9.9 
1982 18,3 28,2 14,1 18,4 12,0 16,2 19,8 18,6 16,9 17,7 14,8 21,9 17,1 19.2 9,9 
1983 17,8 27,4 13,9 18,7 12,3 16,4 19,7 19,3 16,3 17,6 14,9 21,9 17.3 19,3 10,0 
1984 17,4 26,1 13,6 19,0 12,3 16,4 19,0 19,4 15,7 16,8 14,7 21,9 17,1 18,8 9,8 
1985 17,2 25,2 13,6 19,7 12,5 16,3 18,7 19,5 15,3 16,3 14,5 21,2 17.0 19.6 
1986 16,7 24,2 13,3 18,9 12,3 15,7 18,3 19,0 14,8 16,0 14,0 21,3 16,6 
1987 16,3 24,0 13,3 18,6 12,3 15,3 18,1 18,8 14,9 15,8 13,8 21,1 16,5 
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Table 13 
Public consumption at constant prices 
( National currency; annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 1,9 5,3 6,6 4,4 5,6 4,8 2,9 4,4 1,3 2,8 26,7 3,5 4,7 6,1 6,1 
1962 8,6 9,9 10,4 6,7 6,7 4,7 2,9 3,9 2,4 3,3 8,5 3,1 5,6 5,3 8,4 
1963 11,6 2,9 6,3 4,2 9,7 3,4 4,2 4,3 5,8 4,7 3,0 1,8 4,3 1,5 8,7 
1964 4,2 7,3 0,8 9,3 1,3 4,2 3,0 4,2 -0,8 1,7 6,8 1,6 2,6 2,5 6,0 
1965 5,5 3,4 4,0 9,0 3,7 3,2 3,6 4,0 2,5 1,5 7,4 2,6 3,5 2,8 6,3 
1966 4,7 5,8 1,0 6,3 1,7 2,7 1,1 4,0 5,8 1,7 5,3 2,7 2,6 10,2 5,8 
1967 5,7 7,6 3,0 8,5 2,4 4,3 5,3 4,4 4,2 2,4 10,7 5,7 4,4 8,0 4,7 
1968 3,5 4,7 -1,4 1,3 1,8 5,6 4,9 5,2 5,6 2,2 8,5 0,4 2,2 3,0 5,7 
1969 6,3 6,8 4,6 7,7 4,2 4,1 6,7 2,8 3,3 4,5 3,5 -1,9 2,7 0,5 5,1 
1970 3,1 6,9 4,3 5,9 5,2 4,2 7,5 2,6 4,1 6,0 7,0 1,7 3,6 -1,2 5,7 
1961-70 5,5 6,0 3,9 6,3 4,2 4,1 4,2 4,0 3,4 3,1 8,6 2,1 3,6 3,8 6,2 
1971 5,5 5,5 3,8 4,9 4,7 3,5 8,7 5,7 3,9 4,4 6,4 3,0 4,1 -2,1 5,5 
1972 5,9 5,7 2,3 5,7 5,5 2,7 7,5 5,3 4,3 0,8 8,6 4,2 3,8 2,5 5,6 
1973 5,3 4,0 3,7 6,8 6,7 3,2 6,8 2,4 3,9 0,8 7,8 4,3 3,7 0,6 5,4 
1974 3,4 3,5 2,4 12,1 8,2 1,2 7,6 2,8 5,2 2,2 17,3 1,9 2,8 3,3 3,1 
1975 4,5 2,0 1,5 11,9 5,3 4,7 6,5 3,2 6,7 4,1 6,6 5,6 4,1 2,2 6,7 
1976 3,7 4,5 -0,2 5,1 5,3 6,2 2,6 2,2 2,4 4,1 7,0 1,2 2,7 1,9 4,7 
1977 2,3 2,4 1,7 6,5 4,1 1,4 2,1 2,8 2,6 3,4 11,8 -1,7 1,5 1,9 4,4 
1978 6,0 6,2 3,7 3,5 5,5 4,3 8,2 2,3 2,1 3,9 4,3 2,3 3,6 2,1 5,2 
1979 2,5 5,9 3,6 5,8 4,2 1,8 4,5 1,6 2,9 2,8 8,9 2,2 2,7 2,5 4,4 
1980 1,5 4,3 2,1 0,2 4,4 1,8 7,2 2,1 3,1 0,6 6,5 1,3 2,0 2,6 2,8 
1971-80 4,1 4,4 2,5 6,2 5,4 3,1 6,1 3,0 3,7 2,7 8,5 2,4 3,1 1,7 4,8 
1981 1,2 2,6 1,2 6,8 1,5 2,4 0,4 3,3 1,4 2,0 3,4 -0,1 1,7 2,4 4,8 
1982 -1,2 3,1 -0,7 1,9 6,6 2,4 3,8 2,4 0,5 0,7 4,7 0,9 1,5 2,8 1,9 
1983 0,7 -0,8 0,3 2,1 4,6 1,5 -0,0 2,5 1,4 1,5 2,2 1,9 1,6 1,6 2,8 
1984 -0,1 -0,7 0,9 3,9 2,0 0,3 -1,2 2,7 0,4 -1,6 1,8 1,0 1,0 3,5 2,3 
1985 1,0 1,6 2,1 2,3 3,5 1,3 0,5 2,5 1,0 0,6 1,6 0,5 1,6 3,5 2,6 
1986 0,4 -0,2 2,5 -0,8 2,3 0,6 1,0 2,1 1,2 0,5 1,0 0,8 1,3 1,5 2,5 
1987 0,0 0,9 2,3 -1,3 1,3 0,3 0,4 2,2 1,1 0,1 1,0 0,7 1,1 0,7 1,7 
Table 14 
Gross fIXed investment at current prices; total economy 
( As percentage o/GDP at current market prices) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 19,3 21,6 24,3 19,0 17,9 20,1 14,4 22,6 20,9 24,1 23,2 16,4 20,7 17,9 29,5 
1961 20,7 23,2 25,2 18,2 18,8 21,2 16,3 23,2 24,2 24,8 23,2 17,3 21,6 17,4 32,5 
1962 21,3 23,1 25,7 20,1 19,2 21,4 17,9 23,7 25,9 24,5 22,4 17,0 21,8 17,6 32,9 
1963 20,7 22,0 25,6 19,2 19,4 22,1 19,5 24,0 30,1 23,8 23,7 16,8 21,9 17,9 31,5 
1964 22,4 24,5 26,6 21,0 20,7 22,9 20,5 22,2 33,7 25,5 22,8 18,4 22,6 18,1 31,7 
1965 22,4 24,1 26,1 21,6 21,7 23,3 21,4 19,3 28,0 25,2 22,8 18,5 22,3 18,7 29,8 
1966 22,9 24,1 25,4 21,7 22,0 23,7 19,8 18,8 26,6 26,3 25,1 18,5 22,2 18,5 30,4 
1967 22,9 24,2 23,l 20,3 22,3 23,8 20,1 19,5 23,9 26,4 26,6 19,l 21,9 17,9 32,0 
1968 21,5 23,4 22,4 23,2 22,8 23,3 20,9 20,3 22,1 26,9 22,2 19,4 21,9 18,1 33,2 
1969 21,3 24,6 23,3 24,6 23,2 23,4 23,3 21,0 22,2 24,6 22,6 18,9 22,1 18,2 34,4 
1970 22,7 24,7 25,5 23,6 23,2 23,4 22,7 21,4 23,1 25,9 23,2 19,0 22,8 17,6 35,5 
1961-70 21,9 23,8 24,9 21,4 21,3 22,9 20,2 21,3 26,0 25,4 23,4 18,3 22,1 18,0 32,4 
1971 22,1 24,2 26,1 25,2 21,2 23,6 23,6 20,4 28,4 25,4 24,7 18,9 22,7 18,1 34,2 
1972 21,3 24,6 25,4 27,8 22,2 23,7 23,7 19,8 27,8 23,6 27,1 18,7 22,4 18,7 34,1 
1973 21,4 24,8 23,9 28,0 23,6 23,8 25,3 20,8 27,3 23,1 26,8 20,0 22,6 19,1 36,4 
1974 22,7 24,0 21,6 22,2 24,7 24,3 24,6 22,4 24,5 21,9 26,0 20,9 22,6 18,4 34,8 
1975 22,5 21,1 20,4 20,8 23,3 23,3 22,7 20,6 27,8 21,l 25,9 19,9 21,4 17,0 32,5 
1976 22,1 23,0 20,1 21,2 21,8 23,3 25,0 20,0 24,9 19,4 25,1 19,4 21,0 17,1 31,2 
1977 21,7 22,1 20,2 23,0 21,0 22,3 24,8 19,6 25,1 21,l 26,5 18,6 20,6 18,3 30,2 
1978 21,7 21,7 20,7 23,9 19,9 21,4 27,7 18,7 24,1 21,3 27,9 18,5 20,4 19,5 30,4 
1979 20,8 20,9 21,8 25,8 18,9 21,5 30,5 18,8 24,3 21,0 26,6 18,8 20,6 19,8 31,7 
1980 21,2 18,8 22,7 24,2 19,4 21,9 28,6 19,8 27,0 21,0 28,6 18,1 20,9 18,5 31,6 
1971-80 21,8 22,5 22,3 24,2 21,6 22,9 25,6 20,1 26,1 21,9 26,5 19,2 21,5 18,4 32,7 
1981 18,1 15,6 21,8 22,3 20,3 21,4 29,1 20,2 25,4 19,2 32,2 16,4 20,2 17,8 30,7 
1982 17,4 16,1 20,5 20,2 19,7 20,8 25,9 19,0 25,9 18,2 32,3 16,4 19,5 16,5 29,7 
1983 16,4 15,9 20,6 20,3 18,8 19,8 22,7 18,0 23,7 18,1 30,3 16,4 18,9 16,8 28,3 
1984 16,1 17,1 20,3 18,6 17,8 18,9 21,0 17,9 22,2 18,4 24,7 17,4 18,6 17,9 27,8 
1985 16,2 18,8 19,7 19,2 18,1 18,8 20,8 17,9 21,8 18,4 22,5 17,0 18,5 18,4 
1986 16,3 19,9 19,8 18,8 18,0 18,6 20,0 17,8 20,9 18,7 22,7 17,4 18,5 
1987 16,6 19,6 20,4 18,6 18,6 18,7 20,1 18,1 20,6 19,l 24,0 17,4 18,8 
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Table 15 
Gross fixed investment at constant prices; total economy 
( National curreficy; annual perccntagt' change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 12,4 13,9 6,7 8,1 17,9 10,9 15,9 11,6 9,0 6,0 6,0 9,8 9,6 1,6 27.8 
1962 5,9 6,7 4,0 8,4 11.4 8,5 14,8 9,8 7,8 3,4 1,1 0,7 5,7 7,4 11.3 
1963 0,1 -2,4 1,4 5,5 11,4 8,8 12,0 8,1 14,2 1,1 14,6 1,4 4.6 7,4 10,4 
1964 14,7 23,5 11,4 20,7 15,0 10,5 11,6 -5,8 22,I 19,2 4,5 16,6 9,7 6,6 16,7 
1965 4,1 4,7 4,7 12,8 16,6 7,0 10,0 -8,4 -13,9 5,3 10,5 5,2 3,9 10,3 3,2 
1966 6,8 4,3 1,2 3,2 12,7 7,3 -3,0 4,3 -5,1 8,0 17,4 2,5 4,6 5,0 13,4 
1967 2,9 5,4 -6,9 -1,6 6,0 6,0 6,5 11,7 -7,9 8,5 5,8 8,8 3,7 -1.3 17,7 
1968 -1,3 1,9 3,6 21,4 9,4 5,5 13,1 10,8 -4,2 11,2 -9,3 6,1 6,3 6,1 19,9 
1969 5,3 11,8 9,8 18,6 9,8 9,2 18,3 7,8 10,5 -2,2 9,0 -0,5 6,8 2,4 18,5 
1970 8,4 2,2 9,4 -1,4 3,0 4,6 0,3 3,0 7,5 7,5 11,5 2,5 5,2 -3,6 16.9 
-1961-70 5,8 7,0 4,4 9,3 11,2 7,8 9,8 5,1 3,4 6,7 6,9 5,2 6,0 4,1 15.4 
1971 -1,9 1,9 6,1 14,0 -2,9 7,1 8,8 -3,2 12,6 1,5 9,8 1,9 2,9 5,4 4,1 
1972 3,4 9,3 2,7 15,4 15,9 7,2 7,4 0,9 6,7 -2,3 13,5 -0,3 4,1 8,5 10,0 
1973 7,0 3,5 -0,3 7,7 14,3 6,1 16,2 7,7 11,9 4,2 9,5 6,5 5,5 7,3 12,6 
1974 6,9 -8,9 -9,6 -25,6 6,6 0,9 -11,6 3,3 -6,1 -4,0 -7,0 -2,5 -2,5 -6,8 -9.5 
1975 -1,9 -12,4 -5,3 0,2 -3,9 -3,2 -2,6 -12,7 -6,9 -4,4 -11,3 -1,7 ·-5,3 -11,2 -1,2 
1976 4,0 17,I 3,6 6,8 -2,0 3,7 13,6 2,3 -3,8 -2,2 0,8 1,6 2,6 6,3 2,7 
1977 0,0 -2,4 3,6 7,8 -0,2 -0,8 4,1 -0,4 -1,1 9,7 12,0 -1.8 I.I 10,5 4,0 
1978 2,8 1,1 4,7 6,0 -2,3 1,5 18,9 -0,1 1,3 2,5 7,1 3,1 2,3 9,5 8,5 
1979 -2,7 -0,4 7,2 8,8 -4,5 3,7 13,6 5,8 3,8 -1,7 -0,9 2,6 3,5 3.1 5,3 
1980 4,6 -12,6 2,8 -6,5 1,3 3,2 -4,7 9,4 11,6 -0,9 10,3 -5,2 1,9 -6,1 0,0 
1971-80 2,2 -0,8 1,4 2,8 2,0 2,9 5,9 1,1 2,8 0,2 4,1 0,4 1,6 2,4 3,5 
1981 -16,3 -19,2 -4,8 -7,5 1,2 -1,1 7,5 0,6 -6,7 -10,4 4,6 -9,4 -4,I 1,1 3,1 
1982 -1,7 7,1 -5,3 -1,9 -2,4 0,7 -5,1 -5,2 2,4 -4,1 2,9 6,4 -1,5 -6,6 0,8 
1983 -3,9 0,9 3,2 -1,9 -3,6 -2,3 -9,4 -3,8 -5,4 0,4 -7,5 4,6 -0,4 8,1 -0,1 
1984 1,0 11,0 0,8 -4,7 -3,5 -2,2 -1,8 4,1 -1,4 4,3 -18,0 8,2 1,3 18,0 5,7 
1985 3,3 14,7 -0,3 3,4 5,4 3,0 1,6 4,1 1,7 2,4 -1,8 1,0 2,3 7,3 5,6 
1986 5,3 10,8 5,8 -2,5 6,6 3,9 2,5 5,9 2,7 3,7 8,6 3,6 5,0 2,6 6,7 
1987 4,1 1,2 5,7 -0,3 6,3 4,4 5,0 7,5 2,0 3,2 8,5 2,6 4,9 5,7 5,3 
Table 16 
Net stockbuilding at current prices 
( As percentage o/GDP al currenl market prict!s) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 -0,1 4,4 2,9 -0,4 -0,5 3,0 2,0 2,1 2,4 3,3 1.4 2,2 2,3 0,7 3,6 
1961 0,5 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,4 2,3 2,2 2,7 3,9 1,0 1,7 0,4 7,2 
1962 -0,0 2,9 1,7 1,1 3,6 2,3 1,6 1,7 5,6 1,5 1,8 -0,0 1,5 1,2 2,2 
1963 0,4 0,8 0,5 2,1 3,4 1,5 0,9 1,0 -0,1 1,1 2,0 0,5 1,1 0,9 3,6 
1964 1,5 1,7 1,4 4,7 2,6 2,4 1,2 0,5 -1,2 3,0 3,3 2,1 1,8 0,7 3.7 
1965 0,8 2,3 2,3 4,7 3,0 1,6 2,3 0,7 2,1 1,9 4,4 1,3 1,7 1,3 2,1 
1966 1,0 0,8 1,0 0,6 2,9 2,0 0,8 0,8 1,7 1,3 1,8 0,8 1,3 1,5 2,1 
1967 0,4 0,0 -0,1 2,0 1,4 1,8 -0,4 1,1 -3,0 0,9 0,6 0,7 0,8 1,2 3,4 
1968 0,9 0,6 2,1 -0,1 0,8 1,8 1,1 0,0 -1,9 0,6 3,1 1,0 1,2 1,1 3,6 
1969 1,9 1,3 2,9 1,3 2,5 2,6 2,4 0,7 -1,2 2,1 1,8 1,1 2,0 1,1 3,1 
1970 1,6 1,0 2,0 4,5 1,3 2,7 1,7 1,7 3,1 2,0 5,9 0,7 1,8 0,2 3,5 
1961-70 0,9 1,3 1,6 2,3 2,3 2,0 1,3 1,1 0,7 1,7 2,9 0,9 1,5 1,0 3.5 
1971 1,4 0,6 0,6 2,7 1,4 1,5 0,3 0,6 1,9 1,1 3,2 0,2 0,9 0.8 1.5 
1971 0,5 0,2 0,6 1.8 1,4 1,9 1,4 0,6 1,6 0,5 3,6 0,0 0,9 0,7 1,4 
1973 1,3 1,3 1,3 7,8 1,2 2,4 1,6 3,4 0,7 1,4 5,9 2,1 2,2 1,2 1,7 
1974 2,2 1,2 0,2 7,1 3,4 2,4 4,4 4,2 -1,9 2,3 5,2 1,2 2,1 0,8 2,5 
1975 -0,6 -0,2 -0,7 6,2 3,3 -0,3 0,6 -0,3 -4,1 -0,4 -3,3 -1,3 -0,2 -0,4 0,3 
1976 0,2 1,0 1,4 5,1 3,1 1,2 0,4 3,6 -1,0 1,2 1,8 0,7 1,7 0,7 0,7 
1977 0,3 0,8 0,7 3,5 1,6 1,1 3,2 1,8 -3,2 0,6 2,5 1,3 1,2 1,4 0,7 
1978 0,2 -0,2 0,5 3,7 0,4 0,6 1,4 1,3 1,9 0,6 2,6 1,1 0,8 1,3 0,5 
1979 0,7 0,5 1,7 4,3 1,2 1,4 2,5 2,4 -1,1 0,5 2,9 1,1 1,5 0,6 0,8 
1980 0,8 -0,3 0,8 4,4 1,8 1,7 -0,8 5,2 -0,4 0,5 4,1 -1,3 1,5 -0,3 0,7 
1971-80 0,7 0,5 0,7 4,6 1,9 1,4 1,5 2,3 -0,6 0,8 2,8 0,5 1,3 0,7 1,1 
1981 -0,1 -0,2 -0,8 3,2 0,4 -0,2 -1,3 1,1 0,2 -0,9 3,6 -1,2 -0,2 1,2 0.5 
1982 -0,2 0,2 -0,7 2,1 0,1 0,9 -0,5 1,0 -0,9 -0,3 4,3 -0,4 0,2 -0,5 0,4 
1983 -0,8 0,2 -0,1 1,1 0,2 -0,0 0,6 -0,3 1,9 -0,2 -1,3 0,3 -0,0 -0,5 0,1 
1984 -0,3 1,2 0,6 1.4 0,2 0,3 2,1 0,7 3,2 0,5 -1,9 -0,1 0.4 1.5 0,5 
1985 -0,0 1,1 0,8 7,5 0,2 -0,1 0,8 0,7 4,9 1,1 -0,4 0,3 0,6 0,5 
1986 0,3 0,7 1,4 5,0 0,3 0,2 1,3 1,0 4,6 0,7 1,2 0,2 0,7 
1987 0,2 0,6 1,0 4,1 0,3 0,2 1,2 1,3 4,5 0,6 1,3 0,3 0.7 
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Table 17 
Price deflator of GDP at market prices 
( National currency; annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 1,3 4,3 4,7 1,5 1,8 3,4 2,8 2,8 -3,7 2,4 2,0 3,3 3,3 1,0 7,9 
1962 1,7 6,6 3,8 4,6 5,7 4,7 4,4 5,8 3,9 3,5 -0,2 3,7 4,3 1,9 3,6 
1963 3,0 5,8 3, 1 1,4 8,5 6,4 2,6 8,5 3,1 4,7 2,4 2,0 4,8 1,5 4,5 
1964 4,6 4,6 3,0 3,7 6,3 4, 1 9,2 6,5 5,8 8,7 1,8 3,7 4,6 1,7 4,4 
1965 5, 1 7,4 3,6 4,0 9,4 2,7 4,4 4,2 2,8 6, 1 3,9 4,9 4,5 2,0 5,1 
1966 4,2 6,8 3,3 4,9 8, 1 2,9 4,3 2,2 3,9 6,0 5,3 4,7 4,0 3,5 5,1 
1967 3, 1 6,3 1.4 2,4 7,7 3,2 3,9 2,8 0,4 4,2 3,9 2,9 3,1 2,9 6,2 
1968 2,7 7,0 2,2 1,7 5,0 4,2 4,4 1,7 5,0 4,2 1,7 4,2 3,3 5,0 5,3 
1969 4,0 7,0 4,2 3,4 4,4 6,6 8,9 4,1 5,3 6,4 7,4 5,4 5,1 5, 1 5,0 
1970 4,6 8,3 7,6 3,9 6,8 5,6 8,9 6,9 14,9 6,2 2,0 7,3 6,7 5,3 7,7 
1961-70 3,4 6,4 3,7 3,1 64 4,4 5,4 4,5 4, 1 5,2 3,0 4,2 4,4 3,0 5,5 
1971 5,6 7,7 8,0 3,2 8,0 5,8 10,6 7,2 - 1,3 8, 1 5,0 9,4 7,5 5,3 5,6 
1972 6,2 9,2 5,3 5,0 8,7 6,2 13,5 6,3 5,7 9,4 7,8 8,3 6,9 4,4 5,6 
1973 7,2 10,7 6,4 19,4 11,8 7,8 15,3 11,6 11,8 9,0 9,5 7,1 8,7 5,5 12,9 
1974 12,6 13, 1 7,0 20,9 16,6 11 , 1 6,1 18,5 17,5 9,2 18,9 14,9 12,8 9,0 20,8 
1975 12,1 12,4 6,0 12,3 16,7 13,4 22,4 17,5 -2,2 10,2 16,2 27,1 15,0 9,2 7,7 
1976 7,6 9,1 3,6 15,4 16,7 9,9 21,0 18,0 12,7 9,0 16,3 15,0 11 ,4 5,9 7,2 
1977 7,5 9,4 3,7 13,0 22,8 9,0 13,3 19, 1 0,8 6,7 26,4 13,9 11,7 5,7 5,8 
1978 4,3 9,9 4,3 12,9 20,2 9,5 10,5 13,9 5,4 5,4 21,7 11 ,3 10,2 7,4 4,8 
1979 4,6 7,6 4,0 18,6 16,7 10,4 13,7 15,9 5,8 3,9 18,8 14,5 10,8 8,5 3,0 
1980 3,8 8,2 4,8 17,7 13,9 12,2 14,7 20,6 7,4 5,7 20,9 19,9 12,9 9,6 3,8 
1971-80 7, 1 9,7 5,3 13,7 15, 1 9,5 14,0 14,8 6,2 7,6 16,0 14,0 10,8 7,0 7,6 
1981 5,0 10,1 4,0 20,0 13,6 11,8 18,2 18,3 8, 1 5,5 16,5 11,8 10,9 8,9 3,2 
1982 7,1 10,6 4,4 24,7 13,7 12,6 15,9 17,8 9,9 6,0 21 ,8 7,5 10,6 6,9 1,9 
1983 6,4 8, 1 3,3 19,9 11 ,8 9,5 10,4 15,0 8,2 1,6 24,1 5,0 8,3 4,5 0,8 
1984 5,3 5,7 1,9 19,9 11,6 7,3 6,6 10,7 6,6 2,6 25,6 4,4 6,6 3,5 0,6 
1985 5,3 5,4 2,2 17, 1 9,1 5,7 6, 1 8,8 5,6 2, 1 21,3 6,1 6,0 3,4 1,6 
1986 4,0 4,5 2,7 21 ,8 11 ,1 4,5 6,1 9,1 6, 1 0, 1 18, 1 3,6 5,6 3,0 0,8 
1987 1,7 2,6 1,5 12,0 5,6 2,2 2,2 4,6 2,8 -0,3 11,4 4,2 3,3 4,2 0,1 
Table 18 
Price deflator of private consumption 
( National currency; annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EURl2 USA JA 
1961 2,7 3,5 3,6 1,1 1,8 3,3 2,6 1,7 0,5 2,4 1,6 2,9 2,8 1,1 5,6 
1962 1,1 6,2 3,2 1,3 5,3 4,4 4,0 5,3 0,8 2,6 -1,4 3,7 3,9 1,7 6,1 
1963 3,7 5,6 3,1 3,4 7,8 5,7 2,5 7,0 3,1 3,8 1,2 1,7 4,3 1,6 6,9 
1964 4,2 4,0 2,3 2,2 6,7 3,4 6,9 4,9 3,0 6,8 8,1 3,6 4,0 1,4 4,4 
1965 4,6 6,1 3,4 4,6 9,7 2,6 4,8 3,6 3,4 4,0 6,2 4,9 4,3 1,7 6,8 
1966 4,1 6,5 3,5 3,5 7,3 3,2 3,8 2,9 3,4 5,4 8,7 4,0 4,0 2,8 4,9 
1967 2,5 7,4 1,6 1,9 5,8 3,0 3,1 3,2 2,3 3,0 2,6 2,6 2,9 2,4 4,8 
1968 2,9 7,1 1,6 0,7 5,1 5,0 5,2 1,5 2,5 2,6 - 8,5 4,6 3,2 4,1 5,6 
1969 2,8 4,6 2,3 3,0 3,4 7,1 7,4 2,9 1,9 6,1 5,9 5,5 4,3 4,5 4,7 
1970 2,5 6,6 4,0 3,1 6,6 5,0 8, 1 5,0 4,0 4,4 3,4 5,9 5,0 4,5 7,6 
1961-70 3,1 5,8 2,9 2,5 5,9 4,3 4,8 3,8 2,5 4,1 2,7 4,0 3,8 2,6 5,7 
1971 5,3 8,3 6,0 2,9 8,0 5,5 9,4 5,5 4,7 7,9 2,9 8,7 6,5 4,6 6,8 
1972 5,4 8,2 5,7 3,3 8,2 5,8 9,7 6,4 5,2 8,3 5,2 6,6 6,4 3,8 5,6 
1973 6, 1 11 ,7 6,6 15,0 11,4 6,8 11 ,6 12,5 4,9 8,5 9,8 8,3 8,7 5,9 10,7 
1974 12,8 15,0 7,4 23,5 17,5 13,5 15,7 20,9 10,2 9,5 22,8 17,1 14,4 10,1 21 ,2 
1975 12,3 9,9 6,2 12,7 15,6 11,3 22,3 17,7 10,2 10,1 19,1 23,7 14,0 7,7 11 ,3 
1976 7,9 9,9 4,2 13,4 16,8 9,8 20,0 18, 1 9,4 9,0 16,8 15,7 11,6 5,4 9,2 
1977 7,1 10,6 3,7 11,9 24,0 9,0 14,1 18,2 5,8 6,1 27,3 14,9 11,8 5,9 7,2 
1978 4, 1 9,2 2,8 12,8 19,2 8,7 8,0 12,9 3,4 4,5 21 ,0 9,1 9,0 6,9 4,5 
1979 3,9 10,4 4,0 16,5 16,2 10,4 14,9 15,1 5,2 4,3 24,0 13,5 10,6 9,0 3,6 
1980 6,5 10,7 5,8 21 ,2 15,6 13,2 18,6 20,2 7,7 6,9 22,3 16,4 13,2 10,3 7, 1 
1971-80 7, 1 10,4 5,2 13,2 15,2 9,4 14,3 14,6 6,6 7,5 16,8 13,3 10,6 6,9 8,6 
1981 8, 1 12,0 6,0 23,3 15,1 12,8 21,2 19,2 8,6 6,3 16,9 11 ,5 12,1 9,0 4,4 
1982 7,4 10,2 4,7 21,2 14,2 11 ,2 16,0 17,0 10,6 5,3 22,5 8,5 10,4 5,9 2,6 
1983 7,5 7,2 3,1 18,6 12,2 9,5 8,2 15, 1 8,0 2,8 25,5 5,2 8,4 3,8 1,8 
1984 5,9 6,5 2,4 18,0 11 , 1 7,3 8,5 11 ,1 6,4 2,6 29,3 5,1 7,0 3,2 2,1 
1985 4,9 5,0 2,0 18,4 8,4 5,5 5,4 9,4 4,0 2,2 19,3 5,4 5,8 3,2 2,3 
1986 1,2 2,4 - 0,0 22,5 8,0 2,4 2,9 5,6 0,8 - 0,0 12,0 3,9 3,5 2,5 0,5 
1987 1,7 2,1 1, 1 12,6 4,8 2,2 1,3 4,8 1,8 0,2 9,3 4,0 3,1 3,9 -0,3 
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Table 19 
Price deflator of exports of goods and services 
( Nalional currer.cy, annual perc,mtug~ chunge) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EURll USA JA 
1961 0,6 -1,2 0,3 0,2 2,0 0,3 -0,1 -0,8 -3,0 -1,7 3,5 1,3 0,3 1,1 -2,I 
1962 1,0 2,5 0,5 1,1 4,8 1,2 1,5 0,8 -1,7 -0,1 2,1 0,8 1,2 -0,3 -1,3 
1963 2,1 2,8 0,9 8,0 6,3 2,8 2,0 3,3 -0,0 2,6 9,6 0,9 2,6 0,1 2,2 
1964 4,2 3,4 2,5 0,9 2,8 4,4 4,9 4,1 2,2 2,5 -8,4 2,4 2.7 -0,5 2,0 
1965 1,4 2,2 2,5 -1,1 5,6 1,1 1,8 -0,0 1,4 2,3 5,2 1,9 1,8 3,4 0,5 
1966 3,7 3,0 2,5 3,9 5,7 2,0 1,8 0,2 0,8 0,7 -4,8 3,7 2,2 2,9 1,2 
1967 0,5 1,2 0,2 -2,7 7,9 -0,4 0,7 1,1 0,4 -0,0 8,5 2,2 1,3 1,8 1,2 
1968 0,2 3,0 -0,1 -1,3 9,1 -0,4 6,5 0,3 1,3 -0,5 5,4 8,4 2,4 2,2 0,7 
1969 4,6 6,7 4,1 0,5 1,6 4,8 6,1 2,7 6,5 2,2 4,0 2,5 3,5 3,1 2,5 
1970 5,7 6,5 4,4 3,1 5,0 7,8 6,8 6,1 12,5 5,8 12,9 8,7 6,6 5,1 3,5 
1961-70 2,4 3,0 1,8 1,2 5,1 2,3 3,2 1,8 2,0 1,3 3,6 3,2 2,5 2,0 1.0 
1971 2,1 3,5 4,0 1,7 6,0 4,8 7,3 4,3 -3,8 3,2 4,8 4,7 4,1 4,3 2,8 
1972 1,7 6,9 2,0 5,7 6,3 0,7 11,5 2,8 0,7 1,8 6,7 4,6 2,8 3,0 -0,7 
1973 8,3 12,0 6,3 26,l 10,4 7,4 19,7 15,2 13,8 7,2 14,7 12,5 10,2 13,0 9,1 
1974 24,5 20,5 15,1 31,6 22,1 22,7 23,0 34,9 27,1 26,0 43,4 25,2 24,4 22,l 30,7 
1975 5,5 7,7 4,2 12,9 10,4 4,7 18,8 11,3 -1,1 5,1 0,0 20,4 9,5 10,9 3,1 
1976 5,8 7,0 3,6 10,0 15,1 7,8 23,0 20,4 8,5 6,6 6,2 19,6 11,6 3,6 1.7 
1977 3,7 6,7 1,9 9,9 20,l 9,0 14,8 19,2 -2,6 3,6 33,2 15,5 11,0 4,1 -3,6 
1978 1,1 6,3 1,5 8,2 15,9 6,3 6,6 8,2 1,8 -1,3 23,7 7,5 6,2 6,9 -5,6 
1979 9,1 8,2 4,8 14,5 8,0 10,0 9,6 15,6 7,9 8,3 30,3 11,4 10,6 13,4 9,1 
1980 9,3 14,6 6,1 34,2 19,6 12,4 10,8 18,2 6,7 12,3 19,8 14,7 13,5 10,9 9,2 
1971-80 6,9 9,2 4,9 15,0 13,3 8,4 14,4 14,7 5,6 7,1 17,5 13,4 10,3 9,1 5,2 
1981 9,5 12,7 5,5 21,1 19,7 13,5 16,4 21,1 9,0 14,0 21,2 9,4 13,2 8,4 1,1 
1982 13,0 10,6 4,0 22,4 12,8 14,1 10,8 15,5 14,0 3,9 13,2 6,3 10,3 1.3 2,7 
1983 7,3 6,3 1,8 15,4 18,6 8,5 9,1 8,5 6,6 -0,4 26,7 7,2 7,4 1,4 -6,7 
1984 7,5 7,7 3,3 21,3 13,0 8,9 7,5 10,1 9,2 6,1 30,4 7,3 8,4 3,3 -2,3 
1985 3,1 4,7 2,7 16,3 6,5 3,7 3,1 8,1 3,1 1,9 15,5 5,1 5,0 -2,1 -0,7 
1986 -5,0 -4,7 -3,3 14,7 -1,3 -2,9 -2,3 -2,9 -2,0 -11,3 7,3 -6,8 -3,7 5,4 -11,5 
1987 1,2 1,2 0,2 9,3 4,3 2,3 1,1 3,7 1,5 -0,7 11,5 2,1 2,3 4,6 -0,5 
Table 20 
Price deflator of imports of goods and services 
( Natiotral currem..:,.,: annual per«mage change.•) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 2,6 0,1 -2,4 -1,7 2,0 0,1 0,9 -2,2 1,4 -1,9 1,1 0,0 -0,6 -0,9 0,6 
1962 0,8 -0,l -0,1 -0,7 2,0 2,7 0,5 0,4 0,8 -0,9 -1,2 -0,2 0,7 -2,1 - 2,6 
1963 4,0 1,9 2,4 3,o,; 2,0 1,1 1,8 1,5 1,2 1,4 2,0 2.5 2,4 1,4 3,1 
1964 3,2 1,3 1,7 3,0 2,4 0,9 1,3 3,4 2,1 2,4 5,3 2,5 2,4 2,1 1,3 
1965 0,2 1,6 2,9 0,3 0,2 1,4 2,5 0,6 1,7 0,5 7,2 1,6 1,6 1,0 -2,I 
1966 3,2 1,6 2,0 3,3 0,2 3,2 0,2 1,9 1,4 0,7 -0,3 1,6 1,5 2,1 2,1 
1967 0,5 2,5 -1,4 -3,0 2,8 -1,3 -0,3 0,7 -0,7 -0,9 13,I 1,3 0,1 0,5 -1,5 
1968 0,6 5,0 0,4 0,2 10,7 -1,1 7,9 0,7 0,0 -2,9 -16,0 11,1 2,6 1,3 2,0 
1969 3,2 2,9 2,4 0,0 3,0 4,9 4,2 1,4 3,1 3,3 -2,1 2,8 2,5 2,4 3,8 
1970 5,1 5,6 -0,2 4,0 5,1 9,7 6,9 3,7 6,6 6,6 19,2 7,1 5,1 6,6 3,0 
1961-70 2,3 2,2 0,7 0,8 3,0 2,1 2,6 1,2 1,7 0,8 2,4 3,0 1,8 1,4 0,9 
1971 3,4 6,1 1,0 2,9 5,0 3,7 5,4 5,3 6,3 4,3 1,5 3,8 3,5 5,4 -1,9 
1972 0,4 2,0 2,1 7,7 1,6 -1,8 5,8 3,9 -0,2 -0,4 3,4 3,0 1,6 7,3 -4,4 
1973 7,5 16,8 8,1 21,9 10,4 6,8 13,9 26,1 9,8 7,5 14,I 23,2 14,1 17,5 18,5 
1974 27,5 32,7 22,9 41,6 42,1 42,0 44,4 56,2 22,5 32,7 43,5 41,9 38,2 44,1 63,5 
1975 6,7 4,9 3,2 17,4 7,0 -0,2 20,5 6,4 9,8 4,3 15,5 13,7 6,4 9,6 9,1 
1976 6,3 8,5 5,0 11,2 14,4 8,6 19,0 24,1 6.8 6,4 13,2 21,8 12,8 2,8 5,9 
1977 3,1 7,7 2,2 5,8 21,9 10,7 16,8 17,1 1,5 3,2 29,3 14,1 10,5 10,5 -3,7 
1978 1,1 2,7 -2,1 9,7 7,3 1,2 4,7 4,7 2,6 -1,6 22,5 3,0 2,6 4,6 -14,7 
1979 8,9 13,7 8,0 17,7 7,3 10,3 13,7 17,4 7,1 10,9 31,8 8,6 11,7 17,2 28,7 
1980 13,6 21,7 12,3 34,1 36,5 16,8 18,0 21,9 8,3 14,5 25,6 9, 17,1 20,0 38,8 
1971-80 7.6 11,3 6,1 16,4 14,7 9,2 15,7 17.4 7,3 7,8 19,4 13,7 11,4 13,4 11,9 
1981 13,8 17,7 11,6 15,3 27,1 16,2 18,6 27,6 9.2 14,3 25,0 8,2 16,8 0.9 0.8 
1982 13,0 10,1 2,9 26,1 12,9 9,2 7,5 11,4 13.9 1,3 17,1 6,6 8,3 -6.3 3,5 
1983 7,0 5,0 0,5 21,9 21,0 6,5 5,2 5,2 7,3 0,7 28,6 7,7 6,6 -4,5 -5.7 
1984 7,4 8,6 4,7 23,6 10,0 9,4 9,4 10,7 6,8 5,5 31,5 8,8 8,8 -2,9 -4,3 
1985 2,3 2,8 2,3 17,4 3,7 0,5 2,6 7,2 1,6 1,3 11,2 3,5 3,5 -2,1 -2,5 
1986 -8,8 -10,1 -10,7 12,8 -15,4 -11,9 -6,9 -14,4 -7,1 -12,6 -2,6 -4,1 -9,7 1,3 -28,0 
1987 1,2 0,2 0,2 8,4 3,7 1,2 0,6 2,8 0.8 0,3 10,1 1,8 1,7 0,4 -4,0 
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Table 21 
Terms of trade; goods and services; including intra-Community trade 
(1980 = JOO) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK USA JA 
1960 106,0 112,1 100,7 108,8 92,9 105,7 106,2 120,1 115,2 101,9 104,4 100,1 139,5 184,5 
1961 103,9 110,7 103,5 110,9 92,8 105,9 105,1 121,8 110,2 102,l 106,9 101,4 142,3 179,5 
1962 104,1 113,5 104,2 112,9 95,4 104,2 106,2 122,4 107,5 102,9 110,5 102,4 145,0 182,0 
1963 102,2 114,5 102,7 118,4 99,4 105,9 106,4 124,5 106,1 104,1 118,7 100,8 143,1 180,3 
1964 103,2 116,9 103,5 116,0 99,8 109,6 110,2 125,3 106,2 104,2 103,3 100,8 140,8 181,6 
1965 104,4 117,5 103,2 114,4 105,2 109,2 109,4 124,5 105,9 106,0 101,5 101,1 144,l 186,5 
1966 105,0 119,1 103,8 115,0 110,9 107,9 111,2 122,5 105,3 106,0 96,9 103,1 145,2 184,7 
1967 105,0 117,6 105,5 115,4 116,3 109,0 112,4 123,0 106,4 106,9 92,9 104,l 147,0 189,7 
1968 104,5 115,4 105,0 113,6 114,7 109,7 110,8 122,5 107,8 109,4 116,5 101,5 148,4 187,4 
1969 106,0 119,7 106,8 114,2 113,2 109,6 112,8 124,1 111,4 108,2 123,9 101,3 149,3 185,1 
1970 106,6 120,7 111,8 113,1 113,l 107,6 112,8 126,9 117,6 107,3 117,4 102,8 147,2 186,0 
1971 105,3 117,8 115,0 111,7 114,2 108,7 114,8 125,7 106,4 106,2 121,2 103,6 145,8 194,9 
1972 106,7 123,5 115,0 109,6 119,4 111,4 121,1 124,4 107,4 108,6 125,0 105,2 139,9 202,5 
1973 107,5 118,5 113,1 113,4 119,3 112,0 127,2 113,6 111,3 108,2 126,6 96,1 134,5 186,4 
1974 104,9 107,6 105,9 105,4 102,5 96,8 108,4 98,1 115,5 102,8 125,4 84,8 113,9 149,0 
1975 103,8 110,4 106,9 101,3 105,8 101,6 106,9 102,7 104,0 103,6 108,6 89,8 115,3 140,9 
·1976 103,2 108,9 105,5 100,3 106,4 100,8 110,5 99,6 105,7 103,7 101,9 88,2 116,2 135,3 
1977 103,8 107,8 105,2 104,2 104,9 99,3 108,5 101,4 101,5 104,l 105,0 89,3 109,4 135,4 
1978 103,8 111,5 109,1 102,7 113,3 104,2 110,5 104,8 100,7 104,4 106,0 93,2 111,8 149,9 
1979 104,0 106,2 105,8 99,9 114,1 104,0 106,5 103,1 101,5 101,9 104,8 95,6 108,2 127,l 
1980 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1981 96,3 95,7 94,5 105,0 94,2 97,7 98,1 94,9 99,8 99,7 96,9 101,1 107,4 100,3 
1982 96,3 96,1 95,5 101,9 94,l 102,1 101,1 98,4 99,9 102,3 93,7 100,8 116,2 99,6 
1983 96,6 97,3 96,8 96,5 92,3 104,l 104,8 101,5 99,3 101,2 92,3 100,4 123,4 98,5 
1984 96,7 96,5 95,6 94,7 94,7 103,7 103,1 100,9 101,4 101,8 91,5 98,9 131,3 100,5 
1985 97,4 98,2 95,9 93,9 97,3 107,0 103,5 101,8 103,0 102,4 95,1 100,4 131,2 102,4 
1986 101,5 104,2 103,9 95,4 113,4 117,9 108,7 115,5 108,6 103,9 104,7 97,6 136,5 125,8 
1987 101,5 105,2 103,9 96,2 114,0 119,2 109,2 116,6 109,4 102,8 106,1 97,9 142,3 130,4 
Table 22 
Compensation per employee; total economy 
( National currency; annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 3,2 12,9 10,2 3,7 12,9 10,6 9,5 8,2 2,9 7,4 6,4 6,8 8,8 3,2 13,4 
1962 7,2 11,1 9,1 7,1 15,2 11,6 9,3 13,5 4,8 6,8 6,2 4,7 9,2 4,4 14,0 
1963 8,0 4,6 6,1 7,5 21,1 11,4 6,1 19,7 8,0 9,3 8,9 5,0 9,9 4,0 14,2 
1964 9,7 10,7 8,2 13,1 13,7 9,2 14,2 12,3 13,3 16,5 8,5 7,1 9,7 5,1 11,9 
1965 9,5 13,8 9,5 12,0 16,1 6,5 3,2 7,7 4,2 11,7 11,7 6,8 8,7 3,7 11,5 
1966 8,6 10,2 7,6 12,4 17,3 6,0 8,5 7,9 5,0 11,1 10,6 6,4 8,0 5,1 9,9 
1967 7,4 10,9 3,3 9,3 15,2 6,9 8,0 8,4 2,8 9,3 13,8 6,2 7,0 4,3 12,1 
1968 6,3 10,0 6,7 9,7 8,8 11,3 10,6 7,4 5,9 8,6 3,6 7,8 8,2 7,4 13,7 
1969 8,4 11,0 9,5 9,4 12,0 11,1 13,9 7,6 5,6 13,2 10,0 7,1 9,4 7,4 15,8 
1970 9,4 11,0 16,0 8,7 ll,O 10,5 16,8 15,7 15,1 12,4 27,4 13,0 13,5 7,6 16,7 
1961-70 7,8 10,6 8,6 9,3 14,3 9,5 9,9 10,8 6,7 10,6 10,6 7,1 9,2 5,2 13,3 
1971 11,7 11,7 11,6 8,3 14,4 11,5 14,0 13,l 7,8 13,8 16,3 11,4 12,1 7,2 14,9 
1972 14,0 7,9 9,9 13,4 17,5 10,2 16,9 11,1 9,7 12,8 16,4 13,1 11,8 7,4 14,6 
1973 13,0 13,1 12,1 18,0 18,1 12,7 19,8 19,6 11,5 15,4 18,0 13,2 14,6 7,0 20,9 
1974 18,2 18,4 11,5 20,0 22,2 17,5 18,6 22,1 23,0 15,7 35,5 18,8 17,8 8,1 26,1 
1975 16,5 14,0 7,2 21,1 20,5 18,3 26,9 21,0 12,4 13,3 34,5 31,2 18,6 9,2 16,2 
1976 15,9 11,7 7,9 21,3 24,1 14,7 19,9 20,9 11,3 10,8 22,3 14,8 15,0 8,0 10,8 
1977 8,6 9,7 6,6 22,8 26,6 12,6 14,6 21,4 9,9 8,5 24,6 10,8 13,4 7,5 10,0 
1978 7,5 9,2 5,6 23,3 25,4 12,4 15,6 16,2 6,1 7,2 19,0 13,4 12,5 7,6 7,2 
1979 5,6 9,4 5,9 23,4 19,6 13,1 19,3 17,9 7,0 6,0 18,7 15,1 12,7 8,5 5,9 
1980 9,2 10,0 6,9 16,2 17,8 14,7 22,1 22,5 9,1 5,5 23,3 19,4 14,7 9,9 6,0 
1971-80 12,0 11,5 8,5 18,7 20,5 13,8 18,7 18,5 10,7 10,8 22,7 16,0 14,3 8,0 13,1 
1981 6,4 9,2 5,2 23,4 16,3 14,3 17,3 21,9 8,8 3,5 20,6 13,2 12,8 9,5 6,5 
1982 8,1 12,1 4,2 25,4 12,8 13,7 14,6 17,2 7,2 5,8 18,5 9,1 10,9 6,5 4,0 
1983 6,4 7,9 3,8 21,8 13,5 10,7 10,5 16,5 7,6 3,2 21,6 9,2 9,9 5,7 2,7 
1984 6,8 5,4 3,2 22,6 13,0 7,8 9,9 12,0 6,8 0,8 19,8 5,5 7,6 4,1 4,1 
1985 5,7 4,4 3,1 22,0 9,2 6,9 6,6 10,0 4,6 1,3 21,3 7,5 6,9 4,7 3,6 
1986 3,0 3,1 4,0 15,2 8,6 4,3 6,6 7,6 4,2 2,2 17,2 7,7 6,1 3,5 4,0 
1987 2,6 2,9 3,3 10,9 6,1 2,7 4,7 6,1 5,6 1,9 12,5 6,7 4,7 4,2 3,5 
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Table 23 
Real compensation per employee; total economy 
( National cUi'r~ncy,· annual ~rc,·ntag~ change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 0,6 9,0 6,4 2,6 10,9 7,0 6,7 6,4 2,4 4,9 4,8 3,7 5,8 2,1 7,4 
1962 6,1 4,7 5,7 5,8 9,4 7,0 5,1 7,8 4,0 4,1 7,7 0.9 5.1 2,7 7,4 
1963 4,2 -0,9 2,9 4,0 12,4 5,4 3,5 11,8 4,7 5,3 7,5 3,2 5,4 2,4 6,8 
1964 5,3 6,4 5,7 10,6 6,6 5,6 6,8 7,1 10,0 9,1 0,4 3,3 5,5 3,6 7,2 
1965 4,7 7,3 5,9 7,1 5,9 3,9 -1,5 4,0 0,8 7,4 5,1 1,8 4,2 1,9 4,4 
1966 4,3 3,4 4,0 8,6 9,3 2,8 4,6 4,8 1,6 5,4 1,7 2,3 3,9 2,2 4.8 
1967 4,7 3,3 1,6 7,3 8,9 3,7 4,7 5,1 0,5 6,1 10,9 3,5 4,0 1,9 6,9 
1968 3,3 2,7 5,0 8,9 3,4 6,0 5,1 5,8 3,3 5,9 13,3 3,1 4,9 3,2 7,7 
1969 5,4 6,1 7,0 6,2 8,4 3,7 6,1 4,5 3,7 6,7 3,9 1,6 4,9 2,7 10,6 
1970 6,7 4,1 11,5 5,4 4,2 5,2 8,1 10,l 10,7 7,7 23,2 6,7 8,1 3,0 8,4 
1961-70 4,5 4,6 5,5 6,6 7,9 5,0 4,9 6,7 4,1 6,3 7,7 3,0 5,2 2,6 7,1 
1971 6,0 3,1 5,3 5,3 5,9 5,7 4,2 7,2 2,9 5,4 13,0 2,5 5,2 2,5 7,6 
1972 8,2 -0,2 4,0 9,8 8,6 4,2 6,6 4,4 4,3 4,2 10,7 6,1 5,1 3,5 8,6 
1973 6,5 1,3 5,2 2,6 6,0 5,6 7,4 6,3 6,3 6,3 7,4 4,5 5,5 1,0 9,3 
1974 4,9 3,0 3,8 -2,8 3,9 3,5 2,5 1,0 11,7 5,6 10,4 1,4 3,0 -1,9 4,0 
1975 3,8 3,7 0,9 7,4 4,2 6,4 3,8 2,8 2,0 2,9 13,0 6,1 4,0 1,4 4,4 
1976 7,5 1,6 3,6 6,9 6,3 4,5 -0,1 2,4 1,7 1,7 4,7 -0,7 3,0 2,5 1,5 
1977 1,4 -0,8 2,8 9,7 2,0 3,3 0,4 2,7 3,9 2,2 -2,1 -3,5 1,4 1,5 2,6 
1978 3,3 -0,1 2,7 9,3 5,1 3,4 7,1 2,9 2,6 2,5 -1,7 4,0 3,3 0,6 2,6 
1979 1,6 -0,9 1,8 5,9 2,9 2,4 3,8 2,4 1,8 1,6 -4,3 1,4 1,9 -0,4 2,2 
1980 2,6 -0,6 1,0 -4,2 1,9 1,3 3,0 1,9 1,3 -1,3 0,8 2,6 1,3 -0,4 -1,0 
1971-80 4,5 1,0 3,1 4,9 4,7 4,0 3,8 3,4 3,8 3,1 5,0 2,4 3,4 1,0 4,1 
1981 -1,5 -2,5 -0,8 0,1 1,0 1,3 -3,2 2,3 0,1 -2,7 3,2 1,5 0,6 0,4 2,0 
1982 0,7 1,6 -0,5 3,4 -1,2 2,3 -1,2 0,2 -3,I 0,5 -3,3 0,5 0,4 0,5 1,4 
1983 -1,0 0,6 0,7 2,7 1,1 1,1 2,1 1,2 -0,4 0,4 -3,1 3,9 1,4 1,8 0,9 
1984 0,8 -1,1 0,8 3,9 1,7 0,5 1,3 0,8 0,4 -1,7 -7,4 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,9 
1985 0,8 -0,6 1,0 3,1 0,7 1,3 1,1 0,5 0,6 -1,0 1,7 2,0 1,0 1,5 1,3 
1986 1,8 0,6 4,0 -5,9 0,6 1,9 3,6 1,8 3,3 2,2 4,6 3,6 2,5 1,0 3,5 
1987 0,9 0,8 2,2 -1,5 1,2 0,5 3,3 1,2 3,7 1,7 2,9 2,6 1,6 0,3 3,7 
Table 24 
Adjusted share of labour income; total eco}lomy 
( As /Jt'T<entag, o/GDP at factor cost) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 69,2 71,4 70,6 99,1 73,6 72,3 86,5 80,8 66,1 63,7 66,5 71,6 74,6 73,6 84,2 
1961 68,3 72,4 72,1 92,4 72,9 73,2 87,0 79,0 68,9 65,9 65,8 72,3 74,9 73,1 78,1 
1962 69,6 73,0 72,5 92,1 73,2 73,2 88,1 78,7 68,3 66,8 65,9 72,9 75,I 72,2 81,0 
1963 70,4 73,4 72,6 87,7 75,4 73,7 88,0 80,9 68,7 68,3 65,8 72,0 75,3 71,8 80,6 
1964 69,9 72,6 71,4 87,2 76,5 73,6 89,2 82,4 68,9 68,7 65,9 71,9 75,1 71,9 76,9 
1965 70,1 75,4 71,6 85,2 77,3 72,8 86,5 80,9 69,4 69,4 65,8 72,6 75,0 70,9 78,7 
1966 71,8 76,6 72,2 85,7 79,5 71,9 89,9 79,2 69,5 71,6 66,2 73,2 75,1 70,8 75,8 
1967 72,2 77,4 71,5 85,9 81,8 70,9 87,9 79,3 70,3 71,2 67,5 72,6 74,8 71,7 73,8 
1968 71,3 77,9 70,0 86,6 79,7 71,7 86,4 78,1 67,7 70,8 62,8 72,1 73,9 72,4 71,8 
1969 70,7 77,I 70,5 83,5 79,8 71,3 86,2 76,I 62,7 71,3 62,9 73,5 73,9 73,8 71,I 
1970 68,9 78,1 72,1 80,5 80,4 71,0 88,6 78,2 63,0 72,6 72,I 75,3 75,0 75,3 71,3 
1961-70 70,3 75,4 71,6 86,7 77,6 72,3 87,8 79,3 67,8 69,7 66,1 72,8 74,8 72,4 75,9 
1971 70,8 79,4 72,8 78,4 81,1 71,2 88,6 80,7 69,9 74,2 74,3 72,9 75,3 74,I 74,8 
1972 71,3 76,0 72,8 77,8 81,3 70,3 85,0 79,9 70,3 73,5 73,7 73,7 75,0 73,9 74,9 
1973 71,5 75,2 73,6 71,5 81,8 70,5 84,5 80,4 65,4 73,9 70,6 73,3 75,2 73,7 75,9 
1974 73,3 78,0 75,1 72,5 80,6 72,5 90,3 81,0 66,7 74,9 78,1 75,3 76,6 74,9 79.3 
1975 75,9 79,0 74,9 75,2 80,6 74,6 88,2 84,9 83,9 76,8 92,1 77,8 78,4 73,6 83,0 
1976 77,3 77,6 73,4 75,9 82,2 74,8 87,9 83,7 79,8 74,2 91,4 74,6 77,3 73,5 82,8 
1977 77,6 78,0 73,2 81,0 81,5 75,0 80,5 84.8 85,5 74,5 85,0 72,9 77,0 73,0 83,2 
1978 77,8 77,9 72,5 83,3 80,7 74,9 78,6 84,5 83,1 74,5 77,9 72,1 76,4 73,1 81,8 
1979 77,7 78,3 72,0 84,5 81,2 74,8 82,l 82,2 81,9 74,8 75,3 73,2 76,1 73,3 81,5 
1980 78,8 79,3 73,3 81,2 79,7 75,8 87,7 81,7 83,3 74,6 75,6 74,9 76,8 74,2 80,4 
1971-80 75,2 77,9 73,4 78,1 81,1 73,4 85,3 82,4 77,0 74,6 79,4 74,1 76,4 73,7 79,8 
1981 79,5 78,3 73,5 86,3 79,6 76,4 85,9 84,0 84,9 72,5 78,4 74,6 77,3 73,1 80,7 
1982 78,3 76,4 72,4 87,0 77,6 76,2 85,4 83,9 82,2 71,1 73,4 73,7 76,4 74,5 81,0 
1983 77,3 75,1 70,9 89,4 76,8 76,0 84,1 86,7 79,9 70,2 71,6 72,8 76,1 73,8 81,4 
1984 77,l 74,4 70,1 89,3 73,0 74,8 81,5 85,8 77,6 67,4 68,6 73,3 75,1 72,4 80,2 
1985 76,5 73,7 69,2 89,9 71,2 74,5 79,7 84,8 75,3 65,9 72,8 74,3 73,0 i8,7 
1986 74,4 73,0 68,5 88,0 68,8 72,9 78,6 82,1 72,7 66,9 75,1 73,5 73,2 79,I 
1987 73,7 72,7 68,5 91,5 68,4 71,6 78,9 81,4 73,2 68,3 75,9 73,4 72,4 79,6 
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Table 25 
Relative unit labour costs; total economy (calculated in a common currency against 19 countries) 
( 1972= /(K}J 
8/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 104,5 82,1 81,2 163,3 80,8 115,4 93,6 96,9 72,0 103,0 112,5 89,1 124,0 80,7 
1961 98,6 84,5 87,5 147,9 78,7 116,6 93,9 93,0 75,8 99,9 114,I 93,2 120,8 78,9 
1962 98,I 86,5 88,0 147,3 80,7 117,4 96,2 94,5 76,8 95,7 115,3 94,9 117,8 83,2 
1963 97,7 88,0 87,3 136,8 87,1 120,6 96,0 101,8 79,0 94,4 111,7 96,5 114,8 84,7 
1964 98,1 87,9 85,3 136,7 90,7 120,5 102,2 106,8 83,7 92,6 110,9 97,5 113,4 82,4 
1965 100,1 93,6 85,0 133,7 96,4 117,9 98,7 105,2 86,2 92,2 112,8 98,5 109,3 86,5 
1966 101,4 96,7 85,0 135,2 102,7 114,5 101,0 101,3 90,0 93,5 114.0 98,8 109,4 84,4 
1967 101,9 99,4 82,5 135,0 109.0 113,9 99,7 101,0 91,5 95,7 110,3 96,3 109,9 84,6 
1968 101,4 99.0 82,0 135,6 96,6 120,0 92,9 100,3 92,9 91,0 96,8 91,3 115,8 85,2 
-
1969 99,8 99,7 83,2 129,1 95,7 115,2 95,0 97,3 96,5 93,7 97,8 90,7 118,5 84,6 
1970 94,8 100,7 94,5 118,2 94,9 103,7 97,4 98,0 94,4 100,2 99,7 94,8 116.5 84,4 
1971 95,4 101,2 98,6 108,3 95,6 99,4 100,5 100,4 96.7 100,7 99,6 97,1 109,0 89,9 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 100,7 108,4 109,3 94.0 105,0 102.9 99.2 93.2 104,9 98,7 88,4 102,8 88,3 112,0 
1974 103,7 113,4 109,5 102,9 109,5 96,2 95,7 87,8 107,9 112,6 89,5 101,0 84.6 117,0 
1975 108,2 114,9 101,3 93,2 109.3 108,2 93,0 93,9 109,3 128,6 96,1 107,3 78,0 114,0 
1976 113,I 115,6 99,5 95,8 111,4 106,5 90,6 83,9 110,5 124,8 83,6 97,2 80,3 119,0 
1977 119,8 115,5 101,9 103,3 110,4 103,2 86,9 86,5 114.8 106,4 81,2 98,9 77,6 130,0 
1978 120,2 117,1 103,2 101,7 112,0 103,5 89,6 86,7 116,0 89,3 84,0 101,0 71,6 152,3 
1979 118,7 116,0 103.0 107,I 132,8 106,1 98,3 88,8 115,2 80,7 95,0 110,7 71,0 132,5 
1980 112,2 106,1 99,3 97,0 124,0 109,7 102,0 92,8 110,3 84,0 116,4 117,7 71,4 117,1 
1981 103,1 98,I 88,8 104,I 115,8 103,7 96,9 92,1 99,5 89,5 118,7 101,6 79,2 126,4 
1982 91,4 95,4 88,5 110,6 111,9 98,9 101,7 94,2 102,0 82,5 110,8 95,3 90,2 112,9 
1983 89,3 96,2 87,7 104,7 96,6 95,6 100,9 101,8 99,3 74,1 102,6 89,8 94,9 121,4 
1984 89,0 93,4 83,7 103,5 97,0 92,9 97,0 102,2 93,0 71,3 100,l 83,5 101,8 123,1 
1985 90,6 94,I 81,4 100,7 96,0 95,0 98,2 IOI.I 89,7 70.6 101,5 82,7 107,3 121,4 
1986 93,7 98,I 86,9 90,0 97,1 97,6 104,4 106,0 93,6 70,6 101,9 90,3 91,7 142,6 
1987 92,5 97,4 86,9 90,1 94,7 94,1 104,0 106,6 93,4 67,5 104,3 89,0 90,4 147.0 
Table 26 
Exports of goods and services at current prices 
( As percentage o/GDP at current market prices) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 38,4 32,2 18,8 9,1 10,4 15,0 31,8 14,I 86,7 47,7 17,5 21,1 19,9 5,1 10,8 
1961 39,6 29,9 17,9 9,3 IO,O 14,5 34,6 14,4 86,9 45,5 16,4 20,6 19,3 5,0 9,2 
1962 41,2 28,5 17,2 9,7 10,2 13,4 32,3 14,2 79,9 44,8 18,7 20,2 18,7 4,9 9,5 
1963 42,4 30,3 17,7 IO,O 9,6 13,1 33,6 13,7 77,7 44,9 19,1 20,0 18.6 4,9 9,0 
1964 43.2 29,7 17,9 9,2 11,0 13,2 33,4 14.4 78,8 43,5 25,6 19,4 18,8 5,2 9,4 
1965 42,6 29,2 17,9 9,0 10,6 13,8 34,8 16,1 80,7 42,9 26,8 19,3 19,1 5,1 10,5 
1966 44,3 28,4 19,0 11,3 11,2 13,8 37,2 16,5 77,2 41,7 27,I 19,5 19,5 5,1 10,6 
1967 43,4 27,2 20,3 10,7 I0,2 13,7 37,8 16,3 78,5 40,5 27,2 19,1 19,4 5,2 9,7 
1968 45,5 27,5 21,2 9,6 11,8 13,7 38,8 17,1 80,5 41,0 25,0 21,4 20,5 5,2 10,1 
1969 49,5 27,4 21,6 9,7 12,2 14,6 37,3 17,8 84,3 42,5 24,4 22,4 21,2 5,2 10,5 
1970 51,9 27,9 21,l 10,0 13,5 16,3 37,0 17,8 88,4 44,8 24,4 23,3 21,9 5,7 10,8 
1961-70 44,4 28,6 19.2 9.8 11,0 14,0 35,7 15,8 81,3 43,2 23,5 20,5 19,7 5,2 9,9 
1971 50,6 27,6 20,9 10,3 14,3 17,1 36,1 18,2 87.7 45,4 25,1 23,2 22,1 5,5 11,7 
1972 51,I 27,I 20,8 11,7 14,5 17,2 34,6 18,9 81,9 45,0 27,2 22,0 22,0 5,7 10,6 
1973 55,6 28.5 22,0 14,2 14,4 18,2 38,0 18,8 88,3 47,4 26,7 23,9 23,2 6,9 10,0 
1974 61,3 31,8 26,4 16,1 14,4 21,5 42,6 22,3 101,3 53,9 26,9 28,1 26,8 8,4 13,6 
1975 53,7 30,1 24,5 16,9 13,3 19,5 42,7 22,8 91,5 49,9 20,4 26,1 25,0 8,5 12,8 
1976 57,0 28,8 25,6 17,6 14,0 20,2 46,3 24,6 86,8 51,0 17,4 28,4 26,3 8,3 13,6 
1977 55,8 28,8 25,3 16,8 14,4 21,3 49,4 26,3 84,9 47,6 18,4 30,2 26,8 7,9 13,1 
1978 53,9 27,8 24,8 17,6 15,1 21,3 49,9 26,8 82,2 44,9 20,1 28,7 26,4 8,2 11,I 
1979 59,4 29,2 24,9 17,5 14,9 21,9 49,7 27,9 89,2 49,1 27,1 28,4 27,2 9,1 11,6 
1980 62,4 32,7 26,2 20,9 15,5 22,2 49,6 25,1 86,3 52,5 27,4 27,8 27,4 I0,2 13.7 
1971-80 56,1 29,2 24,1 16,0 14,5 20,1 43,9 23,2 88,0 48,7 23,7 26,7 25.3 7,9 12,2 
1981 68,3 36,5 28,6 20.2 17,3 23,6 48,5 26,7 84,1 58,0 27,8 27,I 29,0 9,7 14,8 
1982 72,3 36,4 29,6 18,1 18,2 23,1 48,5 26,6 86,4 57,6 26,6 26,7 29,2 8,6 14,6 
1983 75,2 36,4 28,7 19,1 20,5 23,6 53,0 26,1 86,0 58,0 32,1 27,0 29,5 7,7 14,0 
1984 79,2 37,3 30,6 21.0 23,3 25,4 59,8 26,8 97,0 63,1 38,8 29,1 31,7 7,5 15,2 
1985 78,4 36,9 32,3 20,4 23,4 25,2 60,8 28,2 96,6 64,6 39,9 29,5 32,4 7,0 15,1 
1986 73,0 33,7 30,3 20,4 20,5 23,4 56,7 25,4 89,1 57,5 36,4 26,6 29,6 7,3 13,0 
1987 74,2 33,9 30,2 20,9 20,5 23,9 57,4 25,6 88,3 58,2 37,6 26,3 29,7 7,4 13.1 
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Table 27 
Exports of goods and services at constant prices 
(National ,~ncy; annual per«ntagt change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1961 9,2 4,3 3,7 14,5 7,9 5,1 17,2 14,8 3,5 2,3 -2,6 3,1 5,4 0,6 6,9 
1962 10,l 4,9 4,1 10,0 12,8 1,8 -0,7 10,4 -1,6 6,2 19,1 1,8 5,0 5,3 16,8 
1963 8,2 10,0 8,0 6,7 3,8 7,1 9,7 6,5 3,8 6,0 0,9 4,5 6,4 6,7 7,3 
1964 9,4 8,5 8,5 1,7 25,5 6,7 7,9 10,8 13,3 11,3 58,7 3,2 8,8 12,1 21,0 
1965 6,l 7,9 6,6 12,7 6,9 11,5 9,0 20,0 5,8 7,6 11,1 4,5 8,5 2,4 22,6 
1966 7,7 3,9 10,1 34,4 15,2 6,6 10,7 11,2 -0,2 5,2 16,3 4,0 8,0 7,2 15,5 
1967 4,3 4,0 7,7 5,1 -4,7 7,3 10,2 7,2 1,9 6,6 3,6 1,5 5,1 4,3 5,7 
1968 12,2 9,3 13,0 -1,0 18.4 9,4 8,8 13,9 10,7 12,8 -3,4 12,0 11,9 7,8 23,1 
1969 15,3 6,2 9,3 14,6 15.5 15,7 4,6 11,8 13,8 14,9 2,9 8,9 11,4 4,8 19,6 
1970 10,2 5,6 5,8 12,4 17,4 16,1 4,4 5,8 9,0 11,9 -1,6 4,9 8,2 9,5 16,8 
1961-70 9,2 6,4 7,6 10,7 11 ,6 8,6 8,1 11,1 5,9 8,4 9,3 4,8 7,9 6,0 15,4 
1971 4,5 5,6 6,3 11,9 13,0 11,0 4,1 7,0 4,9 10,7 9,9 7,0 7,8 0,9 16,1 
1972 11 ,1 5,6 7,1 22,9 12,2 12,9 3,6 10,6 4,6 10,0 18,5 0,4 8,1 9,4 4,2 
1973 14,2 7,8 10,7 23,4 9,0 11,8 10,9 3,3 15,1 12,1 4,2 11,5 10,3 19,5 5,8 
1974 3,8 3,5 11,7 0,1 0,8 10,4 0,7 8,5 10,4 2,6 -15,7 6,8 7,1 8,9 23,7 
1975 -8,2 -1,8 -7,2 10,6 -1,4 -1,5 7,2 3,8 -15,8 -3,1 -15,6 -2,8 -3,2 -1,3 0,8 
1976 13,6 4,1 10,2 16,4 10,1 10,6 8,1 12,4 0,9 9,9 0,0 8,7 10,2 3,9 16,9 
1977 1,9 4,1 3,8 . ,8 8,5 9,0 14,0 8,5 3,1 -1 ,8 5,9 6,2 5,3 2,1 11 ,7 
1978 2,6 1,2 3,3 16,4 10,7 6,6 12,3 10,2 3,9 3,3 11,l 1,7 5,1 9,4 - 1,0 
1979 7,9 8,4 4,1 6,7 6,4 6,9 6,5 9,5 9,7 7,4 30,2 4,0 6,6 8,7 3,3 
1980 3,7 5,2 5,1 6,6 0,6 2,4 6,4 -4,6 -1 ,2 1,5 6,8 -0,2 1,5 10,l 17,5 
1971-80 5,3 4,3 5,4 11,4 6,9 7,9 7,3 6,8 3,2 5,1 4,7 4,2 5,8 7,0 9,6 
1981 3,3 8,2 7,7 -4,1 6,9 5,2 2,0 4,1 -4,6 1,5 -2,0 -1,8 3,7 -1,1 14,2 
1982 1,8 2,5 3,3 -9,0 6,7 -2,0 5,5 1,3 -0,2 -0,0 6,5 1,3 1,5 - 8,8 1,0 
1983 3,0 3,7 -0,3 9,9 8,3 4,2 10,5 il,5 3,9 3,6 17,7 2,3 3,1 - 5,2 6,9 
1984 4,6 4,1 7,6 11,6 15,0 7,4 16,9 6,2 15,4 7,0 14,7 6,7 7,6 4,7 18, l 
1985 2,4 3,6 7,6 -0,3 4,7 2,3 6,8 8,2 4,1 4,9 12,0 6,0 5,7 0,8 6,0 
1986 4,0 2,8 3,0 5,9 1,4 2,0 4,4 4,0 2,0 2,2 4,3 2,8 2,9 4,7 1,8 
1987 4,1 4,0 4,0 5,1 3,6 5,1 6,1 5,3 3,0 3,4 6,9 3,2 4,3 3,7 4,0 
Table 28 
Intra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
( As percemagr o/GDP at currt nt marktl prices) 
B/L DK D GR F JRL NL UK EURIO 
1960 20,2 14,8 6,4 2,6 4,4 20,6 4,0 23,3 3,3 6,3 
1961 20,8 13,4 6,7 2,3 4,8 23,0 4,4 23,2 3.6 6,6 
1962 22,6 12,7 6,7 3,0 4,7 20,2 4,7 23,6 3,9 6.8 
1963 25,1 13,4 7.4 2,7 4,8 21 ,4 4,4 24,5 4,2 7,1 
1964 26,3 12,9 7,5 2,8 4,9 22,0 5,1 25,1 4,1 7,4 
1965 27,3 12,1 7,3 2,7 5,2 20,4 5,9 24,6 4,0 7,5 
1966 27,4 11,3 7,8 2,7 5,4 20,9 6,1 23,5 3,9 7,7 
1967 26,3 10,3 8,4 3,3 5,1 22,8 5,8 22,9 3,7 7,6 
1968 27,8 9,7 8,7 3,2 5,2 22,2 6,1 23,6 4,2 8,0 
1969 32,0 9,3 9,3 3,2 6,1 20,8 6,5 24,0 4,6 8,9 
1970 33,3 9,2 9,0 3,4 7,1 21,7 6,6 25,6 4,8 9,2 
1961-70 26,9 11 ,4 7,9 2,9 5,3 21 ,5 5,6 24,1 4,1 7,7 
1971 31 ,8 8,7 9,1 3,2 7,3 21 ,9 7,0 26,5 4,7 9,4 
1972 32,9 8,7 8,7 3,6 7,6 22,6 7,5 26,2 4,7 9,5 
1973 35,1 10,1 9,4 4,9 8,1 24,5 7,5 27,8 5,6 10,4 
1974 36,0 10,6 10,7 5,4 9,3 28,3 8,4 31,7 6,7 11,9 
1975 31,9 10,5 9,7 5,5 7,7 30,4 8,5 29,2 6,1 10,8 
1976 35,2 10,1 10,7 5,7 8,2 30,6 9,8 30,8 7,4 12,0 
1977 33,5 9,7 10,5 5,0 8,5 34,3 10,1 27,7 8,4 12,0 
1978 32,9 10,1 10,4 5,4 8,6 34,5 10,6 26,0 8,5 11 ,9 
1979 36,5 11 ,1 11,2 5,0 9,2 35,0 11,3 29,6 9,2 12,8 
1980 38,1 12,9 11,6 6,2 8,8 33,6 9,7 31,5 9,1 12,7 
1971-80 34,4 10,2 10,2 5,0 8,3 29,6 9,0 28,7 7,1 11,3 
1981 39,0 13,2 12,0 5.1 8.5 30,6 9,3 34,5 8.5 12,5 
1982 42,2 13,5 12,9 5,2 8,3 30,8 9,7 34,7 8,5 12,8 
1983 43,6 13,9 12,5 6,8 8,6 33,1 9,5 35,8 8.9 13,0 
1984 44,8 12,9 13,3 7,8 9,2 38,0 9,6 39,3 9,9 13,9 
1985 44,7 13,1 13,9 7,4 9,4 37,3 10,1 42,0 10.3 14,3 
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Table 29 
Extra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
( As percentage o/GDP at current market prices) 
B/L DK D GR F IRL NL UK EUR IO 
1960 13,8 11,4 10,2 3,5 7,6 3,2 6,2 14,9 11,9 9,8 
1961 12,9 11,2 9,8 3,7 7,0 3,4 6,2 14,3 11,3 9,3 
1962 12,1 11,0 9,0 3,4 6,1 3,5 5,8 13,2 10,8 8,6 
1963 11,I 11,9 8,9 3,9 5,8 3,7 5,6 12,2 10,7 8,3 
1964 11,0 11,8 9,0 3,4 5,6 3,1 5,7 11,4 10,5 8,2 
1965 11,9 11,9 9,3 3,2 5,7 2,9 6,2 11,5 10,7 8,5 
1966 I 1,7 11,7 9,8 3,8 5,6 3,9 6,3 I 1,5 10,8 8,6 
1967 11,2 11,4 10,3 4,0 5,4 5,9 6,5 I 1,3 10,0 8,5 
1968 11,4 11,5 10,4 3,0 5,3 6,3 6,7 10,5 10,9 8,6 
1969 I 1,3 I 1,8 10,2 3,2 5,2 6,6 6,8 9,8 I 1,3 8,6 
1970 I 1,5 12,J 9,9 3,1 5,8 6,4 6,7 9,9 11,2 8,7 
1961-70 11,6 11,6 9,6 3,5 5,8 4,6 6,3 11,6 10,8 8,6 
1971 11,1 I 1,5 9,9 2,8 5,7 6,0 6,6 9,1 11,1 8,6 
1972 11,1 I 1,3 9,3 3,3 5,7 5,4 6,8 8,5 10,5 8,3 
1973 12,2 11,6 10,0 4,0 6,1 7,3 6,8 9,7 I 1,2 8,9 
1974 14,8 13,6 12,6 5,4 7,9 9,3 9,2 11,9 12,9 11,l 
1975 12,5 12,6 11,9 5,5 7,7 7,3 9,5 10,6 12,5 10,5 
1976 11,9 I 1,8 12,1 5,7 7,7 9,1 9,8 10,7 12,9 10,7 
1977 12,8 12,0 12,3 5,5 8,1 9,8 10,7 10,4 14,I 11,1 
1978 12,4 10,7 11,7 5,2 7,5 9,4 10,5 9,7 13,6 10,6 
1979 13,0 11,3 11,3 5,1 7,9 9,4 10,6 10,1 12,5 10,5 
1980 14,6 12,6 11,9 6,9 8,1 10,8 9,8 I 1,2 12,2 10,8 
1971-80 12,6 11,9 I 1,3 4,9 7,2 8,4 9,0 10,2 12,3 10,1 
1981 16,2 15,0 13,5 6,6 9.2 12,6 11,9 12,8 12,2 12,0 
1982 17,0 14,2 13,8 6,l 8,7 12,3 11,l 12,4 12,2 I 1,8 
1983 18,2 14,9 13,4 6,1 8,9 14,2 10,9 12,9 I 1,5 I 1,7 
1984 19,9 16,7 14,5 6,6 9,6 16,6 I 1,3 14,2 12,4 12,6 
1985 19,7 16,8 15,4 6,4 9,5 17,3 I 1,6 14,4 11,9 12,8 
Table 30 
Imports of goods and services at current prices 
( As percentage o/GDP al current market prices) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 39,3 33,4 16,2 16,7 7,5 12,9 37,3 14,3 73,7 45,9 23,7 22,4 19,1 4,4 10,3 
1961 40,6 31,5 15,5 16,4 9,4 12,6 39,8 14,3 80,2 45,4 27,7 20,9 18,7 4,2 10,7 
1962 41,4 31,6 16,0 16,9 11,1 12,4 38,9 14,6 79,2 44,5 23,5 20,3 18,7 4,3 9,3 
1963 43,5 30,0 16,0 18,0 I 1,9 12,8 40,8 15,9 77,5 45,6 24,3 20,4 19,0 4,2 9,8 
1964 43,7 31,8 16,3 19,0 12,2 13,4 41,0 14,1 78,8 45,6 29,9 21,2 19,3 4,3 9,6 
1965 42,9 30,7 17,6 20,3 14,0 12,9 43,9 13,4 79,9 43,6 31,5 20,2 19,2 4,4 9.1 
1966 45,2 30,0 17,3 18,8 14,4 13,6 43,2 14,4 75,1 43,1 31,0 19,6 19,3 4,8 9,0 
1967 43,1 29,2 16,6 18,0 12,8 13,4 4-0,9 15,0 70,6 41,4 29,5 20,1 19,0 4,8 9,4 
1968 45,3 28,9 17,6 18,4 13,6 13,8 45,2 14,7 70,4 41,0 29,8 22,2 19,8 5,2 9,0 
1969 48,6 29,6 18,8 18,7 14,3 15,2 46,3 16,1 69,7 42,7 28,6 21,9 20,7 5,2 8,9 
1970 49,4 30,9 19,0 18,4 14,4 15,8 45,0 17,2 75,6 46,6 30,9 22,4 21,4 5,5 9,5 
1961-70 44,4 30,4 17,1 18,3 12,8 13,6 42,5 15,0 75,7 43,9 28,7 20,9 19,5 4,7 9,5 
1971 48,4 29,4 19,1 18,4 13,5 16,1 43,4 17,1 84,4 45,7 32,1 21,8 21,2 5,7 9,0 
1972 47,6 26,5 18,8 20,0 14,5 16,3 39,9 18,0 76,6 42,2 31,9 22,1 21,2 6,1 '8,3 
1973 53,4 30,4 19,1 25,2 15,5 17,6 44,8 20,9 76,5 44,2 33,7 26,4 23,4 6,8 10,0 
1974 60,7 34,7 21,7 25,6 19,2 23,0 57,2 26,8 81,3 51,2 42,2 33,2 28,4 8,8 14,3 
1975 53,3 31,0 21,6 26,9 17,2 18,8 48,8 22,7 88,0 46,5 32,8 27,8 25,1 7,8 12,8 
1976 56,7 33,5 23,2 25,8 18,1 21,3 54,2 25,9 82,0 47,6 30,9 29,6 27,0 8,6 12,8 
1977 56,6 32,5 23,0 25,2 16,5 21,6 58,5 25,0 82,4 46,3 33,5 29,6 26,7 9,3 I 1,5 
1978 54,8 29,9 22,3 25,6 14,4 20,3 59,8 24,2 82,I 44,9 32,5 27,4 25,4 9,6 9,4 
1979 61,2 32,1 24,4 25,3 14,7 21,8 66,1 26,5 86,3 49,6 37,9 28,1 27,3 10,3 12,5 
1980 65,1 33,8 26,7 26,4 18,0 24,0 63,0 28,0 88,4 53,0 42,1 25,3 28,7 I 1,0 14,6 
1971-80 55,8 31,4 22,0 24,4 16,2 20,1 53,6 23,5 82,8 47,1 35,0 27,1 25,4 8,4 I 1.5 
1981 70,7 35,8 27,8 26,3 19,4 25,2 62,7 28,6 88,2 54,5 47,4 24,0 29,6 10,4 14.0 
1982 73,1 35,9 27,2 28,0 20,0 25,5 55,9 27,6 89,9 53,4 46,3 24,6 29,5 9,5 13,8 
1983 73,6 34,4 26,7 29.2 21,1 24,5 55,8 25,4 88,5 54,1 44,6 26,0 29,1 9,4 12,2 
1984 77,5 36,2 28,1 29,3 20,4 25,2 60,I 27,2 95,9 58,0 46,0 29,0 30,7 10,5 12,4 
1985 76,1 36,7 28,7 32,5 20,2 24,9 58,5 28,6 94,4 59,4 41,9 28,2 30,9 10,1 11,4 
1986 69,3 32,0 26,3 28,6 15,9 21,6 51,9 23,8 83,I 52,8 36,8 26,5 27,4 10,2 8,3 
1987 70,I 31,3 26,8 27,5 16,2 21,9 52,3 24,8 82,1 54,0 38,I 26,6 27,8 10,0 8,5 
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Table 31 
Imports of goods and services at constant prices 
( NatiOIIDFCMTl"enc_r: annual perc<ntai, change) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EURl2 USA JA 
1961 7,2 4,4 7,8 12,7 40,l 6,9 13,9 13,7 7,3 6,4 24,7 -0,7 6,9 0,2 27,2 
1962 8,2 13,4 12,6 10,1 34,4 6,7 5,4 14,9 3,2 6,5 -8,7 2,1 8,5 12,2 -0,7 
1963 8,6 -1,l 3,2 15,4 23,5 14,1 10,7 22,5 3,1 9,8 9,9 4,0 9,2 2,9 18,0 
1964 8,9 19,6 9,8 15,2 13,0 15,1 12,9 -6,1 13,6 14,9 27,0 10,5 9,4 5,5 14,1 
1965 6,6 6,9 14,8 21,2 33,I 2,2 11,1 2,0 4,5 6,1 9,6 0,7 7,0 11,I 7,1 
1966 9,9 5,4 2,4 -0,5 19,0 10,6 3,5 14,0 -2,5 7,0 8,4 2,1 6,8 15,3 12,4 
1967 1,6 4,5 -1,0 7,1 -3,3 8,3 3,8 13,5 -4,8 6,3 -6,0 7,4 4,9 7,0 24,5 
1968 11,7 4,9 13,5 10,3 8,1 12,9 15,6 5,9 9,1 13,0 33,0 7,4 10,6 15,4 10,8 
1969 15,5 13,l 17,0 15,5 15,8 19,5 13,4 19,3 11,2 14,1 7,6 2,7 13,6 5,9 12,7 
1970 7,6 9,3 14,4 6,2 7,0 6,3 2,3 16,0 19,0 14,7 0,9 4,7 10,0 3,8 21,8 
1961-70 8,5 7,9 9,3 11,2 18,4 10,2 9,2 11,3 6,1 9,8 9,9 4,0 8,7 7,8 14,5 
1971 3,6 -0,7 10,8 7,6 0,6 9,1 4,7 2,6 6,9 6,1 14,5 5,3 6,3 6,4 5,9 
1972 9,6 1,5 5,9 15,4 24,7 16,0 5,1 11,0 2,6 4,8 12,0 9,1 9,7 11,1 10,3 
1973 18,5 12,8 4,3 32,2 16,4 15,2 19,0 10,3 10,5 11,0 12,7 11,9 11,6 4,7 24,3 
1974 4,4 -3,8 -0,7 -16,3 7,7 5,2 -2,3 1,2 6,1 -0,8 4,8 1,0 1,3 -3,l 4,6 
1975 -9,0 -4,8 0,9 6,3 -1,1 -6,6 -10,2 -9,7 -9,2 -4,1 -25,2 -7,0 -5,6 -12,3 -9,9 
1976 13,3 15,6 11,6 6,1 10,l 20,3 14,7 14,7 0,7 10,1 3,4 4,1 11,7 20,l 6,0 
1977 4,5 0,0 3,3 8,0 -4,7 2,9 13,3 -0,0 1,6 2,9 12,0 0,9 2,2 8,6 3,9 
1978 2,9 0,1 6,5 7,2 -0,7 5,4 15,7 8,1 6,2 6,3 -0,2 3,7 5,2 11,1 5,7 
1979 9,3 5,0 9,7 7,2 11,5 11,1 13,9 13,5 7,1 6,0 11,5 10,5 10,3 1,6 12,0 
1980 1,1 -6,8 3,5 -6,6 3,8 6,9 -4,5 8,4 3,0 -0,4 11,7 -3,8 2,6 -3,2 -8,7 
1971-80 5,6 1,7 5,5 6,0 6,5 8,3 6,5 5,8 3,4 4,1 5,0 3,4 5,4 4,1 5,0 
1981 -1,4 -1,7 -2,9 3,4 -3,5 1,6 1,7 -5,1 -2,6 -5,9 5,5 -3,4 -2,4 6,1 1,7 
1982 -0,4 3,8 -1,3 5,1 4,8 6,2 -3,1 1,7 -0,8 1,1 5,0 5,0 2,3 1,6 0,4 
1983 -0,1 0,5 2,1 2,8 -0,3 -0,6 4,7 0,2 2,0 3,3 -7,3 6,2 1,5 11,1 -2,7 
1984 4,8 6,0 5,2 -0,1 0,0 2,3 9,5 9,7 13,5 5,9 -3,2 9,2 5,6 27,0 12,5 
1985 2,4 7,8 4,6 13,2 6,2 5,3 2,9 9,4 4,4 5,7 3,3 3,0 5,4 4,3 0,4 
1986 5,9 4,2 8,9 -5,3 5,9 5,3 4,3 8,9 2,7 3,4 10,6 4,1 6,2 5,0 5,0 
1987 3,8 2,4 6,5 -0,9 6,5 5,3 6,1 10,3 3,4 3,5 8,4 5,1 6,1 4,7 10,4 
Table 32 
Intra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
( As percentage of GDP at current market prices) 
B/L DK D GR F JRL NL UK EUR 10 · 
1960 20,0 17,1 5,6 9,4 3,7 24,0 4,7 23,2 3,8 6,3 
1961 21,3 16,3 5,6 9,5 4,0 26,7 4,9 25,8 3,8 6,5 
1962 22,0 15,9 5,9 10,l 4,3 26,4 5,4 25,4 3,8 6,8 
1963 23,6 14,5 6,0 9,4 4,9 28,l 6,2 26,8 3,8 7,1 
1964 24,5 15,3 6,3 9,7 5,2 27,9 5,3 27,1 4,2 7,4 
1965 24,3 14,5 7,4 10,4 5,1 27,8 4,7 26,0 4,1 7,6 
1966 26,5 13,8 7,2 10,2 5,6 26,2 5,2 25,7 4,2 7,8 
1967 24,5 12,8 6,9 9,6 5,7 25,2 5,7 24,2 4,5 7,7 
1968 25,5 12,3 7,4 9,9 6,1 28,3 5,5 23,8 4,9 8,1 
1969 28,2 12,9 8,4 9,5 7,3 29,2 6,3 23,8 4,7 9,0 
1970 28,9 13,4 8,3 10,0 7,5 29,6 7,0 25,6 4,9 9,3 
1961-70 25,0 14,2 6,9 9,9 5,6 27,5 5,6 25,4 4,3 7,7 
1971 30,6 11,7 8,8 9,6 7,4 27,3 6,8 24,0 5,1 9,4 
1972 30,2 10,7 8,5 10,2 7,7 26,1 7,5 22,6 5,5 9,5 
1973 33,l 12,5 8,4 10,6 8,2 30,3 8,9 23,6 7,1 10,4 
1974 35,8 14,3 8,9 10,1 10,0 37,3 10,3 25,7 8,4 11,9 
1975 32,3 12,7 9,1 10,9 7,9 31,2 8,8 23,1 7,4 10,7 
1976 34,8 14,l 9,7 10,7 9,2 35,2 10,3 23,4 8,0 11,8 
1977 34,l 13,6 9,8 11,l 9,1 37,4 9,7 22,5 9,7 12,0 
1978 34,2 12,8 9,7 10,7 8,9 39,0 9,8 22,2 9,3 11,8 
1979 34,5 14,3 10,5 10,9 9,7 44,3 10,7 24,2 10,1 12,6 
1980 35,7 14,5 11,0 10,6 10,0 43,9 11,2 24,3 8,6 12,5 
1971-80 33,5 13,l 9,4 10,5 8,8 35,2 9,4 23,6 7,9 11,2 
1981 36,8 14,8 11,5 12,1 10,l 44,3 10,5 24,4 8,2 12,5 
1982 40,3 14,9 11,5 12,2 10,8 38,6 10,3 24,5 8,8 12,7 
1983 42,9 14,2 11,8 13,4 10,7 36,7 9,7 24,8 9,6 12,9 
1984 44,5 14,5 12,4 13,6 11,3 38,8 10,5 26,7 10,6 13,7 
1985 45,8 15,6 12,9 14,5 11,5 37,6 11,4 29,7 10,7 14,4 
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Table 33 
Extra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
( As percentage o/GDP at current market prices) 
8/L DK D GR F TRL NL UK EUR IO 
1960 15,9 14,9 9,2 11 ,7 7,3 12,6 8,7 20,2 14,8 11 ,1 
1961 15,0 14,0 8,6 9,7 6,9 13,0 8,6 19,2 13,3 10,3 
1962 14,9 14,8 8,7 7,8 6,7 12,1 8,5 18,1 12,9 10,0 
1963 14,9 14,2 8,6 8,9 6,5 12,3 9,0 18,0 13,0 10,0 
1964 15,3 15,7 8,5 8,3 6,7 12,5 8.0 17,9 14,1 10,2 
1965 14,6 15,1 8,9 9,8 6,2 12,7 7,9 16,6 13,1 9,9 
1966 14,8 14,8 8,6 9,4 6,4 12,5 8,3 16,4 12,4 9,7 
1967 13,9 14,6 8,0 7,9 5,8 12,4 8,3 15,4 12,4 9,3 
1968 14,8 14,1 8,1 8,4 5,4 12,6 7,5 14,7 13,7 9,3 
1969 15,0 14,3 8,4 8,8 5,7 12,6 7,9 13,8 13,4 9,4 
1970 15,2 15,0 8,2 10,l 6,3 11,6 8,2 15,3 13,1 9,6 
1961-70 14,8 14,7 8,5 8,9 6,3 12,4 8,2 16,6 13,1 9,8 
1971 13,0 14,0 7,9 9,3 6,0 12,2 7,6 15,2 11 ,9 9,0 
1972 12,1 12,6 7,1 8,4 6,0 10,8 7,5 13,5 11,9 8,5 
1973 13,6 14,7 7,4 10,6 6,5 11 ,3 9,1 14,9 14,4 9,6 
1974 18,2 17,0 9,3 13,3 9,9 16,5 13,8 18,9 18,8 12,9 
1975 15,6 14,9 8,9 14,7 8,1 13,3 11 ,3 17,3 14,9 11,l 
1976 16,5 15,7 10,1 16,2 9,2 14,8 13, l 18,7 16,1 12,4 
1977 16,2 14,9 9,8 15,0 9,2 16,6 12,6 18,2 15,0 12,0 
1978 15,2 12,9 9,3 14,1 8,3 15,9 11 ,8 16,3 15,1 11,2 
1979 19,0 14,1 10,4 14,1 8,8 16,9 13,2 18,4 14,5 12,2 
1980 23,2 15,0 12,0 16,0 10,5 14,7 14,0 21,0 13,7 13,4 
1971-80 16,3 14,6 9,2 13,2 8,2 14,3 11 ,4 17,2 14,6 11,2 
1981 25,3 16,l 12,4 12,1 10,9 14,7 15,3 22,2 12,6 13,7 
1982 25,7 15,6 12,0 14,1 10,4 13,4 14,3 20,9 12,7 13,3 
1983 23,8 15,0 11 ,6 14,5 9,5 14,0 13,0 21 ,7 12,7 12,7 
1984 25,2 16,1 12,4 15,3 9,7 16,3 13,7 24,9 14,4 13,7 
1985 22,3 16,2 12,4 16,5 9,4 15,4 13,9 25,3 13,5 13,4 
Table 34 
Current account of balance of payments 
( As percentage o/GDP at current market prices) · 
8/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EUR 10 USA JA 
1960 0,7 - 1,5 1,7 -2,9 1,5 - 0, 1 0,8 3,0 - 4,0 - 1,0 0,7 0,6 0,3 
1961 0,2 - 2,0 1,1 -2,2 1,1 0,2 1,2 1,4 - 10,0 0,0 0,7 0,7 1,8 
1962 0,6 -3,4 -0,2 -1 ,6 1,0 -1 ,8 0,6 1,0 -3,4 0,4 0,3 0,6 - 0,1 
1963 -0,5 0,1 0,4 -2,2 0,3 2,8 -1 ,4 0,7 -3,3 0,3 -0,0 0,7 1,1 
1964 0,2 -2,4 0,3 -4,3 0,1 - 0,3 -3,5 1,1 - 1,1 0,0 - 1,3 - 0,3 1,1 - 0,6 
1965 0,6 -1,8 -1 ,2 - 5,8 -2,1 0,8 - 4,4 3,6 0,1 - 0,4 -0,4 0,2 0,8 1,1 
1966 -0,2 -1 ,9 0,2 -2,0 -2,1 0,1 -1 ,6 3,3 - 1,0 0,8 0,1 0,4 0,4 1,3 
1967 1,0 -2,4 2,2 - 2,2 - 1,5 0,0 1,4 2,2 - 0,3 3,7 -0,9 0,6 0,3 0,0 
1968 1,2 -1 ,7 2,3 -3,6 -0,8 -0,5 -1,3 3,3 0,3 1,5 -0,8 0,8 0,1 0,8 
1969 1,7 -2,8 1,4 -4,0 - 1,1 -1,1 -4,8 2,7 0,2 3,6 0,6 0,6 0,0 1,3 
1970 3,3 -3,9 0,6 -3,1 0,2 0,1 - 4,0 1,2 - 1,4 1,9 1,2 0,5 0,2 1,0 
1961-70 0,9 - 2,2 0,7 - 3,1 0,2 - 2,3 1,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,8 
1971 2,3 - 2,4 0,4 -1 ,5 2,2 0,6 -3,8 1,8 - 0,3 2,5 1,7 0,8 - 0,1 2,5 
1972 3,9 - 0,4 0,4 -1 ,2 1,2 0,5 - 2,2 1,6 2,8 5,5 0,1 0,8 - 0,5 2,2 
1973 2,5 -1,7 1,3 -3,8 0,6 -0,2 - 3,5 -1 ,7 3,8 3,0 -2,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 
1974 1,4 -3,1 3,1 -3,3 -3,5 - 2,3 - 9,9 - 4,6 3,0 - 6,2 - 4,6 -0,9 0,3 -1,0 
1975 0,4 -1 ,5 1,0 - 4,2 - 3,0 - 0,0 - 1,5 - 0,2 2,4 - 5,5 - 2,1 0,0 1,2 - 0, 1 
1976 0,9 - 4,9 1,1 - 2,6 - 3,5 - 1,5 -5,3 -1 ,5 3,0 - 8,0 - 1,7 - 0,5 0,3 0,7 
1977 - 0,5 - 4,0 0,9 - 1,9 -1,8 -0,7 - 5,4 1,2 0,7 -9,4 -0,1 0,1 - 0,7 1,5 
1978 -0,7 - 2,7 1,4 -1 ,3 0,9 0,6 -6,8 2,4 -0,8 -5,7 0,4 0,7 -0,7 1,7 
1979 - 1,8 - 4,7 - 0,8 -1 ,9 0,3 -0,0 - 13,4 1,7 - 1,1 - 2,6 0,0 -0,4 - 0,l - 0,9 
1980 -3,6 - 3,7 -1,7 - 0,3 - 2,4 -1 ,4 - 11,8 - 2,5 - 1,5 -6,3 1,6 -1,3 0,2 -1,0 
1971-80 0,6 - 2,9 0,0 - 2,2 0,9 - 0,4 - 6,4 - 0,2 1,2 - 3,3 - 0,6 -0,1 - 0,0 0,6 
1981 - 3,6 -3,0 - 0,7 - 0,2 - 2,4 - 1,4 - 14,8 - 2,3 2,1 - 11,8 2,4 - 0,6 0,2 0,5 
1982 - 2,1 -4,2 0,5 - 3,8 - 2,3 -3,0 -10,7 - 1,6 2,8 - 14,3 1,5 - 0,6 - 0,2 0,7 
1983 0,6 - 2,2 0,7 - 4,7 - 1,4 - 1,7 - 6,9 0,2 2,9 0,8 0,0 - 1,0 1,8 
1984 1,2 - 3,2 1,0 - 3,9 1,3 - 0,6 - 5,7 - 1,0 4,1 - 3,0 0,3 0,1 - 2,6 3,0 
1985 1,8 - 4,4 2,2 - 8,7 1,7 - 0,8 - 3,2 - 1,1 4,6 1,8 0,8 0,5 -2,9 3,7 
1986 3,2 -2,5 2,4 - 5,0 4,0 0,6 - 1,3 1,0 4,0 2,0 0,1 1,1 - 2,5 4,5 
1987 3,3 -1 ,8 1,8 - 3,1 3,9 0,8 -1 ,5 0,6 3,5 0,8 - 0,4 0,9 -2,5 3,9 
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Table 35 
Structure of EC exports by country and region, 1958 and 1985 
( As percentag• of 1010/ exporlS , 
Exponsof 8/L DK D GR E F IRL L p UK EUR 12 
to 
B/L 
DK 
D 
GR 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
UK 
Total 
intra.Community trade 
Other European 
OECD countries 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
Developing countries 
of which: 
OPEC 
Other developing countries 
Centrally-planned economies 
Rest of world and unspecified 
World (excl. EC) 
World (incl. EC) 
Table 36 
1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 
1,6 1,1 
11 ,6 18,5 
0,7 0,6 
10,6 18,9 
0,4 0,4 
2,3 5,4 
20,i 14,2 
5,7 9,8 
1,2 1,9 
20,1 15,9 
0,4 0,8 
3,0 4,4 
0,3 0,7 
5,3 3,9 
2,2 3,6 
25,9 12,5 
6,6 6,9 
3,0 2,2 
1,4 1,0 
7,6 11,9 
0,3 0,5 
5,0 7,8 
8,1 8,6 
4,0 8,6 
1.0 1,9 
0,2 0,7 
20.5 20,1 
12,9 8,0 
0,4 0,4 
6,0 11 ,3 
2,0 4,1 
7,6 6,9 
2.6 
0,4 
9,9 
0,6 
16,0 
0,6 
7,2 
5,4 
8,6 
6.3 8,5 
0.8 0,8 
10,4 15,0 
0,7 0,8 
0,2 0,3 
3,4 10,9 
2,0 4,9 
4,9 8,2 
0,8 4,1 
0,1 0,9 
2.2 10.1 
0,1 0,5 
0,8 8,4 
0,4 3,7 
0,5 6,8 
78,8 33,0 
2,3 3,0 
0,8 0,8 
14.3 16,1 
2,1 1.7 
5,3 14,0 
0.1 0,2 
2,1 3.1 
6,8 7,0 
15,0 15.! 
2,6 1.5 
19,0 30,0 
0,9 0,8 
4,9 10.2 
0.5 0.5 
2,7 5.8 
11,9 9,4 
3,6 
2,0 
13.8 
0.3 
12,7 
0,6 
4,0 
6.9 
14,6 
1,9 4,3 
2.4 1,8 
4,2 11.4 
0,7 0.4 
2,4 9,9 
3,5 4,7 
2.1 4,4 
3,1 9,4 
4.9 6,3 
2,0 1.5 
7,4 12.1 
1.0 0,9 
4.6 10.1 
1,1 I.I 
3,1 6,2 
5,4 6.7 
5,5 7,6 
EURIO 53,5 68,9 58,3 43,8 35,9 47,4 50,5 53,3 51 ,1 28,6 49,6 83,6 67,5 33,8 46.0 57,5 73,3 58,5 20,3 46,2 34.9 52,5 
EURl2 70,0 44.7 49,4 54,4 53,3 53,2 68,7 48.3 74.4 62.5 48,8 
10,4 8,0 
9,4 6,3 
1,1 0,7 
0,6 0,8 
0,6 0,3 
18,8 11,2 
3,3 3,3 
15,5 7,9 
3,8 2,6 
1,9 1,2 
17,2 26,5 
9,3 10,2 
0,7 1,0 
0,2 3,0 
0,3 0,7 
9,7 11,7 
2,3 3,1 
7,3 8,6 
3,8 2,6 
0,5 0,6 
23,7 20,0 
7,3 I0,3 
1,2 1,0 
1,0 1,5 
1,0 0,9 
22,3 12,3 
4,8 4,7 
17,5 7,6 
5,0 5,3 
2,6 1,2 
6,7 7,7 
13,6 8,1 
0.3 0,7 
1,4 9,7 
0.1 0,5 
7,2 19,9 
0,1 9,6 
7,1 10,3 
16,3 8,3 
4,0 0,5 
8.3 I0,5 12,7 
10,2 5,9 8,7 
1,1 0,8 1,1 
0,9 0.3 1,2 
0,5 0,4 0,5 
20,9 48,4 21,6 
7.3 21,3 7.4 
13,6 27.1 14.2 
6,2 3,7 3,9 
0,8 1.3 0,7 
1,8 7,1 
5,9 9,8 
0,7 1,8 
0,1 1.6 
0,1 1,3 
1,6 8.6 
1,3 4.0 
1.3 4,6 
0,2 0,8 
6,2 1,5 
16,6 13,3 
9,7 12,3 
1,2 1.2 
0,3 1,2 
1,0 1,0 
27,9 19.0 
7,5 9,3 
20.4 9,7 
4.7 4,5 
5,1 1,6 
12,3 7.6 
5,6 5,1 
0,8 0,5 
0,4 0.5 
0,7 0,4 
18.1 8,9 
4,S 3.2 
13,7 5,7 
2.0 1,7 
2.6 2,0 
15,5 
9,2 
1.0 
0,9 
0.4 
II.I 
2,5 
8,6 
2,0 
9,6 11 .9 
8,8 14,9 
5,8 2,2 
0,6 1,3 
7,1 1.8 
33,8 17.6 
7.0 6,6 
26,8 11 ,0 
3,1 2,1 
1.4 10.8 1,9 
16.4 14.1 
7,8 10,1 
2,3 1.2 
0,6 1.2 
2,5 0.9 
27,9 15.0 
7,8 5.7 
20.1 9,3 
3.9 3.7 
3.8 1,3 
46,4 31,1 41,7 56,2 64,1 52,6 49,5 46,7 48,9 71 ,4 50,0 16,4 32,5 66.2 54.0 42.5 26,7 41 ,5 79,7 53,8 65.1 47,5 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Structure of EC imports by country and region, 1958 and 1985 
( As percentage of 1010/ imporlS) 
Imports of 8/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EURIO 
from 
8/L 
DK 
D 
GR 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
UK 
Total 
intra·Community trade 
Other European 
OECD countries 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
Developing countries 
of which: 
OPEC 
Other developing countries 
Centrally.planned economies 
Rest of world and unspecified 
World ( excl. EC) 
World (incl. EC) 
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1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 1985 1958 1985 1958 1985 
0,5 0,5 
17.2 20,7 
0,1 0,2 
11.6 14,9 
0,1 0,5 
2,1 3,5 
15,7 20,0 
7,4 6,7 
3,8 3,4 
19,8 21,9 
0,0 0,2 
3,4 4,2 
0.0 0,4 
1.7 3,3 
7,3 6,1 
22,8 9,6 
4,5 6,7 
3,4 1,8 
1.7 0,7 
7,6 I0,7 
0,1 0,7 
5.5 7,9 
8.0 14.6 
4,4 7,8 
3,3 2,8 
0,7 1,1 
20,3 17,0 
5,4 6,4 
0,0 0,4 
8,8 9.3 
4,8 5,8 
9,9 3.8 
1,7 
0,5 
11.0 
0,2 
9,8 
0,5 
4.7 
2,1 
6,7 
5,4 10,2 
0.6 0.7 
11,6 17,4 
0,6 0,4 
0,1 0,8 
2.4 9,9 
2,5 7,1 
3,6 8,4 
1,8 2.3 
0,7 0,9 
4,0 8,3 
0,2 0,1 
1.6 5,1 
0,9 1.9 
2,9 4,6 
56,4 47,2 
2.0 3.7 
2,2 0,8 
12,1 16,6 
0,5 0,8 
4.9 12,5 
0.1 0.4 
2.6 5,1 
5,5 4,9 
17.9 11.8 
0,7 0.9 
19.5 21.4 
0.1 0,3 
2,8 6,4 
0,1 0,8 
1.8 2,9 
7,4 9,7 
2.2 
0,6 
11 ,4 
0.1 
8,0 
0,3 
5,1 
3.2 
7,5 
1,6 4.4 
3,1 2,0 
3.6 14,6 
0,2 0,4 
2,7 7.7 
2,9 3,3 
2,0 5,6 
4,2 6.8 
4,4 6.2 
2,0 1.2 
8.2 13.1 
0,4 0,5 
4,2 8.2 
0.9 1,1 
2.5 5,5 
6.4 9,0 
5.0 6.9 
EURIO 54,7 67,0 59,0 49,1 35,2 50,9 53,3 46,7 37.2 26,7 54,9 68,4 70,5 29,8 44,5 50,1 54,0 38,4 20,3 44,3 34,0 51.6 
EURl2 68,4 50,6 52,8 48,1 37.9 58.5 71 ,9 46,8 55,7 45.7 47,0 
8,1 7.6 
9,9 6,0 
1.4 0,6 
0,6 2,2 
1,7 0,3 
19,7 9.6 
5,9 2,3 
13,8 7,3 
2,0 3,1 
1,9 3,6 
19,5 26,4 
9,1 5,5 
0,2 0,4 
1.5 3,5 
0,0 0,6 
6,1 8,7 
0.3 2,8 
5.8 5,9 
4.6 4,8 
0,0 1,0 
15,8 16,4 
13,6 6,5 
3,1 0,8 
0,6 4,2 
1,2 0,4 
24.4 14.5 
6.7 5.5 
17,7 9,0 
5,3 5,5 
O,& 0.8 
9,5 7,1 5.8 
13,7 3,1 10,8 
0.8 0,3 0.5 
2.0 6.4 3,1 
0.3 0.5 0.5 
9.6 27,3 38.6 
1.7 22,3 20.1 
7.8 5,0 18.5 
8,1 7,9 2.7 
2,9 0.8 0,8 
8,0 11,4 
10,0 6,4 
1,0 0,7 
0,2 2,2 
2.4 0.6 
46,7 19.1 
19,7 9,7 
27,0 9.4 
3,3 3.7 
1.6 1.0 
4,3 5,3 
7,0 14,4 
3,0 0.8 
I. I 2,9 
1,2 0,1 
9,7 3.7 
0.7 0.2 
9,0 3,5 
1,2 1,5 
4.2 0,9 
12.0 11,6 
16.2 6,0 
1.4 0,6 
0,4 1.6 
3,0 0,6 
31,2 26.1 
13.9 15,9 
17,3 10,2 
3.6 6,2 
2,3 2,5 
7,7 8,5 
11.3 8,4 
1,5 0,6 
0,8 2.5 
0.2 0,4 
25.0 19,7 
11.5 9,4 
13.5 10,3 
2.6 5,6 
0.8 0,1 
14.1 13.9 16.7 
9.7 9,3 13.0 
I. I 8.2 1.9 
3,0 0.9 5.1 
0,6 5.4 1.0 
30.1 35,0 13.6 
17.6 11.3 3.6 
12,5 23.7 10,0 
1.5 3.2 2.5 
1,5 3,8 2.0 
12.0 13,2 
11,4 7.7 
3,7 0.9 
0,7 3.3 
2,7 0.6 
30.3 16.8 
10.9 7.6 
19,4 9,2 
3.5 4.5 
1,5 1.3 
45,3 33,0 41,0 50,9 64,8 49,I 46.7 53.3 62,8 73.3 45.1 31,6 29,5 70,2 55,5 49,9 46.0 61.6 79,7 55.7 66.0 48,4 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 37 
Money supply (M2fM3) 
( Annual percemage change) 
B/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EUR 10 EUR 12 USA JA 
1960 4,3 8,0 11 ,1 20,2 16,7 5,5 19,6 7,0 0,9 10,5 4,9 20,l 
1961 9,9 9,8 12,9 17,0 17,2 7,3 14,9 5,4 2,3 10,7 7,4 20,2 
1962 7,4 8,5 10,4 21 ,5 18,7 9,6 17,0 6,6 2,6 10,9 8, 1 20,3 
1963 10,3 12,5 9,9 21 ,4 14,1 5,8 13,5 9,8 7,8 11 ,0 8,4 24,0 
1964 7,6 11,1 9,4 16,1 9,8 9,4 12,7 10,4 5,8 9,3 8, 1 18,7 
1965 9,6 9,7 10,6 12,9 10,9 6,7 15,2 6,2 7,6 10,4 8,1 18,0 
1966 8,2 12,8 8,3 18,2 10,6 10,6 13,0 5,9 3,4 8,5 4,5 16,3 
1967 7, 1 9,8 12,0 16, 1 13,1 12,7 13,7 10,9 11,7 9,6 11,7 9,1 15,5 
1968 8,6 14,5 11 ,8 17,8 11 ,6 16,9 13,1 4,8 14, 1 7,3 11,2 7,9 14,8 
1969 7,0 10,2 9,4 16,2 6,1 11,2 12,5 10,2 17,8 2,0 7,7 4,0 18,5 
1970 10,0 3,3 9, 1 19,3 15,4 15,4 14,0 15,9 11 ,0 12,4 9,6 11 ,9 12,2 6,2 16,9 
1961-70 8,6 10,2 10,4 17,6 12,7 10,4 14,2 9,1 5,7 10,2 7,2 17,9 
1971 12,9 8,5 13,5 22,4 24,3 17,8 12,9 17,2 9,0 21 ,0 14, 1 15,0 15,8 13,4 24,3 
1972 17,0 15,0 14,4 23,6 23, l 18,5 14,2 19,0 11,9 23,4 24,6 18,5 18,9 13,0 24,7 
1973 15,4 12,6 10,1 14,5 25,0 15,0 26,0 23,1 21 ,9 28,9 27,0 18,0 18,8 7,0 16,8 
1974 14,0 8,9 8,5 20,9 19,9 15,9 20,6 15,7 20,0 12,1 10,7 12,9 13,5 5,5 11,5 
1975 15, 1 25, 1 8,6 26,5 19,3 18,2 18,9 23,7 5,1 13,1 6,3 13,7 14,2 12,6 16,5 
1976 14,3 10,9 8,4 26,7 19,0 12,8 14,5 20,8 22,7 16,4 9,7 13,2 13,8 13,7 15,4 
1977 10,3 9,9 11 ,2 22,7 18,6 13,9 17, 1 21,7 3,6 21 ,8 9,4 13,1 13,7 10,6 13,4 
1978 10,2 8,7 11 ,0 26,0 19,7 12,2 29,0 22,6 4,2 26,0 15,3 14,2 14,8 8,0 14,0 
1979 8,2 10,8 6,0 18,4 18,3 14,0 18,7 20,8 6,9 31 ,0 13,2 12,4 13,2 7,9 10,8 
1980 6,5 8,1 6,2 24,7 16,9 8,4 17,7 12,7 4,4 28,6 18,5 10,8 11,6 8,9 9,5 
1971-80 12,4 11,7 9,8 22,6 20,4 14,7 18,9 19,7 10,8 22,2 14,7 14,2 14,8 10,0 15,6 
1981 10,0 9,1 5,0 34,7 17,0 10,4 17,4 10,0 5,3 23,8 13,7 9,8 10,6 10,0 11,2 
1982 7,5 11,4 7,1 29,0 16,6 10,8 13,0 18,0 7,6 24,6 8,9 10,9 11 ,6 9,0 9,1 
1983 7,1 25,4 5,3 20,3 15,9 11 ,2 5,6 12,3 10,4 16,3 10,4 10,0 10,6 12,0 8,3 
1984 6,2 17,8 4,7 29,4 13,l 8,3 10,l 12, l 7,6 24,5 10,0 8,9 9,5 8,4 8, 1 
1985 6,7 15,8 5,0 26,1 12,8 6,0 5,3 11 ,2 10,2 29,5 13,5 9,0 9,7 8,1 8.7 
Table 38 
Short-term interest rates 
(%) 
B/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EUR 10 USA JA 
1960 5,1 8,0 4,1 3,5 2, 1 
1961 4,6 6,3 3,6 8,0 3,6 6,2 3,5 1,1 5,2 3,9 2,4 8,5 
1962 3,4 6,5 3,4 8,0 3,6 5,0 3,5 1,9 4, 1 3,6 2,8 9,0 
1963 3,6 6,1 4,0 7,9 4,0 4,3 3,5 2,0 3,7 3,7 3,2 7,4 
1964 4,9 6,2 4,1 7,8 4,7 5,5 3,5 3,4 5,0 4,4 3,6 10,0 
1965 5,0 6,5 5, 1 7,8 4,2 6,8 3,5 4,0 6,8 5,0 4,0 7,0 
1966 5,5 6,5 6,6 8,0 4,8 7,0 3,5 4,9 3,0 7,0 5,6 4,9 5,6 
1967 5,5 6,6 4,3 8,5 4,8 6,3 3,5 4,7 3,1 6,3 4,9 4,3 6,2 
1968 4,5 6,6 3,8 8,3 6,2 7,9 3,5 4,5 3,4 7,9 5,3 5,4 7,6 
1969 7,3 8,2 5,8 8,0 9,3 9,2 3,7 5,1 3,4 9,2 7,1 6,7 7,6 
1970 8,1 9,0 9,3 8,0 8,6 7,0 5,2 6,1 4,0 8,1 7,9 6,3 8,0 
1961-70 5,2 6,8 5,0 8,0 5,3 6,5 3,8 3,8 6,6 5,1 4,3 7,7 
1971 5,3 7,6 7, 1 8,0 6,0 6,6 5,1 4,5 4,3 6,2 6, 1 4,3 6,4 
1972 4,2 6,3 5,1 8,0 5,3 7, 1 5,2 2,7 4,4 6,8 5,4 4,2 4,7 
1973 6,6 8, 1 12,2 9,0 9,2 12,2 7.0 1,5 4,4 11,8 9,7 7,2 7,2 
1974 10,6 13,3 9,8 11,8 13,0 14,5 14,9 10,4 5,3 13,4 12,0 7,9 12,5 
1975 7,0 6,5 4,9 11 ,9 7,6 10,9 10,4 5,3 6,8 10,6 1,5 5,8 10,7 
1976 10,1 10,3 4,3 11 ,5 8,7 11 ,7 16,0 7,4 8,4 11 ,5 8,6 5,0 7,0 
1977 7,3 14,5 4,3 12,0 15,5 9,1 8,4 14,0 4,8 II, 1 8,0 1,5 5,3 5,1 
1978 7,3 15,4 3,7 13,5 17,6 7,8 9,9 11,5 7,0 15,5 9,4 7, 1 7,4 4,4 
1979 10,9 12,5 6,9 16,7 15,5 9,7 16,0 12,0 9,6 16,1 13,9 9,8 10, 1 6,3 
1980 14,2 16,9 9,5 16,4 16,5 12,0 16,2 16,9 10,6 16,3 16,7 12,6 11,6 10,9 
1971-80 8,3 11,l 6,8 12,3 8,8 11,3 11,3 6,9 9,3 10,8 8,6 6,8 1,5 
1981 15,6 14,8 12,3 16,8 16,2 15,3 16,7 19,3 11,8 16,0 14, 1 14, 1 14,0 7,4 
1982 14,l 16,4 8,8 18,9 16,3 14,6 17,5 19,9 8,2 16,8 12,2 11 ,9 10,6 6,9 
1983 10,5 12,0 5,8 16,6 20,0 12,4 14,0 18,3 5,1 20,9 10,1 9, 1 8,7 6,4 
1984 11 ,5 11 ,5 6,0 15,7 14,9 11 ,6 13,2 17,3 6,1 22,5 10,0 9,2 9,4 6, 1 
1985 9,6 10,0 5,4 17,0 12,2 9,9 11 ,9 15,2 6,4 21,0 12,3 9,0 1,5 6,5 
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Table 39 
Long-term interest rates 
(!') 
8/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EUR 10 USA JA 
1960 6,3 5,7 5,4 5,3 4,2 5,4 
1961 5,9 6,6 5,9 5,5 6,2 5,2 3,9 6,3 5,7 3,9 6,4 
1962 5,2 6,6 5,9 5,4 6,0 5,8 4,2 5,9 5,6 3,9 6,4 
1963 5,0 6,5 6,0 5,3 5,6 6,1 4,2 5,4 5,6 4,0 6,4 
1964 5,6 7,1 6,2 5,4 6,0 7,4 4,9 6,0 6,1 4,1 6,4 
1965 6,4 8,6 7,0 6,2 6,2 6,4 6,9 5,2 6,6 6,6 4,2 6,4 
1966 6,7 8,7 8,1 7,4 6,6 6,8 6,5 6,2 5,5 6,9 7,0 4,6 6,8 
1967 6,7 9,1 7,0 7,4 6,7 6,7 6,6 6,0 5,8 6,8 6,8 4,9 6,8 
1968 6,5 8,7 6,4 7,3 7,0 6,5 6,7 6,2 6,5 7,6 6,9 5,3 6,8 
1969 7,3 9,7 6,8 7,1 7,9 7,3 6,9 7,0 6,5 9,1 7,7 6,2 6,8 
1970 7,8 11,l 8,3 7,4 8,6 7,8 9,0 7,8 7,1 9,3 8,7 6,6 7,1 
1961-70 6,3 8,3 6,8 7,1 6,5 6,5 6,7 5,6 7,0 6,7 4,8 6,7 
1971 7,3 11,0 8,0 7,5 8,4 9,2 8,3 7,0 7,7 8,9 8,3 5,7 7,0 
1972 7,0 11,0 7,9 7,8 8,0 9,1 7,5 6,7 7,7 9,0 8,0 5,6 6,9 
1973 7,5 12,6 9,3 9,3 9,0 10,7 7,4 7,3 7,8 10,8 9,0 6,3 7,0 
1974 8,8 15,9 10,4 10,5 11,0 14,6 9,9 10,7 10,0 15,0 11 ,3 7,0 8,1 
1975 8,5 12,7 8,5 9,4 10,3 14,0 11 ,5 9,1 12,0 14,5 10,5 7,0 8,4 
1976 9,1 14,9 7,8 10,2 10,5 14,6 13,1 9,2 12,5 14,6 10,5 6,8 8,2 
1977 8,8 16,2 6,2 9,5 11,0 12,9 14,6 8,5 16,0 12,5 9,8 7,1 8,2 
1978 8,5 16,8 5,7 10,0 12,0 10,6 12,8 13,7 8,1 21 , l 12,6 9,3 7,9 6,3 
1979 9,7 16,7 7,4 11,2 13,3 10,9 15,l 14, l 9,2 22,2 13,0 10,2 8,7 7,3 
1980 12,2 18,7 8,5 17,l 16,0 13,6 15,4 16,1 10,7 22,2 13,9 11,9 10,8 8,5 
1971-80 8,7 14,6 8,0 10,3 10,3 12,8 11,6 8,6 13,9 12,5 9,9 7,3 7,5 
1981 13,8 19,3 10,4 17,6 15,8 16,3 17,3 20,6 12,2 22,6 14,8 13,9 12,9 8,2 
1982 13,4 20,5 8,9 15,4 16,0 16,0 17,0 20,9 10,5 25,2 12,7 12,7 12,2 8,0 
1983 11,8 14,4 7,9 18,2 16,9 14,4 13,9 18,0 8,8 30,4 10,8 10,9 10,8 7,8 
1984 12,0 14,0 7,8 18,5 16,5 13,4 14,6 14,9 8,5 32,5 10,7 10,5 12,0 7,4 
1985 10,6 11 ,6 6,9 15,8 13,4 11,9 12,7 13,0 7,8 30,8 10,6 9.7 10,8 6,5 
Table 40 
Gross official reserves 
( End year, 'OOO millio11 ECU) 
8/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK EUR 12 
1960 1,438 0,271 6,671 0,228 0,513 2,166 0,305 3,097 1,776 0,607 3,548 20,620 
1961 1,692 0,264 6,681 0,249 0,827 3,140 0,318 3,545 1,826 0,515 3,096 22,153 
1962 1,635 0,239 6,485 0,267 0,974 3,775 0,334 3,792 1,813 0,634 3,085 23,033 
1963 1,838 0,438 7,133 0,272 1,070 4,577 0,378 3,375 1,959 0,683 2,936 24,659 
1964 2,076 0,601 7,359 0,262 1,413 5,346 0,416 3,570 2,192 0,813 2,164 26,212 
1965 2,182 0,548 6,943 0,234 1,329 5,930 0,381 4,484 2,256 0,877 2,808 27,972 
1966 2,205 0,559 7,529 0,256 1,176 6,322 0,462 4,604 2,298 1,010 2,908 29,329 
1967 2,516 0,519 7,920 0,278 1,069 6,803 0,425 5,304 2,547 1,199 2,617 31 ,197 
1968 2,420 0,459 10,553 0,340 1,269 4,832 0,546 5,759 2,724 1,491 2,640 33,033 
1969 2,347 0,437 7,008 0,311 1,260 3,775 0,677 4,960 2,488 1,421 2,484 27,168 
1970 2,874 0,476 13,537 0,311 1,805 5,071 0,681 5,411 3,279 1,526 2,847 37,818 
1971 3,366 0,662 17,468 0,484 3,028 7,977 0,903 6,588 3,711 1,893 8,101 54,181 
1972 4,562 0,820 24,443 1,022 4,896 11 ,543 1,034 7,530 5,663 2,754 5,637 69,904 
1973 6,819 1,228 35,066 1,094 6,581 13,207 0,894 10,341 8,766 4,038 6,730 94,764 
1974 9,096 0,953 39,322 1,160 6,809 18,626 1,062 14,988 11 ,777 5,068 7,946 116,807 
1975 8,579 0,908 36,703 1,265 6,451 19,432 1,354 11 ,139 10,745 3,683 6,485 106,744 
1976 8,121 0,961 40,607 1,215 5,867 17,027 1,663 12,761 11,066 3,456 5,497 108,241 
1977 8,950 1,558 44,286 1,359 6,827 18,494 1,984 17,790 12,050 3,547 19,422 136,267 
1978 9,886 2,602 54,764 1,569 9,743 23,515 2,015 21,745 12,706 4,272 15,410 158,227 
1979 10,406 2,592 57,593 1,466 12,283 29,443 1,617 26,692 14,516 5,324 17,394 179,326 
1980 20,536 3,277 76,565 2,494 15,257 57,097 2,245 45,935 27,502 10,025 23,689 284,622 
1981 18,281 3,014 79,810 2,191 15,842 52,522 2,594 45,476 26,260 9,405 22,134 277,529 
1982 16,239 2,938 82,135 2,309 13,268 46,296 2,841 39,018 26,524 8,573 19,713 259,854 
1983 20,941 5,167 98,195 2,949 15,917 63,694 3,333 56,310 33,245 10,207 23,168 333,1 26 
1984 21 ,973 4,994 100,903 3,212 23,505 66,181 3,030 59,666 32,886 9,953 22,513 348,816 
1985 19,022 6,775 88,940 2,625 19,619 62,530 3,454 44,240 29,545 9,742 21 ,023 307,515 
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Table 41 
ECU exchange rates 
(National units per £CU: annual m·erage) 
8/L DK D GR E F IRL NL p UK USA JA 
1960 52,810 7,2954 4,4361 31,69 63,37 5,2145 0,37721 660,l 4,0136 30,37 0,37721 1,0562 380,23 
1961 53,367 7,3722 4,3074 32,02 64,04 5,2695 0,38119 667,l 3,8985 30,69 0,38119 1,0673 384,24 
1962 53,490 7,3893 4,2792 32,09 64,13 5,2817 0,38207 668,6 3,8727 30,76 0,38207 1,0698 385,13 
1963 53,490 7,3893 4,2792 32,09 64,13 5,2817 0,38207 668,6 3,8727 30,76 0,38207 1,0698 385,13 
1964 53,490 7,3893 4,2792 32,09 64,13 5,2817 0,38207 668,6 3,8727 30,76 0,38207 1,0698 385,13 
1965 53,490 7,3893 4,2792 32,09 64,13 5,2817 0,38207 668,6 3,8727 30,76 0,38207 1,0698 385,13 
1966 53,490 7,3893 4,2792 32,09 64,13 5,2817 0,38207 668,6 3,8727 30,76 0,38207 1,0698 385,13 
1967 53,240 7,4229 4,2592 31,94 65,11 5,2570 0,38765 665,5 3,8546 30,61 0,38765 1,0648 383,33 
1968 51,444 7,7166 4,1155 30,87 72,02 5,0797 0,42870 643,1 3,7246 29,58 0,42870 1,0289 370,40 
1969 51,109 7,6664 4,0262 30,67 71,55 5,2903 0,42591 638,9 3,7003 29,39 0,42591 1,0222 367,99 
1970 51,112 7,6668 3,7414 30,67 71,36 5,6777 0,42593 638,9 3,7005 29,38 0,42593 1,0222 368,00 
1971 50,866 7,7526 3,6457 31,43 72,57 5,7721 0,42858 647,4 3,6575 29,64 0,42858 1,0478 363,82 
1972 49,361 7,7891 3,5768 33,65 72,00 5,6572 0,44894 654,3 3,5999 30,48 0,44894 1,1218 339,72 
1973 47,801 7,4160 3,2764 36,95 71,81 5,4677 0,50232 716,5 3,4285 30,27 0,50232 1,2317 333,17 
1974 46,399 7,2593 3,0835 35,78 68,82 5,7339 0,50980 775,7 3,2022 30,25 0,50980 1,1927 347,47 
1975 45,569 7,1227 3,0494 39,99 71,16 5,3192 0,56003 809,5 3,1349 31,50 0,56003 1,2408 367,68 
1976 43,165 6,7618 2,8154 40,88 74,74 5,3449 0,62158 930,I 2,9551 33,62 0,62158 1,1181 331,21 
1977 40,883 6,8557 2,6483 42,04 86,85 5,6061 0,65370 1 006,8 2,8001 43,59 0,65370 1,1411 305,80 
1978 40,061 7,0194 2,5561 46,78 97,43 5,7398 0,66389 1 080,2 2,7541 55,86 0,66391 1,2741 267,08 
1979 40,165 7,2091 2,5109 50,77 91,97 5,8295 0,66948 I 138,5 2,7486 67,04 0,64639 1,3706 300,47 
1980 40,598 7,8274 2,5242 59,32 99,70 5,8690 0,67600 I 189,2 2,7603 69,55 0,59849 1,3923 315,04 
1981 41,295 7,9226 2,5139 61,62 102,68 6,0399 0,69102 1 263,2 2,7751 68,50 0,55311 1,1164 245,38 
1982 44,711 8,1569 2,3760 65,34 107,56 6,4312 0,68960 1 323,8 2,6139 78,01 0,56045 0,9797 243,54 
1983 45,438 8,1319 2,2705 78,09 127,50 6,7708 0,71496 1 349,9 2,5372 98,69 0.58701 0,8902 211,35 
1984 45,442 8,1465 2,2381 88,34 126,57 6,8717 0,72594 l 381,4 2,5233 115,67 0,59063 0,7893 187, 10 
1985 44,918 8,0185 2.2264 104,75 129,03 6,7954 0,71524 I 446,6 2,5111 130,08 0,58879 0,7610 180,56 
1986 43,990 7,9404 2, 1559 142,25 137,87 6,8259 0,71091 I 477,9 2,4311 148,81 0,63421 0,9347 170,80 
1987 43,948 7,8944 2,1369 155,37 144,26 6,9164 0,70952 I 488,3 2,4086 166,16 0,63668 0,9453 162,87 
Table 42 
Central rates against the ECU 
(National c11rrenncy per ECUJ 
Date 8/L DK D GR F IRL NL UK1 
13. 3.1979 39,4582 7,08592 2,51064 5,79831 0,662638 1 148,15 2,72077 (0,663247) 
24. 9.1979 39,8456 7,36594 2,48557 5,85522 0,669141 1 159,42 2,74748 (0,649821) 
30.11.1979 39,7897 7,72336 2,48208 5,84700 0,668201 1 157,79 2,74362 (0,648910) 
23. 3.1981 40,7985 7,91917 2,54502 5,99526 0,685145 1 262,92 2,81318 (0,542122) 
5.10.1981 40,7572 7,91117 2,40989 6,17443 0,684452 1 300,67 2,66382 (0,601048) 
22. 2.1982 44,6963 8,18382 2,41815 6,19564 0,686799 1 305,13 2,67296 (0,557037) 
14. 6.1982 44,9704 8,2340 2,33379 6,61387 0,691011 1 350,27 2,57971 (0,560453) 
21. 3.1983 44,3662 8,04412 2,21515 6,79271 0,717050 1 386,78 2,49587 (0,629848) 
18. 5.1983 44,9008 8,14104 2,24184 6,87456 0,725690 1 403,49 2,52595 (0,587087) 
17. 9.1984 44,9008 8,14104 2,24184 87,4813 6,87456 0,725690 1 403,49 2,52595 (0,585992) 
22. 7.1985 44,832 8,12857 2,2384 100,719 6,86402 0,724578 I 520,6 2,52208 (0,555312) 
7. 4.1986 43,6761 7,91896 2,13834 135,659 6,9628 0,712956 1 496,21 2,40935 (0,630317) 
1 The pound sterling and. since 19 September 1984. the drachma are represented in the ECU. but do not participate in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
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Table 43 
Bilateral central rates since 7 April 1986 
BFR/LFR DKR DM FF IRL LIT HFL UKL' 
(Bruxelles) (Kebenham) (Frankfurt) (Paris) (Dublin) (Roma) ("-tmlam) C.-) 
BFR/LFR 100 ±2,25 100 18,1312 4,8959 15,9419 1,63237 3 425,7 5,51640 
DKR 100 ±2,25 551,536 100 27,0028 87,9257 9,00315 18 894,0 30,4251 
DM 100 ±2,25 2 042,52 370,332 100 325,617 33,3416 69 970,6 112,673 
FF 100 ±2,25 627,278 113,732 30,7109 100 10,2395 21 488,6 34,6032 
IRL 100 ±2,25 61,2606 11,1072 2,99926 9,7661 1 2 098,6 3,37938 
LIT 1 OOO ±6,00 29,1912 5,29268 1,42917 4,65362 0,476508 1 OOO 1,61030 
HFL 100 ±2,25 1 812,78 328,676 88,7526 288,991 29,5912 62 100,2 100 
(UKL 1) 
I The pound sterling docs not participate in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
Table 44 
Effective exchange rates against 19 countries 
(/972 ~ /()()) 
BFR/LFR DKR DM DR PES FF IRL LIT HFL ESC UKL EUR 10 USO YEN 
1960 96,7 106,6 79,4 109,3 113,4 113,4 109,5 102,0 93,7 97,7 120,4 97,4 107,1 86,7 
1961 95,5 105,6 82,3 108,4 112,8 112,5 109,4 101,l 96,6 97,1 119,8 98,9 107,3 86,3 
1962 95,6 105,6 82,7 108,3 113,1 112,5 109,6 101,1 97,2 97,3 120,1 99,4 108,2 86,4 
1963 95,4 105,7 83,0 108,4 113,2 112,5 109,5 101,0 97,3 97,l 119,9 99,5 108,5 86,4 
1964 95,6 105,5 83,3 108,4 113,2 112,5 109,4 100,5 97,1 96,9 119,6 99,4 108,5 86,3 
1965 95,9 105,6 82,9 108,5 113,2 112,6 109,5 100,5 97,4 97,0 119,8 99,3 108,5 86,4 
1966 95,8 105,8 82,9 108,6 113,3 112,4 109,5 100,7 97,0 97,l 119,8 99,2 108,6 86,2 
1967 96,0 105,1 83,4 108,8 111,5 112,5 108,7 100,9 97,6 97,5 117,8 99,l 109,0 86,5 
1968 97,0 101,4 84,9 110,7 99,7 114,2 102,1 103,0 99,l 101,5 104,1 96,3 111,4 88,4 
1969 97,2 101,0 87,2 110,9 99,8 108,6 102,2 102,7 99,2 102,3 104,2 95,9 111,5 89,0 
1970 97,3 100,2 94,5 109,3 99,4 99,9 102,0 101,7 97,7 101,7 103,7 97,3 110,1 88,6 
1971 97,2 99,3 97,4 106,8 98,2 97,6 102,1 100,7 98,6 101,1 103,8 98,2 107,1 90,0 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 
1973 101,4 106,1 110,5 92,0 101,5 103,3 93,1 89,8 103,2 101,8 89,6 102,5 92,0 105,6 
i974 102,8 106,6 116,4 92,3 104,6 96,4 90,8 81,I 108,6 100,4 86,5 100,4 93,9 98,7 
1975 104,4 110,2 118,3 83,2 101,9 105,8 85,6 77,7 111,2 97,4 79,5 102,0 93,1 95,8 
1976 106,8 112,7 125,0 78,7 93,6 101,9 76,9 64,4 114,3 88,9 68,I 93,5 98,0 100,7 
1977 112,9 112,1 135,1 76,4 82,0 97,0 74,2 59,3 120,3 69,7 64,9 94,2 97,3 111,6 
1978 116,2 112,0 143,1 69,4 74,1 95,8 74,6 55,6 123,2 55,5 65,0 95,9 88,3 136,0 
1979 117,6 111,2 149,9 65,5 81,0 96,4 74,8 53,7 125,0 47,0 69,0 101,5 85,8 125,9 
1980 117,0 102,4 150,5 56,7 75,4 96,9 73,2 51,8 125,3 45,5 75,9 103,8 85,7 120,8 
1981 110,2 94,7 142,1 51,0 68,2 88,3 66,8 45,4 119,8 43,8 76,0 88,6 96,6 137,3 
1982 100,0 90,6 149,I 46,9 64,0 81,0 66,1 42,3 125,9 38,2 72,7 83,4 108,2 130,4 
1983 97,3 90,1 155,I 38,4 53,0 75,2 63,4 40,7 128,5 30,1 67,6 78,6 114,4 144,6 
1984 95,1 86,7 152,8 33,0 51,8 71,6 60,7 38,4 126,5 24,9 64,4 72,1 123,3 152,5 
1985 95,9 87,8 153,3 27,8 50,6 72,4 61,4 36,4 126,9 22,0 64,3 71,2 128,3 157,2 
1986 100,9 92,7 166,3 22,2 49,7 75,3 65,0 37,3 134,6 20,I 62,6 77,4 109,2 188,8 
1987 101,0 93,1 168,1 20,5 47,5 74,3 65,I 37,0 135,9 18,0 62,3 77,0 106,4 198,8 
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Table 45 
Current receipts of general government 
( Percenlage of GDP at current markel prices) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR8 
1960 27,5 27,3 35,1 21,1 34,9 24,8 28,8 32,5 33,9 30,l 32,2 
1961 28,4 26,6 36,3 22,0 36,2 25,7 28,2 34,l 34,9 31,3 33,0 
1962 29,2 28,2 36,6 23,2 36,3 25,2 29,1 33,5 34,4 32,9 33,7 
1963 29,4 29,9 36,9 23,2 37,l 26,l 29,5 33,6 35,6 31,5 33,8 
1964 30,0 29,7 36,4 24,0 38,0 26,9 30,6 33,5 35,7 31,5 34,1 
1965 30,7 31,2 35,7 23,7 38,4 27,9 30,1 35,2 37,3 33,2 34,5 
1966 32,4 33,5 36,2 25,3 38,4 30,0 30,1 35,8 39,2 34,4 35,1 
1967 33,2 34,J 36,9 26,2 38,2 30,6 31,0 35,7 40,6 36,3 36,0 
1968 33,8 36,9 38,0 27,3 38,8 31,0 31,6 34,5 42,4 37,7 36,9 
1969 34,3 37,2 39,4 27,2 39,8 31,6 30,7 34,3 43,2 39,6 37,9 
1970 35,2 41,7 38,3 26,8 39,0 35,3 30,4 35,0 44,5 40,5 37,8 
1961-70 31,7 32,9 37,1 24,9 38,0 29,0 30,1 34,5 38,8 34,9 35,3 
1970 36,5 46,2 38,9 26,5 22,9 39,8 30,7 35,8 41,l 39,9 38,0 
1971 37,1 46,9 40,0 26,3 23,0 39,1 31,4 39,2 43,5 37,9 38,0 
1972 37,6 46,5 40,4 26,3 23,4 39,0 31,2 39,3 44,6 36.3 37,8 
1973 38,2 47,3 42,9 25,l 24,1 39,4 30,8 39,4 46,4 35,5 38,4 
1974 39,2 49,1 43,4 26,7 23,3 40,3 34,3 30,9 40,5 47,1 39,2 39,6 
1975 42,0 46,8 43,4 27,1 24,8 41,2 33,7 31,6 49,3 49,4 39,7 40,4 
1976 41,8 47,6 44,6 29,2 25,7 43,5 36,9 33,2 50,5 49,8 38,9 41,3 
1977 43,5 48,3 45,7 29,6 26,9 43,4 35,5 34,5 54,8 50,6 38,4 41,9 
1978 44,l 50,3 45,4 29,9 27,5 43,3 34,3 36,3 55,9 51,1 37,l 41,9 
1979 44,8 51,5 45,1 30,4 28,8 44,8 35,0 35,9 53,2 52,1 38,0 42,4 
1980 44,4 52,9 45,4 30,2 30,4 46,6 37,7 38,1 54,1 53,5 29,2 39,7 43,7 
1971-80 41,3 48,7 43,6 28,1 25,8 42,1 33,4 47,6 48,8 38,1 40,6 
1981 45,3 52,9 45,6 29,0 31,1 47,4 38,4 39,6 53,4 53,8 30,2 41,6 44,7 
1982 47,0 52,0 46,1 31,5 30,8 48,3 40,7 42,2 53,8 54.2 30,3 42,6 45,8 
1983 46,1 54,4 45,9 31,9 33,6 48,9 42,5 45,3 57,0 56,0 33,6 41,6 46,4 
1984 47,3 56,7 46,3 34,2 32,7 49,9 42,8 44,5 55,6 55,3 31,9 42,0 46,7 
1985 47,6 57,6 46,4 34,4 33,6 49,9 42,2 44,4 56,8 55,3 29,6 42,0 46,7 
1986 46,7 58,8 45,9 37,6 33,5 49,2 41,3 44,0 54,5 54,9 32,6 40,9 46,1 
1987 46,6 58,1 46,2 39,3 33,9 48,7 40,9 43,0 52,8 53,7 33,3 40,1 45,6 
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Table 46 
Total expenditure of general government 
( P~rctnttlg! of GDP at nurt nt market prices) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR8 
1960 30,3 24,8 32,5 34,6 28,0 30,I 30,5 33,7 32,4 32,3 
1961 29,8 27,1 33,8 35,7 29,7 29,4 30,3 35.4 33, 1 33,0 
1962 30,5 28,l 35,6 37,0 29,5 30,5 32,2 35,6 34,0 34,2 
1963 31,5 28,6 36,4 37,8 30,5 31,l 32,1 37,6 35,4 35,2 
1964 30,8 28,4 36,1 38,0 31,8 31 ,8 32,3 37,8 33,7 34.8 
1965 32,3 29,9 36,7 38,4 33,1 34,3 33,3 38,7 36,2 36,3 
1966 33,5 31,7 36,9 38,5 33,6 34,3 35,0 40,7 35,4 36,3 
1967 34,5 34,3 38,8 39,0 34,8 33,7 37,5 42,5 38,3 37,7 
1968 36,3 36,3 39.2 40,3 35,2 34,7 37,3 43,9 39,3 38,7 
1969 36,1 36,3 38,8 39,6 36,6 34,2 34, I 44,4 41,3 38,8 
1970 36,5 40,2 38,6 38,9 39,6 34,2 33, 1 46,0 39,2 38,3 
1961-70 33,2 32,1 37,1 38,3 33,5 32,8 33,7 40,3 36,6 36,3 
1970 38,6 42,1 38,7 22, l 38,9 34,2 33,1 42,3 36,9 37,8 
1971 40,3 43,0 40,2 23,5 38,3 36,6 36,9 44,5 36,6 38,6 
1972 41,3 42,6 40,9 23,I 38,3 38,6 37,3 45,0 37,6 39,5 
1973 41,5 42,I 41,7 22,9 38,5 37,8 36,1 45,4 38,2 39,7 
1974 41 ,8 45,9 44,7 23,0 39,7 42,5 37,9 35,8 47,3 42,9 42,0 
1975 46,7 48,2 49,0 24,7 43,5 46,3 43,2 48,4 51 ,8 44,2 45,8 
1976 47,3 47,8 48,0 25,9 44,0 45 ,5 42,2 49,1 52,7 43,7 45,4 
1977 49,0 48,8 48, 1 27,4 44,2 43, 1 42,5 51 ,9 52,4 41 ,7 45,2 
1978 50,1 50,6 47,8 29,3 45,2 44,0 46, 1 51,5 53,8 41,5 46,1 
1979 51,9 53,2 47,7 30,5 45,5 46,4 45,5 52,4 55,8 41,2 46,2 
1980 53,4 56,2 48,4 32,4 46,4 50,4 46,1 54,9 57,5 37,8 43,2 47,4 
1971-80 46,3 47,8 45,6 26,3 42,3 41,6 45,4 50,6 41,1 43,6 
1981 58,1 59,8 49,3 40,7 34,1 49,1 51 ,6 51,4 56,5 59,2 40,3 44,4 49,8 
1982 58,1 61,1 49,4 40,4 36,9 51,1 54,5 54,8 56,1 61 ,3 39,l 45,0 51 ,2 
1983 57,8 61,7 48,5 37, I 39,1 52,0 54,2 57,1 57,6 62,5 40,7 45,3 51 ,7 
1984 57,2 60,9 48,2 44,3 37,8 52,8 52,5 57,4 54,0 61 ,6 39,6 46,2 52,0 
1985 56,9 59,5 47,5 48,3 39,8 52,5 53,5 58,4 52,6 60,4 40.7 45, 1 51 ,5 
1986 55,1 56,4 46,6 47, I 38,6 51,7 50,9 56,7 50,7 60,2 43,9 44,0 50,4 
1987 53,5 54,9 46,5 45,7 38,6 51,2 50,0 55,9 50,2 59,5 44,5 43,0 49,8 
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Table 47 
Net lending or net borrowing of general government 
( Percentage of GDP at current market prices) 
B DK D GR E F IRL L NL p UK EUR8 
1960 -2,8 3,1 3,0 0,9 -2,4 -0,9 3,1 0,8 -1,0 0,6 
1961 -1,3 0,1 2,8 1,0 -3,2 -0,8 4,8 0,1 -0,7 0,6 
1962 -1,3 0,6 1,4 -0,1 -3,6 -1,0 2,3 -0,6 -0,0 0,1 
1963 -2,1 1,9 0,9 -0,1 -3,6 -1,2 2,6 -1,3 -2,8 -0,8 
1964 -0,8 1,8 0,7 0,7 -4,1 -0,8 2,2 -1,5 -1,1 -0,1 
1965 -1,6 1,8 -0,6 0,7 -4,3 -3,8 2,9 -0,8 -2,0 -1,2 
1966 -1,0 2,3 -0,2 0,6 -2,8 -3,8 1,9 -0,9 -0,0 -0,6 
1967 -1,3 0,4 -1,4 0,0 -3,3 -2,2 -0,7 -1,3 -1,0 -1,1 
1968 -2,5 1,1 -0,8 -0,8 -3,3 -2,8 -1,7 -0,9 -0,5 -1,1 
1969 -1,8 1,4 1,1 0,9 -4,2 -3,1 1,2 -0,5 -0,6 -0,3 
1970 -1,3 2,1 0,2 0,9 -3,7 -3,5 2,8 -0,8 2,5 0,1 
1961-70 -1,5 1,3 0,4 0,4 -3,6 -2,3 1,8 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 
1970 -2,2 4,1 0,2 0,7 0,9 -3,5 2,7 -1,2 3,0 0,2 
1971 -3,2 3,9 -0,2 -0,6 0,7 -5,2 2,3 -1,0 1,3 -0,6 
1972 -3,7 3,9 -0,5 0.3 0,8 -7,5 2,0 -0,4 -1,3 -1,7 
1083 -3,3 5,2 1,2 1,1 0,9 -7,0 3,3 1,0 -2,7 -1,3 
1974 -2,6 3,1 -1,3 0,2 0,6 -8,2 -7,0 4,8 -0,2 -3,8 -2,4 
1975 -4,7 -1,4 -5,6 0,0 -2,2 -12,5 -11,7 0,9 -2,4 -4,5 -5,4 
1976 -5,5 -0,2 -3,4 -0,3 -0,5 -8,6 -9,0 1,4 -2,9 -4,9 -4,I 
1977 -5,5 -0,5 -2,4 -0,6 -0,8 -7,6 -8,0 2,9 -1,8 -3,2 -3,3 
1978 -6,0 -0,3 -2,4 -1,8 -1,9 -9,7 -9,7 4,4 -2,8 -4,4 -4,2 
1979 -7,1 -1,7 -2,6 -1,7 -0,7 -11,4 -9,5 0,8 -3,7 -3,3 -3,8 
1980 -9,0 -3,3 -2,9 -2,0 0,2 -12,7 -8,0 -0,8 -4,0 -8,6 -3,5 -3,6 
1971-80 -5,l 0,9 -2,0 -0,5 -0,3 -8,3 2,2 -1,8 -3,0 -3,0 
1981 -12,8 -6,9 -3,7 -11,7 -3,0 -1,8 -13,2 -11,9 -3,I -5,5 -10,0 -2,8 -5,2 
1982 -11,1 -9,1 -3,3 -9,1 -6,1 -2,7 -13,8 -12,6 -2,3 -7,1 -8,7 -2,4 -5,4 
1983 -11,7 -7,2 -2,5 -8,9 -5,6 -3,1 -11,8 -11,7 -0,6 -6,5 -7,1 -3,7 -5,3 
1984 -9,8 -4,2 -1,9 -10,I -5,0 -2,9 -9,7 -13,0 1,5 -6,3 -7,7 -4,2 -5,3 
1985 -9,3 -1,9 -1,1 -13,9 -6,2 -2,6 -11,4 -14,0 4,2 -5,l -11,1 -3,1 -4,8 
1986 -8,4 2,4 -0,7 -9,5 -5,I -2,4 -9,6 -12,7 3,7 -5,2 -11,2 -3,2 -4,3 
1987 -6,9 3,2 -0,3 -6,4 -4,7 -2,6 -9,1 -12,8 2,6 -5,8 -11,2 -2,9 -4,2 
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Table 48 
Budgetary expenditure of the European Communities(a) 
( Million u.a .. EIJA . ECU ' 
ECSC European Euratom EC general budget Total 
opera- Develop- (b) 
tional ment EAGGF Social Regional Industry Adm. Total 
budget Fund (c) Fund Fund Energy, and EC 
Research others 
(d) 
1958 21,7 7,9 5,9 5,9 35,5 
1959 30,7 51,2 39,1 25,2 25,2 146,2 
1960 23,5 63,2 20,0 28,3 28,3 135,0 
1961 26,5 172,0 72,5 8,6 25,4 34,0 305,0 
1962 13,6 162,3 88,6 11,3 81,0 92,3 356,8 
1963 21,9 55,5 106,4 4,6 79,5 84,1 267.9 
1964 18,7 35,0 124,4 7,2 85,9 93,1 271,1 
1965 37,3 248,8 120,0 102,7 42,9 55,5 201,1 607,2 
1966 28,1 157,8 129,2 310,3 26,2 65,8 402,2 717,3 
1967 10,4 105,8 158,5 562,0 35,6 77,5 675,1 949,8 
1968 21,2 121,0 73,4 2 250,4 43,0 115,3 2 408,6 2 624,2 
1969 40,7 104,8 59,2 3 818,0 50,5 182,7 4 051,2 4 255,9 
1970 56,2 10,5 63,4 5 228,3 64,0 156,1 5 448,4 5 578,5 
1971 37,4 236,1 1 883,6 56,5 65,0 284,3 2 289,3 2 562,8 
1972 43,7 212,7 2 477,6 97,5 75,1 424,3 3 074,5 3 330,9 
1973 86,9 210,0 3 768,8 269,2 69,1 533,8 4 641,0 4 937,9 
1974 92,0 157,0 3 651,3 292,1 82,8 1 011,9 5 038,2 5 287,2 
1975 127,4 71,0 4 586,6 360,2 150,0 99,0 1 017,8 6 213,6 6 412,0 
1976 94,0 320,0 6 033,3 176,7 300,0 113,3 1 329,2 7 952,6 8 366,6 
1977 (e) 93,0 800,0 6 667,6 55,3 400,0 167,0 1 303,9 8 483,2 9 376,2 
1978 159,1 394,5 9 552,3 256,5 254,9 266,8 1 430,8 11 884,2 12 190,8 
1979 173,9 480,0 10 765,0 527,0 499,0 288,0 2 368,0 14 602,5 15 256,4 
1980 175,7 508,5 11 596,1 502,0 751,8 212,8 2 994,9(1) 16 057,5 16 741,7 
1981 261,0 658,0 11 443,0 547,0 547,0 232,0 4 060,0 18 546,0(g) 19 465,0 
1982 243,0 750,0 12 792,0 910,0 2 766,0(h) 346,0 4 613,0 21 427,0(i) 22 420,0 
1983 300,0 752,0 16 331,3 801,0 2 265,5 1 216,2 4 151,5 24 765,50) 25 817,5 
1984 408,0 810,0 18 985,8 1 116,4 I 283,3 I 346,4 3 387,4 26 119,3(k) 27 337,3 
1985 453,0 710,0 20 546,4 1 413,0 I 624,3 706,9 3 932,4 28 223,0(1) 29 386,0 
1986 439,0 800,0 23 104,0 2 533,0 2 373,0 762,0 6 402.0 35 174,0(m) 36 413,0 
1987 24 077,0 2 589,0 2 495,0 I 055,0 6 461,0 36 677,0(n) 
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Table 49 
Budgetary receipts of the European Communities(a) 
(Million u.a./EUA/ECU) 
ECSC European Eur-.itom EC budget Total 
levies Dev. contri-
and Fund butions Miscella- Own resources Total 
other contri- (=carch neous and EC 
butions only) contri- Miscella- Agri- Import GNP 
butions ncous cultural duties contri-
under levies butions 
special keys or VAT 
(b) (c) 
1958 44,0 116,0 7,9 0,02 5,9 5,9 173,8 
1959 49,6 116,0 39,l 0,1 25,1 25,2 229,9 
1960 53,3 116,0 20,0 0,2 28,l 28,3 217,6 
1961 53,l 116,0 72,5 2,8 31,2 34,0 275,6 
1962 45,3 116,0 88,6 2,1 90,2 92,3 342,2 
1963 47,1 106,4 6,7 77,4 84,l 237,5 
1964 61,3 124,4 2,9 90,1 93,1 278,7 
1965 66,1 98,8 3,5 197,6 201,l 366,0 
1966 71,2 116,5 3,9 398,3 402,2 590,0 
1967 40,3 40,0 158,5 4,2 670,9 675,1 913,9 
1968 85.4 90,0 82,0 2 408,6 2 666,0 
1969 106,8 110.0 62,7 78,6 3 972,6 4 051,2 4 330,7 
1970 100,0 130,0 67,7 121,1 5 327,3 5 448,4 5 746,l 
1971 57,9 170,0 69,5 713,8 582,2 923,8 2 289,3 2 517,2 
1972 61,1 170,0 80,9 799,6 957,4 1 236,6 3 074,5 3 305,6 
1973 120,3 150,0 511,0 478,0 I 564,7 2 087,3 4 641,0 4 911,3 
1974 124,6 150,0 65,3 323,6 2 684,4 1 964,8 5 038,2 5 312,8 
1975 189,5 220,0 320,5 590,0 3 151,0 2 152,0 6 213,6 6 623,l 
1976 (d) 129,6 311,0 282,8 I 163,7 4 064,6 2 482,l 7 993,1 8 433,7 
1977 123,0 410,0 283,0 1 778,5 3 927,2 2 494,5 8 483,2 9 016,2 
1978 164,9 147,5 217,2 2 283,3 4 407,9 4 975,8 11 884,2 12 196,6 
1979 168,4 480,0 230,3 2 143,4 5 189,1 7 039,8 14 602,5 15 251,0 
1980 226,2 555,0 1 055,9(e) 2 002,3 5 905,8 7 093,5 16 057,5(1) 16 838,7 
1981 264,0 658,0 1 219,0 1 747,0 6 392,0 9 188,0 18 546,0(g) 19 468,0 
1982 243,0 750,0 187,0 2 228,0 6 815,0 12 197,0 21 427,0 22 420,0 
1983 300,0 700,0 1 565,0 2 295,0 6 988,7 13 916,8 24 765,5(h) 25 765,5 
1984 408,0 810,0 I 060,7(i) 2 436,3 7 960,3 14 594,6 26 052,4(j) 
1985 453,0 710,0 2 491,0(k) 2 179,0 8 310,0 15 218,0 28 198,0 29 361,0 
1986 439,0 800,0 96,0 2 699,0 9 700,0 22 679,0 35 174,0(1) 36 413,0 
1987 276,0 3 297,0 9 762,0 23 342,0 36 677,0(m) 
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Table 50 Table 51 
Borrowing operations of the European Communities and Net outstanding borrowing of the European 
of the European Investment Bank Communities and of the European Investment Bank 
( Million u.a./EUA/ECU) ( Mil/ionu.a. EUA /ECU J(a) 
ECSC EIB Euratom EEC(b) EEC- Total ECSC EIB Euratom EEC(b) EEC- Total NCl(c) NCl(c) 
1958 50 50 1958 212 212 1959 1959 209 209 1960 35 35 1960 236 236 1961 23 21 44 1961 248 21 269 1962 70 32 102 1962 304 54 358 1963 33 35 5(d) 73 1963 322 88 410 1964 128 67 8(d) 203 1964 436 154 590 1965 54 65 l l(d) 130 1965 475 217 692 1966 103 139 14(d) 256 1966 560 355 915 1967 58 195 3(d) 256 1967 601 548 I 149 1968 108 213 321 1968 686 737 I 423 1969 52 146 198 1969 719 883 I 602 1970 60 169 229 1970 741 1 020 I 761 1971 102 413 l(d) 516 1971 802 I 423 2 225 1972 230 462 692 1972 963 1 784 2 747 1973 263 608 871 1973 1 157 2 287 3 444 1974 528 826 I 354 1974 1 615 3 124 4 739 1975 731 814 1 545 1975 2 391 3 926 6 317 1976 956 732 1 249 2 937 1976 3 478 4 732 1 161 9 371 1977 729 1 030 99 571 2 429 1977 3 955 5 421 99 I 500 10 975 1978 981 1 863 72 2 916 1978 4 416 6 715 172 1 361 12 664 1979 837 2 437 153 178 3 605 1979 4 675 8 541 323 965 178 14 682 1980 1 004 2 384 181 305 3 874 1980 5 406 10 604 502 I 016 402 18 019 1981 325 2 243 373 339 3 280 1981 5 884 13 482 902 I 062 894 22 224 1982 712 3 146 363 773 4 994 1982 6 178 16 570 I 272 591 I 747 26 358 1983 750 3 508 369 1 617 6 244 1983 6 539 20 749 1 680 4 610 3 269 36 847 1984 822 4 339(e) 214 967 6 342 1984 7 119 25 007 1 892 4 932 4 432 43 382 1985 1 265 5 699(0 344 860 8 168 1985 7 034 26 736 2 013 3 236 4 960 43 979 
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Notes on the tables 
Table 1 
Source : EC: Eurostat, Cronos data bank, USA : Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, series p-25; Japan: OECD, 
National accounts, Volume I. 
Table 2 
Defmition: NL: full-time equivalent; USA : persons engaged. 
Source: EC: as Table I; USA: by Department of Commerce, 
Survey of Current Business; Japan : national publications. 
Table 3 
Definition: EC: SOEC; USA, Japan: OECD. 
Source : Eurostat, Cronos data bank. 
Belgium : For certain categories of unemployed the obligation 
to register was ended with effect from I April 1985. 
Greece : Estimates of Commission services based on national 
surveys. 
The Netherlands: For those unemployed aged 57 1/2 years or 
over, the obligation to register was ended with effect from I 
January 1984. 
Tables 4 to 8, 10 to 22, 26 and 27, 30 and 31 
Source : EC: Eurostat, Cronos data bank; USA, Japan : OECD, 
National accounts, Volume I. 
Table 9 
Coverage : Construction excluded. 
Source: Eurostat, Cronos data bank. 
Table 23 
Definition : Compensation per employee deflated by the price 
index of private consumption. 
Table 24 
Definition : Compensation of employees adjusted for the share 
of self-employed in total employment as per cent of GDP at 
current factor cost. 
Tables 25 and 44 
For a detailed commentary on the method used see European 
Economy No 8, March 1981. 
EUR I O: against 11 non-member countries (Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, USA). 
Tables 28 and 29; 32 and 33; 35 and 36 
Source : Eurostat, Cronos data bank. 
Table 34 
Definition: Net lending or borrowing of the nation minus net 
capital transfers to the rest of the world. 
Source : Eurostat, Cronos data bank. 
Table 37 
Definition : B up to 1969, monetary claims on the main monetary 
institutions; from 1969, M2. DK : M2; new definitions from 
1975. D : M3. GR: M3. E: M3. F : up to 1978, total M2; from 
1978 residents M2. IRL: M3; breaks in series 1971 and 1983. I : 
up to 1975 and from 1982 M2; otherwise M3. NL : M2; breaks 
in series 1976, 1977 and 1978. P : M2. UK : sterling M3. EC : 
rate of growth of the harmonic mean, weighted by GDP at 
current prices and purchasing power parities of the money stock 
indices of the countries (1975 = 100). The weight of Luxembourg 
has been added to that of Belgium. 
Table 38 
Definition : DK : Discount rate until 1976, day-to-day rate since 
1977. D : 3-month inter-bank rate. GR : interest rates on credit 
for working capital to industry until 1980; from 1981 , rate on 
large time deposits. E: 3-month inter-bank rate. F : Day-to-day 
rate until 1968, I-month commercial paper rate since 1969. IRL : 
up to 1970: 3-month inter-bank loans in London; from 1971 : 
3-month inter-bank loans in Dublin. I : 12-month Treasury bill 
rate until 1970, inter-bank call money rate since 1971. NL: 
Treasury bill 3-months up to 1972; inter-bank loans 3-months 
from 1973. B : rate 4-month certificates of Fonds des Rentes. P : 
6-month deposit rate. UK : 3-month Treasury bill rate until 
September 1964, 3-month inter-bank rate since October 1964. 
EC : geometrically weighted average with weights based on 1975 
GDP at 1975 prices and purchasing power parities. The weight 
of Luxembourg has been added to that of Belgium. 
Table 39 
Definition : DK: yield on first-class mortgage loans. D : average 
yield on all public sector bonds. GR : weighted average yield of 
government bonds. E : public sector bond yield (more than 2 
years). F : yield on public sector bonds. IRL : up to 1970 : yield 
on government securities with maturity 20 years in London; 
from 1971 : yield on government securities with maturity 15 
years in Dublin. I : yield on Credi op public bonds. NL : yield of 
3,25% government bonds up to 1973. Private loan to public 
utilities from 1974. B : yield on 5-year government bonds. P : 
yield on long-term bonds (over 5 years). UK : yield on 20-year 
government securities. EC : as for Table 38. 
Table 40 
Source : IMF. International Financial Statistics and Commission 
departments. Gold is valued at market-related prices. 
Table 41 
Source : Eurostat and Commission departments. 
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Tables 42 to 44 
Source : Commission departments. 
Tables 45 to 47 
Source : EC : 1960-70 OECD, 1970-85 member countries na-
tional accounts and Commission departments; USA, Japan : 
OECD. 
EUR 8: Community excluding Greece and Ireland. 
Table 48 
Source : 1958-85 Management accounts. 
(a) u.a. until 1977, EUA/ECU 1978 onwards. (b) Incorporated 
in the EC budget from 1971. (c) This column includes, for the 
years to 1970, substantial amounts carried forward to following 
years. (d) Including the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the administrative 
part of the ECSC budget. (e) In 1977 appropriations for the 
Social Fund carried forward from 1976 and subsequently can-
celled amounted to 227 716 611 u.a., while total expenditure for 
1977 amounted to only 172 439 999 u.a. giving the net figure 
shown here. (f) Including surplus of 82,4 million ECU carried 
forward to 1981. (g) Including I 173 million ECU carried for-
ward to 1982. (h) Including I 819 million ECU UK special 
measures. (i) Including 2 211 million ECU carried forward to 
1983. G) Including I 707 million ECU carried forward to 1984. 
(k) There was a small deficit in 1984 in respect of EC budget 
due largely to late payment of advances by some Member States. 
(I) There was a cash deficit in 1985 of 25 million ECU due to 
late payment of advances by some Member States. (m) Budget 
adopted on 10 July 1986 - includes cost of refund of 2 685 
million ECU to UK. (n) Preliminary draft budget 1987 -
includes cost of refund of 2 366 million ECU to UK. 
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Table49 
Source: 1958-85 Management accounts. 
(a) u.a. until 1977, EUA/ECU 1978 onwards. (b) GNP until 
1978, VAT from 1979 onward. (c) This column includes for the 
years to 1970 surplus revenue from previous years carried for-
ward to following years. (d) As a result of the calculations to 
establish the relative shares of the Member States in the 1976 
budget, an excess of revenue over expenditure occurred amount-
ing to 40 543 573 u.a. This was carried forward to 1977. (e) 
Including surplus brought forward from 1979 and balance of 
1979 VAT and financial contributions. (f) Including surplus of 
82,4 million ECU carried forward to 1981. (g) Including surplus 
of 661 million ECU. (h) Includes surplus of 307 million ECU. 
(i) Includes 593 million ECU of repayable advances by Member 
States. G) See note (k) to Table 48. (k) Includes non-repayable 
advances by Member States of 1981 , 6 million ECU. (I) Budget 
adopted on 10 July 1986. (m) Preliminary draft budget 1987. 
Tables 50 and 51 
Source : European Economy No 6, 'Borrowing and lending in-
struments looked at in the context of the Community's financial 
instruments', No 8, 'The Community's borrowing and lending 
operations : recent developments affecting certain instruments', 
and No 13, September 1982, 'The borrowing and lending activi-
ties of the Community'. 
(a) ECSC : 1958-74, u.a.; 1975-82, EUA/ECU. EIB : 196Vi3, 
u.a.; 1974-82, EUA/ECU. Euratom : 1963-71 u.a.; 1977-84, 
EUA/ECU. (b) EEC balance of payments financing. (c) EEC 
New Community Instrument (for investment). (d) Drawings 
under credit lines opened with Eximbank (USA). (e) Including 
289 million ECU of short-term borrowing. (f) Including 374 
million ECU of short-term borrowing. 
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